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INTRODUCTION
The lack of legitimate populace-government relations in a state has
become an imperative concern and a circumstance that can make the
reasons for a war or intervention more compelling under international
law and politics. 1 Foreign military support was provided to insurgents
t M.A. Political Science (Michigan), M.A. Applied Economics (Michigan), LL.M.
International Law (Georgetown). The author has taught international law courses for
Cooley Law School and the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan,
American Government and Constitutional Law courses for Alma College, and business law
courses at Central Michigan University and the University of Miami.
1. Jeff McMahan, The Morality of Military Occupation, 31 LOY. L.A. lNT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 7, 7 (2009) (noting that while there are a bountiful number of books written on just
war, there are fewer works written on occupation even though the latter is a critical and
related topic).
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to foster violent uprisings in Libya and the U.S. military executed
bombing operations that facilitated the overthrow of the 42-year dictator
Muammar al-Gaddafi in 2011. 2 The uprising in Syria against President
Bashar al-Assad, whose family has controlled the country since 1970, 3
continued for over two years and killed 160,000 through May 2014, 4 but
there was no overt foreign intervention. Populist division remains in
Ukraine among those who prefer closer relations with Western Europe
and those who desire tighter relations with Russia, with foreign powers
selecting sides to support their respective political alliance but without
external powers officially announcing an intention to militarily
intervene. 5 Overt occupation is found in the case of Israel occupying
Palestinian territories, with relations periodically erupting into armed
conflict. 6 U.S. troops exited Iraq in December 2011 after an eight-year
occupation and after the Bush White House's Coalition Provisional
Authority ("CPA") dictated legal reforms and new institutions of
government, 7 ostensibly postulating that the institutions would furnish
the infrastructure for peaceful relations, but instead Iraq is in danger of
splintering.
These cases illustrate that the international community can be
divided with varying levels of support for intervention on behalf of
either a regime or opposing non-government actors. The depth of
2. Joshua Norman, The World's Enduring Dictators: Muammar Qaddafi, Libya, CBS
NEWS (Aug. 21, 2011, 7:49 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-worldsenduring-dictators-muammar-qaddafi-libya/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
3. Profile: Syria's Ruling Baath Party, BBC (July 9, 2012, 10:30 AM), available at
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18582755 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
4. Faith Karimi & Salma Abdelaziz, Syria Civil War Death Top 160,000, Opposition
Group
Says,
CNN
(May
20,
2014,
6:19
AM),
available
at
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/19/world/meast/syria-civil-war/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
5. Landside Crimea Vote To Split From Ukraine, SKY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 9:11
AM), available at http://news.sky.com/story/1226921/landslide-crimea-vote-to-split-fromukraine (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (noting that Crimean people, who are 58% ethnic
Russian, voted 97% in favor of becoming part of Russia in a referendum vote because of
their displeasure with the government in Kiev).
When Russia began to increase
involvement in other parts of eastern Ukraine and supported Ukrainian rebels, the US voiced
more objections and placed a series of sanctions on Russia.
6. Ashley Fantz, Why are so Many Civilians Dying in Hamas-Israel War?, CNN (Aug.
4, 2014, 9:16 AM), available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/04/world/meast/gaza-israelwhy-civilian-deaths/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (reporting that the most recent fighting
began in July 2014 with the Israeli Defense force invading Gaza and that during the first
month of fighting, 1,800 Palestinian were killed (including 300 children) and 10,000
wounded and 64 Israeli soldiers and three Israeli civilians were killed).
7. Mark Landler, US. Troops to Leave Iraq by Year's End, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 21, 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/world/middleeast
/president-obama-announces-end-of-war-in-iraq.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
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international support may be amalgamated by factors such as the extent
that curbing human rights violations is needed, whether the interest in
humanitarian intervention sufficiently outweighs the cost of incursion
on sovereignty, whether foreign intervention can actually effectively
relieve the adverse conditions, and the stake in diplomatic relations with
the regime in question. The outcome of the case of Iraq, due to the
recent insurgency, updates the lessons for the manner in which an
occupier should be permitted to impose institutional and legal reforms
that endeavor to modify government-societal relations. The Bush White
House's CPA unilaterally imposed dictates that were heavily criticized
by Iraqis and the international community, 8 but fundamental to the lack
of long-term success is an imperative distinction between reforms that
were permissible and essential under occupation law and those
modifications that may have set a foundation for blowback and abetted
the recent crisis.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki was an Iraqi defector-exile
for 23 years prior to the 2003 invasion 9 and has been prime minister for
eight years which means that not long after he reentered Iraq, Maliki
became prime minister and has held that position ever since. Maliki
alienated Kurds and Sunnis, 10 was corrupt, deemed himself the
"preeminent military leader," suppressed peaceful protests with his
security services, called protesters terrorists, hired thugs to beat and kill
dissenters, and arrested and tortured thousands of objectors until
protests ended. 11 Remarking about Maliki' s special forces, Zaid Al Ali
8. See Robert Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin of the CPA: An Attribute of the Unitary
Executive, 51 WrLLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming Oct. 2015) (manuscript at 279-98)
[hereinafter Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin]; see also infra Part II (C)(i).
9. Jason Burke, Iraq : How Much is the Divisive Approach of Maliki Responsible for
the
Turmoil?,
GUARDIAN
(June
14,
2014,
1:30
AM),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/15/nouri-al-maliki-is-he-the-man-toblame-in-iraq (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
l 0. See Jay Solomon & Matt Bradley, Iraqi Parties Pressure Prime Minister Nouri alMaliki to Step Down, WALL ST. J. (June 23, 2014), available at
http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-s-kerry-arrives-in-baghdad-for-meeting-with-primeminister-maliki-1403508006 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
11. Zaid Al-Ali, How Maliki Ruined Iraq, FOREIGN PoL'Y (June 19, 2014), available at
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/19/how_maliki_ruined_iraq_armed_forces_i
sis (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Sandy Berger, US. Must Forge New Ties with Iraq to Tackle
ISIS Threat, TIME (Aug. 17, 2014), available at http://time.com/3130983/sandy-bergeriraq-isis-maliki/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (national security advisor during the Clinton
administration stating that "Maliki had governed in such an overtly anti-Sunni fashion that
the Sunni tribes in the north had come to hate him more than they feared ISIS."); Lord
POST
Maginnis, A Fictitious !SIL to Scare Us Away From the Truth in Iraq, Huffington
(Aug. 15, 2014), available at http: //www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/lord-maginnis/iraqisil_b_5494529.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (U.K. House of Lords member stating that
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writes: "Groups of young men were arrested in waves, often in the
middle of the night, and would be wisked to secret jails, often never to
be seen again." 12 A member of the U.K. House of Lords recently wrote
that "Maliki has created a Mafia-like network of criminals and assassins
to eliminate the voice of opposition at every level" and estimated that an
average of a thousand Iraqis have been killed every month over the past
decade by these assassins. 13 Political leaders called for the formation of
a new and inclusive Iraqi govemment. 14
Maliki reluctantly resigned after two months of urging, 15 but
several days later was appointed to the position of vice president. 16
Meanwhile, the group that led the insurgency to end Maliki' s rule has
been labeled brutal zealots, 17 leaders of a larger movement of Sunni
"revolutionaries," 18 and a group that is seeking to regain oil production
facilities, many of which are now operated by foreign multinationals. 19
"Corruption in the [Iraqi] government and those affiliated to the government is almost
unimaginable with billions of dollar embezzled and laundered, thus crippling the country's
economy.").
12. Al-Ali, supra note 11.
13. Maginnis, supra note 11.
14. Jay Solomon & Carol E. Lee, US. Signals Iraq's Maliki Should Go, WALL ST. J.
(June 19, 2014), available at http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-signals-1403137521 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015) ("The Obama administration is signaling that it wants a new
government in Iraq without Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki"); Mark Tran, Iraqi Prime
Minister Reiects Pleas for Government of 'National Salvation', GUARDIAN (June 25, 2014),
avai /able at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/25/iraqi-prime-minister-rejectscalls-salvation-government (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (German Chancellor Angela Merkel
stating "We need a government in Iraq that embraces all parts of the population. For years
this has not happened and because of this the pressure needs to be raised.").
15. Iraq Crisis: Maliki Quits as PM to End Deadlock, BBC (Aug. 15, 2014), available
at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28798033 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
16. See What Do Iraqi Leaders Hope to Hear From Obama 's Strategy?, PBS
NEWSHOUR (Sept. 10, 2014), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/iraqi-leadershope-hear-obamas-strategy/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
17. Leon Watson, Jihadi Terror Group PLC: ISIS Zealots Log Assassination, Suicide
Missions and Bombings in Annual Report for Financial Backers, DAILY MAIL (June 17,
2014), available at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-266 l 007 /15-000-fighters-1000-assassinations-4-000-IEDs-How-Isis-publishes-annual-report-detailing-reign-terrorMiddle-East.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
18. Scott Peterson, Maliki or Isis? Neither Looks Good to Sunni Awakening Veterans,
CHRISTIAN
SCI.
MONITOR
(June
18,
2014),
available
at
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2014/0618/Maliki-or-ISIS-Neither-looksgood-to-Sunni-Awakening-veterans (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (reporting that "the stunning
ISIS advance is riding what some top Sunni politicians- echoed by local players like
Abu Omar- say is a much wider "revolution" against the unabashedly Shiite-first
policies of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.").
19. Iraq Crisis: Baghdad Requests US Air Strikes Against Sunni Militants- Live,
GUARDIAN (June 18, 2014), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-eastlive/2014/jun/ 18/iraq-crisis-maliki-sacks-officers-and-cal ls-for-national-unity-live-updates
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Consequently, the eruption of violence in Iraq, just two years after the
U.S. military departed, could also be perceived as an insurgency ignited
by the existence of institutions that the Bush administration imposed
and a continuation of rule under those institutions by an Iraqi exile who
has evoked vehement opposition and has confronted insurmountable
tribulation over his obligation to respect the human rights of citizens.
To assess the broad question of the balance between foreign
powers respecting sovereignty and choosing to pressure or direct
reforms on an occupied population, this article assesses how the Bush
White House's CPA ordered many legitimate reforms but so
expansively discerned its own authority that the recent backlash of
violence jeopardized the efficacy of the permissible reforms. Hence,
this recent precedent is evidence that an occupier should ensure that
anything other than sanctioned reforms should be a byproduct of the
sovereign choice of citizens in an occupied territory. Part II discusses
competing principles of occupation law along an historical spectrum
and rectifies how some departure in the strictness of occupation law is
justified by new international law principles. Part III addresses how the
Bush Administration's CPA presumed that dictated reforms were a
product of Iraqi democratic control, which is inaccurate and inconsistent
with the language of Security Council mandates. Part IV considers the
opposing interpretations of the current state of occupation law and
maintains that the precedent of Iraq affirms that the customary law of
occupation should reside precisely where the Hague and Geneva
Conventions placed it, except with the accommodation for
institutionalizing human rights norms and principles of representative
government.
Part V concludes by emphasizing that excessive
transgressions by a foreign power that deeply and callously transplant
foreign institutions during an occupation can violate rules of occupation
law, undermine the universal humanitarian interest at stake with a
foreign intervention, and beget a backlash that nullifies the entire reason
for the intervention.

(last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Nafeez Ahmed, Iraq Blowback: Isis Rise Manufactured by
Insatiable
Oil
Addition,
GUARDIAN
(June
16,
2014),
available
at
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/earth-insight/2014/jun/ 16/blowback-isis-iraqmanufactured-oil-addiction (last visited Apr. I , 2015) ("The meteoric rise of Isis is a
predictable consequence of a longstanding US-led geostrategy in the Middle East that has
seen tyrants and terrorists as tools to expedite access to regional oil and gas resources").
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COMPETING PRINCIPLES OF OCCUPATION

There are two polar conceptions of a belligerent military
occupation authority-one that is archaic and another that is
contemporary treaty law-and an apparent gray area that many
commentators have contended exists following the occupation of Iraq. 20
This Part addresses distinctions between the extremes and punctuates
that the obscure zone can be partially elucidated by recognizing the
applicability of universal human rights standards and the preference for
ensuring that there is a virtuous nexus between the governor and the
governed.
The first conception is historical conquest, which presumed that
military occupation imparted an authority to govern 21 and to impose
rules on foreign lands, even if those institutions would be anathema to
the local population. 22 Alexander the Great panegyrized the principle
that conquerors dictated law on the defeated and assumed that
subjugated people were mandated to obediently adhere to occupier
imposed laws. 23 The British, French, Spanish, Portuguese, and other
colonial powers, all imposed rules in foreign lands, including with the
objective of retaining control over territorial possessions. 24 The
international law norm that permitted the colonial power to subjugate
and attain title to territory by conquest was the practice of rule by the
mighty. 25
The U.S. Supreme Court also generally followed this precedent in
the case of the South's attempted succession during the Civil War, but
the distinction was that a foreign sovereign was not imposing rule, but
instead the national government was wielding sovereignty over a
territory that was already locally prescribed. The Union's temporary
subjugation sought to terminate rivalries and feuding with the mission

20. See infra Part III.
21. Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 517 ( 1878).
22. JANE STROM SETH, DA YID WIPPMAN & ROSA BROOKS, CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS?
BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY INTERVENTIONS 195 (2006).
23. James Thuo Gathii, Commerce, Conquest, and Wartime Confiscation, 31 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 709, 730 (2006) (noting that the Roman Empire expanded pursuant to the
principle that it was an "indubitable right of war, for the conqueror to impose whatever
terms he pleased upon the conquered.").
24. See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Failed States, or the State as Failure?, 72 U. CHI. L.
Rev. 1159, 1171-72 (2005) (stating that European powers "established nominally
independent puppet-states" and used straight-forward colonial regimes in Africa, Asia, and
South Asia).
25. Robert Bejesky, Currency Cooperation and Sovereign Financial Obligations, 24
FLA. J. lNT'L L. 91, 143-44 (2012).
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of preserving unification of the United States. 26 The Supreme Court
held that Americans on opposing sides temporarily became enemies to
each other 27 until relations could be permanently changed by
government reform. 28
While reforms were being imposed, the
occupying military possessed immunity from local civil and criminal
laws, 29 which is similar to the terms of some contemporary Status of
Force Agreements that allow one state's military to operate within
another sovereign territory. The Supreme Court followed the thendominant precedent under international law, which was that the military
occupier bore the right to govern the occupied territory, enact laws, and
even ensure that the relationship between the occupied population and
the unlawfully acting Confederate government would be severed. 30
Over the past century, international law has cashiered the historical
practice of consecrating rule by the mighty belligerent and has rebuked
the right of an occupier to impose institutional reform on a subjugated
population. The universally accepted right of self-determination under
international law31 is the guiding norm that foremost undergirds the law
of occupation.32 Detailed rules of occupation law are found in the
Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Convention of 1949, and
customary international law, 33 and the rules automatically apply as soon
as territory is placed under the authority of an invading hostile

26. Dow v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 158, 165 (1879) (explaining that the immunity for the
occupier is due to the need to uphold the "efficacy of the army as a hostile force.").
27. Id. at 164 ("The people of the loyal States on the one hand, and the people of the
Confederate States on the other, thus became enemies to each other . . .. ").
28. Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 69 U.S. 404, 406 (1864) ("[A]ll the people of each State
or district in insurrection against the United States, must be regarded as enemies, until by
the action of the legislature and the executive, or otherwise, that relation is thoroughly and
permanently changed.").
29. Coleman, 97 U.S. at 517 (noting that the residents of the occupied territory were
subject to local laws); Dow, 100 U.S. at 165-66, 170 (immunity applied to the laws of an
officially occupied country as they would to civil laws of any other country).
30. Coleman, 97 U.S. at 517-18; Ford v. Surget, 97 U.S. 594, 604-05 (1878) (noting
that the Confederate government's actions were considered void and "simply the military
representative of the insurrection against the authority of the United States").
31. Rep. of the Int'l L. Comm'n, 53rd Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001,
U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 207-08 (2001); G.A. Res. 1514
(XV), U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684, at 66 (1961); G.A. Res.
2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8082, at 121 (1970).
32. Grant T. Harris, The Era of Multilateral Occupation, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 1,
17-18 (2006).
33. See Melissa Patterson, Who 's Got the Title? Or, The Remnants of Debellatio in
Post-Invasion Iraq, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 467, 469 (2006); David Scheffer, Beyond
Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT' L L. 842, 843 (2003).
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military. 34 Rules for belligerent occupation preclude an occupier from
exerc1smg sovereignty over the territory, adopting expansive legal
change, abusing the population, 35 and contravening laws of occupation
and inflicting damage on local inhabitants without providing
recompense. 36
Article 43 of the Hague Regulations imposes a trusteeship on the
occupier 37 that requires "preserv[ing] the status quo" and forbids
transforming the occupied territory, 38 but does permit the occupier to
establish a "system of administration" to preserve the status quo 39 and to
protect the local population. 40 Article 43 states that once the occupying
34. Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land, art. 42 para. 1, Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 3306, 205 Consol. T.S. 277, 295 ("territory is considered occupied
when it is ... placed under the authority of the hostile army."); Macleod v. United States, 229
U.S. 416, 425 (1913) (stating that a military occupation occurs when there is an "invasion
plus possession of the enemy's country for the purpose of holding it temporarily at least.");
U.S. DEP'T ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE, para. 355 (July 18,
1956), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_ Law/pdf/law_ warfare-1956.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015) (defining an official occupation "as a result of which the invader has
rendered the invaded government incapable of publicly exercising its authority and ...
successfully substituted its own authority" over an area that it intends to hold).
35. Eric De Brabandere, The Responsibility for Post-Conflict Reforms: A Critical
Assessment ofJus Post Bellum as a Legal Concept, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 129-30
(2010).
36. Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex:
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 3, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 [hereinafter Hague Convention] (providing that an
occupying power that violates the Hague Regulations shall "be responsible for all acts
committed by persons forming part of its armed forces ."); see also Protocol Additional to
the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 91, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3
[hereinafter Geneva Protocol I]("A Party to the conflict which violates the provisions of the
Conventions or of this Protocol shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.").
37. Ralph Wilde, From Trusteeship to Self-Determination and Back Again: The Role
of the Hague Regulations in the Evolution of International Trusteeship, and the Framework
ofRightsandDutiesofOccupyingPowers, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L&COMP. L. REV. 85, 101-02
(2009) (expressing that the occupant administers a territory for the local people and in this
status is a trustee).
38. See generally Scheffer, supra note 33, at 851; Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the
Laws of Occupation in the Wake of Operation Iraqi "Freedom," 95 CALIF. L. REV. 2295,
2309-10 (2007); Bartram S. Brown, Intervention, Self-Determination, Democracy and the
Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 23, 27 (2004).
39. Breven C. Parsons, Moving the Law of Occupation into the Twenty-First Century,
57 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 9-10 (2009).
40. Nathaniel Berman, Privileging Combat? Contemporary Conflict and the Legal
Construction of War, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 24 (2004) (stating that pursuant to the
1907 Hague Regulations, the military is required to change from destroying as combatants
to preserving as the occupant). The Geneva Protocol I of 1977, which was ratified by over
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military obtains control and power over the territory, the occupier,
"shall take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely
prevented, the laws in force in the country" existing at the time of the
invasion. 41 The occupier's duties to preserve existing institutions and
protect the civilian population are instrumental to facilitating selfdetermination because these conditions permit local people to exercise
free choice. 42
Despite provisions of the 1907 Hague Regulations and subsequent
international law conventions, there has been some discrepant precedent
of occupiers imposing reform on an occupied population during this
century. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the U.S. military authority
to construct government institutions in Puerto Rico in 1909 after the
former government was displaced44 and in the Philippines in 1913. 45
Occupier dictates were typical under the World War I colonial-power

170 countries but not by the US or Iraq (until 20 l 0), sought to add greater protections to
civilians in occupied territories. See International Humanitarian Law
Treaties &
Documents, INT'L COMM. RED CROSS, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign
?ReadForm&id=4 70&ps=P (last visited Apr. I, 2015) (highlighting a full list of
signatories); Geneva Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 51 ("The civilian population and
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military
operations.").
41. Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 43 (emphasis added); WolffHeintschel von
Heinegg, The Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Factors in War to Peace
Transitions, 27 HARV. J.L. & Pub. PoL'Y 843, 862 (2004) ("[An occupier] is not entitled to
enact comprehensive changes to the political, legislative, administrative, and social
structures in the occupied territory.").
42. See generally EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 4-6
(2004) (noting that the Hague and Geneva Conventions restrict the occupying power and
therein grants rights to the occupied population).
43. See Minxin Pei & Sara Kasper, Lessons from the Past: The American Record on
Nation Building, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE PoL'Y BRIEF 2 (2003), available
at http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Policybriet24.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(considering sixteen cases of US military "nation-building" over the past one hundred years
and only two (Germany and Japan) were identified as clear successes); David Wippman,
Sharing Power in Iraq, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 29, 30 (2004).
44. Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265 (1909) ("By the ratifications of the treaty
of peace [of 1898 with Spain 1, Porto Rico fsicl ceased to be subject to fthat countryl and
became subject to the legislative power of Congress . . . . The authority to govern such
ceded territory is found in the laws applicable to conquest and cession .... [U]nder the
military control of the President as Commander in Chief.").
45. MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416, 425 (1913) ("The local government [of a
conquered countryl being destroyed, the conqueror may set up its own authority, and make
rules and regulations for the conduct of temporary government, and to that end may collect
taxes and duties to support the military authority and carry on operations incident to the
occupation.").
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controlled League of Nation mandates. 46 Likewise, following World
War II and from 1943 to 1945, the Allied powers unilaterally
established deep occupational control and introduced new government
institutions on Germany 47 and engaged in fairly transformative
occupations of Germany and Japan. 48
The historical right to subjugate a population (due to the ability to
subdue) following conquest is no longer valid and occupier dictates are
not sanctioned, but exceptional and distant cases can be distinguished
from institutional alterations implemented for the objective of
actualizing standards encountered in human rights agreements. 49 Even
if an occupier imposed reform in a contemporary occupation process
that could be procedurally akin to the historical practice of
unilateralism, the substantive result would presumably differ if the goal
is to alter abusive institutions and legal structures and to preserve a
civilized status quo. The target state is not entitled to retain oppressive
institutions pursuant to universal human rights standards. However, in
most cases, the substance of legal institutions may not be faulty, but
instead structures are abusive on application for lack of government
adherence or enforcement, which had been the case for eight years with

46. Brian Deiwert, A New Trusteeship for World Peace and Security: Can an Old
League of Nations Idea Be Applied to a Twenty-First Century Iraq?, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 771, 777-79, 782-84 (2004).
47. Dostal v. Haig, 652 F.2d 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (discussing that the U.S.
military possessed "supreme authority," controlled "local government institutions and
courts," and holding that "(t]he U.S. military, entering Berlin as conquerors, were immune
from jurisdiction of the courts of the conquered country, or would have been if any such
courts had remained"); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 361-62 (1952) (noting that the US
did apply certain aspects of the German Criminal Code to non-Germans in the occupied
territory).
48. JAMES GALLEN, Jus Post Bellum: An Interpretive Framework, in Jus POST
BELLUM: MAPPING THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS 58, 62 (Carsten Stahn, Jennifer S.
Easterday & Jens Iverson eds., 2014); see generally RAY A. MOORE & DONALD L.
ROBrNSON, PARTNERS FOR DEMOCRACY: CRAFTING THE NEW JAPANESE STATE UNDER
MACARTHUR (2002); CHARLES HARRIS, ALLIED MILITARY ADMINISTRATION OF ITALY, 19431945 (1957); WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE ALLIED GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY (1947).
49. RICHARD N. HAASS, INTERVENTION: THE USE OF AMERICAN MILITARY FORCE IN THE
POST-COLD WAR WORLD 13 (rev'd ed. 1999) ("when states violate minimum standards by
committing, permitting, or threatening intolerable acts against their own people or other
nations, then some of the privileges of sovereignty are forfeited."); Robert Bejesky, Pruning
Non-Derogative Human Rights Violations into an Ephemeral Shame Sanction, 58 LOY. L.
REV. 821, 829-31 (2012) (discussing that mandatory human rights standards are provided in
a number of human rights agreements); Mark W. Janis, Human Rights and Imposed
Constitutions, 37 CONN. L. Rev. 955, 957 (2005) (stating that there was even a form of
human rights transplant constitutionalism that was "prodded on" Eastern Europe after the
demise of the Soviet Union).
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Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki. 50
In addition to ensuring that institutions meet global human rights
standards so that self-determination can be soundly exercised by a free
people, 51 self-determination can also be reasonably interpreted to
require a political system that permits citizens to democratically choose
their govemment52 or at least to ensure that there is a widely-shared and
legitimate connection between the populace and government. 53

50. Michael M. Farhang, Reconstructing Justice: The Coalition Provisional Authority
Took Giant Steps to Guarantee Iraq a Functioning Criminal Justice System, 27 L.A. LAW.
44, 46 (2004) (noting that previous Iraqi criminal law institutions had flaws that should be
supplemented). For example, pre-invasion Iraqi law prohibited torture and coercive
confessions, but the former regime often ignored provisions. Law on Criminal Proceedings
with Amendments, No. 23 of 1971, Decree No. 230, at para. 27 (Iraq), available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20061208171014/http://www.law.case.edu/ saddamtrial/docume
nts/Iraqi_Criminal_procedure_Code.pdf (last visited Apr. I, 2015); see supra Introduction
(noting Maliki's rule).
51. Failure to maintain human rights may undermine the states right to selfdetermination because of the adverse relation between the populace and government, while
sustaining human rights can promote the theory of state sovereignty derived from a free
people. See e.g. STEPHEN KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 4 (1999)
( emphasizing that principles of sovereignty should not only include the traditional definition
of Westphalian sovereignty with respect to foreign relations, but must also include
"domestic sovereignty," which requires the government to also rule in the interests of the
people); GEORGE P . FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS
58 (1993) ("In a world of dual and conflicting loyalties, the state's demand for exclusive
loyalty is rapidly losing its grip."); Nehal Bhuta, New Modes and Orders: The Difficulties of
a Jus Post Bel/um of Constitutional Transformation, 60 U. TORONTO L.J. 799, 807 (2010)
(noting the theory of emphasizing the sovereignty in the people, which was inherent in the
popular sovereign struggles between the Crown and Parliament in England during the
seventeenth century and during the French Revolution of 1789).
52. Self-determination and sovereignty can be interpreted in different ways. Bhuta,
supra note 51, at 810-11 (stating that the United Nations was formed not on representative
governments within states, but on self-determination, rejection of foreign rule and
domination, non-intervention, equality of states, and political legitimation).
Selfdetermination permits a people with a common connection to a given territory to have the
right to govern their own affairs, which was a critical principle during the era of
decolonization. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 31, para. 2. Self-determination
could support a sub-national secession, based on popular will, if there is a licit justification.
See In re Secession of Quebec, [ 1998] 2 S.C. R. 217, para. 134 (Can.) (holding that there is a
right to secede when the people are disrespected or deprived of rights of the larger state);
Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Judicial Underpinnings, 31 DENY. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 373, 379 (2003); JEFFREY L. DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN,
INTERNATIONAL LAW : NORMS, ACTORS, PROCESS 134 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing Quebec's
49% vote to secede from Canada in 1995).
53. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (Ill), U .N. Doc A/810 at
21 (1948) ("The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government."); see
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 25, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U .N .T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (stating that all citizens have the right to participate in
public affairs, to be elected, to choose representatives, and to vote). Harvard Political
Science Professor Arthur Isak Applbaum remarks of a generally agreed-upon definition of
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Whether voting and democratic institutions are mandated to sanction the
public choice accord between the government and populace have been
controversial and may not be required by customary international law. 54
After all, the principle of sovereign rights grounds the U .N. system and
affirms that "[ e ]ach state has the right to freely choose and develop its
political, social, economic and cultural systems. " 55 On the other hand,
since the end of the Cold War, there has been a progressing acceptance
of the assumption that a democratic government is more palatable than
an undemocratic govemment56 and this preference is accordant with the
theoretical view of international law that presumes sovereignty resides
with the people and not the government. 57 Moreover, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), which entered into
political legitimacy: "[T]he test of legitimate government is two-pronged. There needs to be
an adequate connection between the governors and the governed, and there needs to be
adequate protection of at least basic human rights." Arthur Isak Applbaum, Forcing a
People to be Free, 35 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 359, 288 (Fall 2007). Experts also maintain that
legal institutions must be a representation of "widely shared societal commitment" and
public will. See Daniel Bodansky, Establishing the Rule of Law, 33 GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
119, 131 (2004); Kristen Boon, Legislative Reform in Post-conflict Zones: Jus Post Bel/um
and the Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers, 50 McGILL L.J. 285, 323 (2005).
54. See Niels Petersen, The Principle of Democratic Teleology in International Law,
34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 33, 56-59, 81 (2008) (stating that it does not appear that there is a
customary international law right to democratic governance); Joseph S. Nye, Public
Diplomacy and Soft Power, 616 ANNALS 94, 98 (2008) (noting that fewer than half of the
countries in the world are democracies).
55. GA Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 31.
56. See World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna Declaration
and Programme of Action, para. 5, U.N. Doc. NCONF.157/23 (July 12,
l 993)("Democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms
are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Democracy is based on the freely expressed
will of the people to determine their own political, economic, social and cultural systems
and their full participation in all aspects of their lives"); U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda
for Peace, Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping, para. 82, U.N. Doc.
A/47
7/277 (June 17, 1992) ("Democracy at all levels is essential to attain peace for a new era
of prosperity and justice."); Harold Hongju Koh, Preserving American Values: The
Challenge at Home and Abroad, in THE AGE OF TERROR: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER
SEPTEMBER 11, at 143, 143-47 (Strobe Talbott & Nayan Chanda eds., 2001); Petersen, supra
note 54, at 57 n.132 (since 1988, the UN General Assembly has issued over a dozen
resolutions on "Enhancing the Effectiveness" of elections without explicitly affirming a
"right to democratic elections"); Ronald Rich, Bringing Democracy into International Law,
12 J. DEMOCRACY 20, 25 (2001); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in
International Law, 17 YALE J. INT' L L. 539 (1992); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right
to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
57. See c. MICHAEL BARRY, THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: THE FOURTH FORM OF
GOVERNMENT 35 (2011) (noting that the U.S. Constitution's Framers viewed that "People
are Sovereign," meaning that sovereignty resided in the people); BENVENISTI, supra note 42,
at 94-96; W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 243 (Gregory
H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
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force in 1976 and has been ratified by more than 160 countries, states in
Article 1 that "[ a]11 peoples have the right of self-determination," the
right to "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development." 58 Article 25 of the ICCPR
explicitly endows a right to electorally select a government. 59
Beyond reaching human rights standards, one can contest whether
given occupier-fiduciary reforms are valid as necessary to properly
administrate and preserve the status quo of a citizenry's way of life 60 or
whether newly imposed, modern legal norms should depose antiquated
rules inconsistent with standards of civil society.61 A convincing retort
to a reformist position espousing a carte blanche is that there are no
antiquated rules, other than those that fail to meet human rights
standards or minister criterion of representative government, and an
intervener that unilaterally issues fiats for reform is administrating
immorally, improperly, and possibly illegally because every society has
the self-determined prerogative to elect its own culturally-distinct
institutions. 62
A United Nations authorization could also constitute an institution
to execute an occupier role or might leverage the actual or perceived

58. ICCPR, supra note 53, art. 1.
59. Id. art. 25.
60. Patterson, supra note 33, at 473.
61. Michael J. Frank, Trying Times: The Prosecution of Terrorists in the Central
Criminal Court of Iraq, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2006) (Army JAG prosecutor expressing
that "American advisors had to accomplish these and other tasks without offending the pride
of the Iraqi lawyers and judges and without insulting their legal traditions, despite the fact
that some of these traditions were barbaric and far outside the norm of modem
jurisprudence."); Mirko Bagaric & John R. Morss, Transforming Humanitarian Intervention
from an Expedient Accident to a Categorical Imperative, 30 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 421, 439-40
(2005) (stating that "whether other nations should forcibly defend only the basic right to
life, or whether they should also be concerned with lesser rights, such as the right to own
property" and other liberties are matters that should be contemplated).
62. STROM SETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 22, at 310 ( emphasizing that simply
imposing new legal rules without a focus on matching culture of the ordinary people is not
likely to produce lasting reform); SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, AMERICAN POLITICS: THE PROMISE
OF DISHARMONY 243 (1981) (noting that a foremost reason to oppose interventionism is that
"it is morally wrong for the United States to attempt to shape the institutions of other
societies. Those institutions should reflect the values and behavior of the people in those
societies. To intrude from outside is imperialism or colonialism, which also violates
American values."); Madeleine K. Albright, Speech: Remarks Based on New Book Memo to
the President Elect: How We Can Restore America's Reputation and Leadership, 20 FLA. J.
INT' L L. 1, 4 (2008) ("You cannot impose democracy. Imposing democracy is an
oxymoron."); Francis Fukuyama, Nation-Building 101, ATLANTIC (Jan. 1, 2004, 12:00 PM),
available
at
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/0 l /nation-building10 I /302862/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (maintaining that "outsiders can never build
nations.").
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authority of the state-military occupier.
The U.N. can exercise
significant governance authority over a territory under U.N. Charter
Article 81, 63 particularly to the extent that the governance would foster
other core U.N. objectives, such as to facilitate self-rule and terminate
colonialism. 64 In 1949, the U.N. General Assembly appointed a U.N.
Commissioner for Libya, a former Italian colony; 65 a Trusteeship
Council over Palestine; 66 and authorized Australia, New Zealand, and
the U.K. to exercise full legislative, administrative and jurisdictional
powers over the territory of Nauru 67 and required the occupation to
compensate for occupier-associated wrongs. 68
If a U.N. body does not administrate, one concern over the United
Nations validation is whether the state-occupier's domain derives from
the Security Council or the General Assembly. The Security Council
should remain within its primary prerogative of addressing threats to
international peace and security, 69 whereas the General Assembly has
universal membership and possesses broader missions, 70 which not only
imparts heightened accreditation with broad-based approval from across
the world but also is more appropriate for authorizing civilian and
inclusive government objectives during an occupation.
Perhaps
observing this logic of selecting the most appropriate UN institution, no
Security Council resolutions or international agreements have ever
sanctioned expansive occupations, which includes the operations that

63. U.N. Charter art. 81 (recognizing that the UN can be a potential Administering
Authority over territories); see generally Ralph Wilde, From Danzig to East Timar: The
Role of International Territorial Administration, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 583 (2001).
64. U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 73, 76 para. l(b); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 22 (2d ed. 2010) (stating that paramount UN goals included ending
non-self-governing rule and assisting territories achieve self-government).
65. G.A. Res. 289 (IV)A, U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., U.N. Doc. N1089, at 10 (1949).
66. G.A. Res. 181(11), U.N. GAOR, 2nd Sess., U.N. Doc. N516, at 132 (1947).
67. Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Austl.), Preliminary Objections, 1992
I.CJ. 240, 240-70 (June 26).
68. Id. at 240; see Deiwert, supra note 46, at 795 (stating that Nauruans were entitled
to AUS $107 million in compensation because Australia mined out one-third of the island
while under Australian administration).
69. U.N. Charter art. 24(1). On the dangers of broadly-construed Security Council
missions, see Susan Lamb, Legal Limits to United Nations Security Council Powers, in THE
REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 361, 388 (Guy S.
Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999) (emphasizing that the Security Council's
"open-textured and discretionary powers could be inherently subject to abuse, with profound
consequences for the fundamental rights of States and individuals bearing the brunt of such
measures").
70. U.N. Charter arts. 9-10 (noting universal membership and that the General
Assembly can "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter
or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter").
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were authorized for Afghanistan, Bosnia, East Timor, Haiti,
Herzegovina, and Kosovo; all of which only permitted temporary and
specific military and civilian administration tasks. 71
To summarize the trajectory of change, the following chart
contextualizes these forms of occupation and includes their underlying
justifications:
Full
Prerogative

Very Limited
Prerogative

Historical
notions of
colonialism

Post-World
War II
occupation

Temporary
occupation
with dictates
following the
US Civil War

United Nations
authorizations
and actions to
uphold human
rights

Hague and
Geneva
Conventions:
No alteration
under
occupation
except to
preserve and
protect

Justification:
Rule of the
mighty

Justification:
Ending
belligerency
and quelling
anger when
cities and
infrastructure
were
destroyed

Justification:
Maintain
peace inside
an existing
sovereign
state

Justification:
The UN
possesses a
peace and
security
mission and
endeavors to
uphold
paramount
principles of
selfdetermination
and human
rights

Justification:
Uphold selfdetermination
and terminate
remnants of
colonialism

71. Scheffer, supra note 33, at 852-53; STROMSETH, W!PPMAN & BROOKS, supra note
22, at 6 (referencing similarities of post-conflict involvement in Kosovo, East Timor,
Afghanistan, and Iraq); see e.g. S.C. Res. 1244, para. 10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1244 (June 10,
1999) (stating the international civil presence in Kosovo is designed to "provide an interim
administration for Kosovo under which the people can enjoy substantial autonomy within
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration
while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions."); S.C. Res. 1244, Annex 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (approving
the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in conflict-ridden Kosovo in June 1999);
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/ 1272 (Oct. 25, 1999) (creating the United Nations
Transitional Authority in non-self-governing East Timor in October 1999).
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To briefly prelude the next Part's discussion of the Bush White
House's Coalition Provisional Authority by contextualizing this chart
and its justifications, the occupier's colonial-like dictates have been
universally rejected for most of the twentieth century and the
justification for imposing reforms following World War II were
conducted to address peace and security considerations of aggressors
and the societal crisis of the Axis powers after defeat. Both Germany
and Japan have been subjected to a seventy-plus year, and counting,
occupation. By contrast, the Bush administration committed the
aggression on Iraq without the assent of the Security Council 72 and the
allegations of security threats from Iraq were patently false, 73 making
similar justifications for the compelled reform encountered in the postWorld War II cases inappropriate. Moreover, none of these reasons for
war had anything to do with overthrowing a government and remaining
in a near-nine year occupation, 74 but the decisive post-invasion
development was that the Security Council adopted Resolution 1483
and specified terms for the occupation. The following part discusses the
Bush Administration's pre-resolution rhetoric, the terms of Resolution
1483 's sanction, and the fact that the CPA effectively ignored
occupation law and liberally interpreted the terms of Resolution 1483 to

72. See generally Robert Bejesky, Weapon Inspections Lessons Learned: Evidentiary
Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 295 (2011)
[hereinafter Bejesky, Weapon Inspections]; Bodanky, supra note 53, at 132 (stating that a
significant percentage of the global populace and Iraqis viewed the military invasion as
illegitimate, making byproducts of that invasion potentially coercive).
73. Robert Bejesky, Intelligence Information and Judicial Evidentiary Standards, 44
CREIGHTON L. REV. 811, 875-82 (2011) [hereinafter "Bejesky, Intelligence Information"]
(stating that intelligence assessments were specious and that the Bush administration pushed
the allegations without reservation); see Charles Lewis & Mark Reading-Smith, False
Pretenses,
CTR.
FOR
PUB.
INTEGRITY
(Jan.
23,
2008),
available
at
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2008/01/23/5641/false-pretenses (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(aggregating a summary of 935 false statements).
74. Bruce Ackerman & Oona Hathaway, Limited War and the Constitution: Iraq and
the Crisis of Presidential Legality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 447, 464 (2011) (emphasizing that
Congress provided the Executive with a limited authorization to use force, conditioned on
the existence of an actual imminent threat, which means that when the White House began
offering additional rationalizations after the war, particularly of humanitarian intervention,
"such talk was blatantly inconsistent with the plain language of the 2002 resolution.");
Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72, at 350-69. While overthrowing a government
is not a direct legal justification for intervening, arguments have been made to support a
connection between democracy (which might be the result of replacing an authoritarian
regime) and peace with other states. See U.N. Doc. S/2001 /1154 (Dec. 5, 2001) (former
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali stating that "democratic institutions and processes ...
minimize the risk that differences or disputes will erupt into armed conflict ... In this way,
a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace.").
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do whatever it pleased.

II.

IRAQI DEMOCRATIC CONTROL

A. Bush Administration Rhetoric
The Bush and Blair administrations often refrained from referring
to the presence of the American and British militaries in Iraq as an
"occupation,"75 but frequently preferred to use the phrase "liberation"
and assured that Iraqi citizens would quickly control their own
government. 76 The importance of conveying a general message of
liberation to the Iraqi people was deliberated three months prior to the
invasion in a Pentagon operation called "Rapid Reaction Media Team,"
which arranged for disassembling the current Iraqi media network and

75. BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at ix.
76. President Rallies Troops at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, WHITE HOUSE
(Mar.
26,
2003),
available
at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2003/03/20030326-4.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) ("We will help the Iraqi
people to find the benefits and assume the duties of self-government. The form of those
institutions will arise from Iraq's own culture and its own choices."); Interview on
Doordarshan Television of India, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Mar. 26, 2003), available at http:l/20012009 .state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19075 .htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(noting the aspiration of "put[ting] in place a new government that will reflect the will of all
of the people"); Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with 60 Minutes II, U.S. DEP'T DEF.
(Apr.
1,
2003),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.
aspx?transcriptid=2239 (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (agreeing that it is critical to have "free
institutions" that are a product of the culture and local people, stating that "we're going to
try to be working with the Iraqis to help them build free institutions, and these are people
who understand free institutions and, under Iraq, in a way that nobody who's not an Iraqi
will ever understand," and noting that this free and functioning government will be
developed "as rapidly as possible"); Joint Conference with Serbian Prime Minister
Zivkovic,
U.S.
DEP'T
ST.
(Apr.
2,
2003),
available
at
http:l/20012009 .state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/19296.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(Powell stating: "I can assure you that we all want to end this as soon as possible so we can
go on with the task of allowing the Iraqi people to form a new government- a government
that is democratic, a government that will represent all the people of Iraq, a government that
will cause Iraq to live in peace with its neighbors"); Deputy Defense Wolfowitz, General
Pace on NBC's Meet the Press, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Apr. 6, 2003), available at
http ://i ipdigital. usembassy. gov/st/ english/texttrans/2003/04/20030406 l 92943attocnich0. 18 9
7852.html#axzz3C03RtEwz (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (Wolfowitz stating: "The goal is ...
to move as rapidly as possible after the regime is gone to a government that genuinely
represents the Iraqi people"); Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee:
The Future of NATO and Iraq by Paul Wolfowitz, U.S. DEP'T DEF (Apr. 10, 2003), available
at http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=365 (last visited Apr. 1,
2015) (Wolfowitz stating: "One of the greatest responsibilities of the coalition will be to
help Iraqis create a new government, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, of the Iraqi people, by
the Iraqi people and for the Iraqi people").
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Top Bush
implanting the occupier's message for society. 77
Administration officials also punctuated an unequivocal theme that
promised the foreign military presence in Iraq would rapidly ordain
self-government and ensure that Iraqi choices would design political
institutions.
For example, on March 26, 2003, one week after the war began,
President Bush affirmed: "We will help the Iraqi people to find the
benefits and assume the duties of self-government. The form of those
institutions will arise from Iraq's own culture and its own choices." 78
On April 2, Secretary of State Powell promised: "I can assure you that
we all want to end this as soon as possible so we can go on with the task
of allowing the Iraqi people to form a new government-a government
that is democratic, a government that will represent all the people of
lraq." 79 On April 4, National Security Advisor Rice remarked: "We
will leave Iraq completely in the hands of Iraqis as quickly as possible.
As the President has said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as
long as needed, but not one day longer." 80 On April 6, Undersecretary
of Defense W olfowitz stated: "We come as an army of liberation, and
we want to see the Iraqis running their own affairs as soon as they
can." 81 On April 13, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld emphasized: "And

77. White Paper: "Rapid Reaction Media Team" Concept, U.S. DEP'T DEF. (Jan.
available
at
http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB219/
2003),
iraq_media_Ol.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (referencing that the plan called for
implementing an Iraqi "Free Media" network by "informing the Iraqi public about
USG/coalition intent and operation, to stabilize Iraq, ... and to provide Iraqis hope for their
future" and deploying "hand-picked" media experts from the US and UK to control the Iraqi
media outlets). The program would control the media with messages of De-Bathification,
war crimes of Saddam's regime, US-sponsored versions of "history telling," justice and the
rule of law, and themes of Western entertainment (e.g. Hollywood and sports). Id. The
latter element follows the approach used by the British and US media nearly a century ago,
which employed distractions to create a compliant population. GARTH S. JOWETT &
VICTORIA O'DONNELL, PROPAGANDA AND PERSUASION 100, 103, 162 (2006).
78. In the President's Words: The Rights and Aspirations of the Iraqi People, WHITE
HOUSE (July 8, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
infocus/iraq/rightsandasp.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (citing President Bush's Remarks
to Troops Macdi/1 Air Force Base, Tampa, Florida, Mar. 26, 2003); see id. (providing fifty
statements from assorted speeches and contending that the Bush administration endeavored
to provide liberty, freedom, and swift self-government to the Iraqi people).
79. Joint Press Conference with Colin Powell, Zoran Zivkovic, U.S. DEP'T ST. (Apr. 2,
available
at
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2003/04
2003),
/20030402205204rennetl0. l 897852.html#axzz3C 1W8b 1Rz (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
80. Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice, WHITE HOUSE
(Apr. 4, 2003), available at http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/
2003/04/20030404184631 ennoccmk0.1897852.html#axzz3C 1W8b 1Rz (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
81. Deputy Defense Wolfowitz, General Pace on NBC's Meet the Press, supra note 76;
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the overall [governance] authority at the present time obviously is
General Franks. And the task is to create an environment that is
sufficiently permissive, that the Iraqi people can fashion a new
govemment." 82 On April 24, General Jay Gamer, the former director of
the Pentagon's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
(forerunner to the CPA), 83 stated: "And nobody is going to run those
ministries other than the Iraqis themselves. I think we need to be
absolutely clear about that .... The new ruler of Iraq is going to be an
Iraqi . . . I don't rule anything." 84 On April 28, Bush stated: "As
freedom takes hold in Iraq, the Iraqi people will choose their own
leaders and their own government. America has no intention of
imposing our form of government or our culture. Yet, we will ensure
that all Iraqis have a voice in the new govemment." 85
The message relayed by the Bush Administration was one of
liberation, expeditious self-government, and the conservation of Iraqi
choices in constituting institutions and culture, which were themes of
intention that would presumably be quite palatable to the international
community. The Bush Administration also did not discuss unilaterally
1mposmg legal reform (as distinguished from institutions of

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Interview with 60 Minutes II, supra note 76 (Wolfowitz
remarking that one of the most important goals was "an Iraq that stands on its own feet that
governs itself in freedom ... We'd like to get to that goal as quickly as possible."); Prepared
Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee: The Future of NATO and Iraq by Paul
Wolfowitz, supra note 76 (providing the "goal to leave Iraq in the hands [of the Iraqi people]
as soon as possible").
82. Secretary Rumsfeld Interview with NBC Meet the Press, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF. (Apr.
13,
2003),
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?
transcriptid=2383 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015 (also noting that "over some period of months
the Iraqis will have their government selected by Iraqi people."); Transcript: Gen. Tommy
Franks on Fox News Sunday, Fox NEWS (Apr. 13, 2003), available at
http://www.foxnews.com/ story/2003/04/ 13/transcript-gen-tommy-franks-on-fox-newssunday/ (last visited Apr. l, 2015) (Franks remarking that Iraq would have a government
that will provide the people with "freedom" and "liberty" and noting that "I think what we
will see in the month and years ahead in Iraq will provide a bit of a model for how that can
be done").
83. Gamer and the ORHA were replaced by Paul Bremer and the CPA in mid-May
2003. While the reason for this replacement is not clear, perhaps the outcome supplanted
the perception of a strictly US-creation that the Pentagon controlled- the ORHA- and an
unavailing occupation, with a new entity that had an international label and appeared to be
governed by civilians (rather than the military).
84. Kathleen T. Rhem, Iraqis Need Work, Paychecks, U.S. Administrator Says, AM.
FORCES
PRESS
SERVICE
(Apr.
24,
2003),
available
at
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29065 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
85. President Discusses the Future of Iraq, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030428-3.html (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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government) on the country. The correlative exigencies at the time
these pledges were declared were that the former regime was displaced,
infrastructure was destroyed by Pentagon bombing, societal affairs were
halted, and humanitarian suffering was widespread, and the onset of
these post-invasion reverberations led the U.N. Security Council to
adopt Resolution 1472, one week after the invasion, to summon the
international community to assist in resolving the humanitarian crisis. 86
In fact, President Bush anticipated that such adverse conditions would
befall because he adopted National Security Presidential Directive 24
two months before the invasion in order to constitute an administrative
unit called the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
("ORHA") 87 in order to execute administrative obligations of an
occupation, control funding for humanitarian operations and
reconstruction, and collaborate with the U.S. Agency for International
Development ("USAID") to implement the operations. 88 Despite the
dearth of foreign support for the invasion and the fact that ORHA was
86. S.C. Res. 1472, Mar. 28, 2003, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (2003); S.C. RES. 1483,
para. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Problems perdured. S.C. RES. 1511, para.
8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003); (stating that additional humanitarian relief,
economic reconstruction, conditions for sustainable development, and restoration of
government institutions were necessary). Al Jazeera and a dozen other channels "provided
straight news that in many ways gave their viewers a more rounded picture- from the
inside- than the Anglo-American networks did. While the Anglo-American networks
tended to show Allied medics treating injured Iraqi civilians tenderly while their armed
colleagues handed out drinking-water cans to thirsty Iraqi POWs, the Arab media, while
airing the briefings and sound bites coming from London, Washington, and Doha ... also
showed the ... charred Iraqi bodies, [corpses, blood-soaked pavements, blown-out brains,
screaming infants and wailing women] ... grievously wounded civilians, ... [children
wounded by US cluster bombs,] dead Allied troops and injured Iraqi soldiers, hospitals
choked with wounded and burnt Iraqis. Away from the battle zone, the Arab networks
showed Iraqi suffering, humiliation, and panic - distraught families held up at AngloAmerican military checkpoints, hooded Iraqi POWs, thousands of fleeing the capital, and
civilians, deprived of food and water, driven to begging or looting." DILIP HIRO, SECRETS
AND LIES: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND AFTER 192-94 (2004).
87. Judith Miller, White House Assembles Officials to Review Plan to Rebuild Iraq
After War, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23
/world/threats-responses-looking-ahead-white-house-assembles-officials-review-plan.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2015) (noting that Directive 24 was adopted on January 20, 2003).
88. L. Elaine Halchin, The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin,
Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 2 (June 6, 2005),
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl32370.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2015); see Karen DeYoung & Dan Morgan, US. Plan for Iraq 's Future is Challenged;
Pentagon Control, Secrecy Questioned, WASH. POST, Apr. 6, 2003, at A2 l (questioning the
secrecy of the ORHA mission and intentions). ORHA would direct the post-invasion
activities of "civilian aid, reconstruction, and civil administration or governance." Miller,
supra note 87 ("The Bush administration's new office of postwar planning held a secret
session this weekend to assess the government's plans for securing and rebuilding Iraq if
Saddam Hussein is overthrown, senior administration officials said today.").
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not internationally-authorized, 89 the Pentagon-run ORHA postulated
that non-Coalition countries should deploy soldiers to stabilize Iraq90
and that the U.N. should pay for the occupation. 91
Jay Garner, a retired general, was the appointed head of the
ORHA. 92 After irate Iraqis voiced widely-publicized complaints that
nothing was getting accomplished, services were not being provided,
and government officials had not been compensated for several weeks,
Garner remarked that "[a]s soon as (the Iraqis) can identify those people
to us, we'll start paying their salaries." 93 The problem is that no one
could identify salary recipients because the invasion overthrew the
previous government and eventually CPA Order Number 1, which was
adopted before the Security Council Resolution 1483 authorized an
occupation, legally stripped between fifteen and thirty thousand publicsector employees out of government due to association with the
previous regime. 94 Perhaps the sensibility of such a request was more
persuasive at the time because the international community was still
under the impression that, due to six months of false statement by the
Bush administration, it was necessary to search for the prohibited
weapons that Iraq supposedly possessed, but those weapons ultimately
did not exist. 95
89. The entity was created concomitant with UN inspections taking place, before Colin
Powell addressed the Security Council, and before the UN Security Council had even begun
the most intensive debates. Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72, at 335-52.
90. Michael R. Gordon, The Strategy to Secure Iraq Did Not Foresee a 2nd War, N.Y.
TIM ES (Oct. 19, 2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/19/intemational
/19war.html?pagewanted= l&_r=O (last visited Apr. I , 2015).
91. Simon Chesterman, Bush, the United Nations and Nation-Building, 46 SURVIVAL
101, 106 (2004).
92. Miller, supra note 87 (stating that the plan was announced nearly a month before
the invasion). After the American media had entirely accepted the justifications for the
invasion as proven for several months, it hosted former military commanders explaining
potential invasion plans. Ideas of an anticipated invasion were being planted at the same
time Bush administration officials explained that no such action was inevitable. Robert
Bejesky, Politico-International Law, 57 LOY. L. REV. 29, 83-84 (2011) [hereinafter Bejesky,
Politico] .
93. Rhem, supra note 84.
94. Purge of Saddam loyalists, BBC (May 16, 2003 , 11 :55 AM), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle east/3033919 .stm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Adam
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580, 614 (2006) (calling CPA Order No. 1 a much criticized
order).
95. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. , U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); see generally
Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72; Bejesky, Intelligence Information , supra note
73 , at 875-82; Lewis & Reading-Smith, supra note 73 (providing a chronological chart of
false statements and noting that "President George W. Bush and seven of his
administration's top officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security
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B. U.N. Authority for Occupation
In furtherance of Resolution 14 72 and to alleviate the continuing
humanitarian crisis, 96 the Security Council passed Resolution 1483,
which commissioned the occupying "Authority" to preserve public
order, deliver humanitarian aid, search for weapons of mass destruction
(the Bush administration's purported reason for invasion), administrate
government functions, and assist Iraqi citizens in forming new
institutions of government. 97 Other than searching for prohibited
weapons, which did not exist, 98 the Resolution was constituted entirely
to ameliorate injurious repercussions of an invasion and war that the
United Nations had not authorized. Moreover, the pre-war diplomacy
within the United Nations only involved questions of whether Iraq was
violating a ban on enumerated prohibited weapons, but given that there
were no proscribed weapons, even the underlying reason for invasion
for which the Bush Administration was so insistent on convincing the
Security Council and the international community--dire urgency from
dreadful security peril99-made the invasion unnecessary and premised
on "false pretences." 100 It also appears that the Bush and Blair

Adviser Condoleezza Rice, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, made at least 935 false
statements in the two years following September 11, 2001, about the national security threat
posed by Saddam Hussein's Iraq . . . . On at least 532 separate occasions (in speeches,
briefings, interviews, testimony, and the like), Bush and these three key officials, along
with Secretary of State Colin Powell, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, and White
House press secretaries Ari Fleischer and Scott McClellan, stated unequivocally that Iraq
had weapons of mass destruction (or was trying to produce or obtain them), links to Al
Qaeda, or both.").
96. S.C. Res. 1472, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1472 (Mar. 28, 2003).
97. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. paras. 1, 2, 4, 11, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003);
Permanents Reps. of the U.K. & U.S. to the U.N., Letter dated May 8, 2003 from the
Permanent Reps. of the United Kingdom and the United States to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003),
available
at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/0608
usukletter.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (recognizing that these itemizations were the
goals). One cited example of significant concern was that "[m]ember States shall take
appropriate steps to facilitate the safe return" of archeological items from the Iraq National
Museum but the resolution does to mention that the Hague Regulations of 1907 (Arts. 43
and 56) can require the US to pay for items destroyed or missing is there was a failure to
secure. S.C. Res. 1483, para. 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003); Hague Convention,
supra note 36, arts. 43, 55, 56.
98. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 73, at 875-82.
99. Bejesky, Weapon Inspections, supra note 72, at 369-75.
100. Press Release, Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence, Senate Intelligence
Committee Unveils Final Phase II Reports on Prewar Iraq Intelligence (June 5, 2008),
available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=298775 (last visited Apr. 1,
2015) (stating that the Bush Administration led the nation to war under "false pretenses");
see also Ackerman & Hathaway, supra note 74, at 464.
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administrations may have enthusiastically sponsored a Security Council
resolution for occupation to introduce a perception of the Security
Council implicitly authorizing the war post facto, 101 but this is not
particularly convincing.
Resolution 1483 specified the mission and conditions for
occupation, but it was the CPA's unsparingly-construed assumptions of
prerogative to unilaterally restructure government and, more
controversially, adopt new laws that remained in contention. Curiously,
in a later released memo, dated March 26, 2003, which was before
Resolution 1483 was adopted, British Attorney General Goldsmith
affirmed that "a further Security Council resolution is needed to
authorise imposing reform and restructuring of Iraq and its
Government" because without "a further resolution, the U.K. (and the
U.S.) would be bound by the provisions of international law governing
belligerent occupation, notably the Fourth Geneva Convention and the
1907 Hague Regulations." 102 Both the U.S. and U.K. acknowledged
that they were bound by the Geneva and Hague conventions when
Resolution 1483 was adopted 103 and delivered letters to the United
Nations that stated "[t]he States participating in the Coalition will
strictly abide by their obligations under international law," 104 and
Resolution 1483 stated nothing about granting the occupation a
prerogative to unilaterally impose reform. No unrestricted sanction was

101. See Achilles Skordas, Hegemonic Intervention as Legitimate Use of Force, 16
MrNN. J. INT'L L. 407, 439 (2007) (contending that Resolution 1483 reflected "the UN's
indirect, albeit unwilling, endorsement of the US intervention policies"); see contra Davis
Brown, Iraq and the 800-Pound Gorilla Revisited: Good and Bad Faith, and Humanitarian
Intervention, 28 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 22 (2004) ("Although the Security
Council did not authorize the invasion, and several of its members opposed to it, the Council
has nevertheless put its imprimatur of legitimacy on the presence of coalition forces in
Iraq.").
102. Roberts, supra note 94, at 609 (referencing that Goldsmith further added that the
"imposition of major structural economic reforms would not be authorized by international
law").
103. Stefan Talmon, A Plurality of Responsible Actors: International Responsibility
for Acts of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (Univ. of Oxford Faculty of Law
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 25/2007, 2007), available at
http://users.ox.ac.uk/-sann2029/SSRN-id 1018172%581 %5D.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(citing
405.
P ARL.
DEB.
H.C.
(6th
ser.)
(2003)
22
available
at
http://www. publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm200203/cmhansrd/vo0305 l 2/debtext/3051205 .htm#305 l 2-05 _ spmin 1) (British Foreign Secretary remarking to the House of Commons:
"The United Kingdom and the United States fully accept our responsibilities under the
fourth Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations.").
104. Letter dated May 8, 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and and the United States of America to the
President of the U.N. Security Council, S.C. Doc. S/2003/538 (May 8, 2003).
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endowed; Resolution 1483 expressly affirmed that the Geneva
Conventions and the Hague Regulations restrictions applied, which
limited the occupation, and merely rearticulated mandatory customary
international law norms 105 and overtly stated that Iraqis had the power
to select their own institutions. 106 The sequence of events with the
invasion and occupation is a prime example of being granted a U .N.
authority based on public promises about intentions, and being afforded
an inch by the terms of the sanction and then taking a mile.
Not only was the Security Council's institutional authority for this
unprecedented circumstance placed into question by some Council
members and the CPA' s exercise of authority inconsistent with the
authority that it was actually granted, 107 but several Council members
objected to Resolution 1483 because Britain and the US were unwilling
to expressly grant the U.N. a genuine role and because members were
concerned that Iraqis would be situated in a rather uncompromising and
105. See Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, ICRC available at
https://www.icrc.org/IHL#view:_idl :_id2:_id250:repeatl :5:labelAnchor (last visited Jan.
25, 2015) (listing over 190 country-signatories to the Geneva Conventions); FRANCOISE
BOUCHET-SAULNIER, THE PRACTICAL GUIDE TO HUMANITARIAN LAW 115 (Laura Brav &
Clementine Olivier eds., 2d ed. 2007) (noting the customary international law status); see
also PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
161-168 (7th ed. 1997); LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
33-36 (2d ed. 2000); S.C. Res. 1483, at pmble. para. 5, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,
2003) (citing the applicability of the Hague and Geneva Conventions); see generally Boon,
supra note 53, at 285 (noting that the United Nations promotes the obligation of occupiers to
adhere to the Hague rules of occupation).
106. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. paras. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c)(i), 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May
22, 2003) (Provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions affirm that foreign assistance
is permitted to the extent that the occupied population is allowed to choose its own
institutions and preserve its own culture and Resolution 1483 precisely affirmed this
structure.); see e.g. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. para. 4, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1483 (May 22, 2003)
(requiring the US and UK to "promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through effective
administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people
can freely determine their own political future").
107. U.N. Charter art. 2(1 )(7) (affirming the sovereign equality of members and states
and that the UN shall not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state"); S.C. Res. 1483, at preamble, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22,
2003) (affirming the "sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq"; Mahmoud Hmoud, The
Use of Force Against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council Resolution /483, 36 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 435, 438, 443, 445 (2004) (stating that "the legality of the Coalition's occupation
of Iraq was, at best, questionable ... [T]he occupation of Iraq was an illegal act that should
be recognized by the international community"); Felicity Barringer, U.N. Reaction to
Resolution Seems Positive but Reserved, N.Y. TIMES, (May 10, 2003), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/l 0/world/aftereffects-diplomacy-un-reaction-toresolution-seems-positive-but-reserved.html?pagewanted=print (last visited Apr. I, 2015)
(stating that the degree ofauthorization under 1483 was criticized by some Security Council
members as exceeding any authority that the Security Council can even grant).
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overly-dependent situation as oil revenues would be controlled and
distributed by the U.S. and Britain. 108 Given the humanitarian crisis,
dissenting Security Council members voiced that they had no other
viable option, but to approve Resolution 1483. 109 Despite objections
from Security Council members, Resolution 1483 was passed pursuant
to the assumption that the U.N. would provide a significant advisory
role and that political authority would be transferred to an Iraqi
government as quickly as possible, 110 but after the Resolution went into
effect, the Bush Administration ensured that the U.N. played almost no
role 111 and the CPA did whatever it desired while appointing loyalists to
the occupation, calling the assemblies of chosen individuals local
representative bodies, ignoring the terms of Resolution 1483, and
dictating new laws and reforms without regard to the Iraqi people.

C. CPA Dictates
i.

Balancing Prerogative and Restrictions

Even if an occupation is perceived as lawful, the self-determination
of the local population can be violated by the manner of occupation. 112
An occupying foreign military cannot alter the structure of government

108. Gary Younge & Ian Black, Blueprint Gives Coalition Control of Oil, GUARDIAN
(May 10, 2003), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/ 10/iraq.oil (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015); Hmoud, supra note 107, at 451 (reporting that several Security
Council members wanted the United Nations to administer the country); Scheffer, supra
note 33 , at 850 (stating that the White House rejected a significant UN role); Paul Blustein,

G- 7 Agrees that Iraq Needs Help with Debt; Important Roles seen for IMF, World Bank,
WASH. POST (Apr. 13, 2003) (stating that the Bush administration was "balking at mandates
that would give the United Nations as big a part in running postwar Iraq as many European
nations want").
109. U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 467lst mtg., at 11 , U.N. Doc. S/PV.4761 (May 21,
2003), available at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.4761 (last
visited Apr. 1, 2015) (referencing a statement made by the Pakistani representative to the
Security Council prior to the adoption of Resolution 1483 that captures the surrounding
circumstance: "Pakistan, like several other members of the Security Council, has agreed,
due to the exigencies of the circumstances, to the delegation of certain powers by the
Security Council to the occupying Powers, as represented by the Authority."). Out of
expediency and the dire humanitarian need, the Security Council should be perceived as a
credibility surrogate in this case.
110. See Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice,
97 AM. J. INT'L L. 823, 825 (2003).
111. See BOB WOODWARD, PLAN OF ATTACK 357-63 (2004); Nehal Bhuta, The
Antinomies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT' L. L. 721 , 736-3 7 (2005); Grant,
supra note 110, at 853.
112. Yael Rouen, Illegal Occupation and Its Consequences, 41 IsR. L. Rev. 201, 218
(2008).
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or institutions in the occupied country 113 and must ensure that the preoccupation law remains in force, 114 which means that dictated
frameworks, exceeding an occupier's authority, can be viewed as null
and void. 115 Instead of heeding the lawful parameters of occupation
Law, the CPA failed to conform to licit administrative responsibilities
as an "occupier," 116 freehandedly imposed controversial reforms from
its inception, 117 and adopted at least thirty new laws relating to the
economy over its fourteen month existence, 118 which were blatant
transgressions that tore society apart. 119 Immediately prior to its
disbandment, the CPA locked in the reforms for the future 120 under
Order 100 as Transitional Administrative Law, which could only be
modified with a supra-majority vote of a future legislature and with the
consent of the cabinet. 121 The CPA also replaced "the name of new
113. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
124 (2009); see also Christopher C. Joyner, "The Responsibility to Protect": Humanitarian
Concern and the Lawfulness of Armed Intervention, 47 VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 713-14 (2007)
(stating that in prosecuting a lawfully conceived humanitarian intervention, "the authority
structure of the offending state should not be overthrown, nor should the domestic political
process of that state be permanently altered."); Bhuta, supra note 51, at 824 (noting that an
occupier "cannot legislate to 'implement' the population's right to self-determination
through the creation of a new order.").
114. See Boon, supra note 53 , at 322 (further stating that the occupational authorities
freely accepted the conditions of the international law of occupation).
115. See Scheffer, supra note 33, at 842; see also Peter Galbraith, Iraq : The Bungled
Transition, 51 N.Y. Rev. BOOKS 70 (Sept. 23, 2004) (book review).
116. See Zahawi, supra note 38, at 2297; see also Roberts, supra note 94, at 614;
Boon, supra note 53, at 324-25.
117. See J. Stephen Shi, The Legal Status of Foreign Military and Civilian Personnel
Following the Transfer of Power to the Iraqi Interim Government, 33 GA. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 245, 246 (2004).
118. See Kristen E. Boon, "Open for Business": International Financial Institutions,
Post-Conflict Economic Reform, and the Rule of Law, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 513, 544
(2007).
119. See Zahawi, supra note 38, at 2301 (expressing that "blatant transgressions
outside the laws of occupation exacerbated the post-war tensions, jeopardizing the security,
economy, and administration of the state and safety of the people.").
120. Id. at 2332.
121. See Antonia Juhasz, Bush's Economic Invasion of Iraq, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2005), available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/14/opinion/oe-juhaszl4 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015) ("Laws governing banking, investment, patents, copyrights, business
ownership, taxes, the media and trade have all been changed according to U.S. goals, with
little real participation from the Iraqi people. (The TAL can be changed, but only with a
two-thirds majority vote in the National Assembly, and with the approval of the prime
minister, the president and both vice presidents.) The constitutional drafting committee has,
in tum, left each of these laws in place"). Yet, at the time that the TAL proposals were
launched, it was only intended to remain operative until nation-wide elections scheduled for
January 31, 2005. See also Law of Administration for the State oflraq for the Transitional
Period (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/govemment/TAL.html (last
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Iraqi institutions and officials for those of the CPA" in order to "protect
the [CPA] reforms into the future." 122
At the same time the CPA unilaterally dictated reforms and
operated above the law, 123 President Bush was publicly representing that
the institutional metamorphoses were a byproduct of Iraqi free will and
self-governance, which was the same theme that top Bush
Administration officials repeatedly represented as their intention for
occupation starting shortly after the invasion and prior to the adoption
of Resolution 1483. 124 The text of Resolution 1483 did bestow an
occupational authority, which was akin to the Bush Administration's
pre-Resolution 1483 public promises and to the restrictive approach to
occupation enumerated in the Hague and Geneva Conventions, 125 but
the occupation repeatedly contravened occupation law. 126 Moreover,
during the occupation, the Bush Administration relayed that there was
no substantial plan for post-war operations, 127 but one year after the
invasion, declassified documents divulged that the White House's

visited Apr. 1, 2015). Then, in the same law, it states that the laws would "remain in force
until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force oflaw." See id.
art. 26(C). Theories that have permitted overruling foreign occupation dictates in the past
have included asserting that the laws were not consistent with international law (i.e. the
doctrine of postliminy) or the occupier exceeded its authority.
See ERNEST H.
FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATIONS 145-50
( 1942); ROLAND ROBERTS FOULKE, 2 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 289-90 ( 1920).
122. Zahawi, supra note 38, at 2332.
123. See Ryan J. Liebl, Rule of Law in Postwar Iraq: From Saddam Hussein to the

American Soldiers Involved in the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, What Law Governs Whose
Actions?, 28 HAM LINE L. Rev. 91, 131 (2005) ("Under the legal system established by the
CPA in Iraq, the CPA was above the law").
124. President Bush Addresses the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2003)
(emphasizing that "[t]he primary goal of our coalition in Iraq is self-government for people
of Iraq, reached by orderly democratic process."); see supra Part II (A): Bush
Administration Rhetoric.
125. S.C. Res. 1483, at pmbl. paras. 1, 4, 5, 7, 8(c)(i), 9, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May
22, 2003).
126. Kristen E. Boon, Obligations of the New Occupier: The Contours of a Jus Post
Bel/um, 31 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. Rev. 57, 61 (2009) (noting that the core concept of
conservationism in protecting existing institutions during occupation was compromised);
Patterson, supra note 33, at 472 (emphasizing that inherent in the title "Operation Iraqi
Freedom" is the implicit assumption that the Bush administration was "not planning to
respect the laws of any regime that had ever existed in Iraq.").
127. THOMAS E. RICKS, FIASCO: THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ 109
(2006) (quoting Lieutenant General Joseph Kellogg, who was involved in the invasion
planning, stating that "[t]here was no real plan" for postwar operations); T. CHRISTIAN
MILLER, BLOOD MONEY: WASTED BILLIONS, LOST LIVES, AND CORPORATE GREED IN IRAQ
(2006) (noting that occupation planning was amiss); see also Monroe E. Price, Symposium:
Foreward: Iraq and the Making of State Media Policy, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 5, 8-9
(2007).
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Future of Iraq Project, constituted in early-2002 and over a year before
the invasion, selected White House, State Department, CIA, and
Pentagon employees, and two hundred Iraqi exiles, and adopted thirteen
volumes comprising 2,000 pages of plans for government restructuring
and economic reform. 128 Not only did the CPA ostensibly follow this
blueprint and appoint similarly-situated defectors who were involved in
the Future of Iraq Project, but the early and detailed planning suggests
that the Bush White House never had any intention of respecting
occupation law.
One of the most significant complications with the CPA' s
unilateralism is that hostilities across the population can be expected to
erupt if new institutions shift resources and alter political, social, and
economic power. 129 Reform, particularly capitalist and privatization
frameworks, can generate winners, but also antagonistic losers because
a democratically-elected government or even representative locals did
128. Farrah Hassan, New State Department Releases on the 'Future of Iraq ' Project,
NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE (Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Eric Schmitt & Joel Brinkley,
State Dept. Foresaw Trouble Now Plaguing Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/l 0/ 19/world/struggle-for-iraq-planning-state-dept-studyforesaw-trouble-now-plaguing-iraq.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (stating that the 13
volumes and over 2,000 pages of the Future of Iraq Project was not released until "several
House and Senate committees" had requested them); US DEP'T ST., THE FUTURE OF IRAQ
PROJECT: OIL AND ENERGY WORKfNG GROUP 2 (Apr. 30, 2003) (declassified in part on June
22, 2005), available at http://www2 .gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB 198/
FOI%200il.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (espousing "decentralization" which literally
means reducing central government control, but is apt to also result in privatization or at
least significant advocacy for private sector participation). This fetish for privatization is
particularly controversial when exploiting the natural resources of a territory is expressly
prohibited under occupation law. Patterson, supra note 33, at 478 ; Antonio Perez,
Symposium: Markets in Transitions: Reconstruction and Development: Part One Reconstruction: Prescriptions for Iraq, Predictions for Russia and Performance for China:
Legal Frameworks for Economic Transition in Iraq - Occupation Under the Law of War vs.
Global Governance Under the Law of Peace, 18 TRANSNAT'L L. 53, 55, 63 (2004).
129. See Judith Kullberg and William Zimmerman, Liberal Elites, Socialist Masses,
and Problems of Russian Democracy, 51 WORLD POL. 323, 324 (1999) (writing of polls
several years into the Russian reforms and noting that elites like the system because
"[s]upport for liberalism is causally related to the ability of individuals to participate in the
new economic order: those who are 'locked out' of the new economy and are constrained by
circumstances and context from improving their conditions will be more likely to express
antiliberal values and attitudes," but only a small segment of the Russian population
dramatically benefited with the fall of the socialist economy, but a majority of the Russian
population has been harmed); Duncan Kennedy, Shock and Awe Meets Market Shock,
BOSTON Rev. (Oct. 1, 2003), available at http://www.bostonreview.net/world/duncankennedy-shock-and-awe-meets-market-shock (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (listing the
capitalist reforms applied to Iraq and noting that "[ e]conomic development is a dynamic
process in which small initial disadvantages often translate into massive permanent
inequalities").
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not enact the laws. Reactions may arouse immediate violence or beget
delayed hostilities because of the belief that the occupation coerced
unfair conditions and subsequently enforced those ultimatums with a
police power. In fact, the existence of this police power to protect
economic reforms into the future is found in both the secret agreement
on the continuing occupation consummated by the Bush and Maliki
governments in 2007 and the withdrawal agreement adopted in 2008. 130
Having addressed how CPA dictates were inconsistent with
occupation law and the mandate contained in Resolution 1483, the CPA
was entirely reasonable to presume that it possessed significant latitude
to ensure that Iraqi law comported with customary international law or
jus cogen doctrines in the case of universal human rights standards,
such as principles contained in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 131 which
was an implication drawn in the typology depicted in Part II. Although,
it is difficult to reconcile the occupation's right to impose compliance
with human rights standards in the cases of the Pentagon's high-profile
mass incarcerations and interrogation abuses at Abu Ghraib prison 132
130. Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the
Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of Their Activities
during Their Temporary Presence in Iraq, art. 27, Nov. 17, 2008, available at
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ l 22074.pdf (last visited Apr. l, 2015) (stating
that the U.S. military would agree to protect Iraq's constitutional order in the future); White
House, Declaration of Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and
Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States of America, Nov. 26, 2007,
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007 I 11 /2007112611.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (stating that the U.S. would further support Iraq's
financial and economic system and "facilitate[] and encourage[] the flow of foreign
investments into Iraq").
131. Brett H. McGurk, Revisiting the Law of Nation-Building: Iraq in Transition , 45
VA. J. INT'L L. 451, 463 (2005-06). These alterations would include having an effective
judiciary, having institutions that would prohibit any future Iraqi government from having
the prerogative or means of perpetrating torture and discrimination, and promoting due
process standards in criminal law, which were actions that the CPA did take. Coalition
Provisional Authority, Order No. 7, Penal Code, §§ 3(2), 4, CPNORD/9 June 2003/07
available
at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
(June
9,
2003),
20030610_CPAORD_7_penal_Code.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (banning torture and
prohibiting law enforcement officers and legal system personnel from discriminating);
Coalition Provisional Authority, Order 13, The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, § 6,
CP NORDIX 2004/ 13 (July 11, 2003), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20040422 _ CP AORD_ 13 _Revised_ Amended.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015)
(establishing the court system and specifying that judges must be independent); Coalition
Provisional Authority, Order 15, Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee,
CPNORDI-- June 2003, June 23, 2003, available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/
regulations/20030623 _ CP AORD_ 15 _ Establishment_of_the_Judicial_Reveiw_ Committee.p
df (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
132. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
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and with the brutality and human rights abuses of Prime Minister
Maliki, 133 the long-term prime minister that the Bush administration
effectively installed.
The design of democratic institutions was also a legitimate CPA
reform that was very acceptable across Iraqi society 134 and engendered
widespread support from the international community, but the manner
in which reforms were executed and the institutional preferences that
were codified proved controversial. 135 There is complexity for any
transitional political system due to discord over what "democracy"
means because of the many different models across the world, 136 but

or Punishment art. 14(1), opened/or signature Dec. 10. 1984, 108 Stat. 382, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85 ("Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation including the
means for as full rehabilitation as possible."); Frank, supra note 61, at 3 n.5 (mentioning the
torture scandal and noting that it arose prior to the "liberation oflraq."). The abuses at Abu
Ghraib and the interrogations ordered by the Bush administration were not consistent with
norms of modem humanitarian jurisprudence. See generally Robert Bejesky, The Abu
Ghraib Convictions: A Miscarriage ofJustice, 32 BUFF. Pus. INT. L.J. 103 (2013).
133. See Dirk Adriaensens, Iraq: Unspoken Crimes Against Humanity Committed
Against the People of Iraq , CENTRE FOR RES. ON GLOBALIZATION (Jan. 28, 2012), available
at
http://www.globalresearch.ca/iraq-unspoken-crimes-against-humanity-committedagainst-the-people-of-iraq/29162 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (itemizing warnings about
Maliki's abuses); Letter to President Obama Regarding the Visit of Iraqi Prime Minister
Nuri
al-Maliki,
HUM .
RTS.
WATCH
(Oct.
13,
2013),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/ 10/29/letter-president-obama-regarding-visit-iraqi-primeminister-nuri-al-maliki (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (noting 5,740 deaths in areas such as
Basra, Thi Qar and Baghdad, and within Diyala and Ninewa and that perpetrators are not
being held accountable, and stating that this impunity has infuriated Sunnis who "see the
government' s failure to hold Shia-dominated security forces accountable as confirmation
that policies remain rooted in sectarianism"); Maginnis, supra note 11 (member of the UK
House of Lords writing that "Maliki has created a Mafia-like network of criminals and
assassins to eliminate the voice of opposition at every level" and estimated that a thousand
Sunnis have been killed every month for the past decade by these assassins); supra
Introduction.
134. Public International Law & Policy Group and the Century Foundation,

Establishing a Stable Democratic Constitutional Structure in Iraq: Some Basic
Considerations, 39 NEW ENG. L. Rev. 53, 56 (2004); Roberts, supra note 94, at 621 (stating
that "of all the parts of a transformative project, the ones likely to have the strongest appeal
include the introduction of an honest electoral system as part of a multiparty democracy .. .
reflecting as it does the sense that democracy and self-determination ... constitute not only
an important part of a human rights package, but also an acceptable means of hastening the
end of an occupation.").
135. Note, Democracy in Iraq: Representation Through Ratification, 199 HARV. L.
Rev. 1201, 1201 (2006) [hereinafter Note]; Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law
and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM . J. COMP. L. 97 (2002) (noting the
assumption that Iraq fell into the category of a country that suffered from a democratic
deficit).
136. G.A. Res. 55/96, U.N. Doc. NRES/55/96 (Dec. 4, 2000) (articulating the very
basic institutional structures that can be agreed upon); JAN TEORELL, DETERMINANTS OF
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perhaps the most precarious variable regarding democratization
protrudes from the fact that even the American public overwhelmingly
believes that American democracy has been subject to "corporate
capture" 137 and that the CPA was intent on subordinating public
functions as part of the democratic process, which may disempower
citizens.

ii.

Constitutional Reforms
An indication of the agitation over the broadness of reforms, how
occupational dictates can bind society without commensurate local
democratic will, and the dominance of U.S. influence on the Iraqi
political system, is encountered in the Iraqi constitutional ratification
process. In any country, a constitutional drafting process can be
essential for establishing robust and abiding societal norms because the
constitution endows and structures government powers, 138 imposes
constraints on government, 139 formulates enduring rules, and requires all
legislation and administrative regulations to comport with constitutional
principles. Countries, such as the U.S., have traversed prolonged
periods of "constitutional construction" in which constitutional
ratification is followed the interpretation of abstract principles, vague
clauses, and interacting precedent to set a trajectory of expectations

DEMOCRATIZATION: EXPLAINING REGIME CHANGE IN THE WORLD, 1972-2006, at 30 (2010)
(noting that beyond the "basic criteria" of having effective elections and political rights,
"there is profound disagreement over the meaning of democracy"); CHARLES TILLY,
DEMOCRACY 2-3 (2007) (listing a series of indicators for democracy, as derived from a
Freedom House checklist); Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Design: An Oxymoron?, in
DESIGNfNG DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 253, 253-54 (Ian Shapiro & Stephen Macedo eds.,
2000) ("there is no agreement on the political and constitutional arrangements most likely to
be conducive to peace and accommodation in a democratic context"); Nick Robinson,

Citizens Not Subjects: US. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentralization of Foreign
Policy, 40 AKRON L. REV. 647, 676-77 (2007) (stating that notions of suitability of
democracy have evolved since Plato and Aristotle theorized about democracy over two
thousand years ago and assumed that it was only suitable for city-states and an ideal
electorate size of 5,040).
137. Survey: January 18-27, 2008, WORLDPUBLICOPINION.ORG (Jan. 18-27, 2008),
available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/mar08/USGov_ Mar08 _quaire.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (finding that 94% of Americans believe that "leaders should pay
attention to the views of the people as they make decisions" and that 80% of Americans
believed that the US was "run by a few big interests" with only 19% believing that US
government is "run for the benefit of the people").
138. David Gray Adler, George Bush and the Abuse of History: The Constitution and
Presidential Power in Foreign Affairs, 12 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 75, 142 (2007).
139. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) ("The United States is entirely a creature
of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act in
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution").
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through rules and practices. 140 Whether there are stable and effective
societal norms depends on whether there is a commitment to and
acceptance of the values incorporated into constitutional provisions,
institutions, and codes. 141
In the case oflraq's constitutional drafting procedures, the process
was conducted rapidly, under the shadow of a gun, 142 in secrecy, with a
small committee of CPA and CPA-appointed Iraqi Governing Council
("IGC") members, 143 and without Iraqi citizens discerning the bearing
of provisions 144 or possessing an effective avenue for challenging the
drafting process or the IGC. 145 Feldman and Martinez opined that the
Iraqi public's rejection of the IGC and its lack of perceived democratic
qualities significantly delayed the constitutional drafting process. 146

140. Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers
and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. Rev. 1789, 1812 (2010).
141. STROMSETH, WIPPMAN & BROOKS, supra note 22, at 78 (stating that today's
globalized world "requires modem and effective legal institutions and codes, and it also
requires a widely shared cultural and political commitment to the values underlying these
institutions and codes").
142. Noah Feldman, Imposed Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. Rev. 857, 858 (2005)
(advisor to the CPA acknowledging about the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan that
"constitutions are being drafted and adopted in the shadow of the gun").
143. See Conference: From Autocracy to Democracy: The Effort to Establish Market
Democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan: Panel 2: Building the Institutions of the Nation, 33
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 171, 175 (2004) (describing general approach as "elite pactmaking"); Kristen A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal
System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695, 707-08 (2004); Randall T. Coyne, Reply to Noah

Feldman: Escaping Victor's Justice by the Use of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions,
58 OKLA. L. REV. 11, 11 (2005); Vicki C. Jackson, What's in a Name? Reflections on
Timing, Naming and Constitution-Making, 49 WM AND MARY L. Rev. 1249, 1272-74
(2008).
144. Ashley S. Deeks & Matthew D. Burton, Iraq's Constitution: A Drafting History,
40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (2007) (American legal advisers in Iraq remarking: "There has
been considerable speculation by the press, by non-governmental organizations, and by Iraqi
citizens themselves about why various provisions of the new Iraqi constitution look the way
they do and about what they mean."); Bodansky, supra note 53, at 132; Daniel H. Cole,
From Renaissance Poland to Poland's Renaissance, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2093 (1999)
(stating that many years are required for a constitutional drafting process).
145. Article 38, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of
Iraq] of 2005 (only permitting freedom of expression, peaceful demonstration, the press, and
association if they do not infringe "public order and morality"). Another restriction on the
right of free speech existed due to criminalizing criticisms to the new government. Paul von
Zielbauer, Iraqi Journalists Add Laws to List of Dangers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2006),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/09/29/world/middleeast/29media.html?
pagewanted=print&_r=O (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (This was ostensibly a draconian
restriction and the Executive reasonably enforced the terms perhaps was a rule that could
remove Iraq from the category of "democracy," unless a judiciary reasonably interpreted the
terms).
146. Noah Feldman & Roman Martinez, The International Migration of Constitutional
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Deeks and Burton, Legal Adviser and Deputy Legal Adviser at the US
Embassy in Baghdad during the Iraqi constitution drafting process,
detailed their advisory role during the drafting procedures, which
included US officials writing formulations of constitutional text,
submitting those drafts to CPA-appointed Iraqi leaders, and voicing
concerns on behalf of the "U.S. Government" over the substance of the
provisions. 147
Critiques of the constitutional drafting process should actually be
construed as a product of anteceding initiatives. Constitutionalism had
already effectively been imposed by the CPA' s adoption of TAL
provisions. 148 The process that traversed from the CPA's ultimatums to
the constitutional drafting procedures can be interpreted as a semblance
of "precommitment," which means "becoming committed, bound or
obligated to some course of action or inaction or to some constraint on
future action . . . to influence someone else's choices." 149
Precommitments open the prospect of path dependent behavior, which is a
term in political science employed to describe how planting precursors
to future action makes a desired outcome highly probable. 150 The CPA
enacted T AL, which defined "precommitments" for the draft
Constitution and the Constitution set a "precommitment" for future Iraqi
governments even before an elected government took office. Indeed,
the proposals for the Constitution were predominantly consistent with
the CPA' s TAL mandates. 151 Deeks and Burton emphasize that

Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An
Experiment in Islamic Democracy, 75 FORDHAM L. Rev. 883, 892-94 (2006); Stilt, supra
note 143, at 697.
147. Deeks & Burton, supra note 144, at 2, 8, 31; Feldman & Martinez, supra note
146, at 919 (stating that the US role was "facilitating, not imposing, constitutional
compromises"); Ashley S. Deeks, Iraq 's Constitution and the Rule of Law, 28 WHITTIER L.
REV. 837, 838 (2007).
148. Feldman & Martinez, supra note 146, at 895.
149. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS
(2006).
150. Path dependence and critical junctures refer to decisive choices and events that
prompt future trajectories, which are difficult to reverse because the progression of the
political or institutional consequence involves entrenched behavior, anteceding
determinations, and an elevated cost of altering course. RUTH BERINS COLLIER & DA vm
COLLIER, SHAPING THE POLITICAL ARENA: CRITICAL JUNCTURES, THE LABOR MOVEMENT,
AND REGIME DYNAMICS IN LATIN AMERICA 27-29 (2002); Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns,
Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. Rev. 251, 251-53 (2000).
151. Deeks & Burton, supra note 144, at 7 (frequently referencing back to the TAL
when describing the drafting and legislative history). A word search of the article retrieves
98 instances of "TAL" and 40 instances of "CPA," often relating to Orders and Regulations,
seemingly suggestive of the critical influence of the CPA on the constitutional drafting
process. Id. A word search of another document written by constitutional advisors retrieves
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constitutional language often "tracks precisely a phrase . . . of the
TAL." 152 In fact, the T AL had been regarded as the "supreme law of
Iraq" 153 and the interim constitution. 154
Consequently, constitutional drafting procedures consisted of Iraqi
factions principally lining up in opposition to or in support of the CPA' s
TAL provisions, but because T AL provisions were often the same as the
final constitutional text, compromises among Iraqi groups were
apparently not considered. 155 Even with the populace's ambiguous
understanding of the Constitution, 79% voted in support of the proposed
constitution in the October 2005 national referendum vote. 156 However,
the ratification vote may have been an expedient reception facilitated by
a desire to shed the occupation more precipitously than a testament to a
rational analysis of the content of the Constitution. 157
Iraq's
Constitution was not an autonomous product of the self-determination
of the Iraqi people, but instead was a foreign transplant framework that
remained alien to the society and befuddled Iraqis for years after the
ratification. 158
110 uses of"TAL." Feldman & Martinez, supra note 146, at 883.
152. Deeks & Burton, supra note 144, at 43, 54, 60-61, 75 (citing examples).
153. Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, International and Comparative Perspectives on
Defamation, Free Speech, and Privacy: Also Inside: Reviving Constitutionalism in Iraq:
Key Provisions of the Transitional Administrative Law, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 269, 274
(2005-06) (stating that "Article 3(C) makes the TAL the supreme law oflraq.").
154. Feisal Amin al-Istrabadi, Iraqi Ambassador to the UN, remarked before the
Constitution was adopted: "No Iraqi wanted the American Civil Administrator to sign a
document called an Iraqi constitution. Thus rather the [TAL] .. .in fact is Iraq's interim
constitution." al-Istrabadi, supra note 153, at 270; Jackson, supra note 143, at 1273.
155. Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making and Its Pathology in Iraq, 51
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 534, 546 (2006/07) ("the TAL, in spite ofrepeated violations, and in a
very crude way regulated the subsequent process of transitional government formation and
constitution-making").
156. Note, supra note 135, at 1205.
157. Arato, supra note 155, at 551; Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton,
Constitution Drafting in Post-Conflict States Symposium: Baghdad, Tokyo, Kabul ... :
Constitution Making in Occupied States, 49 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1139, 1139 (2008) ("new
constitutional structure has not been able to ameliorate, and may even have exacerbated, a
problem of instability and political disintegration."); Bejesky, Politico, supra note 92, at 105
(Iraqis favored a withdrawal of the occupation) (citing to a list of polls that affirmed that
approximately 80 percent oflraqis were opposed to the continuing occupation). Program on
Int'l Policy Attitudes, What the Iraqi Public Wants: A Worldopinion.org Poll, WORLD
PUBLIC
OPrNION
4
(Jan.
31,
2006),
available
at
http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/jan06/lraq_Jan06_rpt.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2015) (In January 2006, 87% of Iraqis wanted a timeline for withdrawal, with 64% of
Kurds, 90% Shia, and 94% Sunnis supporting withdrawal.. .Overall, 47% of Iraqis
supported attacks on U.S. troops, with 16% of Kurds, 41% of Shia, and 88% Sunnis
supporting attacks on U.S. troops).
158. lntisar A. Rabb, "We the Jurists": Islamic Constitutionalism in Iraq, 10 U. PA. J.
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Despite the pitfalls inherent in not ensuring that there was
widespread domestic sentiment of ownership over the process, many
constitutional provisions were soundly designed, such as those articles
that promoted pluralism, federalism, and equality. 159 Pluralism and
equality are consistent with democratization and institutions designed to
bolster human rights. Federalism can respect geographical distinctions
across a population that coincide with religious, linguistic, and ethnic
differences; accommodate local diversity in law and policy; check the
central level; and boost participation in democratic processes. 160
Adopting federal institutions is a prudent choice for a country with
sharp divisions across geographically concentrated population with
approximately 15-20% Sunnis, 15-20% Kurds, and 60-65% Shi'ites 161
and the CPA imposed a federal structure in Article 4 of the TAL twenty
months prior to constitutional reform. 162 However, trade-offs in
decentralizing Iraq into a duel-sovereignty system might have reduced
the prospect of more exceptional nationality unity 163 and protracted
discord on formidable choices, including on reconciling the sharing of
geographically concentrated oil reserves and on determinations over
CONST. L. 527, 528 (2008) ("More than two years after this ratification, there has been little
to no headway toward detailing the mechanisms to be employed for fleshing out Iraq's
constitutional skeleton."); Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Nation-Building:
An Introduction, 60 ME. L. REV. 281, 289 (2008) (stating that there can be disconcertment in
a population if nation-building constitutionalism is imposed and informal practice is
inconsistent with new institutions).
159. IRAQICONST.atpmbl.arts. l, 14.
160. Robinson, supra note 136, at 679 (noting that Federalism can check concentrated
government power.) Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("Just as the separation
and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent
the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between
the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front.").
161. Iraq Poll: Note on Methodology, ABC NEWS (Mar. 17, 2008), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/story?id=4443992 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); Joseph R.
Biden, Jr. & Leslie H. Gelb, Op-Ed., Federalism, Not Partition, WASH. POST (OCT. 3, 2007),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/02/
AR2007100201824.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (explaining that external advocates
favored a decentralized system of power sharing in Iraq that would elevate sub-national
power); Peter W. Gailbraith, Op-Ed, Make Walls, Not War, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2007),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007 /10/23/opinion/23galbraith.html (last visited Apr.
1, 2015) (favoring partition).
162. Law of Administration for the State oflraq for the Transitional Period, supra note
121,art.4.
163. See Feldman & Martinez, supra note 146, at 898, 914; Note, supra note 135, at
1203; Scott Malcomson & Michael Zumot, Iraq 's Kurds: Toward an Historic
Compromise?,
lNT'L
CRISIS
GROUP
(Apr.
8,
2004),
available
at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2004/mena/iraqs-kurdstoward-an-historic-compromise.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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whether oil production decisions should be governed at the federal or
local level. 164 With the insurgency led by ISIS, which reportedly has
claimed its own Caliphate where Sunnis reside in western Iraq, and
Kurdish demands for more regional autonomy in northern Iraq, there is
an intensified struggle for those who seek to keep Iraq unified. 165
III. INTERPRETATIONS TO RECONCILE OCCUPATION LAW
WITH CPA DIRECTIVES
A. Theoretical and Legal Interpretations

The restrictive view of occupation law, which is the nearuniversally-accepted treaty framework that has been applicable for most
of this century, does not accord an occupying military with a
prerogative to transmute law and state institutions, but instead requires
preserving existing institutions. 166 Moreover, the modem international
law on occupation, which includes the Hague and Geneva
Conventions, 167 does not depend upon whether there is a belligerent or
non-belligerent occupation or how the occupier classifies itself, 168 but

164. Vanessa J. Jimenez, Iraq's Constitutional Process: Challenges and the Road
Ahead, 13 HUM. RTS. BR. 21, 23 (2005) (noting that Federalism could lead to more
subnational control over property rights and natural resources, and that the success of
federal structure is particularly dependent on the resource allocations); Christopher Helman,
How Iraq's Kurds May be the Unlikely Losers in the !SIS Chaos, FORBES (June 12, 2014),
available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/2014/06/ 12/how-iraqs-kurdsmay-be-the-unlikely-losers-in-the-isis-chaos/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (reporting that even
Kurds have had lasting disputes over the central level's monopolization of the licensing
system).
165. Two Arab Countries Fall Apart, ECONOMIST (June 14, 2014), available at
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21604230-extreme-islamist-groupseeks-create-caliphate-and-spread-jihad-across (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) (noting that the
most contentious and extreme position of the occupation was partition into three separate
countries, which was proposed to quell violence); Andrew George, We Had to Destroy the
Country to Save It: On the Use of Partition To Restore Public Order During Occupation, 48
VA.J.INT'LL.187, 187(2007).
166. Scheffer, supra note 33, at 859 (stating that principles of self-determination and
autonomy were the "crucial parts of the very phenomenon of democratic constitutional ism
itself.").
167. Youngjin Jung, In Pursuit of Reconstructing Iraq: Does Se(f-Determination
Matter?, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & Pol'y 391, 394 (2005).
168. JEFFREY DUNOFF, INTERNATIONAL LAW 590 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that the
occupier may be reluctant to accept the restrictions and duties that occupation law imposes);
Gregory Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195, 231 (2005) (stating that
many occupying powers during the twentieth century refused to admit that they were
"occupiers" and instead stated that they lacked "requisite control over the occupied
territory.").
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instead the Conventions apply to any partial or full foreign military
occupation of another country, 169 which means that the restrictions on
the military occupation of Iraq governed as soon as the U.S. and U.K.
invaded Iraq and controlled territory. 170
The Security Council provided language in Resolution 1483 that
approximated a contextually-specific interpretation of the restrictive
view of occupation law, an explication of the "Authority's" obligation
to preserve and protect, 171 and affirmed that it was imperative to address
the humanitarian crisis, which unfolded due to the invasion itself.
Hence, with clear international law provisions governing occupation,
but with the CPA occupation disregarding rules of occupation law and
assuming excessive liberty with interpreting the language of Security
Council Resolution 1483, and without the Security Council or any other
actor preventing or halting the CPA's initiatives or imposing liability,
scholars offered many provocative explanations to reconcile how to
classify the CPA's precedent 172 and the possible impact on the
customary international law of occupation.
At one end of the spectrum, historical doctrines accentuate a
victorious military's unconditional prerogative during occupation. 173
The ancient doctrine of debellatio represents that a conqueror takes title
to the subjugated adversary's territory, 174 establishes "fundamental

169. Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 973 [hereinafter Convention (IV)]
("The present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the
state of war is not recognized by one of them. The Convention shall also apply to all cases
of partial or total occupation of a territory ... even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.").
170. Scheffer, supra note 33, at 842.
171. See infra Part III (B).
172. Naomi Burke, A Change in Perspective: Looking at Occupation Through the
Lens of the Law of Treaties, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 103, 114 (2008); Jean L. Cohen,

The Role of International Law in Post-Conflict Constitution-Making: Toward a Jus Post
Bel/um/or "Interim Occupations", 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rev. 496, 500 (2006-07).
173. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 59th Sess., May 7-June 5, July 9-Aug. 10 2007,
U.N. Doc. A/62/10 at para. 324(b)(ii) (discussing occupation following armed conflict);
PAUL K. MACDONALD, THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF PERIPHERAL CONQUEST IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 185-86 (2014) (discussing Iraq as a case of peripheral conquest,
but was not similar to Britain's quest to acquire a global empire).
174. Patterson, supra note 33, at 467; GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF
ENEMY TERRITORY 7 (1957)(discussing historical rule); Perez, supra note 128, at 60. The
historic claim to property with debellatio meant that there was full "extermination in war of
one belligerent by another through annexation of the former's territory after conquest, the
enemy forces having been annihilated." 2 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
DISPUTE§ 264, at 470-71 (Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed., 1963)(1905).
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institutional changes to the government of an enemy nation," takes
actions to alleviate the potential continuing threat posed by that country,
and provides for the population. 175 The CPA assuredly did not seize
title to conquered land, 176 which eliminates a key prerogative
characteristic of debellatio, but the incidence of other factors makes the
CPA' s unilateral dictates approximate circumstances surrounding the
period that immediately followed the downfall of colonial empires.
During the early-twentieth century and pursuant to the League of
Nation's territorial trusteeship system, 177 the military occupier
possessed a "sacred trust" justification for temporary governance over a
foreign population in order to assist the foreign population with selfgovernance. 178
The CPA's actions were comparable to the "territorial trusteeship"
system, but some distinctions are that the occupation of Iraq followed
after a one-sided war and not colonial rule, there has been a conclusive
renunciation of the appalling self-righteousness that pervaded
colonialism, 179 a dictated occupation may not be accordant with a
trusteeship, 180 and the Mandate and Trusteeship systems were racist
concepts that classified certain people as "uncivilized" and unworthy of
possessing "sovereignty." 181 Decolonization thoroughly repudiated this
discriminatory distinction between sophisticated and simpleton

175. John Yoo, Iraqi Reconstruction and the Law of Occupation, 11 U.C. DAVIS J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 7, 8 (2004).
176. See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (affirming self-determination).
177. Deiwert, supra note 46, at 772-73.
178. League of Nations Covenant art. 22, para. 1 ("To those colonies and territories
which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States
which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by
themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modem world, there should be applied the
principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of
civilisation and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this
Covenant.").
179. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. N5217
(1970); TATAH MENTAN, THE STATE IN AFRICA 157 (2010) (stating that "[t]here is a general
consensus among Africanist historians that colonialism is morally wrong."); see generally
ANTHONY ARNOVE, IRAQ: THE LOGIC OF WITHDRAWAL 31, 34 (2006); CHALMERS JOHNSON,
THE SORROWS OF EMPIRE 29 (2004); THE UNITED NATIONS AT THE MILLENNIUM: THE
PRINCIPAL ORGANS 142 (Paul Graham Taylor & A.J.R. Groom eds. , 2000); UDAY SIGH
MEHTA, LIBERALISM AND EMPIRE: A STUDY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH LIBERAL
THOUGHT (1999); Eyal Benvenisti, The US and the Use of Force: Double-edged Hegemony
and the Management of Global Emergencies, 15 EUR. J. INT'L L. 677 (2004); Thomas M.
Franck, When, if Ever, May States Deploy Military Force Without Prior Security Council
Authorization?, 5 WASH. U. J. L. & PoL'Y 51 (2001).
180. Wilde, supra note 3 7, at 109.
181. Id. at 94.
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populations on which the trusteeship system depended, 182 making the
conception decidedly anachronistic in the twenty-first century.
Perhaps the most compelling interpretation that justifies significant
leeway in instituting reform is one that affirms the restrictions of the
Hague and Geneva Conventions, but incorporates universal human
rights prescriptions as a fundamental goal of an occupation. In this
sense, the history of occupation law is not as salient as reconciling the
development of international convention rules governing }us post
helium in conjunction with the chronological introduction of modern
human rights values, which is a diagnostic synthesis of codified law and
subsequent custom that may still ultimately result in a transformative or
"nation-building" occupation. 183
Professor Feldman, who was a constitutional advisor to the Iraqi
Governing Council, believed that a minimalist intrusion in domestic
affairs should be followed during an occupation, but emphasized that a
"government may permissibly set its goals on the basis of its own
citizens' interests whenever those goals do not fundamentally conflict
with the interests of people whom the government does not
represent." 184 Offering an interpretation for applicability to the
occupation, Professor Purdy notes that this philosophy is a spin on the
application of the John Stuart Mill "harm principle" to international
affairs, in which "one may act freely so long as one's actions do not
harm another," but Purdy also accentuates the deficits in this
interpretation, including that one "cannot have perfect knowledge" of
others' "interests" or appreciate which interests should be most
authoritative. 185 Moreover, commentators might also disagree over
whether there should be a presumed intention that the occupier aspires
to fulfill a philanthropic mission or whether the international
community should acquiesce to the foreign military's disposition that
occupation law restrictions would only unduly hamper the fuzzy and

182. WILLIAM BAIN, BETWEEN ANARCHY AND SOCIETY: TRUSTEESHIP AND THE
0BLIGA TIONS OF POWER 135-36 (2003).
183. DANIEL LEVY & NATAN SZNAIDER, HUMAN RIGHTS AND MEMORY 25-26 (2010)
(emphasizing that there is a dearth of theorizing on human rights in the context of nationbuilding, but that "human rights are about the breakdown of boundaries"); see also Boon,
supra note 126, at 57 (noting that while interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in
transformative occupations, there is "no uniform legal framework regulating transitions
from conflict to peace," but that rules of jus post helium fill the void); Norchi, supra note
158, at 281.
184. NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING 24 (2004).
185. Jedediah Purdy, Review Essay: The Ethics of Empire, Again, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
1773, 1779 (2005).
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warmly regarded goodwill mission. 186 Fact-specific exigencies may not
be the most favorable circumstances for establishing new customary
international law norms, but this position has been raised by
commentators with reference to the occupation oflraq. 187
B. Interpreting the Terms ofResolution 1483 in Light of Contemporary
Occupation Law

Theorization and contentions that practice may have updated
custom should also include the language of Resolution 1483, which
defined the occupation's authority, and appraise how scrupulously the

186. McGurk, supra note 131, at 452 (working lawyer for the CPA remarking that "we
often encountered hard ceilings on the limits of our authority under international law" but
that his experience "revealed an inexcusable gulf between what international law clearly
permits and what any successful state-building operation requires."). The connotation that
there is a fuzzy and warmly regarded do-gooder presence that should remain beyond
reproach is a theoretical conception; MACDONALD, supra note 173, at 186 (noting that
"states' intentions [such as if they are assumed to be noble] are largely irrelevant when
assessing whether a particular act qualifies as an act of conquest"); Roberts, supra note 94,
at 601 (remarking of the depiction of the occupant as a bastion of progress can beget a
"dangerous mix of crusading, self-righteousness, and self-delusion"). Others have raised
questions over what is "lawful" under international law and what is "legitimate," including
by maintaining that occupation rules are outmoded because these particular actions in Iraq
involved "nation-building." Harris, supra note 32, at 3; Cohen, supra note 172, at 496, 500.
Others have suggested that sovereignty can fracture because it was never really absolute.
Jenik Radon, Sovereignty: A Political Emotion, Not a Concept, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 195,
196 (2004).
187. BENVENISTI, supra note 42, at xi (contending that even though CPA actions in
Iraq were not consistent with occupation law, the precedent may update occupation law). A
"transformative occupation" may represent an evolution in occupation law since the era in
which international agreements were consummated. Roberts, supra note 94, at 580; Nehal
Bhuta, The Antimonies of Transformative Occupation, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 721, 740 (2005).
Army JAG attorney Major Nicholas F. Lancaster also suggests that principles of customary
international occupation law and the Hague Regulations and the Geneva Convention may
have been replaced by new customary standards as a result of a "Coalition occupation and
administration of Iraq." Major Nicholas F. Lancaster, Occupation Law, Sovereignty, and
Political Transformation: Should the Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva
Conventions Still be Considered Customary International Law?, 189 ARMY L. REV. 51 , 51
(2006). Other commentators have maintained that there are other recent examples of
practice modifying custom. Jeanne M. Meyer, Tearing Down the Facade: A Critical Look
at the Current Law on Targeting the Will of the Enemy and Air Force Doctrine, 51 A.F. L.
Rev. 143, 144 (2001) (contending that even though Article 52(2) of the Geneva Convention
strictly limits attacks to military targets and objectives, because these rules have not always
been followed, violations are not indicative of a breach of international law but instead that
the treaty rule "may not necessarily reflect customary international law or state practice.").
A possible limitation in this contention is that breach examples, which contradict customary
practice (World War I and World War 11), precede the 1949 treaty provision. Id. at 153-62
(providing examples). However, Human rights Watch and Amnesty International have
criticized bombing tactics in the former Yugoslavia during the late-l 990s. Id. at 165-66,
176-77.
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CPA adhered to the Resolution. Depending on the level of compliance,
perhaps questions should not fixate on what occupation law is or how
occupation law has evolved, but on why Bush administration rhetoric
prior to the adoption of Resolution 1483 maintained one representation,
why Bush's CPA departed from those representations, 188 and how the
parameters of Resolution 1483 were averted without consequence.
These reflections do not venture to imply that the U.N. could not permit
the Security Council to impose a deep occupation authority on an
unwilling target state, 189 but queries whether that authorization was in
fact located in the text of Resolution 1483.
Resolution 1483 specifically called the U.K. and the U.S. "the
Authority" and "occupying powers," referenced the applicability of the
Geneva and Hague Conventions, and specified that the Authority was
obliged to "recognize the specific authorities, responsibilities, and
obligations under applicable international law . . . as occupying
powers." 190 Not one word in Resolution 1483 refers to "the Authority"
or any faction of the occupation to embark on any form of
"legislating." 191
In the six times that the Resolution refers to
"institutions" and the equivalent of law-making initiatives, the language
is surrounded by affirmations that it is the Iraqi people who will
determine their "own political future" and that all U.N. members, U.N.
organs, and "the Authority" were required to assist Iraqis in establishing
their own institutions. 192 Thus, aside from the occupying authority's
right to make rule modifications or adopt certain laws as necessary to
ensure public order and safety during the occupation, 193 uphold human
rights, and assist the fruition of a representative Iraqi government that

188. See infra Parts II (A)(C).
189. The legitimacy of such a delegation could be more robust to the extent that the
Security Council's specific mission endeavors to maintain peace and security and also
weighs the respective infringement on internal governance.
190. S.C. Res. 1483, pmbl. para. 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (emphasis
added); see Boon, supra note 118, at 535-36.
191. S.C. RES. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
192. Id. at pmbl. paras. 1, 7, 8(c), 8(e) 15; Harris, supra note 32, at 1 (stating that the
Security Council, without reservation, affirmed that the Iraqi people were to possess
sovereign control of their own choices).
193. Convention (IV), supra note 169, art. 64 (permitting the occupying power to
"subject the population of the occupied territory to provisions which are essential to enable
the Occupying Power to fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain an
orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying Power.");
Hague Convention, supra note 36, art. 43 (providing that the occupier must ensure that there
is "public order and safety" and must respect the laws of the country unless absolutely
prevented from doing so); Boon, supra note 53, at 324 (remarking that the occupier has
some authority to legislate).
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would make its own legal choices, there was no unilateral prerogative in
Resolution 1483 that permitted the "Authority" to reform Iraq's legal
system. 194 Resolution 1483 required the U.S. and U.K. to "promote the
welfare of the Iraqi people through effective administration of the
territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political
future." 195 It is the political future that selects the legal future. That is
how democracy works.
Despite the language, some commentators have maintained that
Resolution 1483 did sanction widespread reforms. For example, Bart
Fisher, an attorney who founded the U.S.-Iraq Business Council in April
2002, explains that he specializes in assisting American businesspersons
who want to invest in Iraq and believed that Iraq should have taken full
advantage of the benefits of foreign investment and privatization, and
remarked:
As far as privatizing Iraq, a regime has been established. As the occupying power,
we have great discretion under the CPA. U.N. Resolution 1483 actually provides
the authority to promote economic reconstruction and we have operated under this
resolution. If fact, operating under the Resolution is a matter of international law.
Occupying powers have broad discretion to change the laws of the country to ensure
that it functions. The first pillar is to establish an investment law. 96

194.
U.S. DEP'T ARMY, supra note 34, at preface, para. 2, 4 ("the
occupant. .. continue[ s] [to administer and enforce] the ordinary civil and penal laws of the
occupied territories except to the extent [that] it may be authorized by Article 64 [of the
Geneva Convention] ... and Article 43 [of the Hague Regulations] to alter, suspect or repeal
such laws."); Scheffer, supra note 33, at 845-49 (stating that Resolution 1483 did fall within
occupation law and occupation law "was never designed for such transforming exercises.").
195. S.C. RES. 1483, preamble para 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
196. Bart S. Fisher, Symposium: Markets in Transition: Reconstruction and
Development: Part One - Reconstruction: Prescriptions for Iraq, Predictions for Russia
and Performance for China: Investing in Iraq: Legal and Political Aspects, 18 TRANSNAT'L
LAW 71, 73 (2004). (Fisher is correct in that this was the CPA's actions, but where that
authority came from is a mystery. Similarly, if one reads half of Article 47, one can say that
the "occupying power may introduce changes, 'as the result of the occupation of a territory,
into the institutions or government of the said territory."' However, a complete quote of
Art. 4 7 actually states that "protected persons who are in occupied territory shall not be
deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present
Convention by any change introduced, as the result of the occupation of a territory, into the
institutions or government of the said territory, nor by any agreement concluded between the
authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying Power." Regulations Respecting
the Law and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 1 Bevans 631. Reading
the entire provision denotes that an occupation must meet a very high threshold before it can
introduce changes to the institutions of the occupied territory because any modification is
almost guaranteed to disadvantage at least one protected person. In terms of human rights
protections or democratization, one can make a legitimate argument that equally respected
and protected citizens are not politically disadvantaged, but to maintain that an occupation's
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Fisher represented what the CPA did. Likewise, Feisal Amin alIstrabadi, Iraqi Ambassador to the U.N., admitted that Bremer and the
CPA exercised all lawmaking authority and states: "Resolution 1483
derogated this principle [that an occupier cannot change the occupied
country's legal system] by giving sweeping powers to the Civil
Administrator." 197 Resolution does affirm that the occupation was
authorized to administrate the government's affairs 198 and to assist
Iraqis in developing their own representative government institutions, 199
which was reasonably interpreted as an implied right to initiate the
democratic reform process. 200 Administrate does not mean legislate.
Having read Resolution 1483 several times in an attempt to specifically
locate broader discretion, this author remains perplexed and continues
to believe that the CPA was never given any special authority in
Resolution 1483 to unilaterally legislate.

economic changes will not disadvantage certain segments of the population is not
compelling).
197. al-Istrabadi, supra note 153, at 270; Yoo, supra note 175, at 12-13, 16
(referencing the fact that the Geneva and Hague Conventions are binding and that
Resolution 1483 is binding on the occupation and citing provisions of those conventions
relating to administering and "providing public services and maintaining security").
198. Hmoud, supra note 107, at 449-50 (stating that, specifically, the CPA assumed
responsibility over the Oil-for-Food program from the United Nations and established the
Development Fund for Iraq which permitted using the funds to administrate and for
reconstruction).
199. Parsons, supra note 39, at 32 (noting that "U.N. Security Council Resolution
1483, recognizing the state of occupation after the fact, stated that the law of occupation
applied to the U.S. and Great Britain in Iraq, while at the same time allowing the
transformation of Iraq into a democratic nation."); Yoo, supra note 175, at 7 (referencing
"the authority of the United States, under domestic and international law, to make
fundamental changes to the constitutional law and government institutions oflraq.").
200. Jose E. Alvarez, Contemporary International Law: An 'Empire of Law' or the
'Law of Empire'?, 24 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 811, 820, 820 n.40 (2009) ("At least during the
period prior to installation of an Iraqi government, the Security Council also gave the United
States and the United Kingdom, as occupying powers, implicit permission to reform Iraqi
institutions to the extent necessary to bring about democratic institutions" and pointing to
the preamble and paragraphs 4 and 8 of Resolution 1483); Scheffer, supra note 33, at 84546 (the resolutions "invited the Authority to act beyond some of the barriers that occupation
law otherwise would impose on occupying powers."); Cohen, supra note 172, at 500, 511
(stating that the language of Resolution 1483 seems ambiguous under occupation law as it
requires promoting "economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable
development" and for "the protection of human rights," which suggests legislating could be
necessary and/or implied). This point does reference the most interpretable language of the
seven-page resolution, but it refers to a UN Special Representative for Iraq" who should
work with "the Authority" to "assist the people of Iraq" in promoting these missions, but it
does not state that the "Authority" should take any initiative on its own or make choices for
the Iraqi people or appointed puppets. S.C. Res. 1483, at 8(e) (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
If one maintains that there are carte blanche occupation
prerogatives and that there is an evolution of the customary
international law by occupation as a result of the occupation of Iraq,
perhaps the consequence of the CPA' s reforms should be considered.
Violence was a hallmark of the occupation, the overwhelming majority
of Iraqis opposed the occupation, Iraqis were infuriated by the CPA
reforms, 201 and now, in mid-2014, Iraq faces another critical turning
point. Divisions have intensified with Sunni insurgencies and Kurds
expressing acerbity with Prime Minister Maliki, the long-term Iraqi
exile and eight-year prime minister, who has presided as a brutal
dictator 202pursuant to the institutions initially installed by the CPA.
This practical result further evinces that the most favorable
interpretation of occupier powers is to adhere to the restrictions of
occupation law and to not assume that there is legitimate precedent that
has altered the customary international law of occupation. The people
should commonly recognize that they formulated the trajectory for their
political and legal future because that is self-determination.
While the governing treaties only permit an occupier to discharge
functions necessary to administer the country and nothing more, 203
persuasive arguments can be made that the international law of
occupation does now permit an occupier to impose institutional reform
that will allow the local population to enjoy cogent human rights and
representative govemment, 204 particularly when these are optimal
201. See Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin , supra note 8 (manuscript at 279-98); see
generally Robert Bejesky, A Ripe Foundation for the Formation of ISIS: Tit-for-Tat
Hostilities and Contingently Contained Violence (Working Paper June 2015).
202. See supra Introduction.
203. GALLEN, supra note 48, at 62 (noting that the intention behind occupier
administrative duties in the law of occupation was to only permit "[t]he occupier . .. to
administer territory in a conservative fashion, only enforcing legal changes where necessary
to maintain peace and security" and to "promote local capacity for autonomous selfgovernment"); see also VON GLAHN, supra note 174, at 139-41; HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS 254 (Dieter Fleck ed. , 1995). Moreover, the
invasion of Iraq was not approved by the Security Council and was called a violation of
international law. Robert Bejesky, A Theorization on Equity: Tracing Causal Responsibility
for Missing Iraqi Antiquities and Piercing Official Immunity, 27 PACE INT'L L. REV.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 39-41). There was a progressively deepening intention
for occupation involving a unilaterally conceived British and American mission, designed
for disarmament of prohibited weapons. However, this then expanded into removing
Saddam Hussein and his top officials from power, and then into removing tens of thousands
of identifiable Baathe officials from government. See Clair Dyer, Occupation of Iraq
Illegal, Blair Told, GUARDIAN (May 22, 2003, 7:18 AM), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/may/22/uk.iraq2 (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
204. See supra Introduction.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/1

52

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Vol. 42, No.

2015]

CPA Dictates on Iraq

317

conditions to ensure the populace is able to freely choose its own laws.
It is much more controversial to assume that an occupier can impose a
large-scale economic and social restructuring to implant a capitalist
free-for-all that upsets an existing socioeconomic order. One can raise a
variety of novel and extemporaneous claims of vague quasi-de Jure
authority205 that existed beyond the very limited prerogative in
Resolution 1483 because the Hague rules do permit an occupier to act in
concert with temporary governing authorities. The problem is that
occupiers absolutely do not possess the sovereign authority of the
regime that was ousted, 206 cannot obtain any authority above a
temporary de facto administrative authority, 207 and cannot exercise
rights of sovereignty, 208 and all of the temporary governance bodies
were appointed by and beholden to the CPA. 209
Circumstances have evolved since The Hague and Geneva
Conventions were adopted, but if anything, it would appear that the era
of decolonization furthered a population's right of self-determination to
pursue its own interests without being paternalistically coddled by a

205. S.C. Res. 1511, para. 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 (Oct. 16, 2003) ("The Governing
Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which,
without prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq
during the transitional period until an internationally recognized, representative government
is established and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority."). By the terms of this
resolution, the appointed Governing Council was not de Jure, but the resolution offers lip
service to de facto authority. However, the Governing Council was not exercising de facto
authority because the CPA was the entity with sovereign control and the Governing Council
had no independent existence apart from the CPA. The Governing Council's existence was
probably more similar to the functioning of presidential appointments in the US. The
CPA's own mission statement identified itself as the temporary, "lawful government of
Iraq." Michael A. Newton, The Iraqi High Criminal Court: controversy and contributions,
88 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 399, 417 (June 2006). Pursuant to Order No. 1, The CPA "vested
[itself] with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including
Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war." Coalition Provision Authority,
Reg.
No.
l,
sec.
1(2),
CPA/REG/16
May
2003/01,
available
at
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/200305 l 6_ CP AREG_ l _The_Coalition_Provisiona
I_ Authority.pdf (last visited Apr. l, 2015). The ruling organizational chart depicted the
Pentagon and the CPA, and the CPA directing various US and British generals and
diplomats for their respective responsibilities, and the JGC was subordinate to all relevant
actors. NOAM CHOMSKY, IMPERIAL AMBITIONS 46 (2005); see contra al-Istrabadi, supra note
153, at 270, 274 (Iraqi UN representative suggesting that the CPA had some amorphous de
Jure authority but then alternatively described that "Iraq's sovereignty was dormant for a
time").
206. OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 437 (H. Lauterpacht, ed. 1952).
207. See Davis P. Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the Law of
Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1581 (1985); Boon, supra note 53, at 296.
208. Burke, supra note 172, at 109-111.
209. Bejesky, The Enigmatic Origin, supra note 8 (manuscript at 279-98).
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foreign intervention or by subjecting a population to a system similar to
a League of Nations' mandate. It is offensive to assume that a
population does not really "understand" its own real interests and
requires assistance to learn how to be "civilized," as this postulate is
akin to the same strain of loathsome intermeddling that sustained
colonialism, but has since been universally repudiated. As for imposing
laws because Iraqis do not comprehend legitimate legal structure, an
Iraqi judge opined:
We don't need you to come here and tell us about what law is. We invented law....
We are the people who figured law out, thousands of years ago. But now your
soldiers are coming in and telling us what to do, and you're not respecting our legal
traditions or legal process. The first thing the Americans did after the war was to
announce that they were immune from Iraqi legal process. So, if an American
commits a crime, they're completely immune, there's nothing that we can do about
21
it. The Americans are unaccountable. How can this be the rule of law?

210. Bodansky, supra note 53, at 130.
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ABSTRACT 1
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of
foreign investors in international investment law and plays an important
role in several aspects of the protection of foreign investors. In
particular, certain standards of investment protection, notably "full
protection and security" ("FPS") include an obligation for the State to
act with due diligence.
This articles seeks to establish an explanatory framework for past
and future decisions of arbitral tribunals which have applied or will be
confronted to applications of the due diligence standard in international
investment law, by providing a typology of the different possible
applications of the standard in relation to the obligations of the host
State. It addresses the role of due diligence in the law governing State
responsibility, and the application of due diligence in the customary
norms relating to the protection of aliens. Based on these two sections,
it next discusses the principle in contemporary investment law, focusing
on the application of due diligence in the FPS, the international
minimum standard ("IMS") and the fair and equitable treatment
("FET") standards of treatment. It then addresses the question of
whether applying due diligence allows for the possibility of taking into
account the relative capacities of host States, and the consequences the
application of the due diligence standard has on the compensation for
damages.

INTRODUCTION
Due diligence is present in a variety of aspects of the protection of
foreign investors in international investment law and plays an important
role in several aspects of the protection of foreign investors. In
particular, certain standards of investment protection, notably "full
protection and security" ("FPS") include an obligation for the State to
act with due diligence.
Due diligence has been considered to be a general principle of
1
Keywords: Investment law, due diligence, protection and security, fair and equitable
treatment, minimum standard, state responsibility, protection of aliens
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law. 2 Its role in international law however is limited and concise, in that
due diligence applies in certain specific situations only.
In
contemporary international law, due diligence requires States to
exercise due diligence only in relation to certain specific conduct that is
required from States under a set rule of international law. If a State is
found in breach of its obligation to exercise due diligence, State
responsibility may then ensue if the act in question is attributable to the
State. For several reasons, the current regime governing international
State responsibility indeed has departed from generalizing the
application of the due diligence standard as a secondary norm for
establishing State responsibility, but due diligence has taken a
prominent place in certain specific areas of international law, as part of
primary norms, notably in international environmental law, 3 the law
relating to diplomatic and consular relations, 4 and international
investment law. The due diligence standard has essentially been
considered in relation to FPS, the international minimum standard
("IMS"), and fair and equitable treatment ("FET").
This article seeks to establish an explanatory framework for the
application of the due diligence standard to host State's obligations in
international investment law, by providing a typology of the different
possible applications of the standard in that respect. In doing so, this
article will draw on the historical origins of the standard to understand
the present relevance of due diligence and to map the contemporary use
of due diligence in international investment law. This article will
translate the historical uses of due diligence into modem investment
treaty standards, notably the FPS and FET standards. This article does
not, therefore, aim at providing a general account of or categorizing all
references to due diligence in awards of arbitral tribunals. This article
focuses on the obligations of States to act in due diligence, and does not
address foreign investors' due diligence obligations. 5

2. Timo Koivurova, Due Diligence, in 11 MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 2 (Rildiger Wolfrum ed., Oxford U. Press, 2012), available at
http://www.arcticcentre.org/loader.aspx?id=78 l 827 l 8-d0c9-4833-97b3-b69299e2fl 27 (last
visited Mar. 30, 2015).
3. Id. para. 3.
4. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22(2), Apr. 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T.
3237, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
5· See Peter Muchlinski, 'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the
Investor Under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard, 55 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 527
(2006); IOANA TUDOR, THE FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATMENT STANDARD IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT 216 (Oxford U. Press, 2008); MARTINS
PAPARINSKIS, THE INTERNATIONAL MINIMUM STANDARD AND FAIR AND EQUITABLE
TREATMENT 256 (Oxford U. Press, 2013); Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of
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I will first address the role of due diligence in the law governing
State responsibility, before addressing the application of due diligence
in the customary norms relating to the protection of aliens. Based on
these two sections, I will discuss the principle in contemporary
investment law, focusing on the application of due diligence in the IMS,
the FPS and FET standards of treatment. I will then address the
contents of the standard, and the question of whether applying due
diligence allows for the possibility of taking into account the relative
capacities of host States, and the consequences the application of the
due diligence standard has on the compensation for damages.

I.

DUE DILIGENCE AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY

The work of the International Law Commission ("ILC") on the
topic of State responsibility originally focused on the responsibility of
States for injuries caused to aliens, 6 despite the more general mandate
given to the ILC by the United Nations General Assembly. 7 Much
attention in the first years of the work of the ILC was thus devoted to
classifying the various categories of injury caused to aliens, and the
ensuing obligation to provide reparation. In doing so, the ILC at that
time had included in certain of its draft articles substantive rules in
relation to the treatment of aliens, such as the "duty of protection" of
States and rules relating to expropriation and nationalization. 8 In view
of the double focus on the responsibility of States for injuries caused to

Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, Award, para. 333 (Sept. 11, 2007); Biwater Gauff
(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para.
602 (Jul. 24, 2008); Eudoro Armando Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/5, Award, para. 75 (Jul. 26 2001); Iurii Bogdanov, Agurdino-Invest Ltd. &
Agurdino-Chimia JSC v. Republic of Moldova, Arbitral Award, 19 (Sept. 22, 2005);
Alasdair Ross Anderson et al v. Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/3,
Award, para. 58 (May 19 2010).
6. See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Second Rep. on the Responsibility
of the State for Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens. Part I:
Acts and Omission, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/106 (Feb. 15, 1957) (by F. V.
Garcia Amador) [hereinafter Second Report]; State Responsibility, INT'L LAW COMM'N,
available at http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/9_6.htm (last visited Apr. I, 2015) (all documents
relating to the work of the ILC on the topic State responsibility is located here unless
mentioned otherwise).
7. See G.A. Res. 799 (VIII), U.N. GAOR, 4th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/2589,
at 52 (Dec. 7, 1953).
8. See Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, Responsibility of the State for
Injuries Caused in its Territory to the Person or Property of Aliens - Reparation of the
Injury, arts. 7 & 9, Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/134 (Jan. 26, 1961) (by F. V.
Garcia Amador).
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aliens and on the primary norms in this respect, it is not surprising that
one finds numerous references to the obligations for States to exercise
due diligence in the protection of aliens for acts of third parties in the
early work of the ILC on this topic. 9
The 2001 Articles on State Responsibility on the contrary focus on
the secondary norms governing State responsibility and do not seek to
define the contents of the primary obligations of States. 10 As a
consequence, whether or not the conduct of the State involves "some
degree of fault, culpability, negligence or want of due diligence ... vary
from one context to the another for reasons which essentially relate to
the object and purpose of the treaty provision or other rule giving rise to
the primary obligation." 11 The possible failure to exercise due diligence
is not constitutive of State responsibility, unless the primary obligation
contains such an obligation. Then, the failure to act in due diligence or
not will determine whether or not there is a breach of the primary
obligation. This in essence is the consequence of the ILC abandoning
attempts to codify and progressively developing the primary obligations
of States in relation to injuries caused to aliens following the
designation of Roberto Ago as Special Rapporteur on the topic. 12
However, under Ago, much attention still was given to the classification
of different forms of responsibility, in terms of whether the obligation at
stake required for the State to adopt a specific course of conduct, or
required the State to achieve a particular result. 13 This distinction was
finally abandoned by James Crawford in the 2001 final version of the
Articles, essentially because the ILC considered that the distinction
"does not seem to bear specific or direct consequences." 14

9. See Second Report, supra note 6, at 122-23; Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility, Fourth Rep. on The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of
International Responsibility (continued), Int'l Law Comm'n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/264 (Jun.
30, 1972) (by Roberto Ago) [hereinafter Fourth Report].
10. Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n, 53d Sess., April 23-June 1, July 2-August 10,
2001 , U.N. Doc. A/56/10; GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Articles
on State Responsibility].
11. Id. art. 2 (commentary, para. 3).
12. Fourth Report, supra note 9, at 99-100; see also Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Reviewing
the Difficulties of Codification: On Ago 's Classification of Obligations of Means and
Obligations of Result in Relation to State Responsibility, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 371 (1999);
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Dionisio Anzilotti and the Law of International Responsibility of
States, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 139 (1992); Koivurova, supra note 2; Robert P. Bamidge, The Due
Diligence Principle under International Law, 8 INT'L COMMUNITY L. Rev. 81 (2006).
13. See Special Rapporteur, Sixth Rep. on the Internationally Wrongful Act of the
State, Source of International Responsibility (continued), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/302 and Add.
1, 2 & 3 (1977) (by Robert Ago) [hereinafter Sixth Report]; see also Dupuy, supra note 12.
14. ILC Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 10, art. 12 (commentary).
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As a consequence, whether or not the obligation of a State is one to
obtain a certain result or an obligation of conduct, such as an obligation
to exercise due diligence, is a matter to be determined by the primary
norm only, and the distinction has little or no consequence for the rules
on State responsibility.
I say "little" because there are some
implications in respect of the obligation of reparation ensuing from
responsibility, in function of whether the obligation is one to exercise
due diligence or any other obligation of result, but this is again a
consequence of the type of obligation breached, and does not derive
from any specific secondary norm on state responsibility to this effect. I
will turn back to this at a later stage. That being said, the use of the
principle of due diligence as part of a primary norm, does bear some
resemblance with subjective responsibility, which tends to be applicable
in cases where States fail to act or in cases of omissions. 15 The current
approach to State responsibility however, is to view the subjective
aspect of responsibility as part of the primary norm rather than the
secondary norms governing State responsibility.

II.

DUE DILIGENCE AND THE PROTECTION OF ALIENS
Many cases dated from the late 19th Century and early 20th Century
have applied the customary norms relating to the duty of States and
State organs not only to abstain themselves from taking measures that
would infringe on the security of aliens and their property, but also the
duty of States to protect the security of aliens and their property from
acts of third parties in their territory. While the first obligation - the
duty for States and State organs to abstain themselves- was not assessed
through the due diligence standard, the second obligation - the duty to
protect against acts of individuals - has been tested through that
standard. 16 I will therefore focus here essentially on the latter
obligation, although I will refer to the former in order to make clear the
distinction between both.
The duty to protect the security of aliens and their property from
acts of third parties in their territory has been accepted since long in
international law. This obligation can be decomposed into three sub-

15· James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International
Responsibility, in MALCOLM D. EVANS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 441, 454-58 (Oxford U. Press,
2010).
16. See Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the
International Responsibility ofStates, 35 GER. Y.B. INT' LL. 9 ( 1992).
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components 17 :
1) the obligation of States to prevent acts of individuals that may
harm the security of aliens and their property, by making use of
their administrative and judicial apparatus to that effect;
2) the obligation of States to apprehend and bring to justice those
responsible for injuries caused to aliens by making use of their
administrative and judicial apparatus to that effect, and
3) the obligation for States to possess and make available to aliens
a judicial and administrative system capable of preventing 18
acts, and of punishing and apprehending those responsible for
the acts.
This distinction between these three obligations is important, since
practice shows that the third obligation - States' obligation to possess
and make available a judicial and administrative system - is tested not
by reference to the due diligence standard, 19 while States' other
obligations have been assessed by reference to the due diligence
standard. 20
These principles have been confirmed in many cases, notably in
the decisions of several Claims Commissions established in the late 19th
Century and early 20th Century. These obligations have been found to
be applicable in cases of occasional acts of third parties, in situations of
public disorder, revolts and violence, and in case of civil war or
international armed conflict. 21
In relation to isolated acts of individuals, in Venable v. Mexico, 22
the Commissioner considered that the acts complained of (essentially
allowing theft of parts of locomotives that had been seized -the
obligation for States to prevent- and not prosecuting those responsible
17. Id. at 25 .
18. The obligation too possess a judicial and administrative system capable of
preventing acts however is very close to the obligation of States to act with due diligence to
prevent acts of individuals. The difference however lies, not only in that due diligence
applies to the latter only, but in that the first covers States' obligations in a specific situation,
while the second concerns States' general obligations to maintain public order and prevent
crimes. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 26-29; Noyes (U.S. v. Panama), 6 R.I.A.A,
308, 311 (U.S.-Panama Gen. Cl. Comm'n 1933).
19. See Second Report, supra note 6, at 110-11.
20. See id. at 120; Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 26-29.
21. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 27-29 (discussing the general overview of
the various case-law to this effect).
22. See H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 219-261 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1927).
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for the crime -the obligation for States to apprehend and punish-)
amounted to "an insufficiency of governmental action so far short of
international standards that every reasonable and impartial man would
readily recognize its insufficiency." 23 In several other cases, the
specific obligation to apprehend or punish those responsible for the acts
was also confirmed.
In Janes v.
Mexico 24 for instance, the
Commissioner decided, that "there was clearly such a failure on the part
of the Mexican authorities to take prompt and efficient action to
apprehend the slayer," and therefore the Mexican authorities were held
responsible for not having taken "proper steps to apprehend and punish
the slayer of Janes."25 In Kennedy v. Mexico, 26 in which the person
responsible for the injuries caused had been convicted to a sentence
disproportionate to the crime committed and the injuries inflicted, the
Commission decided that "it seems that there was negligence in a
serious degree, and that such negligence constitutes a denial of
justice."27 Since this obligation related to the obligation for States to
possess and make available to aliens a judicial system capable of
punishing those responsible for the acts, the Commission made no
reference to the due diligence standard. 28
In respect of mob violence, riots or civil unrest, several decisions
applied the same principles. Arbitrator Max Huber in the British
Property in Spanish Morocco case 29 confirmed the principle that in the
events of riots ("banditry, which results in a state of general insecurity,
but without the situation amounting, strictly speaking, to a state of
rebellion") 30 States have a duty of vigilance towards aliens. In Youmans
v. Mexico, the Commissioner also held that in case of "mob violence",
States incur responsibility if "a lack of diligence in the punishment of
the persons implicated in the crime" is shown. 31

23. Id. para. 23.
24. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 82-98 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1925).
25. Id. at 85-86, paras. 10, 17.
26. Kennedy (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A.194-203 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl. Comm'n
1927) (concurring opinion by American Commissioner).
27. Id. para. 5.
28. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 30.
29. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 615, 642, 645 (U.K.Spain 1925); see also Great-Britain United States Mixed Commission, 9 RI.A.A. 144
(1920).
30. Original in French ('actes de brigandage, dont resulte un etat d' insecurite generale,
sans toutefois qu' il y'ait, a proprement parler un etat de rebellion ' - translation by the
author). British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 1925).
31. Youmans (U.S. v. Mexico), Gen. Claims Comm'n, 110-17 (1926).
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Finally, in relation to insurrectional movements, one can refer to
the Sambiaggio case, decided in the context of the Italy-Venezuela
Mixed Claims Commission, in which the Commission held that
Venezuela would be responsible for acts occurred during the revolution,
if "Venezuelan authorities failed to exercise due diligence to prevent
damages from being inflicted by revolutionists. " 32
Despite the occasional use of terms such as "indirect
responsibility" 33 in early cases, which was in essence the consequence
of the ambiguity that existed at that time on the question of whether the
State was responsible for the injury caused to the alien, or rather was
responsible only for the failure to exercise due diligence in preventing
the injury or apprehending and punishing the responsible individuals, 34
which of course had important consequences in respect of the
compensation awarded, the responsibility of States for breaching their
obligations in relation to the protection of aliens is not an "indirect
responsibility" of the State for the act committed; the act which has
caused harm in itself cannot be attributed to the State. 35 This does not
imply, however, that the reparation awarded may not take account of the
damages caused by the act, but this will depend on the circumstances of
each case. Indeed, in principle, the reparation should first of all remedy
the obligation breached, which is not the act of the individual, but the
obligation of the State to act in due diligence to prevent an injury caused
to an alien or the failure to exercise due diligence in apprehending and
punishing the individual responsible for that injury. This was famously
posited by Max Huber in the mentioned British Property in Morocco
case, which not only confirmed the application of the due diligence
standards, but also confirmed the absence of any direct responsibility of
the State for the commission of the act itself 36:
It seems indisputable that the State is not responsible for a riot,
rebellion, civil war or international war nor for the fact that these
events cause damage on its territory.
This principle of absence of responsibility does not exclude the duty to

32. Sambiaggio (Italy v. Venezuela), IO R.I.A.A. 499, 524 (Mixed Claims
Commission 1903).
33. See H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 229, para. 23. (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1927).
34. Second Report, supra note 6, at 34; Sixth Report, supra, note 13, at 99.
35. Sixth Report, supra note 13, at 100.
36. British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 709-10 (U.K.-Spain
1925).
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exercise certain vigilance. While the State is not responsible for the
revolutionary events themselves, it may nevertheless be responsible
for what the authorities are doing or not doing to avert, to the extent
possible, the consequences. Responsibility for the action or inaction
of public power is completely different from responsibility for acts
attributable to individuals who are beyond the influence of the
authorities or who are openly hostile to the authorities. 37

In Janes, the Commissioner also pointed out that "in cases of
improper governmental action of this type [denial of justice], a nation is
never held to be liable for anything else than the damage caused by
what the executive or the legislative committed or omitted itself." 38 As
a consequence, "the measure of damages for which the Government
should be liable can not be computed by merely stating the damages
caused by the private delinquency of Carbajal. " 39 These principles still
stand today. 40
This early practice has been particularly relevant for the recent
application of due diligence in the context of international investment
law. Considering that the current investment regime is partly rooted in
the general customary norms governing the treatment of aliens in
international law, this is not surprising. Indeed, full protection and
security ("FPS"), the international minimum standard ("IMS"), and fair
and equitable treatment ("FET") share many features with that
customary norm.

III. DUE DILIGENCE IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW
Although it is not the purpose here to engage in an all-inclusive
discussion of the exact contents of these standards of treatment, it is

37. Original in French ('Il parait incontestable que l' Etat n' est pas responsable pour le
fait d'une emeute, revolte, guerre civile ou guerre intemationale, ni pour le fait que ces
evenements provoquent des dommages sur son territoire. [... ] Le principe de la nonresponsabilite n'exclut point le devoir d'exercer une certaine vigilance. Si l'Etat n'est pas
responsable des evenements revolutionnaires eux-memes, il peut etre neanmoins
responsable de ce que les autorites font ou ne font pas, pour parer, dans la mesure possible,
aux suites. La responsabilite pour l'action ou l'inaction de la puissance publique est tout
autre chose que la responsabilite pour des actes imputables a des personnes echappant a
l 'influence des autorites ou leur etant ouvertement hostiles.' - translation by the author). Id.
at 642.
38. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 88, para 22. (Mex.-U.S. Gen.
Cl. Comm'n 1925).
39. Id. at 89, para 25.
40. See Crawford & Olleson, supra note 15, at 454-55.
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necessary to briefly sketch their main characteristics and their
interconnectedness in order to better grasp the role of due diligence in
assessing breaches of these standards.
FPS, IMS, and FET are generally referred to as non-contingent,
absolute or objective standards of treatment as opposed to contingent,
relative or subjective standards, such as national treatment ("NT") or the
most favored nation treatment ("MFN"). 41 The latter category of
standards of treatment impose on the host State the obligation to act in a
certain way by reference to how other investors or investments are
treated, e.g. national investors or investments in case of NT, or investors
or investments from third States in case of MFN treatment. The
objective of such standards is that States may not discriminate between
investors and investments; whether or not the State has exercised due
diligence in this respect is irrelevant. Objective standards, on the other
hand, require from the State to act in a certain "objective" way, as
required under international law (either custom or treaty law)
irrespective of how other investors or investments are treated. There is,
in other words, no comparison with the treatment of other investors or
investments.
This categorization partially explains the presence of due diligence
in those standards of treatment. Indeed, when the acts of States are
tested against how other investors or investments are treated, there is
neither room nor need to apply a due diligence standard. The standard
to be applied when dealing with relative standards is a comparative
standard: how other investors or investments have been treated.
Whether the State was diligent or not is irrelevant. Conversely, when
the acts of States are tested against absolute standards under FPS, IMS
and FET, how other investors or investments are treated is irrelevant;
the conduct and acts of States are tested against requirements for such
conduct or acts under international law. The assessment standard of a
breach of the latter category of standards then requires a comparison
with an objective assessment standard: how investors and investments
should be treated under international law. This comparator/objective
assessment in certain interpretations of FPS, and partly also in the IMS
and FET as will be explained, is the due diligence standard - the
conduct of a diligent State.
However, the "objectivity" of the absolute treatment standards will

See

& MATTHEW WEINIGER,
207, para 7.19
(Oxford U. Press, 2008); Nicolas Angelet, Fair and Equitable Treatment, in 3 MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1094 (Rudiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
41.

CAMPBELL MCLACHLAN QC, LAURENCE SHORE
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vary by operation of the due diligence standard if one considers that the
circumstances and resources of the host State should be taken into
account when applying the due diligence requirement, which I will
discuss below. In that sense even absolute standards of treatment carry
a subjective element, although the latter should not be understood as
implying a comparison with how other investors or investments are or
have been treated.

A. Due Diligence and the International Minimum Standard
The exact relation between FPS, the IMS and FET is still subject to
much debate. It has been contented that FPS forms part of the IMS, 42 or
that FET and FPS are included in the IMS.43 Others have contended to
the contrary that all three standards or treatment are independent treaty
standards. 44 Despite these controversies, which I do not intend to settle
here, it is beyond doubt that all three-treatment standards have certain
commonalities, and thus overlap in certain aspects. 45 The overlap is
particularly noticeable in context of the State's duty to protect foreign
investors and investments from acts of third parties, and thus, as will be
shown in the application of the due diligence standard to such
obligation. The overlap, in essence, is a consequence of the fact that
these standards, whether one views them as autonomous standards or
not, are rooted in the general rule relating to States' obligations in
respect of the protection of aliens discussed above. The obligations to
which the due diligence standard applies, and thus those that I will
consider here, are part of the FPS or FET, and whether one views these
standards as embodied in the IMS is irrelevant for our purposes.

42. See Christoph Schreuer, Full Protection and Security, 1 J. INT'L DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT 353, 354 (2010). The decision of the Tribunal in Noble Ventures argued that
"[w]ith regard to the Claimant's argument that the Respondent breached Art. II (2)(a) of the
BIT which stipulates that the 'Investment shall . .. enjoy fall protection and security ', the
Tribunal notes: that it seems doubtful whether that provision can be understood as being
wider in scope than the general duty to provide for protection and security of foreign
nationals found in the customary international law of aliens." Noble Ventures, Inc. v.
Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 164 (Oct 12, 2005).
43. See Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions, NAFTA FREE
TRADE COMM 'N (July 31 , 2001 ), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/tpd/nafta/
Commission/CH 11 understanding_e.asp (last visited Apr. 7, 2015).
44. Schreuer, supra note 42, at 362.
45. Jan de Nul N.V. & Dredging Int'l N.V. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/13, Award, para. 269 (Nov. 6, 2008) (stating that "[t]he notion of continuous
protection and security is to be distinguished here from the fair and equitable standard since
they are placed in two different provisions of the BIT, even if the two guarantees can
overlap"); see also PSEG Global Inc. & Konya Ilgin Elektrik Oretim ve Ticaret Limited
Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258 (Jan. 19, 2007).
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Situations covered by the FPS indeed will reqmre conduct m
accordance to the IMS.
To give one example, in the Neer case, often quoted as
representing the IMS, although not without controversy in respect of the
application of that decision to modem investment law, 46 the US/Mexico
General Claims Commission described the IMS as follows:
[T]he propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of
international standards, and (second) that the treatment of an alien, in
order to constitute an international delinquency, should amount to an
outrage, to bad faith, to wilful neglect of duty, or to an insufficiency of
governmental action so far short of international standards that every
reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its
insufficiency. Whether the insufficiency proceeds from deficient
execution of an intelligent law or from the fact that the laws of the
country do not empower the authorities to measure up to international
standards is immaterial. 47
This statement in actual fact related to a situation typically covered
by a contemporary FPS provision, as understood in physical protection
from acts of third parties, as it related to the obligation of Mexico to
apprehend and punish those responsible for the acts. 48 The scenario of
that case, although seen as defining the IMS, is applicable to FPS as
well. To that extent, it is beyond doubt that the IMS can be seen as
embodied in contemporary treaty obligations relating to the obligation
to provide (full) protection and security. 49 FPS, understood as providing
an obligation for the State to protect against physical violence, is indeed
analogous to the IMS standard represented in the classical theory on the
protection of aliens discussed above, 50 and it is consequently
unnecessary to distinguish both standards in respect of physical
protection from acts of third parties. It is moreover unnecessary since
contemporary investment treaties generally do not refer to the minimum
standard at all, or in isolation of other treaty standards namely without
linking FPS and FET to the IMS.
46 See ROLAND KLAGER, 'FAIR AND EQUITABLE TREATEMENT' IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 51-55 (James Crawford SC FBA & John S. Bell FBA, 2013).
47· L. F. H. Neer & Paulene Neer (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 RI.A.A. 60, 61-62 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
48· Id. at 62.
49· See Elettronica Sicula SpA (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.CJ. 15, para. 111 (July 20) ("The
primary standard laid down by Article V is 'the full protection and security required by
international law', in short the 'protection and security' must conform to the minimum
international standard.") [hereinafter ELSI].
50· El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 522 (Oct. 31, 2011 ); see KLAGER, supra note 46, at 292.
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Whether or not FPS entails more than the IMS is a question I will
not settle here, although specific consideration will be given to broader
interpretations of FPS, without taking any position on the correctness of
such a view, in order to verify the possible application in such context
of the due diligence standard. As a consequence, the discussion below
on FPS, understood as the duty to protect foreign investors and
investments from physical violence by third parties, is mutatis mutandis
applicable to the IMS.

B. Due Diligence and Full Protection and Security
Provisions granting protection and security to investments and
investors vary in nature. Some treaties refer to "full protection and
security," while others provide for "protection and security" or
"constant protection and security." 51 It is not the purpose here to
engage in a discussion of these variances, and the standard will be
referred to here as FPS despite the existing differences in wording.
Indeed, the current conception of the FPS standard of treatment
however phrased
comprises the obligation for States to provide
physical or police protection to foreign investments/investors from harm
caused by the State itself or by third parties, which includes the
obligations to prevent, to punish and apprehend, and possess and make
available a functioning administrative and legal system to that effect. 52
Some tribunals moreover have argued that the difference in wording do
"not make a significant difference." 53 Therefore, the addition of terms
such as "constant" or "full" do not change the application of the due
diligence standard rather than a strict liability standard for assessing
breaches of that provision54 nor does the use of "protection" rather than
"protection and security" change the level of police protection a host
State is required to provide. 55

51. See Schreuer, supra note 42 , at 353-69.
52. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Bilateral Investment Treaties 1995-2006: Trends
in Investment Rulemaking, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/2006/5, 132 (2007), available at
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20065_en.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015); see also JESWALD
w. SALACUSE, THE LAW OF INVESTMENT TREATIES 132, 209-10 (2010); George K. Foster,

Recovering "Protection and Security ": The Treaty Standard's Obscure Origins, Forgotten
Meaning, and Key Current Significance, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1095, 1095-156
(2012).
53. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 354 (Sept. 11, 2007).
54. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 50 (June 27, 1990).
55. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 354 (Sept. 11, 2007).
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As said earlier in relation to the customary norm on the protection
of aliens, the obligation to provide FPS applies to acts both of the State
and of third parties under its jurisdiction. 56 Although I will essentially
focus on the latter type of obligation, since I argue that the standard of
due diligence applies primarily to those type of cases, it is nevertheless
necessary to briefly discuss whether or not the due diligence standard
plays a role when the acts of the State itself, or when any of its organs
or other entities the acts of which are attributable to the State, have
physically impaired the investor or investment, are involved. This is
important also to explain investment law cases which have discussed
the due diligence standard in that context.
1. The State's Duty to Abstain
Traditionally, as was explained above, the State's duty to abstain
from infringing the physical protection and security of aliens, which
applies to all State organs and entities the acts of which are attributable
to the State, is not tested by reference to the due diligence standard. 57
This is supported by several cases, such as the Sambiaggio case
mentioned above, in which Umpire Ralston distinguished between the
acts of the State and the acts of revolutionaries, and applied to the
former acts the principle that a State is responsible for the acts of its
organs, while in the latter case, responsibility only was considered
possible in the event of a lack of due diligence. 58 It has also been
confirmed in many other cases, which related to the unlawful killing of
individuals by police officers or the military. 59 The act itself - the
unlawful killing - was considered a breach of an international
obligation of the State, which was attributable to the latter because of
the involvement of State organs. No reference then was made to the
principle of due diligence - the State basically is responsible for the acts
of its organs. If, for example, police officers or the military have caused
harm to a foreigner, whether or not the State has acted with due
diligence to prevent the act is unconnected. The act itself is attributable
to the State. This of course presupposes that the act in question, which

56. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 355-62; see also Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v.
United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 730 (Jul. 24,
2008).
57. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 23.
58. See Sambiaggio (Italy v. Venezuela), 10 R.I.A.A. 499, 520-24 (Mixed Claims
Commission 1903).
59. See J. W. & N. L. Swinney (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.1.A.A. 98-101 (Mex-U.S. Gen.
Cl. Comm'n Nov. 16, 1926); D. Guerrero vda. De Falcon (Mexico v. U.S.), 4 R.I.A.A. 104106 (Gen. Cl. Comm'n Mex-U.S. Nov. 16, 1926).
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has caused harm, is in itself wrongful. It is interesting to note in this
respect that certain tribunals, such as the Tribunal in El Paso, have
implied that in case of acts of the State or State organs, the FPS standard
does not apply, being limited to acts of third parties only. 60 Other
tribunals have however, correctly, posited that the FPS standard applies
both to State and third party acts. 61
In this case, contrary to the responsibility of States for acts of third
parties other than State organs, the wrongful act is the act that has
caused harm. In case of acts of third parties other than State organs, the
internationally wrongful act is the failure to prevent the occurrence of
the act or the failure to apprehend or punish those responsible for the
act, assessed through the due diligence standard. This explains why due
diligence is of no relevance in the first case, but is in the latter.
There is some case law from investment tribunals, which discusses
this distinction. In line with the early case law mentioned above, it is
correct to state that the acts of State organs which result in an
impairment of the protection and security to be guaranteed to aliens
generally, and thus foreign investors and their investments, are wrongful
as such, without the need to enquire whether the State organ in question
was diligent or not. Tribunals have refrained from applying the due
diligence standard to the conduct of States and State organs, although
they have on several occasions explicitly referred to the due diligence
standard in general terms when discussing the contents of the FPS
standard. This may cause certain confusion as to the relevance of due
diligence when the duty of the State to abstain is concerned, but the
principle remains that due diligence is irrelevant in relation to the duty
of the State to abstain.
AAPL v. Sri Lanka and AMT v. Zaire are sometimes invoked in the

60. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 524 (Oct. 31, 2011 ). "El Paso did not specify or determine the duty to act
against a third party that has allegedly been breached by Argentina under the BIT: all the
impugned acts that allegedly violate the FPS standard are directly attributable to the GOA
and not to any third party. In the present case, none of the measures challenged by El Paso
were taken by a third party; they all emanated from the State itself. Consequently, these
measures should only be assessed in the light of the other BIT standards and cannot be
examined from the angle of full protection and security." Id.
61. See Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/8, Award, para. 355 (Sept. I I, 2007). "A violation of the standard of full
protection and security could arise in case of failure of the State to prevent the damage, to
restore the previous situation or to punish the author of the injury. The injury could be
committed either by the host State, or by its agencies or by an individual." Id. (internal
footnotes omitted).
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context of violence caused by State organs, 62 but as I will point out,
both cases did not relate to such acts. In AAPL v. Sri Lanka, 63 the
Tribunal indeed did not apply the due diligence standard to the acts of
State organs which had caused harm. 64 In that case, which concerned
the destruction of a shrimp farm and the killing of several staff members
of that farm during a military operation between the Sri Lankan Security
Forces and Tamil rebels, the Tribunal considered that Sri Lanka, by
failing to take precautionary measures to remove suspected staff
members from the farm through peaceful means before launching the
attack, "violated its due diligence obligation which requires undertaking
all possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the
eventual occurrence of killings and property destruction. " 65 This
finding was not applied to the acts of the State organ which had caused
the killings and destruction of property, since the Tribunal had found
that there was no conclusive evidence that the Sri Lankan security
forces had in fact killed the staff members and destroyed the farm, nor
that the acts had been caused by rebels. 66 Faced with the impossibility
of establishing who was directly responsible for the acts, the Tribunal
thus engaged in an analysis of whether the governmental forces were
capable of providing protection to prevent the destruction of the farm,
which indeed was assessed through application of the due diligence
standard. This assessment thus was alien to the application of the due
diligence standard to the acts of the destruction of the property itself by
the Government forces.
In AMT v. Zaire, 67 the claimant had sought compensation for the
destruction of property of one of its subsidiaries, and the looting in 1991
by certain member of the Zairian forces, which had resulted in the
destruction, damage and loss of finished goods and raw materials. The
Tribunal considered the host State in breach of its obligations to provide
FPS to AMT by having failed to take any measure whatsoever, but here
again, the Tribunal did not consider the acts in question to be those of a
62. See Gleider I. Hernandez, The Interaction Between Investment Law and the Law of
Armed Conflict in the Interpretation of Full Protection and Security Clauses, in
INVESTMENT LAW WITHIN INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTEGRATIONIST PERSPECTfY ES 21, 35-38
(Freya Baetens ed., 2013).
63. See generally Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID
Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award (June 27, 1990).
64. But see Schreuer, supra note 42, at 5.
65. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, 562. (June 27, 1990).
66. Id. at 563.
67. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award
(Feb. 21 , 1997).
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State organ, since they were perpetrated by "separate individuals and
not the [Zairian] forces." 68
In more recent cases, Tribunals have explicitly referred to the due
diligence standard in general terms, but have refrained from applying
that standard to alleged acts of States, which had caused damage. In
Saluka v. Czech Republic, the acts in question were acts of the State
organs. The acts complained of consisted of the suspension of trading
of shares Saluka held in IPB, the prohibition of transfers of Saluka's
IPB shares, and police searches and seizure of documents. 69 After
setting out the contents of the FPS standard, which includes a brief
mention of due diligence, and limiting FPS to physical protection only,
the Tribunal rejected all claims in this respect, by arguing, without
taking the position that all acts complained of fell within the ambit of
the FPS clause, that the measures taken were not "totally unreasonable
and unjustifiable."70 The Tribunal refrained from applying the due
diligence standard to those acts, which moreover did not involve the use
of force, and in essence boiled down to claims of denials of justice and
lack of due process. 71 In that respect, I will refer back to this case at a
later stage.
In Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania, the Tribunal considered that the
removal of the management from the offices or the seizure of the City
Water's premises, "even if no force was used [were] unnecessary and
abusive and amount[ ed] to a violation by the Republic of its obligation
to ensure full protection and security." 72 Rightly, no reference was
made to the "due diligence" standard in applying the law to the facts of
the case since the complaints related to the acts of Tanzania itself,
although ample reference was made to the standard in the preceding
paragraphs. 73
Another case at point is Teemed v. Mexico, in which the Tribunal
briefly touched upon the issue. 74 In that case, the Claimant had alleged
that Mexican authorities had not only encouraged protests against the
landfill it sought to operate through its subsidiary Cytrar, but also that
68. Id.
69. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 485
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
70. Id.
71. Id. para. 486.
72. Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 731 (Jul. 24, 2008).
73. Id.
74. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB (AF)/00/2, Award (May 29, 2003).
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police and judicial authorities
did not act as quickly, efficiently and thoroughly as they should have
to avoid, prevent or put an end to the adverse social demonstrations
expressed through disturbances in the operation of the Landfill or
access thereto, or the personal security or freedom to move about of
the members of Cytrar' s staff related to the Landfill. 75

The Tribunal in Teemed differentiated the rules applicable to acts
of the State or State organs, or other acts which are otherwise
attributable to the State, but concluded that no evidence was furnished
to prove, first, the involvement of the authorities in the demonstrations,
and, secondly, in relation to acts of third parties, that Mexican
authorities "have not reacted reasonably, in accordance with the
parameters inherent in a democratic state, to the direct action
movements conducted by those who were against the Landfill," the
latter criterion being an application of the due diligence standard. 76
More recently in Tulip v. Turkey, the Tribunal mentioned the
distinction explicitly in an obiter dictum, and applied due diligence only
the conduct of State organs in relation to acts of third parties:
There is, therefore, no basis to conclude, that the State (assuming,
arguendo, that Emlak were an emanation of the State) planned to
engage in an unlawful seizure of land belonging to a foreign investor
or, alternatively, that State organs failed to exercise due diligence and
to prevent planned unlawful action by a private party. 77

Recent practice of investment tribunals thus shows that the
principles established by early case-law, namely that when the State's
acts impair the physical protection and security of foreigner investors
and investments, the due diligence standard should not apply, applies
equally in investment law. Based on the discussed cases, and since the
FPS standard without doubt is similar to or emerges from the IMS, at
least when understood as requiring physical protection and security,
there is no reason to depart from the principles applied in the past.
2.

The State's Duty to Protect Foreign Investments from Acts of Third
Parties
In line with the distinction made above, States' obligations in
respect of acts of third parties under the FPS standard of treatment

75. Id. para. 175.
76. Id. at para. 177.
77. Tulip Real Estate Investment and Development Netherlands B.V. v. Republic of
Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/11/28, Award, para. 433 (Mar. 10, 2014) (an application for
annulment of the tribunal's award was filed in July 2014).
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comprise several distinct obligations: first, the obligation to act with due
diligence to prevent such acts, secondly, the obligation for States to act
with due diligence to apprehend and punish those responsible for the
act, and thirdly, the obligation to possess and make available to foreign
investors a judicial and administrative system capable of preventing
acts, and of punishing and apprehending those responsible for the act.

i.

States' Obligation to Act with Due Diligence to Prevent Acts of
Third Parties

Although FPS is often not further defined in investment treaties, it
is the general understanding of the contents of the standard that it
requires the State to exercise due diligence in providing physical
protection and security to foreign investments and/or investors to
prevent acts of individuals that would cause damage. To that extent it
represents the classical understanding of the customary norm relating to
the protection of aliens described above, and represented in cases such
as Venable v. Mexico. This is the most common use that is made of the
provision in contemporary investment law and arbitration.
Such obligation does not entail any form of strict liability for the
host State. In Lauder v. Czech Republic, the Tribunal noted in respect
of an FPS provision:
The Arbitral Tribunal is of the opinion that the Treaty obliges the
Parties to exercise such due diligence in the protection of foreign
investment as reasonable under the circumstances. However, the
Treaty does not oblige the Parties to protect foreign investment against
any possible loss of value caused by persons whose acts could not be
attributed to the State. Such protection would indeed amount to strict
liability, which cannot be imposed to a State absent any specific
provision in the Treaty. 78
This understanding of the FPS standard of treatment is shared by
many tribunals. 79 Investment law cases over the past decade confirm
not only the existence of the due diligence standard to test State's

78. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 310 (Sept. 3,
2001).
79. See Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para.
164 (Oct. 12, 2005); Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Partial Award,
para. 483 (Mar. 17, 2006); Biwater Gauff, Ltd. v. Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 725 (July 24, 2008); Rumeli Telekom A.S v. Republic of
Kazakhstan, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/16, Award, para. 668 (July 29, 2008); Toto
Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/12, Award,
para. 229 (June 7, 2012); Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, para. 161 (July 30, 2010).
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behavior, but also the principle mentioned above, that the State is not
responsible for the acts of individuals as such, but only for having failed
to exercise due diligence in preventing harm caused by the act in
question. Such obligations also apply, and perhaps primarily, in cases
of armed conflict, civil strife or revolution, 80 in line with early case law
mentioned above which has applied this principles as part of customary
law. In the event of an armed conflict, a State indeed should use "the
police and military forces to protect the interests of the alien to the
extent feasible and practicable under the circumstances, both before the
event and while it unfolds." 81 Certain tribunals have used tests similar
to "due diligence," without however referring explicitly to a duty of
"due diligence." They have rather referred to a duty of "vigilance. " 82
In practice, the applied standard essentially is the same.
It is clear from arbitral practice that the State holds no strict
liability for harm caused by third parties. 83 Although not explicitly
referring to "due diligence," the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") in
the ELSI case followed the same approach. 84 The ICJ in ELSI posited
that "the reference in Article V to the provision of 'constant protection
and security' cannot be construed as the giving of a warranty that
property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed. " 85
Considering the very close relation between FPS and the customary
rules governing the protection of aliens, this rule is not surprising, and
indeed conforms to the main principles mentioned above. An FPS
treaty provision understood as requiring the State to exercise due
diligence to prevent acts of third parties that would cause harm to

80. ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUiS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT
TREATIES: STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 315 (2009).
81. RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT LAW 166 (2008).
82. See, for instance, the statement by the Tribunal in Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v.
Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, Award, para. 6.05 (Feb. 21, 1997) ("The
obligation incumbent on Zaire is an obligation of vigilance, in the sense that Zaire as the
receiving State of investments made by AMT, an American Company, shall take all
measures necessary to ensure the full enjoyment of protection and security of its investment
and should not be permitted to invoke its own legislation to detract from any such
obligation."); see also Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No.
ARB/98/4, Award, para. 84 (Dec. 8, 2000) (citing and endorsing this statement).
83. See SALACUSE, supra note 52, at 132, 209-10; Asian Agric. Prods. Ltd. v. Republic
of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 77 (June 27, 1990); Tecnicas
Medioambientales Tecmeda S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB
(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003).
84. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A, Judgement (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 108. (July
20).
85. Id.
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foreign investments and/or investors essentially is the same requirement
as the customary standard mentioned above. The same is true in respect
of the obligation for States in apprehending and punishing those
responsible for the harm.
ii.

States' Obligation to Act with Due Diligence to Apprehend and
Punish those Responsible for the Acts

The principle that a State is under an obligation, in case of harm
caused by acts of third parties to apprehend and punish those
responsible for the acts also is part of the FPS standard. 86 Besides the
preventive obligation mentioned in the previous section, States thus
have also a remedial obligation, 87 or in the words of the Tribunal in El
Paso v. Argentina, "a duty of prevention and a duty of repression." 88
This "existence of a duty of repression" again is very much in line with
the obligations under customary international law described above, 89 in
particular in relation to the conduct of investigations into the events that
have caused damage. Again, the principle of due diligence applies:
States should take all reasonable measures a diligent State would take to
apprehend and punish those responsible. As the Claims Commission in
Janes explained "[t]he culprit is liable for having killed or murdered an
American national; the Government is liable for not having measured
up to its duty of diligently prosecuting and properly punishing the
offender."90 At the outset I should note that this obligation does not
comprise the obligation for the State to act in due diligence in respect of
the conduct of a potential trial or the access given to foreign investors to
their judicial system. Such obligations are covered in States' general
obligation to possess and make available to foreign investors a judicial
and administrative system capable of preventing acts, and of punishing
and apprehending those responsible for the act.
Some investment tribunals have dealt with this question, and in
doing so have confirmed these main principles. One of the few
examples is Wena Hotels v. Egypt, in which the Tribunal explicitly

86. MCLACHLAN QC, SHORE & WEINIGER, supra note 41, at 262, para. 7 .190;
NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 246, para 6.8.
87. See, e.g., Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/12, Award, para. 229 (June 7, 2012).
88. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 523 (Oct. 31, 2011).
89. See U.N. General Claims Comm'n, Reports of Arbitral, Lina Balderas de Diaz
(United Mexican States) v. United States ofAmerica, Decision, 106-108 (Nov. 16, 1926).
90. Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 87 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1925).
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argued that the failure by the State to take action against those
responsible for the forceful seizure of Wena's property constituted a
breach of FPS. 91 No specific mention was made of due diligence
however, but this is understandable considering the complete absence of
any action taken by the host State. Another example is Parkerings v.
Lithuania in which the claimant had alleged the police did not find the
authors responsible for damages to its materials. 92 The Tribunal
however considered that there had been an investigation and that there
was no evidence that the process of investigation was in breach of the
applicable BIT. In Frontier v. Czech Republic, the claimant inter alia
alleged that Czech officials charged with investigating the criminal
complaints, which had been lodged against certain individuals, "were
negligent and did not proceed in an even-handed manner." 93 The
Tribunal, after confirming the application of due diligence to such
claims, dismissed the claim having concluded that there was no
evidence that the police authorities had been negligent or acted in bad
faith. 94
This State obligation of course is closely related to the general
obligation of States to possess a judicial and administrative system
capable of preventing acts, and of apprehending and punishing those
responsible for the acts. Indeed, the obligation to apprehend and punish
those responsible for the acts will in the majority of the cases rest upon
an assessment whether the foreign investors had adequate access to the
legal system to seek redress for the acts, which have caused harm.
Several cases, such as Parkerings or Frontier, have thus applied both
obligations.
iii.

States' Obligation to Possess and Make Available to Foreign
Investors a Judicial and Administrative System Capable of
Preventing Acts, and ofPunishing and Apprehending Those
Responsible for the Act

It is accepted that, under customary international law, States have
an obligation of due diligence in the administration of justice, very often

91. Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Award,
paras. 82, 84, 94 (Dec. 8, 2000).
92. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 326 (Sept. 11 , 2007).
93. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para.
423 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/
case-documents/ita0342.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
94. Id. paras. 261, 436.
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also in relation to criminal acts towards the foreign investor. 95 This is
embodied in the FPS obligation to act with due diligence in
apprehending and punishing those responsible for the harm, but States'
obligations in this respect go beyond such understanding FPS standard.
States indeed more broadly have an obligation to possess, and make
available to foreign investors an adequate administrative and judicial
system capable of preventing acts, and of apprehending and punishing
those responsible for the acts. 96 I will focus here on the obligation to
possess, and make available to foreign investors an adequate
administrative and judicial system capable of apprehending and
punishing those responsible for the acts, and not on the obligation in
relation to the prevention of acts. The latter obligation, although
nothing would hinder its application in contemporary investment law
being part of customary law, has not been addressed by investment
tribunals.
This obligation has also been considered as part of the FPS
standard, 97 especially when it relates to acts of third parties that impair
the protection and security of foreign investors. As noted by the
Tribunal in Frontier: "In this Tribunal's view, where the acts of the host
state's judiciary are at stake, 'full protection and security' means that
the state is under an obligation to make a functioning system of courts
and legal remedies available to the investor."98 The obligation however
has also been considered more broadly to form part of the IMS or the
FET standard, especially when seen in relation to the obligations
relating to due process and the prohibition of a denial of justice, which
have been considered part of customary law. 99
This obligation, which indeed is close to the prohibition of denial
of justice, does not entail any due diligence obligation. The "due
diligence" standard here is inapplicable, and thus, one should not
generalize the application of the standard to the obligation to possess
and make available a judicial and administrative system capable of

95. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 246.
96. See generally JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 57
(Cambridge University Press 2005).
97. See Giuditta Cordero Moss, Full Protection and Security, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION 131, 144 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
98. Frontier Petroleum Services LTD. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 273 (Nov. 12, 2010).
99. Katia Yannaca Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent
Developments, in STANDARDS OF INVESTMENT PROTECTION 111, 144 (August Reinisch ed.,
2008); see also Loewen Grp., Inc. v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3, Award,
para. 129 (June 26, 2003).
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preventing acts and punish and apprehend those responsible for the
injuries caused. 100 The obligation to possess and make available a
functioning administrative and legal system is not tested against the due
diligence standard; due diligence applies only to the use by the State of
that system, not to the existence and availability of the system to a
foreign investor.
This is confirmed by several decisions of investment tribunals, but
these cases, although applying these principles, did not concern acts of
third parties which had caused physical damage to the
investor/investment. Rather, these cases concern the need for host
States to make available to foreign investors a functioning judicial
system for disputes with third parties more generally. While this may
seem surprising, it may at the same time simply be the application of the
customary principles to modem investment relations, where the State's
obligation to provide FPS not only covers protection from physical
harm, but also other types of harm caused by third parties. Whether this
is correct or not, will not be discussed here, and in any event, the same
principles apply, namely that due diligence is of no relevance to test that
State's obligation.
For instance, the Tribunal in Lauder considered in relation to the
FPS standard that,
The investment treaty created no duty of due diligence on the part of
the Czech Republic to intervene in the dispute between the two
The
companies over the nature of their legal relationships.
Respondent's only duty under the Treaty was to keep its judicial
system available for the Claimant and any entities he controls to bring
their claims, and for such claims to be properly examined and decided
in accordance with domestic and international law. 101

Because the Czech Republic had made a functioning system of
courts and legal remedies available to the claimant, who in fact had
made use of these possibilities, the Tribunal considered that there was
no breach of the FPS standard. 102
In Saluka, the Tribunal also considered that Saluka had been given
adequate access to justice to appeal certain decisions of Czech Republic
and that "nothing therefore emerges from the facts before the Tribunal
that would amount to a manifest lack of due process leading to a breach
of international justice and to a failure of the Czech Republic to provide
100. See discussion supra Section II.
101. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, para. 314 (Sept. 3, 2001)
(emphasis added).
102. Id.
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'full protection and security' to Saluka's investment." 103 Again, the due
diligence standard was not mentioned.
In similar wording as the Tribunal in Lauder, the Tribunal m
Parkerings considered that,
The Claimant also criticized the Respondent for its passivity when the
City of Vilnius breached the Agreement. However, the Arbitral
Tribunal considers that the investment Treaty created no duty of due
diligence on the part of the Respondent to intervene in the dispute
between the Claimant and the City of Vilnius over the nature of their
legal relationships.
The Respondent's duty under the Treaty was, first, to keep its judicial
system available for the Claimant to bring its contractual claims and,
second, that the claims would be properly examined in accordance
with domestic and international law by an impartial and fair court. 104

In Frontier, also mentioned above in relation to the obligation to
apprehend and punish, the claimant had alleged breaches of an FPS
clause because of the failure for certain state agencies "to 'exert
pressure' on the bankruptcy trustees to properly protect the interests of
Claimant," and the refusal by Czech courts to recognize and enforce an
arbitral award related to the bankruptcy of two companies in which the
claimant had invested. 105 The Tribunal, after citing Parkerings,
considered that the obligation to make a functioning system of courts
and legal remedies available to the investor implies that the Tribunal
may verify whether "the courts have acted in good faith and have
reached decisions that are reasonably tenable," 106 which is reminiscent
of the due diligence standard, but it is not clear where the Tribunal
derived this from. The Tribunal finally found that a judicial system was
available to the claimant, and that although Claimant had availed itself
of that system only with limited success, there was no breach of the
principle of full protection and security. 107 No mention was made of
due diligence, despite extensive references to the principle in the
Tribunals general comment on the standard, 108 and similar wording. It

103· Saluka Investments B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para.
485 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
104. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para. 333 (Sept. 11 , 2007).
105. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 454 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/
default/files/case-documents/ita0342. pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
106. Id. para. 273.
107. Id. para. 467.
108. Id. para. 270.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/1

80

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Vol. 42, No.

2015]

Host States' Due Diligence

345

is, however, unclear whether the Tribunal intended to convey the idea
that due diligence applies in this context as well. In relation to the
recognition of the arbitral awards, the Tribunal engaged in a rather
extensive review of the decision of Czech courts, but found that there
was no evidence that the court had "acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily,
or in bad faith." 109
3. FPS and Legal Protection and Security
Besides the requirement of providing physical protection and
security, certain tribunals have, in particular when the word "full"
precedes "protection and security," also extended the application of the
standard to "legal protection and security," making this understanding
of the standard in fact relatively similar to the FET protection
standard. 110 This understanding of the standard is different from the
idea that States should prevent acts of third parties and apprehend and
punish those responsible for harm caused to foreign investors, and the
obligation of States to possess and make available a functioning judicial
and administrative system, which are derived from the classic
customary norms on the protection of aliens.
Legal protection and security, in certain interpretations, in essence
would require States to refrain from taking legal or governmental acts or
measures that would hinder the proper functioning of the investment or
would contravene investor's rights. 111 It is thus an interpretation of the
standard that targets acts of the State itself, not of third parties. Certain
case law suggests that FPS requires host States to provide to foreign
investors a legal framework that guarantees legal protection to
investors. 112 As explained by the Tribunal in CME for example:

109. Id. para. 529.
110. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para.
613 (Sept. 13, 2001 ); Ceskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v. Slovak Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/97/4, Award, para. 170 (Dec. 29, 2004); Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para. 408 (July 14, 2006); PSEG Global,
Inc., North Am. Coal Corp., & Konya Ingin Electrik Dretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v.
Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, para. 258 (Jan. 19, 2007); Enron
Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award,
para. 323 (May 22, 2007); Compania de Aguas de! Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, para. 7.4.15 (Aug. 20,
2007); Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/22, Award, para. 729 (Jul. 24, 2008); National Grid v. Argentine Republic,
UNCITRAL, Award, para. 189 (Nov. 3, 2008).
111. See Schreuer, supra note 42, at 6-8; see also NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note
80, at 311.
112. Schreuer, supra note 42, at 10.
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The host State is obligated to ensure that neither by amendment of its
laws nor by actions of its administrative bodies is the agreed and
approved security and protection of the foreign investor's investment
withdrawn or devalued. 113

This goes further than the obligations explained above, but seems
to add little to the protection offered by FET. Moreover, tribunals are
not clear on the precise scope of such protection because these issues
often are discussed in conjunction with FET. 114 Although it has been
suggested that this in fact had already been accepted, although not
explicitly, by the ICJ in the ELSI case, 115 such reference only is partially
correct. The question in the ELSI case in that respect revolved around
the question of the length of judicial proceedings in relation to the
administrative requisition of the ELSI plant, a situation covered by the
obligation of States to possess and make available a functioning judicial
and administrative system. It did not concern the "amendment of laws,"
to use the CME terminology. Therefore, the question discussed by ELSI
related to the more customary norms relating to the obligation for States
to make available a functioning judicial system than to an FPS clause,
which would include a stable legal framework as part of legal protection
and security.
In any event, when deciding claims in relation to failures to
provide legal protection and security, arbitral awards contain little
references to due diligence. 116 This is understandable and logical, since
the obligation is one that relates to the acts of the State itself or a State
organ which would breach the FPS standard, not the responsibility of
the State to act in relation to acts of third parties which have caused
harm to the investor or investment. Such obligation, in terms of the
standard applied, thus is similar to the obligation to make available a
functioning court system, which is not tested against to the due
diligence standard. This is also why due diligence in relation to FET, to
which the notion of legal protection and security bears much
resemblance is limitedly applicable.

C. Due Diligence and Fair and Equitable Treatment
Due diligence is also occasionally referred to when assessing
alleged breaches of the fair and equitable treatment standard ("FET").

113. CME Czech Republic B.V, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, at para 613.
114. See NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 312.
115. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15, para. 109 (July
20).
116. See generally Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16.
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The fair and equitable treatment standard is a flexible and rather vague
concept.
However, it is generally accepted that the legitimate
expectations of the foreign investor forms a key element of fair and
equitable treatment, 117 as are obligations of due process, transparency,
freedom from coercion and harassment, stability, predictability and a
general duty of due diligence. 118 Fair and equitable treatment also
includes the prohibition against denial of justice. 119
Because FET requires at least treatment in accordance with the
IMS as understood in general international law, 120 there is here again a
certain overlap between the two standards, notably in relation to the due
diligence obligations of States in relation to FPS. As the Tribunal in
Lauder explained: "fair and equitable treatment is related to the
traditional standard of due diligence." 121 Also, there is a certain overlap
between FET and legal protection and security. 122 This explains why in
several cases, Tribunals have held that if a State breaches the fair and
equitable treatment standard, this automatically entails a breach of FPS,
when the latter is interpreted as legal protection and security, 123 or have
dealt with both standards at the same time. 124 In such cases, Tribunals

117. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 279.
118. Id. at 277; see TUDOR, supra note 5, at 157, 186; see also Katia Yannaca Small,
Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard: Recent Development, in STANDARDS OF
INVESTMENT PROTECTION l l l, 118 (August Reinisch ed., 2008).
119. See Swisslion 000 Skopje v. Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, ICSID
Case No. ARB/09/16, para. 262 (July 6, 2012); see also DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note
81, at 163.
120. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 277.
121. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 292 (Sept. 3,
2001).
122. TUDOR, supra note 5, at 157.
123. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, para.
408 (July 14, 2006). Note that Argentina filed a claim in annulment of the award, including
on the equation made by the tribunal between the two standards, and the lack of reasoning in
support of this. This was rejected by the Ad Hoc Committee on the ground that, even
though this finding may constitute an error in law, annulment of an award is not possible on
such a ground only. Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, paras. 183-84 (Sept.
1, 2009). See also Occidental Exploration and Prod. Co. v. Republic of Ecuador,
UNCITRAL Arb., LCIA Case No. UN3467, Final Award, para. 187 (July 1, 2004) ("The
Tribunal accordingly holds that the Respondent has breached its obligations to accord fair
and equitable treatment under Article II (3) (a) of the Treaty. In the context of this finding
the question of whether in addition there has been a breach of full protection and security
under this Article becomes moot as a treatment that is not fair and equitable automatically
entails an absence of full protection and security of the investment").
124. See Siemens A.G. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, Award,
paras. 303-403 (Jan. 17, 2007) (stating that the Tribunal deals with both standards of
treatment jointly, without distinguishing or identifying a specific standard necessary to
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have not identified a specific standard necessary to violate the FPS
standard of treatment, which may be explained by the fact that if the
tribunal has already found a breach of the FET standard, a finding that
the State has also breached it obligation to provide the investor or the
investment with legal protection and security is unlikely to affect the
outcome of the decision. 125
More generally, references to due diligence in Tribunal's
discussion of the FET standard are rather sparse, such references being
only made when the FET standard is jointly discussed with the FPS
standard.
Indeed, Tribunals refer most often to the "legitimate
expectation" part of the FET standard, rather than due diligence. It is
therefore difficult to understand how the general duty of due diligence
would operate under FET, besides situations which are also covered by
the FPS standard of treatment. There is however one case in which this
was discussed. In Suez, the Tribunal defended relying on the concept of
"legitimate expectations" rather than "due diligence" in applying the
FET standard, but did not rule out that "due diligence" forms part of
FET as well, as had been argued by Arbitrator Pedro Nikken in a
separate opinion:
A State may violate an investment treaty's fair and equitable treatment
standard in many ways and with many differing consequences. The
majority's finding in the present cases that Argentina's various actions
violated the fair and equitable treatment standard by frustrating the
Claimants' legitimate and reasonable expectations is by no means a
rejection of the conclusions of our esteemed colleague Professor
Nikken in his separate opinion to the effect that Argentina failed to
exercise due diligence in certain elements of its treatment of the
Claimants' investments. The majority agrees that Argentina failed to
exercise due diligence, as that concept is generally understood, and
that such failure resulted in a violation of the treaties' fair and
equitable treatment standard. As discussed earlier in this Decision, the
majority of the Tribunal finds that Argentina's actions also frustrated
the Claimants' legitimate expectations and it has concluded that it is
more appropriate to base its decision on that rationale. 126
In a separate opinion, Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, criticizing the use
violate that the FPS standard of treatment); Compania de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. v.
Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, paras. 7.4.15-17, 11.1 (Aug. 20,
2007). For a discussion, see OECD, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International
Investment Law 24 (OECD Working Papers on Int'l Inv., 2004/03), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investment-policy/WP-2004_ 3 .pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
125. NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 277.
126. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, para. 248 (July 30, 2010).
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of the "legitimate expectations" of foreign investors as a standard in
relation to FET, argued that generally, FET represents a standard of
conduct for States, which should be tested against a due diligence
standard:
However, even as a current minimum standard, and even within the
concept that has prevailed in recent doctrine and in decided cases in
the sense that fair and equitable treatment is different from and
independent of the customary minimum standard, it could never lose
its essence as a standard of conduct or conduct of the State with
respect to foreign investments, which should not automatically
translate into a source of subjective rights for investors. The BITs
contain a list of the States' obligations regarding their respective
investments, not a declaration of rights for investors. Regardless of
what is considered the autonomy of fair and equitable treatment with
respect to the minimum standard, fair and equitable treatment
represents the degree of due diligence that the States Parties to the
BIT mutually pledged to observe with respect to the investments from
nationals of both States. The language used in the French Treaty
reinforces this interpretation, since the reference to the principles of
international law can only be understood, at least, by prescribing an
obligation of due diligence. 127

Nikken argued further that the due diligence standard should be
assessed by reference to "the canons of good governance" and "the
propriety of the government 'of a reasonably well-organized modern
State."' 128

The idea developed by Nikken essentially is to return to the
customary norms on the treatment of aliens, which I have discussed
above, in order to define the content of FET. In doing so, Nikken
extracts the application of the due diligence standard in customary
norms, and transposes its application more generally to FET, which he
considers to be a norm, which applies only to the conduct of States, and
could not attract any obligation of result. If one considers FET to have
its roots in the customary norms relating to the treatment of aliens and
the IMS, the due diligence standard indeed would be applicable, at least
in certain situations, which are similar to those discussed in relation to
FPS. The problem however is that several tribunals, including the
Tribunal in Suez, - rightly or wrongly - have interpreted FET as going
beyond the IMS, in which case the due diligence becomes of little or
127. Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Separate Opinion of Arbitrator Pedro Nikken, para. 19 (July
30, 2010).
128. Id. para. 20 (internal footnotes omitted).
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subsidiary relevance, as is implicit in the reasoning of the Suez Tribunal
cited above. That is why there is little explicit reference to the standard
of due diligence in this context in arbitral decisions. Despite the
occasional references to due diligence standard in relation to FET in the
arguments raised by the parties, 129 discussions of the link between FET
and due diligence are uncommon in arbitral awards, which tend to limit
the use of the due diligence standard in relation to FET only to those
situations where there is an obvious overlap with FPS.

IV. THE CONTENTS OF THE DUE DILIGENCE STANDARD
How the due diligence standard is applied is still subject to much
debate and tribunals are often sparse in giving explanations in this
respect. In general, one could describe it as an obligation for the State
to take all measures it could reasonably be expected to take in order to
prevent the occurrence of damages to the foreign investor and its
investment. 130 In case law, what would be required from a 'diligent'
State is not explained in detail and sometimes even absent. 131 This is
not surprising since it is difficult to define the standard in abstract terms,
as was moreover acknowledged by the Seabed Disputes Chamber in its
Advisory Opinion on the Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons and Entities with Respect to Activities in the Area:
The content of "due diligence" obligations may not easily be described
in precise terms. Among the factors that make such a description
difficult is the fact that "due diligence" is a variable concept. It may
·
ch ange over time
.... 132

129. See for example the statement by the Claimant, that [the FET] standard requires
the government to exercise "vigilance and use due diligence within its political and legal
system to protect investments." Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/12, Award, para. 404 (July 14, 2006). Also, the argument raised by the Claimant in
Biwater Gau.ff that "[t]his series of public statements, according to BGT, was designed to
destroy, rather than maintain, confidence in City Water and inevitably undermined the
investment. This failure to manage the public expectations, and the actions taken to
undermine the public's confidence in City Water, together constitute a breach of the fair and
equitable treatment standard, in as much as they represent a failure to use due diligence in
the protection of BGT's investment, and the departure from BGT's legitimate expectation
that the government would at the very least maintain a neutral position and not tarnish City
Water' s image in the eyes of the public." Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United
Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22, Award, para. 552 (Jul. 24, 2008).
130. SALACUSE, supra note 52, at 217.
131. National Grid v. Argentine Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Award, para. 189 (Nov.
3, 2008).
132. Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with
Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion of Feb. 1, 2011, ITLOS
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When the due diligence standard is applied by investment
tribunals, references are made to whether the State has "reacted
reasonably, in accordance with the parameters inherent in a democratic
state," 133 whether the State had "adopt[ed] all reasonable measures to
protect assets and property from threats or attacks which may target
particularly foreigners or certain groups of foreigners," 134 the obligation
for the State to "take all measures necessary to ensure the full
enjoyment of protection and security of its investments," 135 whether acts
lead to a "manifest lack of due process leading to a breach of
international justice," 136 the requirement for the State to "undertak[e] all
possible measures that could be reasonably expected to prevent the
eventual occurrence of killings and property destructions," 137 whether
certain conduct "fell well below the standard of protection that the
Claimants could reasonably have expected," 138 the requirement for a
State to "take reasonable actions within its power to avoid injury when
it is, or should be, aware that there is a risk of injury," 139 or the rather
circularly formulated need for States "to act to prevent actions by third
parties that it is required to prevent." 140
Although difficult to define in abstract terms, a couple of elements
can be derived from the mentioned case law, in order to provide
contents to the notion of due diligence. First, reasonableness is a
common thread in determining which measures States should take. 141
The term however is, as is the due diligence standard itself, difficult to

Rep. 2011, para. 117.
133. Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003).
134. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 484
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
135. Am. Mfg. & Trading, Inc. v. Republic of Zaire, ICSID Case No. ARB/93/1, para.
6.08 (1997).
136. Saluka Invs. B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para. 493
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006).
137. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, Final Award, ICSID
Case No. ARB/87/3, para. 85 (1990).
138. Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID
Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, para. 448 (June I, 2009).
139. El Paso Energy Int'l Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15,
Award, para. 523 (Oct. 31, 2011).
140. E. Sugar B.V. (Neth.) v. Czech, SCC Case No. 088/2004, Partial Award, para.
203 (Mar. 27, 2007).
141. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 526 (7th ed.
2008); see generally Helge E. Zeitler, The Guarantee of "Full Protection and Security" in
Investment Treaties Regarding Harm Caused by Private Actors, 3 STOCKHOLM INT'L ARB.
REV. l (2005).
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determine in abstracto. Reasonableness indeed implies an evaluation of
the measure taken by reference to what could be expected from a State.
And this precisely is problematic to define, since what could be
expected from a State cannot be described in general terms, and depends
more on the question of whether this can be objectively defined (cf.
Section 5). This is why the application of the standard requires a caseby-case analysis. In this respect some indication of the contents of
"reasonableness" may be found in the national treatment standard, in the
sense that treatment may be considered unreasonable if it is less than is
normally provided to nationals. 142 Some tribunals have also posited the
need for States to acts "in accordance with the parameters inherent in a
democratic state," 143 in order to further delimit what could reasonably
be expected from a State.
Secondly, such an obligation only applies when the State has
knowledge of the situation, or should be aware of the risk of injury. A
certain conduct of a State can, quite logically, only be expected if the
State has knowledge of the situation, and the burden of proof in this
respect lies with the claimant. 144 A specific request for protection
therefore is not necessary, but it will of course not only establish proof
of the knowledge, but it will also more easily serve as proof of the bad
faith conduct of the State in the absence of any measure taken by the
State. This was the case, for example, in Wena discussed above. This
idea moreover is very much in line with due diligence as understood in
international environmental law, to the extent that a State has to act
diligently in the event of foreseeable harm. 145
Thirdly, a State cannot be considered to have acted diligently when
the State has acted in bad faith or has knowingly refused to take any
measures whatsoever. In that case, indeed, a State will not be able to
claim that, being aware of the situation, it has taken reasonable
measures to prevent the act or apprehend and punish those responsible
for the acts.

142. Zeitler, supra note 141, at 16.
143 . Tecnicas Medioambientales Teemed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case
No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, para. 177 (May 29, 2003).
144. Zeitler, supra note 141, at 14.
145. See Duncan French & Tim Stephens, ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in
International Law, First Report, INT'L L. Assoc. (Mar. 7, 2014), available at
http://www.ila-hq.org/en/study-groups/index.cfm/cid/l 045 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
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THE OBJECTIVITY OR SUBJECTIVITY OF THE STANDARD

A debate exists as to the assessment of due diligence in this
context, namely whether it should be subjectively or objectively
assessed. Is "all necessary means" objectively definable or should the
specific situation of the state be taken into consideration? This
discussion exceeds the application of the due diligence standard, 146 but I
will focus here only on the assessment criteria of the due diligence
standard. Max Huber, in the British Property in Spanish Morocco case
mentioned before, 147 explained in detail the due diligence standard to be
applied, advocating the use of a standard which takes account of the
circumstances of the situation and the means available to the State. This
statement is worth reproducing in extenso:
Is the territorial State exempt from responsibility if it did what we may
reasonably request from it, taking into account the actual situation? Or
is the State required to guarantee some degree of security, being
responsible for any failure to provide it?
To require such means to correspond to the circumstances would
impose on the State a burden which it will often not be able to bear.
Also, the argument that the vigilance to be exercised must match the
importance of the interests at stake has not been accepted. Vigilance,
which from the point of view of international law the state is required
to guarantee, can be characterized by applying by analogy the Roman
law term of diligentia quam in suis. This rule, consistent with the
overriding principle of the independence of States in their internal
affairs, in fact offers States, for their nationals, the degree of security
which they can reasonably expect. As long as the vigilance exercised
clearly falls below this level compared to nationals of a foreign State,
the latter is entitled to consider this to be an injury its interests which
should enjoy the protection of international law.
What has been said about the due diligence with respect to general
insecurity arising from the banditry, applies a fortiori to the other two
situations envisaged above, namely common crimes and rebellion. In
the first case, to require a vigilance beyond the diligentia quam in suis
would require the State to provide special security services to

146. See Nick Gallus, The "Fair and Equitable Treatment" Standard and the
Circumstances of the Host State, in EVOLUTION IN INVESTMENT TREATY LAW AND
ARBITRATION, 223 (Cambridge University Press, 2011); see also Nick Gallus, The Influence
of the Host State 's Level of Development on International Investment Treaty Standards of
Protection, 5 TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTE MANAGEMENT (2006).
147. See also Home Frontier & Foreign Missionary Soc'y of the United Brethren in
Christ (U.S. v. U.K.), 9 RI.A.A. 44 (1920).
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foreigners, which certainly would go beyond the scope of accepted
international obligations (with the exception of persons having a right
to special protection).
In the other case, that of the rebellion, etc., responsibility is limited
because the public authority is faced with an exceptional
opposition. 148

Huber distinguished between the due diligence obligations of
States in relation to acts committed by individuals against other States,
which indeed requires States to exercise a specific degree of vigilance
which may exceed the means available to the State, 149 and the due
diligence obligation of States towards aliens. Huber supported the use
of the diligentia quam in suis standard, which in essence requires States
to act respecting the same standard as they ordinarily observe in relation
to their own affairs. 150 This boils down to a culpa in concreto. 151 This
standard may be contrasted to the standard of a diligens paterfamilias,

148. Original in French ('L'Etat territorial est-il exonere, s'il a fait ce qu'on peut
raisonnablement lui demander, en tenant compte de sa situation effective? Ou est-il tenu de
garantir un certain degre de securite, etant responsable de l 'incapacite eventuelle de
l'assurer? ( ... ] Exiger que ces moyens soient a la hauteur des circonstances, serait imposer
a l'Etat des charges auxquelles il ne pourrait souvent pas faire face. Aussi, la these que la
vigilance a exercer doit correspondre a l'importance des interets enjeu, n'a-t-elle pu
s'imposer. La vigilance qu'au point de vue du droit international l'Etat est tenu de garantir,
peut etre caracterisee, en appliquant par analogie un terme du droit romain, comme une
diligentia quam in suis. Cette regle, conforme au principe primordial de l'independance des
Etats dans leurs affaires interieures, offre en fait aux Etats, pour leurs ressortissants, le degre
de securite auquel ils peuvent raisonnablement s'attendre. Du moment que la vigilance
exercee tombe manifestement au-dessous de ce niveau par rapport aux ressortissants d'un
Etat etranger determine, ce dernier est en droit de se considerer comme lese dans des interets
qui doivent jouir de la protection du droit international. Ce qui vient d'etre <lit au sujet de la
vigilance due par rapport a l'insecurite generale resultant de l'activite des brigands,
s'applique a plus forte raison aux deux autres situations envisagees ci-dessus, savoir: la
criminalite de droit commun et la rebellion. Dans le premier de ces cas, une vigilance
poussee plus loin que la diligentia quam in suis imposerait a l'Etat l'obligation d'organiser
un service de surete special pour les etrangers, ce qui depasserait certainement le cadre des
obligations internationales reconnues (en dehors des cas ou ii s'agit de personnes jouissant
en droit d'une protection speciale). Dans l'autre hypothese, celle de la rebellion, etc., la
responsabilite est limitee parce que la puissance publique se trouve en presence d'une
resistance exceptionnelle.' - translation by the author). See British Claims in the Spanish
Zone of Morocco, 2 RI.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain 1925).
149. See Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 31.
150. AARON X. FELLMETH & MAURICE HORWITZ, GUIDE TO LATIN IN INTERNATIONAL
LA w
(2011 ),
available
at
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/
9780195369380.001.0001/acref-9780195369380 (last visited Mar. 30, 2015); Herbert
Hausmaninger, Diligentia Quam In Suis: A Standard of Contractual Liability from Ancient
Roman to Modern Soviet Law, 18 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 179, 180 (1985).
151. REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 210 (1996).
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or culpa in abstracto, 152 which requires States to act under a certain
Diligens
objective standard, namely that of a pater familias.
paterfamilias leaves no room for taking the specific means of the State
into consideration, since it requires States to act as a reasonable State
only, the State equivalent of the bonus pater familias. 153
Certain authors have argued that international law adheres,
generally, to the diligens paterfamilias standard, 154 which is also
supported by certain old cases. 155 In his 1955 Hague Academy Lecture,
Freeman noted that the standard of due diligence requires "nothing
more nor less than the reasonable measures of prevention which a welladministered government could be expected to exercise under similar
circumstances." 156 This is an "objective" assessment criterion.
The objective standard has however been rejected by several
scholars, and arbitrators, which have instead relied on the "subjective
due diligence standard," taking into consideration the means at the
disposal of the state, and the specific circumstances present in the
state. 157 Brownlie for instance, following Max Huber, supported the
Brownlie
application of the diligentia quam in suis standard.
considered that, while no all-encompassing definition of due diligence
exists, the applicable standard is the standard ordinarily observed by the
particular state in its own affairs, which means that variations in the
wealth between States can be taken into account. 158 This is in line with
the application of the principle other fields of international law, such as
international environmental law. The ILC, in its Draft Articles on
Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, for
instance considers that the "economic level of States is one of the
factors to be taken into account in determining whether a State has
complied with its obligation of due diligence," in relation to States
obligation of prevention, noting at the same time that "a State's
economic level cannot be used to dispense the State from its
obligation." 159

152. Id.
153. Cf Hausmaninger, supra note 150, at 180.
154. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, supra note 16, at 41.
155. See, e.g., H. G. Venable (U.S v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 229 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.
Comm'n 1927) (referring to governmental action "so far short of international standards that
every reasonable and impartial man would readily recognize its insufficiency").
156. Alwyn V. Freeman, Responsibility of States for Unlawful Acts of Their Armed
Force, 88 RCADI 1955-11, 267, 277-78 (Leiden, Sijthoff, 1956).
157. For an overview, see NEWCOMBE & PARADELL, supra note 80, at 310, para. 6.44.
158. BROWNLIE, supra note 141, para. 77.
159. U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) Draft Articles on Prevention
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Investment tribunals have only very sparsely addressed the
question, and only in relation to the application of due diligence under
the FPS standard of treatment. Case law thus is very limited on this
specific question, which is also the consequence of the little information
Tribunals usually give in relation to what the due diligence standard
specifically entails. AAPL v. Sri Lanka is an exception, in that the
Tribunal spent much time on elaborating its understanding of the
standard. The Tribunal noted
A number of other contemporary international law authorities noticed
the "sliding scale", from the old "subjective" criteria that takes into
consideration the relatively limited existing possibilities of local
authorities in a given context, towards an "objective" standard of
vigilance in assessing the required degree of protection and security
with regard to what should be legitimately expected to be secured for
foreign investors by a reasonably well organized modem State.
As expressed by Professor FREEMAN, in his 1957 Lectures at the
Hague Academy of International Law:
The "due diligence" is nothing more nor less than the reasonable
measures of prevention which a well-administered government could
be expected to exercise under similar circumstances.
According to modem doctrine, the violation of international law
entailing the State's responsibility has to be considered constituted by
"the mere lack or want of diligence", without any need to establish
malice or negligence. 160

Despite references to the "old 'subjective' criteria" of due
diligence in that case, more recent cases suggest that the applicable
standard is a subjective due diligence standard. In Lauder, the Tribunal
considered that the FPS obligation "obliges the Parties to exercise such
due diligence in the protection of foreign investment as reasonable
under the circumstance." 161 In CME, the Tribunal also explained "a
government is only obliged to provide protection which is reasonable in
the circumstances." 162 The sole arbitrator, Jan Paulsson, in Pantechniki
v. Albania also unambiguously adopted the subjective assessment
method, distinguishing "physical protection and security" from "denial
ofTransboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, noted in commentary to Article 3, para.
13.
160. Asian Agricultural Products Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3, Final Award, para. 77 (June 27, 1990) (internal references omitted).
161. Lauder v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL Arb., Final Award, para. 310 (Sept. 3,
2001).
162. CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Partial Award, para.
353 (Sept. 13, 2001).
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of justice," the latter not requiring to take into account the resources of
the State, but the former allowing to take account of the resources of the
State:
A failure of protection and security is to the contrary likely to arise in
an unpredictable instance of civic disorder which could have been
readily controlled by a powerful state but which overwhelms the
limited capacities of one which is poor and fragile. There is no issue
of incentives or disincentives with regard to unforeseen breakdowns of
public order; it seems difficult to maintain that a government incurs
international responsibility for failure to plan for unprecedented
trouble of unprecedented magnitude in unprecedented places. The
case for an element of proportionality in applying the international
standard is stronger than with respect to claims of denial of justice. 163

In Frontier however, the Tribunal questioned in an obiter dictum
whether the principle posited by the Tribunal in Pantechniki is
applicable in situations not involving violence, without firmly
establishing that an objective standard applies. 164
Despite these ambiguities, the preferable standard is without doubt
diligentia quam in suis, when one deals with due diligence in relation to
physical protection and security. As noted earlier, the application of
due diligence in other fields of international law, notably environmental
law, allows taking into account the economic and other capabilities of a
State. This moreover conforms to the relevance of investor conduct
when making the investment, and the expectations of investors. As
noted by the Tribunal in Parkerings for instance:
The investor will have a right of protection of its legitimate
expectations provided it exercised due diligence and that its legitimate
expectations were reasonable in light of the circumstances.
Consequently, an investor must anticipate that the circumstances could
change, and thus structure its investment in order to adapt it to the
potential changes of legal environment. 165
Which measures a State ought to have taken, as explained in
Section 4, indeed has to be determined by reference to what can be
expected from a State, and it would be difficult to accept that a State
should provide protection and security to investors beyond the capacity
163. Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. Republic of Albania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/07/21, Award, para. 77 (July 30, 2009).
164. Frontier Petroleum Servs. Ltd. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award,
para. 271 (Perm. Ct. Arb. Nov. 12, 2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/ita0342.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
165. Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8,
Award, para 333. (Sept. 11, 2007).
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of the State to do so. As noted by Huber, admitting the contrary would
require States to organize a special security service for foreign
investors, 166 which to date is only accepted in relation to certain specific
categories of protection individuals in international law, such as foreign
officials.

VI. COMPENSATION FOR BREACHES OF THE DUE
DILIGENCE STANDARD
As noted in relation to the customary rules, the responsibility of
States for breaching their obligations to exercise due diligence in
preventing an injury caused to a foreign investor or investment, or for
failing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing the third
party responsible for that injury, is not an "indirect responsibility" of the
State for the act committed. The act attributable to the State is not the
act that has caused harm, but rather the failure to exercise due diligence.
As a consequence, in principle, the compensation awarded to a
foreign investor should be to provide reparation for the damage caused
by the failure of the State to exercise due diligence, not to provide
reparation for the damage cause by the act of the third party, as argued
by Max Huber in the British Property in Morocco case 167 and the
Commissioner in Janes. 168 As a consequence, "the measure of damages
for which the Government should be liable can not be computed by
merely stating the damages caused by the private delinquency of
Carbajal." 169 These principles still stand today. 170 This does not imply
that the compensation awarded may not take account of the damages
caused by the act, but this will depend on the circumstances of each
case. Indeed, in principle, the reparation should first of all remedy the
obligation breached, which is not the act of the individual, but the
obligation of the State to prevent an injury caused to an alien or
apprehend and punish the individual responsible for that injury.
The practice of arbitral tribunals does not reveal much in this
respect. First, findings of violations of the failure of a State only to
exercise due diligence in relation to FPS, IMS or even FET are almost

166.
1925).
167.
168.
Comm'n
169.
170.

British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco, 2 R.I.A.A. 644 (U.K.-Spain
Id. at 709-10.
Laura M. B. Janes et al. (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 88 (Mex.-U.S. Gen. Cl.

1925).
Id. at 89.
See Crawford & Olleson, supra note 15, at 454-55.
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completely absent. In the majority of the cases, such findings are
accompanied by findings of violations of other treaty provisions as well,
such as those relating to the prohibition of unlawful expropriations, or
other aspects of the FET standard. Then, a finding of a violation of the
due diligence obligations of States does not influence the outcome of
the decision, nor the calculation of compensation. 171 Secondly, findings
of violations of FPS alone are relatively scarce, at least when compared
to findings of violations of other treaty standards. 172
In AAPL however, the Tribunal found that the State had failed to
exercise due diligence in launching an armed attack causing the
destruction of the farm owed by Claimant, and decided to calculate the
compensation based on the loss suffered by the Claimant by the
destruction of the property, although the Tribunal had not found that the
armed forces of the host State were directly responsible for the
destruction of the farm. 173 This may seem surprising. However, since
the legal basis for equating the compensation to the effective losses
suffered from the act itself, and not from the failure to exercise due
diligence is not explicitly mentioned, this decision may be read as
confirming the principle that the compensation awarded may be
equivalent to the damage caused by the act, but that this is not
automatically the case. In fact, when the failure to exercise due
diligence is applied to a failure to prevent the occurrence of harm, such
decision is perfectly arguable. However, when the failure to exercise
due diligence relates to apprehending or punishing the individual
responsible for the act that has caused damage, it seems more
appropriate to calculate the compensation differently from the damage
caused by the act itself, in line with the principles explained above.

171. See Biwater Gauff_(Tanzania) Ltd., v. United Republic of Tanzania, ICSID Case
No. ARB/05/22, Award, para 731 (Jul. 24, 2008) (where the Tribunal found violation of
legal FPS, but acts in question were not considered to have 'caused any quantifiable
financial or commercial loss'); see also Waguih Elie George Siag & Clorinda Vecchi v.
Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/15, Award, paras. 448, 450 (June l,
2009) (the Tribunal found violation of FPS standard and due diligence obligation of State,
but since it also found the State had made an unlawful expropriation, breached FET standard
and subjected the investment to unreasonable measures, there was no influence on
compensation). Further, the Tribunals found that a violation of FET entailed a violation of
FPS, and again, there was no influence on the calculation of compensation. See Azurix
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12, Award, paras 408-09 (July 14,
2006); see also Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, Decision on Liability, paras 178-80 (July 30, 2010).
172. For instance, in Lauder, Saluka, or Rumeli Telekom, no violation of the due
diligence obligations of the State in relation to FPS was found.
173. L. F. H. Neer & Paulene Neer (U.S. v. Mexico), 4 R.I.A.A. 62 (Gen. Claims
Comm'n 1926).
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CONCLUSION
This article has discussed the role due diligence plays in
contemporary international investment law; based not only on recent
practice in this respect, but also on the historical roots of the current
protection standards in international investment law. Such historical
overview indeed has been useful to describe the contours of the
application of due diligence in several standards of treatment, such as
FPS, the IMS and FET.
The article has demonstrated that especially in relation to FPS, due
diligence performs an important function. This function can be traced
back to the historical interpretations of the obligations of States in
respect to the treatment of aliens more generally. In particular, while
case law suggests that the acts of State organs, which result in a
deprivation of the protection and security to be guaranteed to aliens, and
thus foreign investors and their investments, are wrongful as such
without the need to enquire whether the State organ in question was
diligent or not, the principle of due diligence applies fully to the state's
duty to protect foreign investments from acts of third parties. Indeed,
FPS requires the State to exercise due diligence in providing physical
protection and security to foreign investments and investors from acts of
third parties, which does not entail any form of strict liability for the
host State. Such obligation also applies to the host State generally,
including in cases of armed conflict, civil strife, revolution or natural
disasters. The principle that a State is also under an obligation, in case
of harm caused by acts of third parties to apprehend and punish those
responsible for the acts, is considered part of the FPS standard, which
implies that States should take all reasonable measures a diligent State
would take, to apprehend and punish those responsible.
Whether viewed as part of the FPS or the IMS, it is clear that
States have an obligation of due diligence in the administration of
justice, also very often in relation to criminal acts towards the foreign
investor. This principle is similar to the obligation of due diligence as
understood in FPS, particularly in relation to the State's obligation to
act with due diligence in apprehending and punishing those responsible
for the harm. However, it applies more generally to making a
functioning judicial system available to foreign investors.
The
obligation in making available an adequate judicial system is however
not assessed by applying the due diligence standard.
In relation to the FET, this article has argued that because the FET
requires at least treatment in accordance with the minimum standard of
treatment as understood in general international law, there is a certain
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/1
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overlap between the two standards, notably in relation to due diligence.
References to due diligence in Tribunal's discussion of the FET
standard are rather sparse, such references being made only when the
FET standard is jointly discussed with the FPS standard.
As noted in relation to the customary rules, the responsibility of
States for breaching their obligations to exercise due diligence in
preventing an injury caused to a foreign investor or investment, or for
failing to exercise due diligence in apprehending and punishing the third
party responsible for that injury, is not an "indirect responsibility" of the
State for the act committed. The act attributable to the State is not the
act that has caused harm, but rather the failure to exercise due diligence.
In respect to the question of how the due diligence standard is
applied, although it is not only impossible to define the standard in
abstract terms, Tribunals require States to have knowledge of the
situation and to react to that situation by taking reasonable measures.
What could be expected from a State also cannot be described in general
terms, and depends on the question whether this can be objectively
defined. In that respect, I have argued that the preferable standard is
without doubt diligentia quam in suis, which allows the taking into
consideration of the specific circumstances of the cases and the means
available to the State.
As far as compensation is concerned, this article has explained that
compensation awarded to a foreign investor should be to provide
reparation for the damage caused by the failure of the State to exercise
due diligence, not to provide reparation for the damage cause by the act
of the third party. The practice of arbitral tribunals however does not
address this question in detail, notably because findings of violations of
the failure of a State to exercise due diligence in relation to FPS, IMS,
or even FET only are almost completely absent. There is however no
reason to depart from this principle, established since long in customary
law, and in line with the wrongful act in question, which is not the act
that has caused harm, but rather the failure to provide protection and
security.
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INTRODUCTION
A. Prelude-Chevron Case and the Challenge of Governing
Transnational Corporations Through "Soft Law"

After eighteen years of litigation, on February 14, 2011 an
Ecuadorian judge ordered the oil conglomerate Chevron to pay eighteen
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billion dollars in damages, "the largest judgment ever awarded in an
environmental lawsuit," 1 in the oil contamination case Afectados ("the
Affected") v. Chevron. 2 The judgment was affirmed on appeal a year
later, 3 yet the case is far from over. The liable parties remain to be
called to account and the environmental damage is still to be remedied.
Chevron no longer has considerable assets in Ecuador; 4 it has lodged an
appeal with the Ecuadorian Supreme Court, and a United Nations
Commission on International Trade ("UNCITRAL") arbitration before
the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") in The Hague has
witnessed a number of interim awards in favor of Chevron. 5 In the
media, the case has been described as a local plaintiffs' apparently
fruitless legal struggle in a society with a corrupt judiciary and political
and economic dependence on foreign oil companies. 6
The Chevron case evidences the difficulties in properly governing
transnational corporations ("TNCs"), sometimes even to prevent the
most egregious of abuses. Multiple international and domestic laws
may be applicable, but that often seems detrimental rather than helpful.
Weaknesses in the content, implementation and enforcement of laws
may allow the politically and economically powerful parties to
dominate the situation. Thus, in cases such as Chevron, alternative
means of governance are desperately needed to address the failures of
1. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Reversal of Fortune, NEW YORKER (Jan. 9, 2012),
available at http://feeds.newyorker.com/magazine/2012/01 /09/reversal-of-fortune-patrickradden-keefe (last visited Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter Reversal of Fortune].
2. See generally Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2011) Trial No. 2003-0002,
Provincial
Court
of
Justice
of
Sucumbios
(Ecuador),
available
at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2011-02-14-Aguinda-v-ChevronTexaco-judgementEnglish. pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
3. See generally Aguinda y Otros v. Chevron Corp., (2012) Case No. 2011-0106,
Provincial
Court
of
Justice
of
Sucumbios
(Ecuador),
available
at
http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-01-03-appeal-decision-english.pdf (last visited
Apr. 1,2015).
4. See Patrick Radden Keefe, Why Chevron Will Settle in Ecuador, NEW YORKER (Jan.
4, 2012), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2012/01 /whychevron-will-settle-in-ecuador.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
5. See generally Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador
(U.S. v. Ecuador), Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2013) ("Fourth Interim Award on
Interim Measures"); Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador
(U.S. v. Ecuador), Case No. 2009-23 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2012) ("Third Interim Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility"). The case is still pending at the moment of publication.
Chevron's main argument is that its due process rights were denied before the Ecuadorian
courts because of undue influence on the judiciary by the Ecuadorian government. The
arbitral tribunal still has to decide on the merits whether the issuing of the Ecuadorian
judgment was in violation of the investment agreement.
6. See Reversal a/Fortune, supra note 1.
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classic international and domestic laws in protecting the environment
and human rights. "Soft law" is then often hailed as the remedy.
Chevron, for example, is indeed an active participant in several
voluntary initiatives and schemes, such as the Social Responsibility
Group of the International Petroleum Industry Environmental
Conservation Association ("IPIECA"). 7 Chevron was also one of the
companies consulted during the drafting of UN Special Representative
John Ruggie's UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 8
Proposing "soft law" as the solution in more effectively governing
transnational giants such as Chevron leads, however, to a fundamental
conundrum: it remains quite unclear what the notion of "soft law"
entails, and why and how it could be able to provide an adequate policy
response. The objective of this paper therefore is to clarify the
discussion through a detailed theoretical analysis of "soft law," and to
test the findings in the practically pivotal area of the environmental and
human rights conduct of TN Cs.

B. The Thesis and the Objectives
This paper claims, using the fields of environmental protection and
human rights as examples, that "soft law" is conceptually and
substantively inadequate and misleading in filling the voids left by
classic "hard law" in governing TNCs. A reconceptualization of, and a
more systematic approach to, soft instruments is required if they are to
play a constructive part in filling the void.
The paper proceeds in five steps to prove its thesis and to propose
remedies to the identified shortcomings. The first objective is to show
that what has been called classic "hard law" - state laws and the formal
sources of international law - seems to fail in adequately governing
TNCs. Second, the paper explains why other, "soft law" instruments
are believed to address the void, but reveals as the third step that the
current way of understanding such other, "soft law" instruments is
inadequate and too general for assessing the successes or failures of
such a very diverse group of instruments. The paper therefore seeks as
its fourth objective to create and assess better methods for approaching
the void, and proposes to that account a tool that Fe-conceptualizes and
systemizes the soft law discourse. Fifth, preliminary tests of such a new

7. See INT'L PETROLEUM INDUS. ENVTL. CONSERVATION Ass'N (IPIECA), available at
http://www.ipieca.org/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
8. Obviously, the "soft law" instruments cited here date from after the relevant facts of
the Chevron case.
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tool are conducted by applying it to practical case studies of TNC
behavior in the fields of environmental and human rights protection.
The paper concludes by showing how the notion of "soft law" is not
only obscure and inadequate, as has been previously contended by other
scholars, but that it also is conceptually deceptive in ways that risk
leading towards ineffective policy instruments. "Softness" on the other
hand does seem instructive for better understanding and reacting to the
challenges of managing transnational corporations.

I. THE CHALLENGE OF GOVERNING TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS ("TNCS")

A. Business Across the Borders
The first objective of this paper is to show how classic "hard law"
seems to fail in adequately governing transnational corporations
(TNCs). The U.N.'s Special Representative on business and human
rights has stated that TNCs come in many varieties on a scale from little
to almost complete reliance on transnational activities. 9
The
qualification of a company as a TNC is thus not based on its legal
personality; corporations of various legal forms can be included in the
category of TN Cs. More important than an undisputable definition of a
TNC is, however, that there are important factual and regulatory
problems that arise as a consequence of corporations pursuing activities
in multiple jurisdictions. Globalization of the marketplace has driven
companies to operate across borders. Many companies have become
TNCs, and many TNCs have become global actors. This is no longer
limited to developed country based businesses; numerous TN Cs are
Asian or South American companies. With the emergence of multiple
trade areas ( such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
("ASEAN") or the Andean Community in Latin-America) the TNC has
truly "gone global."

B. The Sanctuary of Multiple Jurisdictions
The activities of TNCs are spread among the territories of many
so-called host states. In the majority of cases, and often due to

9. See Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the U.N. Human
Rights Council, 8th Sess., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and
Human Rights, para. 6-7, 15, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John G. Ruggie)
[hereinafter Ruggie].
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requirements in domestic laws, they are nonetheless based in a single
home state. In contrast to domestically operating businesses, however,
they do not fall under the complete control of a single jurisdiction, not
even that of their home state. They are partially subject to the domestic
legal systems of their home state and of all the host states in which parts
of their fragmented, networked activities take place or have effects.
Domestic laws are to an increasing extent harmonized by
international law, such as customary law and conventions. On many
issues, however, domestic legal systems still vary considerably, in
particular in the implementation and enforcement of law. This variance
may create a void: activities in a particular jurisdiction risk escaping the
(legal) consequences that would and should have followed.
A
hazardous part of waste treatment activities may be located in a country
where such activities are not subject to (stringent) standards, for
example, or labor-intensive work in the textile sector is set up in a
country where labor laws permit longer working hours, or the part of
operations that is subject to high taxes in the company's de facto home
state is formally relocated to a tax haven.
Innovative judges may find ways around the issue of multiple
jurisdictions with different substantive standards. In some of the recent
judgments from the lower court and the court of appeals in the Chevron
case, for example, the judges were not held back by the fact that neither
environmental standards nor legal protection of the areas belonging to
indigenous people existed in Ecuador at the time of the tort. Yet the
judges reasoned that it was enough that "the existence of damages has
been verified," combined with "the right to obtain compensation for
damages suffered in its various forms, which was recognized by the
Civil Code well before the start of Texpet [Texaco, predecessor of
Chevron] activities in the Amazon." 10 Thus, a specific prohibition of an
environmental harm was not deemed necessary to establish a tort. In
various Wes tern jurisdictions, arguments are being forwarded that the
home state standards should apply to "their" TNCs' activities in the host
states as well. 11
10. Aguinda, Case No. 2011-0106, para. 9 (further arguing by the Appeals Court found
"the fact that there is no express mention of environmental damages in references to
contingent damages in the Civil Code does not mean that environmental damages cannot be
contingent damages, nor does it mean that the legislature wished to exclude the possibility
that environmental damages could be considered to be contingent damages.").
11.
See generally Jonathan Verschuuren, Overcoming the Limitations of
Environmental Law in a Globalised World, in A HANDBOOK OF GLOBALISATION AND
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, SECOND EDITION: NATIONAL GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS IN A
GLOBAL ARENA 616 (Frank Wijen et al. eds., 2012).
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C. Resistance Towards the Implementation and Reform of
Domestic Law and International Law
The opportunities of globalization have made many transnationally
operating companies extremely wealthy, superseding in economic terms
many nation states. The largest TNCs have become especially
influential economic and political players, both in the various domestic
jurisdictions where they operate, as well as on the global level. For
example, many developing countries rely on TNCs to use their
resources. The TNCs may thereby have a clear advantage over local
actors in influencing the creation or implementation of law by domestic
authorities, although this will vary case by case.
Unlike local
companies, TNCs can often rather easily shift their activities from one
country to another, should a local government advocate for instance to
more stringently enforce costly environmental standards. TNCs are also
often backed by Bilateral Investment Treaties ("BITs"), concluded
between their home state and their host state. The BITs may allow the
TN Cs to threaten to sue the host state for expropriation, should the
enforcement of laws risk harming the company economically. Such a
BIT is also the basis for Chevron's claim before the PCA in the
Chevron case. 12
TNCs-especially when acting together through sectorial global
business associations or high-profile events such as the World
Economic Forum in Davos 13 - are also a powerful force influencing
the decisions made in international organizations and diplomatic
negotiations. The scope of the TN Cs' organizations gives them a global
overview and a strategic grip of the policy discourse that particularly the
developing states may struggle to match. This power may allow the
TN Cs to create or sustain a void on the global level, which moves or
keeps parts of the corporations' operations beyond the reach of the
domestic and international legal orders.

12. See generally Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty, U.S.-Ecuador, Aug. 27, 1993,
103-15 (1997).
13. The publicly visible tip of the proverbial iceberg of this political influence
occurred at the yearly World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. See Ellen Paine, The
Road to the Global Compact: Corporate Power and the Battle Over Global Public Policy at
the United Nations, GLOBAL POL'Y FORUM (Oct. 2000), available at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/GPF_The_road_to_the_global_compact_October_
2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015). Incidentally, the 1999 Forum was also one of the
earliest occasions where the UN Global Compact was formally and informally discussed.
See id.

s. TREATY Doc. No.
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D. Domestic Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs -Host
State and Home State Dimensions
The ability of the TNCs to escape full regulatory control and to
exert political pressure on decision makers clearly creates the risk of a
legal void. 14 This paper defines a legal void as a regulatory situation in
which a TNC behavior, permitted in a host state, would have been in
violation of the laws of the TNC home state or of international law. The
legal void may be viewed as part of a (wider) policy void, whereby the
public policy objective on the particular question is not reached.
The legal void reveals itself in a slightly different fashion in the
home states (where the company is incorporated) than in the host states
(where the TNCs operate). As De Feyter submits, "developing and
transition countries [i.e. often the 'host states'] compete to attract
foreign investment and technology to exploit natural resources, and are
often reluctant to impose human rights and other conditions on foreign
companies." 15 In the case of developing country host states, there thus
may be a system of laws that is applicable-the problem is that it either
sets very low standards (in which case the legal void is qualitative) or it
does not properly apply the higher standards (in which case the legal
void is one of enforcement).
On the other hand, De Feyter continues, "[t ]he home state is faced
with the difficulty that, in principle, the reach of domestic law is limited
to its own territory." 16 To overcome the limits of home country
jurisdiction, some states exceptionally recognize universal or extraterritorial civil jurisdiction over torts outside their territory. 17 However,
the potential of such extra-territorial jurisdiction is for various reasons
quite limited. 18 Suffice it to say here that international law allows extraterritorial (or universal) jurisdiction only for a few crimes under
international customary law. These offenses may be enforced by any
state(s) regardless of their ties with the offense. 19

14. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights speak of "governance
gaps created by globalization." See Ruggie, supra note 9, at 3.
15. Koen De Feyter, Globalisation and Human Rights, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN A GLOBAL CONTEXT 51, 81-82 (Felipe Gomez Isa & Koen De Feyter eds., 2009).
16. Id. at 82 ( emphasis added).
17. See generally Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011).
18. See generally Donald F. Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition
of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 142-63 (2006).
19. Universal civil jurisdiction of U.S. courts remains nonetheless a tool of at least
some usefulness for the most gruesome abuses that remain unprosecuted in the states where
they occur.
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Another possibility to overcome the home state problem is the
active nationality principle, which allows a state to exercise prescriptive
and adjudicative jurisdiction over its nationals for offenses they commit
abroad. In practice, however, states are not likely to use this option
more than sparsely, and have done so in the past only for a limited
number of crimes. An important reason for this is that it conflicts with
competing jurisdictional claims of other states, primarily the
territoriality principle. Another reason is that international law does not
allow states to enforce such jurisdiction abroad, for example to collect
evidence or to make arrests.

E. International Law and the Legal Void in Regulating TNCs
If there is a void in domestic law regulating TNC activities, one
might assume that international law could better succeed in addressing
this distinct group of actors. Surely international law, which can
potentially contain universal or near-universal rules, 20 could help in
filling the void left by domestic law. In addition, it could be argued that
the international legal order is positioned 'close' to the transnational
sphere, where TNCs themselves operate.
There are four ways in which international human rights law may
apply or be applied to TNCs 21 : (1) it can be applied directly, (2) almost
directly, (3) transposed into national law or (4) applied indirectly. In
international environmental law, the picture is somewhat different,
because directly and almost directly applicable international law is
practically non-existent. The application of most international law to
individuals depends on transposition or indirect application.
Particularly those two means of application do not overcome a number
of obstacles to effectively regulating TNCs through international law.
As noted earlier, the matter is elaborated here through the examples of
international environmental and human rights law.

1. Lack ofInternational Law (almost) Directly and Specifically
Applicable to TNCs
In contrast to states and intergovernmental organizations, TN Cs are
generally not considered subjects of international law, and are as such

20. See generally Jonathan Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT'L L.
529 (1993).
21. This section uses the taxonomy suggested by John H. Knox. See generally John H.
Knox, Horizontal Human Rights Law, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (2008).
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not directly bound by most of it. 22 TNCs entertain only certain rights
and have a limited set of obligations23 on the basis on international law
directly. These rights and obligations are similar to those directly
applicable to all private actors. 24 Direct applicability of international
law entails that both national judicial organs of home, host and
potentially other states, as well as international tribunals, enforce the
international law obligations directly, even without such provisions
being transposed into national law. 25 The direct applicability of
international law to the conduct26 of TN Cs as private actors is limited to
a few international human rights related crimes, such as genocide and
crimes against humanity, based on customary international law. 27 As
mentioned above, universal jurisdiction to enforce such obligations is
the least controversial.
There is another set of obligations that, in Knox's terminology, is
applied "almost directly" to private actors. These obligations are not
directly applicable, but they specifically instruct states-including
dualist states-how to place requirements on private actors and how to
enforce them through domestic laws. The transposition of such
provisions is thus strictly predetermined. 28 The Convention Against
Torture 29 and the Convention on Child Labor30 contain examples of
22. P.A. NOLLKAEMPER, KERN VAN HET INTERNATIONAAL PUBLIEKRECHT 58-59 (5th
ed. 2011 ). For human rights specifically see, e.g., Robert McCorquodale, Corporate Social
Responsibility and International Human Rights Law, 87 J. Bus. ETHICS 385 (2009).
23. If a legal provision requires an action or inaction from an actor, it is a legal
obligation.
24. See Knox, supra note 21, at 2 (speaking generally of private duties).
25. However, the question of extraterritoriality arises in the context of applying it in
home states, however, see infra Section I (E)(2).
26. The present paper does not focus on the rights of TN Cs.
27. In the words of the human rights scholar John Knox, "[ v]irtually all of these duties
are found in international criminal law. The paradigmatic example is the Genocide
Convention, which states that 'genocide ... is a crime under international law' that the
parties 'undertake to prevent and to punish,' through both domestic tribunals and 'such
international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction."' Knox, supra note 21, at 28. These
provisions are not only directly targeted at, but also internationally enforced upon individual
parties, including TNCs. See id. Direct applicability to companies is sometimes seen to be
contrary to the basic consensual premise of international law. See id. How can TN Cs have
obligations on the basis of international law to which they have not consented?
28. Id. at 28-29. The obligations concern duties, such as the prohibitions on slavery
(Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery the Slave Trade, and Institutions
and Practices Similar to Slavery, April 30, 1956) and torture (Convention Against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, December 10, 1984).
The parties to these conventions are states that are obliged to make slavery and torture
criminal offences under their domestic laws and to enforce them upon private parties. Id.
29. See Knox, supra note 21, at 28-29.
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such "almost directly applicable international law." However, the
limited number of these kinds of provisions leaves many parts of the
legal void uncovered. Another reason for the void is that the provisions
do not tend to address the behavior of TN Cs specifically. 31
As far as the international obligations that are placed "almost
directly" upon the individuals are specific, they de facto create quasiuniversal domestic criminal law. In other words, the global application
is decentralized, so that the direct applicability, and almost direct
applicability, approaches can make good use of domestic courts'
enforcement capacities, which are far superior to those of international
judicial institutions. Political will permitting, this seems the most
promising international law track to pursue in governing TNCs. It
could in theory combine a universal and precise prescription of
obligations specifically for transnational commercial activities with the
high enforcement capacities of domestic authorities. A contracting state
would not fulfill its own international obligations, should it not enforce
the provisions against TN Cs under its jurisdiction.

2. Poor Domestic Implementation and Enforcement of International
Law - Back to Square One?
The third and fourth types of international law that deal with the
internal policies of developed western states, including international
human rights law and international environmental law, are not directly
applicable to TNCs. 32 International treaty provisions need to be
properly transposed into the domestic legal system in order to create the
intended legal effect on the TNCs. The states often retain a large
measure of freedom in this respect. For example, many environmental
treaty provisions, such as the provisions in the Montreal Protocol on the
downscaling of the production of ozone depleting substances, must be
first transposed into domestic law and then properly implemented if a
state is to meet its obligations under the treaty. The treaty will in this
way become binding, not only on the state in question, but also in the
form of national law on those operating a production facility of ozone

30. Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, June 17, 1999, 87 ILO 182.
31. See INT' L CONVENTION ON CIVIL LIABILITY FOR OIL POLLUTION DAMAGE, 1992,
reprinted in INT'L OIL COMPENSATION FUNDS, LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL
POLLUTION DAMAGE: TEXTS OF THE 1992 CONVENTION, TH E 1992 FUND CONVENTION AND
THE
SUPPLEMENTARY
FUND
PROTOCOL
(2011),
available
at
http://www.iopcfunds.org/uploads/tx _ iopcpublications/Text_of_Conventions_e. pdf
(last
visited Apr. 1, 2015) [hereinafter CLC] (for an example of the latter)
32. On indirect applicability, see infra note 33.
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depleting substances within the jurisdictions.
The obligation to incorporate and enforce the international norm
rests on the states and it is left to the state in question to decide exactly
how it will incorporate and enforce the international law provisions.
This is problematic if the content of the international norm is too vague
to establish clearly whether a state has failed to discharge its duties or
not. This is often the case in international human rights law and
international environmental law.
Finally, international law may also be indirectly applicable on
TN Cs. Indirect applicability means that the (existing) laws of the
domestic legal system are construed, i.e. interpreted in a manner that is
as much in conformity with international law as possible. 33 Most of the
international human rights law and international environmental law can
be considered indirectly applicable. 34
For example, state parties must take the above noted provisions of
the Montreal Protocol on the downscaling of the production of ozone
depleting substances duly into consideration in interpreting their
relevant domestic norms, to be consistent with their obligations under
the treaty. The interpretation will also affect the TNCs operating within
the jurisdiction.
There is certain hierarchy in the way that domestic courts rely on
direct and indirect applicability of international law. In striving to
achieve conformity with the international norm, the courts give priority
to consistent interpretation, i.e. indirect applicability. Only if the
domestic law is so inconsistent with international law that it is not
reconcilable by favorably interpreting domestic law, will the courts rely
on international law directly. 35 Indirect applicability of international
law is thus the primary means of trying to fill in the gaps of domestic
law on TNCs.
However, the value added of all the not-directly-applicable
33. See Andre Nollkaemper & Gerrit Betlem, Giving Effect to Public International
Law and European Community Law Before Domestic Courts. A Comparative Analysis of
the Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 569, 582 (2003).
34. The two general international human rights conventions-the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICCPR) and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 16, 1966 (ICESCR)-are
prominent examples of international law obligations that apply indirectly to TNCs. The
same goes for international obligations on states in the realm of environmental protection:
they ultimately have some impact upon the legality of natural and legal persons' behavior.
This is true for both monist and dualist states.
35. R.H. LAUWAARS & C.W.A. TIMMERMANS, EUROPEES GEMEENSCHAPSRECHT IN KORT
BESTEK 100 (4th ed. 1997); see Nollkaemper & Betlem, supra note 33, at 569.
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provisions of international law in diminishing the void left by domestic
law is often quite limited. The very same "host state problem" that was
explained for law of purely domestic origin resurfaces, unsurprisingly,
in the transposition, implementation, and interpretation of international
obligations in domestic law.36 The broad and generic language of
international agreements often leaves states ample room for discretion
in incorporating international law into domestic legislation, and even
more in enforcing it. The TNCs are able to exert their clout as with any
other domestic law.
The indirect application of interpreting
international law by courts would be in a better position, should the
courts be more resilient to (external political) pressure than the
legislature. This is not necessarily the case in practice, however. Yet
even where free from external pressures, the fragmented, transboundary
nature of TNC activities may in the end preclude any nation state- or
multiple states-from effectively enforcing an international
obligation. 37
The international law obligations are thus rarely globally directly
and specifically applicable to TNCs. The policy void of TNCs cannot
be fully and effectively addressed through present international law.
3. Nigerian Farmers v. Shell - The Absence of International Law in
"Home State" Cases

The Nigerian Farmers v. Shell case is a good example of how
international law is still absent in "home state" court cases that involve
"home state" TNCs. In that case, four inhabitants of Oruma (Nigeria)
sued Shell and its subsidiary companies before a civil court in the
Netherlands, i.e. the "home state" of Shell. 38 The case concerned an oil
leakage from a Shell pipeline that had, according to the plaintiffs,
caused damage to the local environment and to the incomes of
fishermen and farmers. The domestic court in The Hague 39 decided that
according to the Dutch conflict of laws rules on tort cases, it had to
apply Nigerian law in this dispute. Indeed, the case is a classic
attestation of the home state problem, where only the below-par
developing country standards are applied to TN Cs.
Having decided that Nigerian law was applicable, the Dutch court
36. Questions relating to the monistic versus dualistic systems in transposing
international law are left aside here.
37. De Feyter, supra note 15, at 81-82.
38. Milieudefensie v. Royal Dutch Shell PLC & Shell Petroleum Development
Company, Merits Decision of 30 January 2013 (LJN: BU3535) [Language: Dutch].
39. To be clear, this is not one of the Hague international courts and tribunals.
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made another important procedural decision: it denied the plaintiffs
access to documents solely in possession of Shell cum suis, even though
the documents could have given further insight into the causes and
consequences of the oil leakage. The court concluded that Shell and its
Nigerian daughter company had, on the face of the evidence already
available to the court, not acted in violation of any obligations under
Nigerian law.
In making its decision, the court did not check whether Nigerian
law was in accordance with international environmental, human rights,
or labor law. For example, the court concluded that under Nigerian law,
an oil company does not seem to be under an obligation to replace
deteriorated pipelines. Yet, the court did not examine whether there
were international rules that would have forced Nigeria to enact such an
obligation, or that would have mandated it to interpret Nigerian law in
accordance with international law. The obligation would have existed
in the legal system of The Netherlands and other developed countries.
The court also disregarded all potential violations of international law in
concluding that under Nigerian law, only the owner of a polluted fishing
pond or property was able to claim losses, and that future losses could
not be claimed.
The stance taken by the Dutch court seems understandable from
the viewpoint of sovereignty. It would be quite far-reaching if a court
were to rule on the compatibility of another country's law with
international standards. It is also doubtful whether any international
standards were sufficiently precise so as to enable a meaningful
conformity check. Still, it seems somewhat illogical that as soon as a
foreign law becomes applicable, international law will no longer be of
relevance. And what would be the difference between applying foreign
law and applying international norms to which the foreign state has
consented? Whatever the merits of the above considerations, it seems
unlikely both in practice and in legal theory that international law will
fill the legal void in cases like this.
F. "Hard Law" as an Insufficient Means to Address TNCs

To summarize, the current framework of domestic law and
international law appears incapable of fully managing the effects of
globalization, in particular the global nature of commercial activities.
The variation in domestic laws, together with the TNCs' economic and
political power and ability to partially avoid falling under the laws of a
specific state, allows the corporations to operate to some degree in a
legal void. As defined above, a legal void is a regulatory situation in
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which a TNC behavior in a host state would have been in violation of
the laws of the TN C home state or of international law. There is very
limited, directly applicable international law, and the transposition,
implementation, and enforcement of international law usually leave the
several state institutions/branches with (considerable) room for
maneuver. International law is therefore unable to improve the
situation.
As a result of the problems that both national and international law
have in controlling TNCs, there is room for misconduct. In the words
of the U.N. Special Representative:
The root cause of the business and human rights predicament today
lies in the governance gaps created by globalization-between the scope
and impact of economic forces, and the capacity of societies to manage
their adverse consequences. These governance gaps provide the
permissive environment for wrongful acts by companies of all kinds
without adequate sanctioning or reparation. 40
The Chevron case, introduced at the outset of this paper, is a case
in point on these challenges. The Ecuadorian government had been in a
joint venture with the oil company at the time of the pollution. It thus
appears to have been at least silently complicit in the abuses. The
whole of the Ecuadorian economy had been dependent on the
exploitation of oil resources, so there was a counter-incentive to
faithfully implement national legislation or international rules. The
Ecuadorian judicial system offered no remedy, either, as it proved to be
extremely weak and corrupt. Several judges had to step down during
the long process amidst accusations of corruption, while others were
seen to have a clear allegiance with either side of the conflict. 41
In terms of environmental law, Chevron did acknowledge the
environmental pollution to some degree, but argued that its predecessor
Texaco had acted "completely in line with the standards of the day" and
that "[the] practices did not directly violate Ecuadoran law; in fact, the
country had no meaningful environmental regulations at the time." 42 In
other words, behavior that presumably would have been illegal in the
United States at the time 43 was in all earnestness claimed to be perfectly
legitimate in Ecuador. However, the courts in the United States, where
40. Ruggie, supra note 9, para. 6-7.
41. Reversal of Fortune, supra note I.
42. Id.
43. "In the United States, it is standard practice, once the oil has been isolated from
this mixture, to 'reinject' the produced water, pumping it deep underground into dedicated
wells, in order to prevent damage to the local habitat." Id.
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the case had originally been brought in 1993, found in 2001 that the
case had "everything to do with Ecuador and very little to do with the
United States."44 It thereby refused an extra-territorial application of
U.S. law, affirming that a U.S. company did not have to live up to U.S.
standards as long as it acted abroad and the judicial system there did not
take issue with the activities.
It is telling that probably the clearest invocation of international
law in the Chevron case was on the part of the TN C-defendant Chevron.
The legal representatives of the company moved the forum to the
Permanent Court of Arbitration on the basis of the Bilateral Investment
Treaty between the U.S. and Ecuador. All in all, the Chevron case is a
tangible illustration of the failures of domestic, extraterritorial and
international law in governing TNCs in a global environment.
It has so far proven impossible to come to a formal international
agreement, or a treaty specifically addressing TNCs or transnational
commercial activities to alleviate the void. Perhaps such a treaty even
could not alleviate the matter, as it too may be bound to suffer from
many of the structural problems previously explained. It appears very
unlikely that the causes behind the void will disappear any time soon.
The governance of TN Cs (or transnational commercial activities more
generally) clearly appears to require responses beyond classic "hard
law."

II. FILLING WITH "SOFT LAW" THE VOID LEFT BY "HARD
LAW"?
The last two decades have witnessed a continuous proliferation of
instruments-public, private and any combination thereof-that
specifically address TNCs, but seem to do so by expanding beyond the
notion of classic "hard law." Strictly speaking, instruments that fall
outside the category of "law" cannot perhaps alleviate a legal void. But
they may, in more general terms, address the practical problem at stake,
which is abusive company behavior. Instruments other than legal ones
can, in other words, alleviate the policy void in question.
The term "soft law" has often been used to denote these types of
instruments. The multiplicity, volume and variance of such soft
instruments, as well as their coexistence with the "hard law" framework
has created a regulatory situation that is much more difficult to

44. Id.
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understand than the 'straight-forward' formal agreements. 45 Scholarly
and practical attention seems necessary to better understand the
possibilities and shortcomings of using "soft law" instruments in filling
the void left by "hard law".
The reasons that are often presented for using "soft law"46 may be
divided into three generic groups.
Necessity-there exists only limited binding and effective hard
legal instruments now and in the foreseeable future;
Uniqueness-the coverage of "soft law" instruments is extensive,
and may influence TNCs in ways that "hard law" does not. They can be
much more specific to TNC behavior, and their adoption and adaptation
may be more flexible and quicker; and
Inevitability-the emerging transnational space renders it
inevitable that a separate transnational normative order emerges as well.
It inevitably consists of other types of instruments, as the non-state
actors who operate in this space cannot make "hard law."
A more careful look into these three, partly overlapping groups
appears instructive for properly understanding the reasons that have
been proposed to explain the emergence "soft law" (Sections II (A) and
II (B)). It is important to shortly describe also the views of those more
pessimistic about the use of "soft law" as an alternative or a
complement to classic "hard law". Some authors see "soft law" rather as
working antagonistically against "hard law" (see Section II (C)).

A. Turning a Political Necessity into a Virtue - "Soft Law" as an
Alternative or Precursor to "Hard Law"
First of all, non-binding instruments appear to be in many cases a
sheer necessity. As long as no directly applicable, legally binding
instruments specifically aimed at the behavior or TNCs will be adopted
by states, nor existing international and national laws reformed to this
effect, the rationalist perspective is to see "soft law" as the alternative. 47
The large and diverse array of non-legal instruments may simply be the
best attainable means to govern TN Cs.
A binding international
45. The normativity of "hard law" also remains to a large extent a mystery. See
generally Martti Koskenniemi, The Mystery of Legal Obligation, 3 INT'L THEORY 319
(2011).
46. See generally Jean d'Aspremont, The Politics ofDeformalization in International
Law, 3 GOETTrNGEN J. INT'L L. 503 (2011).
47. See Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives,
Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance, 94 MINN. L. REV. 706, 722
(2010).
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agreement to govern TNCs directly is indeed unlikely in the foreseeable
future, 48as many states and much of the private sector continue to resist
the idea for the reasons and with the means explained below. At the
same time, however, a certain willingness to adopt instruments of a
voluntary character can be observed.
A related point is to see soft instruments as precursors to formal
agreements. In a situation where an outright formal agreement is
politically unattainable, other types of instruments can be used as
intermediate steps towards it. These alternative instruments may be
used to, for example, experiment with a new rule or to innovatively
encourage changes in the behavior of relevant actors. Exposure to the
new ideas will, the theory assumes, prepare the regulators and
regulatees up to a point where they are ready to take the ultimate step
towards "hard law."49 This is relatively common in areas with
considerable (scientific) uncertainty regarding the optimal contents and
effects of the policies in tackling a particular problem. 50 However, this
type of precursory role for soft instruments is relatively weak in areas
where the obstacles to "hard law" are political, rather than relate to
uncertainty.
Finally, soft law instruments may be seen as a necessity also from
the perspective of non-state actors, in case they themselves act as
regulators: these parties obviously do not even have the direct means to
develop classic "hard law."

B. Unique Qualities of "Soft Law" -A Complement to "Hard
Law"
Soft law instruments often are unique in terms of their versatility,
scope and/or "depth." The large number of different kinds of soft
instruments means that they are many times aimed much more
48. The last attempt, the 'Norms on Responsibility' did not make it above the level of
a sub-commission of the Human Rights Council. See, e.g., De Feyter, supra note 15, at 8182. And the more recent UN Guiding Principles make explicit that they are not intended as
the precursor to a binding international agreement. See Rep. of the Special Representative
of the Secretary General of the U.N. Human Rights Council, 17th Sess., Guiding Principles

on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (John Ruggie), available at
http://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/business/A.HRC.17 .31.pdf [hereinafter Guiding
Principles].
49. HARD CHOICES, SOFT LAW: VOLUNTARY STANDARDS IN GLOBAL TRADE,
ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIAL GOVERNANCE 28 (John J. Kirton & Michael J. Trebilcock eds.,
2004).
50. See, e.g., Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learningfrom Difference: The New
Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU, 14 EUR. L.J. 271 (2008).
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specifically at the problems caused by the activities of TNCs than are
formally binding instruments. They may be used to address TNC
behavior in more elaborate detail than, for instance, international human
rights conventions, which have an evident legacy as acts aimed
primarily at state behavior and rarely are very specific as to what
amounts to proper or improper behavior. It seems important also for
these reasons to gauge whether and how this large body of instruments
may actually alleviate the policy void on TNCs.
Another, interlinked argument is that soft instruments possess
different qualities than formal international law. Many policy tools
work in ways that are not dependent upon the core characteristic of
"hard law," which is to create legally binding rights and obligations on
parties. Constructivists, in particular, argue that soft law can promote
discursive, experimentalist processes that can transform the way norms
are perceived and created. 51 Such means may even be preferable from
the perspective of responsive governance. 52 In comparison with rules
that need to go through the entire legislative or treaty-making process,
they may also be much faster to set up and to flexibly change
afterwards. But whether and how exactly such "soft law" could
complement "hard law" is precisely the question that deserves further
clarification. This is all the more so, considering that soft instruments
may even be inevitable or inherent in the phenomenon of globalization.
According to Nijman and Nollkaemper, "[o]ne of the challenges that
globalization poses to legal theory is precisely the emergence of 'nonState' legal orders, and the resulting need for a conceptual framework
which enables our discipline to accommodate different legal cultures." 53
In other words, these instruments may correctly reflect the fact that the
activities of TN Cs are of such a special kind that they warrant a unique
approach.
As noted, if TNCs, non-governmental organization
("NGOs"), and other non-state parties act themselves as rule makers in
51. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 722.
52. Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law
Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1019-20 (2004).
53. Beyond the Divide, in NEWPERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
AND NATIONAL LAW 341, 349 (James Nijman & Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2007)
(paraphrasing WILLIAM TWINrNG, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY 51 (Butterworths
2000)) ("Today, a picture of law in the world must deal with a much more complex picture
involving established, resurgent, developing, nascent and potential forms of legal ordering."
Id. Twining furthermore asks: "[c]an public international law, as traditionally conceived,
cope adequately with such problems as environment, international crime, and basic human
needs or rights at the global level?"); see also Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private
Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 117 (2013).
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these transnational normative orders, then there may not even be any
other choice but to resort to soft instruments. TNCs and NGOs simply
do not have the capacity under international law to make legal
instruments, nor are they directly subjects of international law.

C. Counter-productive Uses of Soft Law - The Antagonist
Approach
Shaffer and Pollack claim that all three principle schools of
thought that address the strengths and weaknesses of soft law and "hard
law"-positivists, 54 rationalists, 55 and constructivists 56-tend to see
them as alternatives or mutually supporting complements. 57 These
authors raise doubts about the proposition that new soft instruments are
always adopted with a view to decreasing the policy void. More
attention should be paid to "soft law" as an antagonist to "hard law," 58
because it frequently leads to inconsistencies and conflicts among
norms. Or worse, this may have been the aim from the outset. The
antagonistic behavior has specific implications in a fragmented legal
system, resulting in a strategic hardening of "soft law" regimes and
softening of hard-law regimes, or in a pre-emption of "hard law"
through "soft law." These kinds of situations arise under conditions of
distributive conflicts between states and in regime complexes, in
particular. 59 They also fit well the notion of legal pluralism, where
numerous heterogeneous legal orders coexist, interact and compete
without clear hierarchies. 60 "Soft law" in this sense is inevitably a part
54. See, e.g., Jan Klabbers, The Undesirability of Soft Law, 67 NORDIC J. INT'L. 381
( 1998); Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT'L
L. 413 (1983).
55. See, e.g., Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45
INT'L ORGS. 495 (1991); Andrew Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16
EUR. J. INT'L L. 579 (2005); ANDREW GUZMAN, How [NTERNAT[ONAL LAW WORKS: A
RATIONALIST CHOICE THEORY (2010); Kai Raustiala, Form and Substance in International
Agreements, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 581 (2005).
56. See, e.g., David Trubek, Patrick Cottrell & Mark Nance, "Soft Law," "Hard Law,"
and European Integration: Toward a Theory of Hybridity, in LA w AND NEW GOVERNANCE
IN THE EU AND THE US 65 (Grainne de Burca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006).
57. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 707-08.
58. This argument has been made by others before, albeit in a less comprehensive way.
For example, NGOs, who have long held this position, oppose voluntary instruments in part
because they tend to bring hard law" negotiations to a standstill.
59. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 709, 728.
60. See, e.g., Martti Koskenniemi & Pa vi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law?
Postmodern Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT. L. 553 (2002); Roderick A. MacDonald, Metaphors
of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal Pluralism, 69 ARrz. J. INT. & COMP. L. 75
( 1998).
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of globalization.
D. Interactions Between "Soft Law" and "Hard Law"
The last-mentioned, antagonistic perspectives on "soft law" are not
at the core of this paper, which focuses on the ability of "soft law" to fill
the void left by "hard law." It is nevertheless important to realize,
following Shaffer and Pollack that "hard law" and soft law are not in a
binary either/or relationship. Rather, their interaction is one where
specific conditions are conducive to making the actors employ them as
alternatives, complements, or antagonists. 61 This paper strives to
contribute to the discourse by exploring the notion of softness and how
that characteristic may reflect in the choice of the instrument in each
individual case. The analysis leads to observations about how on
occasion, neither a hard nor soft type of an instrument is able to fill a
policy void, and that a focus on "soft law" may in fact only be leading
the attempts astray.

lll. FROM THE DEFICIENT NOTION OF "SOFT LAW"
TOWARDS AN ACCURATE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF
SOFTNESS
In order to understand whether "soft law" instruments may succeed
in alleviating the policy void in governing TNCs, and if so, how, it is
next pertinent to define in more detail what "soft law" actually means.
As the analysis below will reveal, the term "soft law" is rather
problematic: there seem to be more suitable terms than "soft law" to
describe instruments that are not part of "hard law" in the classic sense
of the term. The terminological analysis will lead to a conceptualization
of instruments, which is believed to be more instructive for
understanding their key characteristics in terms of "softness." With the
tool, the suitability of a number of leading human rights and
environmental instruments that govern TNCs may then be analyzed in
the ensuing Section IV.
A. Definitional Deficiencies of "Soft Law"
1. An Incorrect Concept
The instruments looked at in this paper have often been grouped
together under a single concept: "soft law." "Soft law" is widely used
61. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 709.
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as a concept to denote all normative instruments that do not amount to
classic "hard law." As Jan Klabbers, a staunch critic of the concept, has
submitted
[w ]e tend to use the term soft law in order to describe things which are
difficult to describe as hard law. Thus, guidelines, codes of conduct,
resolutions, recommendations and action programs, indeterminate
provisions of treaties, unratified conventions, perhaps even the
opinions of advocates general or dissenting opinions of individual
judges of the ICJ or the various human rights courts, they may all
perhaps be qualified as 'soft law.' Clearly they are not hard law;
clearly they are not totally irrelevant either, so voila: soft law it must
be. 62

Klabbers and some other international legal scholars denounce the
idea that law can be "soft." "As soon as soft law is to be applied to any
specific set of circumstances, it collapses into either 'hard law,' or no
law at all." 63 In a binary world of law and non-law, soft law as an inbetween is incorrect: there either are or are not normative obligations
that are created when the law is applied ex post. The "soft" part of the
concept creates confusion from another perspective. It glosses over the
fact that many "soft instruments" have direct effects on the behavior of
states, TN Cs, and other actors, and they have indirect legal effects by
transforming subsequently into formal international law. Mechanisms
often employed by "soft law," such as economic incentives and
reputational costs, can be much more compulsory than the term soft
would indicate. They may be more effective than "hard law" itself, as
some of the authors noted in Section II have suggested.
As for the 'law' part of the concept, it seems rather odd to use it
where states or international organizations have usually quite
purposefully chosen "an instrument that lies outside the realm of law,"
and have thus indicated their specific intention "not to legally commit
themselves." 64 Using the term "law" for something that is adopted
explicitly as something other than law threatens to blur the "normativity
threshold." This is so in particular if and when there is a point of
transition between law and non-law, between what does and does not
constitute a legal norm. 65

62. Klabbers, supra note 54, at 385.
63. Id. at 382.
64. Jean d' Aspremont, Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New
Legal Materials, 19 EUR. J. INT. L. 1075, 1081-82 (2008) (emphasis added).
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 2000); Weil, supra note 54, at 415.
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2. Too Generic a Concept
While soft law may be inaccurate as a concept, it also seems much
too generic to properly guide our understanding regarding the very
different nature, properties, and normativity of the various instruments
relating to TNCs and their behavior. As long as there are soft and hard
ends to the spectrum of instruments, it seems inevitable that there are
also shades of softness and hardness in between. At the very least, there
must be such spectrums from softer to harder within the two binary
categories of law and other instruments. A sharp binary categorization
seems unlikely to be helpful in explaining all the legal as well as nonlegal instruments, each with their different characteristics. This is so
especially for legal instruments with soft dimensions and for non-legal
instruments with hard dimensions. There is no denying the growing
disaggregation of power into myriad spheres of authority, which may
not (fully) be public authorities and that deliver formal and informal
rules and norms of various kinds. 66 There is considerable variance,
whichever way one may wish to create categories. 67 This is certainly so
with respect to instruments addressing the behavior of TN Cs.
Although it is thus not possible to describe all such variance with a
single term "soft law," it would seem equally unadvisable to limit the
use of the term to only a clear but narrow sub-group among the
variance. In this latter case, there is likely to exist a more accurate
descriptive term than "soft law" to explain the instruments in question.
Therefore, a simple dichotomy between "hard law" and "soft law"
(and also between law and "non-law") alone seems too stiff and
inaccurate to be useful for fully understanding the instruments, which
the terms intend to cover. 68 It remains important to maintain that binary
distinction, because in some contexts-such as domestic or international
adjudication-the legal status of an instrument continues to be relevant

66. Martti Koskenniemi, The Fate of Public International Law: Between Techniques
and Politics, 70 Moo. L. REV. 1 (2007); James Rosenau, Governing the Ungovernable: The
Challenge of Global Disaggregation ofAuthority, 1 REG. & GOVERNANCE 88, 88 (2007).
67. Sylvia Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Antto Vihma, Comparing the Legitimacy and
Effectiveness of Global Hard and Soji Power: An Analytical Framework, 3 REG. &
GOVERNANCE 400, 401 (2009).
68. Laszlo Blutman, In the Trap of a Legal Metaphor: International Soji Law, 59
INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 605, 611 (2010); Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity:
From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of International Public Authority, 9
GERMAN L.J. 1865, 1869 (2008) (Goldmann remarked that the term "soft law" is not much
more than a slightly more elegant way of saying "underconceptualized law." Accordingly,
he continues, we should use formal criteria to divide it into subspecies, each with its own
characteristics).
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for its softness or hardness. Yet it also seems vital to understand norms
to be on a continuum with a lot of diversity along numerous other
variables. 69
One may thus agree with d' Aspremont that a binary approach to
law is not in conflict with the growing complexity of regulatory tools in
contemporary international relations. 70 A binary division may be
maintained, but while distinguishing e.g. the different regulatory
choices and the gradations of normativity in the language that are
available for both legal and non-legal norms. The nuance and the
binary approach are not mutually exclusive. 71

B. The Lay of the Land in the Theory of "Soft Law"
Numerous attempts have been made to make sense of "soft law."
Problematic in these approaches has been the disregard for the idea of
maintaining the binary distinction in parallel with the more fluid
characterizations. The empirical basis of the attempts has also often
been wanting. 72 This Section highlights the views of authors that appear
the most insightful, and which therefore have served as the basis in this
paper for developing the methodology for assessing "soft law."

1. The Three Dimensions of Softness
Amongst the most quoted authors in describing "soft law" are
Abbott et al., who have proposed a continuum of legalization, 73 where
the softness or hardness of legalization may be measured in terms of the
"obligation, precision and delegation" of the measure. 74 Obligation
means the (legally or otherwise) binding nature of the rule; precision
reflects the ability of the rule to unambiguously define conduct; and
delegation refers to the extent to which an implementing and

69. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 402; see also DANIEL
80DANSKY, THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 100-01, 106-07
(2010) (emphasizing the importance of both legal status, as well as various other
characteristics).
70. d' Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1075.
71. Cf Jan Klabbers, The Redundancy of Soft Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 167, 180
(1996) ("law itself, for all its binariness, is capable of reflecting a whole spectre of subtleties
and nuances; . . . law itself can accommodate various shades of grey without losing its
binary character").
72. Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 401.
73. These authors define legalization as "global regulation through diverse types of
norms." Kenneth W. Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401
(2000).
74. Id.
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interpretive authority has been defined. 75 Taking these three dimensions
seriously, most international instruments, including those on the 'law'
side of the binary distinction, seem soft in many respects. 76 This is
certainly true of global environmental and human rights treaties with
their many indeterminate provisions and limited delegation to third
parties.
To be more specific, the dimension of "obligation" is dependent on
the mandatory, normative-Abbott et al. use "binding"-nature of the
rule. Obligation seems to be a concept with multiple meanings. It may
indicate especially the mandatory quality of the language of the
instrument. The authority of the actors that adopted the instrument, or a
more general sentiment of obligation caused by the legitimacy of the
instrument is also central. Obligation thus can be linked to the concept
author, which Neil Komesar finds important from an institutional
perspective. 77 As he has suggests, the implications of a policy may
differ greatly according to the author.
"Precision," the second dimension proposed by Abbott et al.,
measures the extent that "that rules unambiguously define the conduct
they require, authorize, or proscribe." 78
The third dimension,
"delegation," reminds us that not only the authority of the adopting
entities matters. The instrument's implementation, enforcement, and
interpretation are quite relevant. 79 It needs to be determined who, if
anyone, is in charge, and how much authority is being delegated.
The approach of Abbott and Snidal to instrument choice, which
builds on these three dimensions of legalization, emphasizes the role of
different types of legalization in the instrumentalist hands of powerful
states. 8 For example, Chinkin's categories of "soft law" reflect these
three dimensions. 81 Weakening one or more of the dimensions turns

°

75. Id.
76. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT'LORG. 421, 422 (2000).
77. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY 4-5 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1994).
78. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
79. The relevance of delegation to the normativity of international norms was already
stressed in Lauterpacht's critical analysis of the auto-interpretive character of international
law, or what he called "self-judging obligations." See HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY (Oxford Univ. Press
1933).
80. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 76, at 421.
81 . Christine M. Chinkin, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in
International Law, 38 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 850 (1989). The degree of legalization (as
defined by Abbot et al. 's obligation, precision and delegation) is the independent variable,
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legal arrangements conveniently into "soft law" or vice versa. This is
essential from the perspective of governance, because TNCs may be
able to exert pressure towards the governing authorities on the types of
instruments that will be created.

2. Softness v. Effectiveness
It may be noted that Abbott et al. deliberately avoid assessing the
instruments' effects, as that would conflate delegation with effective
action. 82 Also in the analysis of this paper, effectiveness is understood
as conceptually distinct from softness; the two must be evaluated
separately. While softness refers to low levels of obligation, precision,
and delegation seems to correlate negatively with effectiveness, the
interrelationship between the two appears rather complex and casespecific. 83 There are many intervening external factors, such as the
degree of stakeholder agreement on the issue, reputational risks, and
potential fringe benefits of compliance. Softness is not a conditio sine
qua non of ineffectiveness, nor is hardness a prerequisite of
effectiveness, even if the former usually increases the latter. 84 Indeed,
soft measures can be effective, otherwise the prospect of them acting as
alternatives to "hard law" would not materialize. Similarly, there would
be no need to complement or replace "hard law" if it could not be
ineffective. Thus, by not conflating softness and effectiveness, the
analysis of the instruments of governance remains more detailed and
transparent on the surface. The focus of this paper is precisely on this
softness aspect.
Karlsson-Vinkhyuzen and Vihma take a similar view in their
comparison of international norms: softness is the independent variable,
while effectiveness, together with legitimacy, emerge as the central,
overarching dependent variables. 85
effectiveness and legitimacy the dependent variables in determining softness. See Abbott et
al., supra note 73.
82. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 402.
83. See, e.g., Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 414; Jean-Marie
Kamatali, The New Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights' Contribution in
Ending the Divisive Debate over Human Rights Responsibilities of Companies: Is it Time
for an /CJ Advisory Opinion?, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 437, 449-50 (2012);
Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 43-45 (2012); Deborah E. Rupp & Cynthia A. Williams, The Efficacy
of Regulation as a Function of Psychological Fit: Reexamining the Hard Law/Soft Law
Continuum, 12 THEO. INQ. L. 581, 594-95 (2011).
84. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 414.
85. Id. at 401-03. Their approach thus is wide as it relies on both rationalist and
constructivist theories to cover, respectively, the utilitarian political economy aspects and
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3. lnstrumentum and Negotium
d' Aspremont proposes on the basis of the theory of legal acts that
in contemporary international law, it is either the instrumentum (the
"container") or the negotium (the "content") that can be softened. 86 The
softness of the instrumentum thus pertains to the choice of an instrument
outside the realm of law, defined as formal treaties or binding unilateral
declarations. 87 A soft instrumentum can also produce legal effects, such
as interpretative guidelines of other legal acts, or even customary law in
the long run. However, being such legal fact, capable of creating legal
effects, is according to d' Aspremont not sufficient to qualify it as a legal
act. The latter creates effects only at the explicit will of its authors,
hence the distinction to "hard law. " 88
As for the negotium (the content) of a legal act, it can also be softer
or harder. Soft, non-normative content does not produce rules that
would commit the subjects. The negotium of a legal act can be softened
without invalidating it or transforming it to a legal fact. 89 The softness
of the negotium will not affect the status of the instrument as law. It
will, however, reduce law's ability to oblige the parties, reflecting on
the obligation and precision dimensions of Abbot et al.
Blutman takes a similar approach using the notions of legal
(formal) source and the substance of the norm. 90 He further notes that
current studies group "soft law" into three categories: ( 1) non-binding
decisions of international organisations, (2) non-obligatory agreements
of states, and (3) recommendations of non-state parties (NGOs). 91 In
the first two groups, the softness emanates from what d' Aspremont
called the negotium - the lack of obligation of the non-binding content
the culturo-anthropological aspects of the issue. See id. at 401-03. Effectiveness is for these
authors interdependent with legitimacy, and they both consist of numerous components. See
id. at 403-04. Effectiveness can be understood as the degree to which the set policy
objective is achieved as a consequence of the measure. See id. at 405. Note the difference
between effectiveness and compliance. See Kai Raustiala & David G. Victor, Conclusions,
in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 659-708 (Kai Raustiala, David G. Victor & Eugene
Skolnikoff eds., 1998). Also note the difference between behavioral effectiveness and
problem-solving effectiveness. See Arild Underdal, One Question, Two Answers, in
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS: CONFRONTING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE 3 (Miles
Edward et. al eds., 2002).
86. d' Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1084.
87. Id. at 1084-85.
88. Id. at 1084-87.
89. Id. at I 084.
90. Blutman, supra note 68, at 606.
91. Id. at 607-08.
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of the norm. In the third group, softness is caused by the instrumentum
and the legislating party. Blutman does not consider the authority of the
author, and indeed probably not the delegation or the instrumentum
either. Moreover, neither precision, effectiveness, nor legitimacy are
directly relevant in this type of categorization. The strength of
categorizations such as Blutman' s, lies in their simplicity and ease of
application, as well as the direct link to existing types of instruments.

C. Making Use of the "Soft Law Theories"
It would seem that the above selection of approaches to "soft law"
have varying degrees of explanatory power. Many of them consist of
dimensions that from the perspective of softness constitute continuums
rather than either/or type binary choices. A careful combination of the
dimensions, whether continuums or not, appears to be a useful way to
better conceptualize "soft law" and to understand specific cases of
instruments' softness in international governance.
It seems possible to combine the assessments of softness along
many such dimensions onto a single, summarizing scale. A summary
value of softness may be useful in providing an overview of the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with. It might even
be possible to define a point, a dividing line between soft and hard,
similar to that which we recognize between law and "non-law." One
may wonder, however, to what extent such a point is actually relevant.
First of all, all instruments, be they soft or hard in the end, are in any
event analyzed along the same dimensions of softness, just as water
may be measured for its coldness/hotness. But like water, is there a
metaphysical "melting point" where the definition of an instrument
changes from hard to soft in a way that would represent a drastic change
in its qualities, like (solid, hard) ice changes into (liquid, soft) water?
Most of the instruments are likely to have some degree of
softness/hardness anyway; only at the extremes are instruments entirely
hard or soft.
Second, it seems important to perceive that any such dichotomy
between soft and hard is indeed only a summary of many aspects. It
appears more relevant to understand what the constitutive dimensions of
each summary value of softness in a particular case may be, in
particular on those dimensions that are close to the extreme ends of the
scales. This is so especially as regards the "instrumentum." On the one
hand, there are legal instruments, which in the context of international
governance consist of the formal sources of international law:
conventions, customary law and binding decisions of international
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organizations. On the other hand, there are non-legal instruments,
which are all the other international or transnational public or private
instruments that are not formal sources of international law. 92 A hard
instrumentum thus refers to formal "law," while a soft instrumentum
means that one is not dealing with law. This in tum implies that to
qualify as soft an instrument that in terms of its instrumentum
dimension is "hard (law)", it would need to rank quite low (soft) on
many if not all other dimensions. Conversely, to consider a non-legal
(and thus prima facie soft) instrument as hard, 93 it would need to rank
high across many, if not all, dimensions beyond the instrumentum. A
precise obligation by an authoritative NGO with strong oversight on the
implementation could perhaps achieve such hardness in a soft
ins trumentum.
Third, an understanding of softness as relative and measured
against the same criteria for all kinds of instruments, whether formal
law or something else, is important. As could be seen in the discussion
in Section II on the voids left by (international) "hard law" in governing
TNCs, various types of instruments may have important roles to play.
Perhaps an instrument is not just a second best solution in a particular
case
or for particular ends within that case
but indeed the best, or
even the only means of achieving a policy outcome?94 The situation for
which the instrument is intended needs to be analyzed along the same
dimensions to know what type of an instrument is required.
Finally, there is still an important aspect from the viewpoint of the
instruments' functioning that could be called systemic coherence. It
relates closely to the above points noted by Shaffer and Pollack: all
legal and non-legal instruments, whether hard or soft, also affect one
another. Indeed, as was described above, soft instruments are often
seen as an alternative or complement to international "hard law."
Treaties can generate secondary (delegated) rules that may be non-legal.
Treaties can harden existing non-legal instruments, and non-legal
instruments may not only be an alternative or complement to legal
instruments, but also soften them. Non-legal instruments may even
become antagonists that work directly against treaties, as Shaffer and
Pollack have pointed out. 95
92. Guzman, supra note 55, at 580 (noting that a categorical difference between harder
and softer types of governance is created here).
93. Blutman, supra note 68, at 612 (noting that it is a common misconception that nonbinding "soft law" would influence less the actions of a state than a binding norm).
94. See id. at section 3.
95. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47, at 788-96. This would seem to imply that the
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The types of conceptualizations portrayed in this Section can be
useful when the hardness/softness of multiple instruments, both legal
and non-legal, is assessed comparatively against one another. As
Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen and Vihma point out, the development of a legal
or non-legal instrument, and subsequently its qualities as a "harder" or
"softer" instrument in global governance, is only one variable in the
evolution that determines the long-term policy outcome. 96 Moreover,
the choice as often explained involves a highly complex set of
interrelated, time- and place-specific variables and impacts. This
touches the very core of modem politics that struggles to address the
dynamics of globalism.

D. Towards a More Accurate Conceptualization of Softness in
Instruments
Linguistic conventions such as "soft law" are difficult to fight
against. 97 Political scientists make the observation that "[a] few
international institutions and issue-areas approach the theoretical ideal
of hard legalization, but most international law is soft in distinct
ways. " 98 The proposal here is to take the above-noted dimensions of
softness, fine-tune them, and use them to describe the instruments more
accurately. The assumption is that such a systemization/categorization
may be helpful to the understanding of policy instruments,
distinguishing, for example, between their softness and effectiveness. 99

effectiveness of an instrument could even be negative from the perspective of the policy
objective: it decreases rather than increases the ability to reach the set policy goal. This is
an important aspect explaining the reasons behind the existence of a legal void in TNC
governance. As was explained earlier, the void on TNCs is in part created by their ability to
influence law making at various levels of governance. An important way to do so is to swap
from the role of a subject of international norms to that of an author of international
(private) norms by creating alternative (non-legal) norms that are antagonistic to the
objectives of prevailing legal instruments, or to other public instruments such as decisions of
international organizations or joint declarations of states. In other words, if we were to
measure the effectiveness of antagonistic instruments, a scale would need to continue from
"weekly positive" and "none" onto a "negative," when the point of reference are the
prevailing policy objectives rather than the alternative or direct objective of the law or other
instrument in question. Because this paper focuses on ways to fill in the voids left by "hard
law", the antagonistic aspects of non-legal instruments are however, not discussed further.
Id.
96. See Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67, at 400, 40 l.
97. Blutman, supra note 68, at 605.
98. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 76, at 421.
99. Obviously, there is likely to be overlap between the dimensions. A similar
pragmatic approach is taken by Shaffer and Pollack. See Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 47,
at 714.
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It is further proposed here that each of these dimensions of softness
of Abbott et al. (obligation, precision, and delegation) be specified a
step further into a few more accurate, particularly significant subdimensions. The proposed sub-dimensions improve the tool, because
their values seem especially instructive for the processes being studied
in this paper: the behavior of TNCs. 100
The "obligation" dimension is perhaps the most ambiguous. As
indicated above, it seems that Abbott et al. 101 equates "obligation" with
"legal obligation." Such a definition of obligation would, however, not
clearly distinguish the dimension from (i.e. would limit it to) the
concept of instrumentum. The hard v. soft instrumentum distinction in
this paper makes a difference between two types of public instruments:
those that are and those that are not (formal) law. Only formal sources
of law oblige in the hardest sense of legally binding the parties and
being capable of enforcement through judicial means. These qualities
could be qualified as sub-dimensions of obligation. However, because
of the importance of the either/or type binary distinction between what
is or is not a legally binding formal source of law, it seems appropriate
to turn them into a dimension of their own. Jnstrumentum must
therefore be lifted out of the obligation dimension.
The obligatory nature of the instrument, however, also appears to
depend on the authority of the "author" of the instrument and on its
mandatory quality. These should be the focus of the obligation
dimension. First, the authority sub-dimension of obligation reflects the
authority of the author over the addressees of the instrument. Some
institutions that adopt instruments on TNC behavior have more
authority over TNC behavior than others. There are various factors on
which such authority may be based. Authority will depend upon
whether there has been some grant of authority from the addressees of
the instrument to the author. It also turns on the involvement of experts
during the drafting, the perceived quality of the instrument, and whether
the process leading to the text has allowed for consultations with the
addressees. In other words, the relationship between the authors and the
constituency of the instrument matters. This also explains why a single
institution ("author") may have authority in one specific case, but less
so in another. A higher level of authority will make the instrument
more obliging, and hence harder, regardless of its public or private
character.
100. See Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 403 .
101. Id. at 401.
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Instruments created by the addressees themselves are usually
referred to as self-regulation, distinguishing them from other private
rulemaking by third parties. It is difficult to generalize whether a rule to
which specific private parties (such as TNCs) have committed
themselves is more obligatory or less obligatory than that created by
some other private parties without the involvement and/or assent of the
former (i.e. TNCs). Some NGOs are more highly regarded by TNCs
than others in terms of their expertise or trustworthiness, whereas others
may be more feared because of their effective publicity campaigns. All
such factors influence whether TNCs regard instruments to be
authoritative. It would also seem important to extend the obligation
dimension to the negotium, the contents of the instrument. A legal
instrumentum can contain a negotium devoid of any obligatory
language, such as "shall." At the same time, a non-legal instrumentum
can contain a negotium that is worded in unmistakably mandatory
terms. 102 The provisions of both legal and non-legal instruments can
attempt to guide the behavior of their addressees "in a stronger or
weaker fashion." 103 The obligation dimension hence would seem to
consist of two sub-dimensions: authority and the mandatory nature of
the instrument.
Also, the precision dimension would, at least with regard to the
particular subject matter of TNCs, seem to be improved if divided into
two sub-dimensions. Abbott et al.' s concept of precision related to the
object of the rule ratione materiae: "that rules unambiguously define
the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe." 104 This is the
accuracy of the instrument. But precision would also seem to include
the specificity of an instrument towards certain actors or issues.
Softness or hardness of an instrument in terms of a certain group of
actors such as TNCs, also depends on whether the rules specifically
address that group. The softness, in other words, is influenced also by
the scope of the instrument ratione personae. A narrow, specific scope
increases hardness especially in the international context, where the
absence of an institutional framework moves the ex post interpretation
and application of general rules to the hands of the actors to be
governed-the TNCs, in this case, and also states within whose
jurisdiction the TNCs act. 105 The precision dimension therefore is
102. See generally Anthony Aust, Alternatives to Treaty-Making: MO Us as Political
Commitments, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 46, 46-72 (Duncan. B. Hollis ed., 2012).
103. BODANSKY, supra note 69, at 103.
104. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401 (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 414.
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enhanced by including the sub-dimension of "specificity" in addition to
what could be redefined as its "accuracy."
Finally, delegation 106 concerns primarily the question of how much
of the authority to implement and enforce the instrument is delegated to
others, how much is retained by the author of the instrument, and how
much simply remains undetermined.
Delegation to third parties
increases hardness, and is vital where precision in terms of specificity is
low. 107 Delegation of interpretive authority is a variety of delegation
that links back directly to accuracy, i.e. precision ratione materiae.
Furthermore, the softness of the delegation also appears to depend
on to whom exactly the authority is delegated, i.e. the authorship of the
delegated acts. Close ties, even a shared identity amongst those
authorized to implement the instrument and those addressed by it soften
the delegation dimension. Delegation is harder when an auditor or
NGOs enforce the instrument, than where the TNCs, as the subjects of
the instrument, enforce their own rules. It is also important to
distinguish between delegation in rule-making and dispute settlement
(i.e. judicial) functions. 108
To sum up, the tool proposed here incorporates the following
dimensions of softness:
the instrumentum (formal source oflaw v. other instruments)
obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language)
precision (accuracy and specificity), and
delegation (extent and authority of delegation).
These softness-related dimensions measure only specific qualities
of the instrument. They may be combined and may interact with
numerous other qualities of the instruments, such as how quickly they
can be enacted, how representative they are, etc. A discussion on the
qualities of the instrument itself also easily merges into a discussion on
the impacts that the instruments have. International lawyers and legal
scholars often concentrate on compliance, while political scientists
assess, for example, the effectiveness, dynamic and static efficiency,
legitimacy and administrative burden of the instrument, with a clear
106. "Delegation means that third parties have been granted authority to implement,
interpret, and apply the rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules." Id.
at 401.
107. See id. at 415-18
108. See id. at 408-10.
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Mitchell convincingly argues that
emphasis on effectiveness. 109
compliance is only a subset of effectiveness, and indeed from the
perspective of this paper it is the final policy outcome-a change in the
environmental and human rights behavior of TNCs-that is relevant. 110
As this paper specifically addresses the question of the aptness of "soft
law" instruments to govern TNCs, the effectiveness of instruments thus
is a relevant, yet limited part of the analysis. It is worth repeating that
softness and effectiveness are separate but interrelated issues, and that
only softness-related qualities are analyzed in this article; the other
qualities of the instruments are not assessed. 111
The following tool emerges:

lnstr1tment1tm
Formal source of IL or not

Effectiveness

Obligation

Legitimacy

Authority, mandatory
language

Precision

Dynamic efficiency

Accuracy, specificity

Delegation
Extent, authority

Hard

Soft

Dimensions of "softness"

Low

High

Other qualities of instruments

Figure 1: Assessing "Softness" and Other Characteristics of
Instruments
The aspect of systemic coherence-the complementing, replacing,
precursory or antagonistic impacts that the instruments have against
each-seems worth bringing forth in some examples in view of the
earlier discussion. The coherence may be depicted as follows:

See generally RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND THE
146-80 (Sage 2010).
110. See id.; see generally Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67.
111. Qualities such as static and dynamic efficiency, and administrative burden, are
typically assessed.
109.

ENVIRONMENT
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Instrument 2

ls the overall policy mix
optimal?

Instrument 3

Are individual tools
optimal?
Instrument 4

Figure 2: Systemic Coherence of Soft Instruments

E. Applying the Tool to Public Legal Instruments, Public Non-

Legal Instruments and Private Instruments
In order to structure the application of the tool to particular
environmental and human rights instruments in Section IV, it is useful
to categorize the instruments in a preliminary fashion. First, as was
indicated in Section III (C), it is possible to distinguish between the
formal sources of international law (legal instrumentum) and the nonlegal or "soft" instrumentum. It is not implied that non-legal instruments
cannot bind actors politically, nor that they cannot be successful in
addressing a policy problem. The distinction simply reflects that such
instruments cannot legally bind states and in most cases cannot be
enforced through judicial means. Therefore, there are some good
reasons why non-legal instruments cannot operate in the same way as
legal instruments.
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Second, the broad non-legal category can be further sharpened 112
by separating public instruments from private instruments. 113 Three
broad categories of instruments can be identified 114 :
• Public Legal Instruments are the formal sources of
international law - i.e. the legal instrumentum within the context
of the international legal order - consist primarily of conventions,
customary law and binding decisions of international
organizations. These instruments are in the left column of Table
1, while non-legal instruments form the right column.
• Public Non-Legal Instruments include the output of
international organizations, two or more states collectively, or
even more loose gatherings of public officials (such as
collaborative networks), that are however not laid down as formal
international law. 115 "Public" thus denotes the centrality of public
actors: state representatives, intergovernmental organizations,
other public officials.
• Private lnstruments 116 in contrast include the output of
private or primarily private transnational initiatives, such as
guidelines or standards. A few instruments, such as the UN
Global Compact and other public-private partnerships, partly fit
under either category, public or private.
The distinction
public/private may be particularly relevant in the area of TNCs,
where the private authorship of an instrument usually points to
the involvement of either the regulated TNCs themselves or their
staunchest critics, NGOs. The difference between the Public
Non-Legal and Private (Non-Legal) Instruments (as well as the

112. See Blutman, supra note 68 , at 607-08.
113. Compare the IN-LAW project, which leaves private formal instruments outside of
its ambit. See generally INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKfNG (Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses
Wessel & Jan Wouters eds., Oxford U. Press 2012).
114. These three groups are different from those distinguished by Blutman: the output
of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is part
of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 68, at 607-08.
115. Blutman distinguishes more categorically between state instruments and
instruments adopted by international organizations. However, because the adoption of
instruments within international organizations is heavily influenced by states a further
distinction would not seem useful or justifiable.
116. The type of private instruments that this article analyses are never legal
instruments, so that the addition 'non-legal' is superfluous. Private actors are of course
perfectly capable of adopting legal instruments in the form of private law contracts, but
those are outside the scope of this research.
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overlap between them) is highlighted with background shadings
in the right-hand column of Table 1 below.
The most noteworthy environmental and human rights instruments
can be grouped into these three categories of Public Legal Instruments,
Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private Instruments as shown in
Table 1 below:

Legal instrumentum
(Formal Sources of
International Law)

IV.A. Public Legal
Instruments

PUBLIC
(States and
IOs)

PUBLICPRIVATE
(Mix of States/
IOs and TNCs/
NGOs)

- ICCPR, ICESCR,
other human rights
treaties;
-Multilateral
Environmental
Agreements
- Security Council
Decisions

-

Non-legal
instrumentum
(Other than Formal
Sources of International '
Law)

IV.B. Public NonLegal Instruments
-UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human
Rights
-OECD Principles on
Multinational
Enterprises
-UNEP Guidelines 117
-UN Global Compact
-UN Business
Partnerships
-Equator Principles
-Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human
Rights

117. E.g., Charles Thomas, Tessa Tennant & Jon Rolls, The GHG Indicator: UNEP
Guidelines for Calculating Greenhouse Gas Emissions for Businesses and Non Commercial
Organizations
(2000),
available
at
http://www. unepfi .org/fileadmin/documents/ghg_indicator_2000.pdf (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
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IV.C. Private
Instruments
PRIVATE
(TN Cs)

PRIVATE
(NGOs)

Table 1. Categories
Instruments.

-

-Corporate Codes of
Conduct
-Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative

-Forest Stewardship
Council's Forest
Principles
-!SEAL Alliance-labels
-Social Accountability
International Standards
of Environmental and Human Rights

It seems that instruments belonging to different categories are
likely to denote certain recurring combinations of dimensions of
softness. These soft dimensions are marked in white in Figure 3
below, 118 although there may also of course be other soft characteristics,
as the analysis further below will clearly show.

118. The values of the other characteristics in the Figure are default values marked
only for the purposes of illustration.
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Public, Non-legal
Instruments

Private , Non-legal
Instruments

l 11strumentum

fnstrlll#N""'11t

Instrumentum

Formal source of lL or not

Formal source of IL or not

Potential
softness

Soft

Hard

Soft

Hard

Soft

Hard

Figure 3: Hypothetical Illustration of the "Softness" of Instruments
(white color indicates the sources of softness)

The possibility of such different dynamics of softness, as well as
different underlying explanations, justifies a separate analysis of
instruments from each of the three categories. The categories of Public
Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments and Private
Instruments thus constitute Sections IV (A) through (C) in the
discussion that follows below.

IV. APPL YING THE CONCEPTUAL TOOL ON SOFTNESS
TO PRACTICAL CASES
In this Section, the conceptual tool created in the preceding Section
is applied to practical case examples on human rights and
environmental instruments that deal with TNCs. The approach has two
objectives. First, the tool's scores along the dimensions of softness
enable a sharper differentiation of the numerous instruments that apply
to TN Cs. Second, the application of the tool will allow for observations
of potential connections between the instrument's softness (both along
individual dimensions and overall) and how it operates. Ultimately, this
enables preliminary reflections on the relationship between (categories
of) instruments' softness and their effectiveness. It might even enable
the grouping of measures into some type of sub-categories on the basis
of their softness, as measured along the dimensions.
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The instruments that are to be analyzed have been selected for their
central place in the legal system for this area (Human Rights
Covenants), for their high profile (U.N. Guiding Principles, OECD
Guidelines) or their visibility towards the public (U.N. Global Compact,
Forest Stewardship Council). In the TNC context, instruments often
combine human rights with environmental protection.
As may be recalled from the previous Section, the preliminary
application of the tool grouped instruments into three general
categories, that are each discussed in the Sections that follow: Public
Legal Instruments (IV (A)), Public Non-Legal Instruments (IV (B)), and
Private Instruments (IV (C)). 119 The instruments have been chosen so
as to provide case examples that are representative of each of those
categories. 120 The selected instruments for each category will be
scrutinized along the (sub )dimensions of softness of the conceptual
tool-obligation (authority and mandatory nature of the language);
precision (accuracy and specificity); and delegation (extent and
authority of delegation)-to add further nuance to the analysis.

A. Public Legal Instruments
1. General Observations
Instruments that are formal sources of international law- treaties
and binding decisions of international organizations- possess a legal
instrumentum, and have thereby specific characteristics compared to
non-legal instruments: only formal sources of law are capable of
creating obligations that are hard in the sense of being legally binding
and capable of enforcement through judicial means.
Most international law, aside from a few obligations under
customary law, is nonetheless not applicable to TNCs directly 121 as was
explained in Section I. Treaties and binding decisions of international
organizations also usually do not specifically address TNC behavior.
The hardness of the instrumentum of Public Legal Instruments is
therefore in the particular context of international governance not

119. A few of the examples amount to such an important participation of both private
and public actors that they may also be considered to constitute a separate public-private
category.
I 20. The first group, Public Legal Instruments, was already discussed in Section I to
establish the existence of a legal void. The observations in the following section on them
will therefore build upon the previous analysis in Section I.
I 21. NOLLKA EMP ER, supra note 22, at 58-59.
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equaled in the negotium part when measured along the dimensions of
creating obligations on TNCs and being specific in doing so.
Authority as a sub-dimension of "obligation" emanates in this
category of instruments from public authors, states and, to a much lesser
extent, international organizations. However, a state as a public
authority is not always authoritative as a rule maker, when it adopts
instruments to address its own behavior, the obliging authority of the
instrument is at the state's own discretion, and thus lower than when it
is set by a binding Security Council Chapter VII resolution. States also
do not have much authority over activities that take place outside their
jurisdictions, which is very relevant in the context of TNCs. This type
of exception therefore limits public authorities' power in terms of the
obligatory nature of the enacted instrument.
On the other (sub )dimensions in the tool, the softness of Public
Legal Instruments may in principle vary like it varies in all other types
of instruments. In the absence of direct obligations and likely poor
specificity, the tool places special emphasis on the delegation dimension
of international public law instruments. Are the implementing tasks
comprehensively delegated, and do the delegatee bodies possess the
necessary authority to oversee the process? It should be kept in mind
that because the states in any event need to act in-between the
international requirements and TNCs, there already are two steps in
applying international public law instruments.
The delegation
dimension of the tool shows how there is one further step to be taken
into account.
The state's implementing authority and responsibility to apply the
international provisions is often delegated to a public body such as a
ministry or agency. Although an actor other than the TNCs themselves,
the authority of the delegation is limited by the fact that it was these
very states that adopted the instruments in question, and they are
addressed to these very same states. The implementing and interpretive
authorities are in this sense not delegated to a truly independent actor.
The state's independent authority in the delegation will depend on many
factors, but there is often little in the instruments to guarantee it, and
much to restrain it. For example, the interests of the state may be too
close to that of the TNCs for it to exercise "independent" delegated
authority over the corporations. This holds true for host states, as the
Chevron case vividly illustrated, but also for home states, which may be
unwilling to constrain the operations of 'their" corporations abroad.
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Another problem is that international jurisdictional laws limit the
authority that is legally delegated to the home state. Home state organs
enforcing or adjudicating on 'their' corporations may rightly fear that
such extensive exercises of jurisdiction are for the most part prohibited
by international law. The Shell Nigeria case showed that even where a
home state judge declares itself competent, it may only be able to apply
the law of the host state, which in that case was far below the standards
prescribed by the home state. 122 Third, a state may be unlikely to
proactively enforce the rules, and will often only intervene if the victims
or their representatives bring a case against the state authorities. Local
inhabitants or vigilant NGOs may be required to force the state to
assume its role as the delegatee. An example is again the Chevron case,
where only a decades-long effort by interest groups was able to move
the case forward.
Truly relevant delegation would mean third party oversight over
the states' performance of their delegated tasks with regard to TNCs.
The following sections will show that such oversight is nevertheless
often deficient on all levels: national, regional as well as international.
In conclusion, the delegation sub-dimension is rather soft for many
Public Legal Instruments on TNCs.
A tentative picture can thus already be envisaged before applying
the tool to provisions of particular Public Legal Instruments in areas of
human rights covenants and multilateral environmental agreements.
Public Legal Instruments are formally binding upon states that are
parties to them, but not upon TNCs nor do they generally contain
mandatory and precise requirements specifically about their behavior, or
delegation of oversight regarding state actions vis-a-vis TNCs. Public
Legal Instruments thus appear soft along all dimensions in their
application to TNCs. The conclusion seems almost counter-intuitive.
'Hard law' could leave a void in terms of TNCs because it is in fact not
hard at all.

2. The Human Rights Covenants
The human rights covenants, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"), illustrate the
softness that may plague Public Legal Instruments in the field of human
rights. The Covenants amount only to what Knox calls a due diligence
122. See supra Section I (E)(3); Milieudefensie v. Dutch Royal Shell, Judgment (LJN:
BU3535) (2013).
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obligation, "an obligation of conduct and effort, not of result," 123
regarding human rights violations between private actors such as TNCs
and individual citizens. It is sufficient for the state governments to
satisfy their obligations to just take "reasonable steps" in trying to
prevent violations. Individual states and national legal orders retain
rather large discretion to determine appropriate measures.
Admittedly, the Human Rights Committee has commented that
states must protect individuals "also against acts committed by private
persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights
in so far as they are amenable to application between private parties or
entities." 124 But how exactly the rights apply to private actors, and
which actions are required of states in particular situations is left to the
states themselves to determine. Moreover, the General Comments of
the Covenant's bodies are not legally binding. Research conducted
under the UN Special Representative for business and human rights'
mandate shows that in practice, very few states actually have "special
policies, programs, or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate
human rights challenges." 125 The conclusion is that the "due diligence"
standard leads to a low level of obligation, and that the lack of accurate
guidance on which actions are a part of that due diligence standard
amounts to a low level of precision, both in terms of accuracy and
specificity.
As for the duties of home states to oversee that corporations based
within their jurisdiction respect human rights extra-territorially, the
Covenants are even more ambiguous: "The committees have not
expressly interpreted the treaties as requiring states to exercise
extraterritorial jurisdiction over abuses committed abroad by
corporations domiciled in their territory. Nor however, do they seem to
regard the treaties as prohibiting such action, and in some situations
they have encouraged it." For example, the Committee on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights has suggested that state parties take steps to
"prevent their own citizens and companies" from violating rights in
other countries. 126 Thus, the dimensions of obligation and precision
appear to be for home states even softer than for host states.
123. Knox, supra note 21, at 22.
124. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, para. 8, U.N . Doc.
CCPR/21/Rev.l/Add.13 (May 26, 2004).
125. See Human Rights Council, Human Rights Policies and Management Practices:
Results from Questionnaire Surveys of Governments and the Fortune Global 500 Firms,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/Add. 3 (Feb. 28, 2007).
126. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 46th Sess. May 2-May 20,
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Is the softness of such low levels of obligation and prec1s10n
mitigated through oversight by third parties, delegation? The Human
Rights Committee ("HRC") and the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights (the "Human Rights Bodies") may be considered as
a kind of "secondary" delegatee: they monitor whether the states
complete their delegated task of providing horizontal protection. Such
interventions by the Human Rights Bodies will not be able to strengthen
the delegation much in practice, however, as it is widely acknowledged
that these U .N. bodies have only very limited powers. The so-called
'views' the HRC adopt in specific cases are non-binding as are the
General Comments of both committees.
Regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights,
have declared themselves incompetent to assert jurisdiction outside the
territory of the member states of the European Convention on Human
Rights, except where a member state exercises effective control, but this
is only possible in cases of either full occupation 127 or military action on
the ground. 128 In the developing regions, where the consequences of the
void are felt most, oversight mechanisms are much weaker. They are
practically absent in Asia, 129 while the African Court of Human and
Peoples' Rights is slowly starting to make use of its competences. 130
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights seems in this respect most
promising in the short term. However, the primary focus of all these
courts often is, or at least should be, in scrutinizing government's own
inappropriate conduct. Scrutiny of governmental oversight of corporate
conduct would seem a second-tier priority.
The Shell-Nigeria case implies that home state courts will at most
oversee that the state applies to national corporations the domestic law
of the host state, but not that it applies the ECHR or the ICCPR. The

2011, U.N . Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 para. 5.
127. See Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 731, para. 76 (2001);
see Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, 20 Eur. H.R. Rep. 99, para. 62 (1995).
128. See Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18,
para. 110 (2011 ).
129. The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) has as
of yet no real judicial powers. See James Munro, The Relationship Between the Origins and
Regime Design of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR),
15 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 1185, 1185 (2011).
130. A first decision was issued on 15 December 2009, in the matter of Michelot
Yogogombaye v. The Republic of Senegal, 001/2008, AFR. CT. H.R. See Chacha Bhoke
Murungu, Judgment in the First Case Before the African Court of Human and Peoples'
Rights: A Missed Opportunity or a Mockery of International Law in Africa?, 3 J. AFR. &
INT'L L. 187 (2010).
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OECD National Contact Points are a very modest attempt to oversee
human rights violations outside ECHR territory. The Contact Points fall
in this paper under the next category of Public Non-Legal Instruments.
These examples are well aligned with the conclusions of the U.N.
Special Rapporteur. States seem to escape effective oversight by other
delegated bodies, irrespective of the level of governance.

3. Environmental Agreements
The previous discussion on Public Legal Instruments in the field of
human rights indicated that these tools often lack in terms of their
obligation, precision and delegation.
International environmental
agreements may however be used to illustrate that such deficiencies are
not an unavoidable characteristic of Public Legal Instruments, but rather
a consequence of more or less deliberate choices in constructing the
instruments. In other words, hardness is also possible to achieve in
international law. The International Convention on Civil Liability for
Oil Pollution Damage (the "CLC Convention") 1992 131provides an
instructive example. The CLC Convention is an international maritime
treaty that was adopted to ensure that adequate compensation is
available for oil pollution damage caused by accidents of oil tankers. 132
Article IX of the Convention states that "[ e ]ach Contracting State shall
ensure that its Courts possess the necessary jurisdiction to entertain such
actions for compensation."
The convention is extremely precise and framed in mandatory
terms. It reads almost like an insurance contract. 133 Paradoxically, as
131. International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (Civil
Liability Convention, (CLC)), INT'L MARITIME 0RG. (Nov. 29, 1969), available at
http://www. imo .org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/lntemati onalConvention-on-Ci vil-Liability-for-Oi 1-Poll ution-Damage-( C LC) .aspx (last visited Apr. 1,
2015).
132. Id.
133. For example, paragraphs 1-3 of Article V state:
The owner of a ship shall be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention in
respect of any one incident to an aggregate amount calculated as follows:
(a)4,5 l 0,000 units of account for a ship not exceeding 5,000 units of tonnage;
(b)for a ship with a tonnage in excess there of, for each additional unit of
tonnage, 631 units of account in addition to the amount mentioned in sub-paragraph
(a);
provided, however, that this aggregate amount shall not in any event exceed
89,770,000 units of account.
The owner shall not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is
proved that the pollution damage resulted from his personal act or omission,
committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge
that such damage would probably result.
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the text of for example the Preamble and Articles III and V of the
Convention show a central aim of the Convention is in fact to limit the
liability of the ship owners. A number of scholars indeed criticize the
way in which a regime, which was meant to establish a balance between
the needs of the victims of oil spills (compensation for the harm) and
the needs of the economic actors (continuation of activities), favors the
latter. 134 The victims of a recent oil spill, caused by the tanker Erika,
have for that reason sought to escape the limitations of the international
civil liability regime. They try to rely on the more protective provisions
of national criminal law or EU waste legislation, 135 instead. 136 All other
public law instruments, such as the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("HR
Convention"), also seem incapable of alleviating the victims' concerns.
For the purpose of availing himself of the benefit of limitation provided for in
paragraph l of this Article the owner shall constitute a fund for the total sum
representing the limit of his liability with the Court or other competent authority of
any one of the Contracting States in which action is brought under Article IX or, if
no action is brought, with any Court or other competent authority in any one of the
Contracting States in which an action can be brought under Article IX. The fund can
be constituted either by depositing the sum or by producing a bank guarantee or
other guarantee, acceptable under the legislation of the Contracting State where the
fund is constituted, and considered to be adequate by the Court or other competent
authority.
Id. art. V.
134. Cf A.E. Boyle, Globalising Environmental Liability: The Interplay of National
and International Law, 17 OXFORD J. ENVTL. L. 3 (2005); see EDWARD H. P. BRANS,
LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES: STANDING, DAMAGE, AND
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT (1st ed. 2001 ); LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
(Colin M. De la Rue ed., 1993); Gotthard M. Gauci, Protection of the Marine Environment
Through the International Ship-Source Oil Pollution Compensation Regimes, 8 REv. EUR.
COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 29 (1999); Magnus Goransson, Liability for Damage to the
Marine Environment, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST
ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 345 (Alan Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999);
David Wilkinson, Moving the Boundaries of Compensable Environmental Damage Caused
by Marine Oil Spills: The Effect of two New International Protocols, 5 OXFORD J. ENVTL. L.
71 (1993 ). For more critical approaches, see Anne Daniel, Civil Liability Regimes as a
Complement to Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Sound International Policy or
False Comfort? , 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 225 (2003); Michael Faure & Wang
Hui, The International Regimes for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage: Are they
Effective?, 12 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 242 (2003); Armelle Gouritin, The
International Regime for the Compensation of Oil-Pollution Damage. A Good Candidate to
Have a Human Rights Approach?, 20 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L.194 (2011);
Drame lbrahima, Recovering Damage to the Environment per se Following an Oil Spill:
The Shadows and Lights of the Civil Liability and Fund Conventions of 1992, 14 REV. EUR.
COMP. & INT'L ENVTL. L. 63 (2005).
135. See Case C-188/07, Commune de Mesquer v. Total Fr. SA, 2008 E.C.R. 1-4501,
paras. 24-27, 66.
136. See Gouritin, supra note 134.
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The precision and delegation of the HR Convention is low and much
inferior to that of the CLC Convention.
The example demonstrates how a Public Legal Instrument can be
very hard in terms of its obligations, precision and delegation, and that
it may then tend to be working to shield rather than to govern the
specific powerful group of TNCs, in the quoted example the shipping
compames.

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Legal Instruments
The application of the softness tool on Public Legal Instruments
reveals that they tend to score low on the mandatory language, precision
and specificity in terms of managing TNCs and other private actors.
The level of obligation for states in fulfilling their tasks as delegatees
also remains ambiguous. Especially the extra-territorial enforcement of
home state laws against national corporations is rare. In many respects,
the "hard law" turns out not to be hard at all, even if there clearly is
potential for it be so.

I
I

I nstrumentum
Formal source of IL or not

Obligation
Authority, mandatory
language

Precision
Accuracy,
specificity

Delegation
Extent,
authority

"Softness in
average"

Soft

Hard

Figure 4: "Softness" of TNC Related Public Legal Instruments in
Human Rights and Environmental Protection.
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B. Public Non-Legal Instruments
1. General Observations
The second group, Public Non-Legal Instruments contains
agreements between state parties, state-centric institutions or even
looser gatherings of public officials. The proliferation of international
organizations has increased the importance of public yet non-legal
instruments, 137 and this is also true for the governance of TNCs. Such
instruments are therefore not a new phenomenon in international
governance, and their longstanding role has been described by scholars,
such as Schachter, Lipson, and Aust. 138
The obvious observation on the softness of the entire category of
Public Non-Legal Instruments is what distinguishes them from formal
law: that governments and international organizations ("IOs") have
opted for a non-legal instrumentum, that is not formal law. The nonlegal nature of the instrumentum is often reflected in the denominations
of the instruments, such as "recommendations" or "guidelines."
Sometimes a closer analysis of the IO's constitutive instrument, or of
the content of the agreement, is necessary to establish that one is indeed
dealing with a non-legal instrumentum.
Many Public Non-Legal Instruments that relate to TNC behaviour
are adopted through, or by, IOs such as the Organization for Economic
Cooperation in Europe ("OECD"), the United Nations ("U.N.") and the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP"). Their authority
tends to vary on a case-by-case basis: the U.N. as an eminent
organization can assert great moral authority on state and TNC
activities, while the OECD is regarded highly by TNCs for its
competence and expertise on economic issues. The obligations created
by the authority of other IOs, for instance UNEP, towards TNCs are in

137. See generally JOSE E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS (2005); see, e.g., Christian Brutsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl, Complex Legalization and
the Many Moves to Law, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS 9, 9-27
(Christian Brutsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007) (discussing the increase in international
law making and legalization of transnational relations); Kai Raustiala, Institutional
Proliferation and the International Legal Order, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 293 (Jeffrey
L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 20 I 2) (referring to institutional proliferation and the rise
of institutional density).
I 38. See Anthony Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal International
Instruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 787 (I 986); Charles Lipson, Why are Some
International Agreements Informal?, 45 INT'L ORG. 495 (1991); Oscar Schachter, The
Twilight Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977).
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many cases softer. What is relatively new in Public Non-Legal
Instruments is that increasingly they contain a mixture of provisions that
are intended to directly cover the behavior of non-state actors, even
though the non-state actors have no official part in the adoption of such
instruments. This increases the obligatory nature of the instruments
towards TNCs. On the other hand, the member states of international
organizations voting in favor of such instruments tend to equate them
with political agreements. The language of the instruments is not
mandatory, and hence does not create obligations: not on the TNCs, the
states, nor on the !Os adopting them. The member states tend to share
the idea that the TN Cs' behavior needs to change in certain ways, and
wish to point each other's actions into that direction. The instruments
that are directly addressed to TNCs only encourage them to act in a
certain way.
The sub-dimensions of precision-the accuracy and specificity of
the instruments
appear to vary widely in Public Non-Legal
Instruments. Specificity perhaps tends to be the 'harder' sub-dimension
of the two, as the instruments occasionally address specific kinds of
businesses and specific types of TNC behavior, but are less often very
accurate about what exactly the states and TNCs are in practice
expected to do.
Finally, the delegation dimension tends to be low across Public
Non-Legal Instruments, as the implementation and interpretation of the
instruments is mostly left to the enacting states and !Os themselves.
2. The OECD Guidelines and National Contact Points
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") adopted the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
("OECD Guidelines" or "Guidelines") in 1976, and revised them in
2000 and 2011.
The OECD Guidelines are "recommendations
addressed by governments to multinational enterprises operating in or
from" OECD Member States adhering to the Guidelines. 139 They
"provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business
conduct in a global context," 140 thus apparently aiming to fill the void
left by the Human Rights Covenants with their unclear stance on extraterritoriality. The Guidelines encourage companies to "[r]espect the

139. OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises,

0RG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION

3 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf (last
visited Mar. 16, 2015) [hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
140. Id.
AND DEV.
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internationally recognised human rights of those affected by their
activities," 141 "wherever they operate." 142
In terms of precision, the OECD Guidelines are thus specifically
addressed at multinational enterprises and are quite accurate as to what
is expected from them. For example, the Guidelines state that
[a] State's failure either to enforce relevant domestic laws, or to
implement international human rights obligations or the fact that it may
act contrary to such laws or international obligations does not diminish
the expectation that enterprises respect human rights. 143

However, much of the language is not phrased as obligations. In
most provisions, "should," "seek ways to," or "does not diminish the
expectation" in the provisions just quoted above prevail over "shall." 144
It remains unclear where in the Guidelines an obligation for the TNCs 145
to actually act in accordance with them is really created. Perhaps it
flows from the "procedural" obligations that are phrased in more
mandatory terms. 146 For instance, TNCs-if acting in accordance with
the Guidelines-must have an internal policy on human rights, carry out
human rights due diligence and "provide for or co-operate through
legitimate processes in the remediation of adverse human rights
impacts." 147 Yet the Guidelines do not mention any sanctions on
transnational corporations that do not carry out such tasks. It should be
recalled that for the TNCs, the Guidelines indeed only establish nonbinding principles. The ability of the procedural provisions of the
Guidelines to set obligations that amount to a high level of hardness in
the sense of the tool will hence depend on the authority of the
instrument, and the OECD more generally. As was noted above, the
corporate community would seem to regard the organization rather
highly. 148
A further dimension along which to measure the hardness of the
Guidelines is the delegation of their implementation and enforcement.
141. Id. at 19, art. 11.A.2.
142. Id. at 17, art. 1.3.
143. Id. at 32, art. IV.38.
144. See e.g., OECD Guidelines supra note 139, art. IV.1-IV.3.
145. Id. at 21, para. 3 (The OECD Guidelines uses the terminology "MN Es.").
146. Id. at 31, art. IV.4-IV.6.
147. Id. at31,art. IV.6.
148. For an example of a critical approach to the OECD Guidelines, see Joris
Oldenziel & Joseph Wilde-Ramsing, OECD Guidelines Lack Teeth, Influence, OECD
WATCH (Sept. 25, 2009), available at http://oecdwatch.org/news-en/oecd-guidelines-lackteeth-influence (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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The Guidelines do set legally binding obligations on the OECD member
states in this respect. The states must, amongst other things, establish
"National Contact Points" ("NCPs") to assist companies and their
stakeholders in complying with the Guidelines. 149 This obligation finds
a legal backrest in Article 5(a) of the OECD Convention, which
specifically mandates state parties to follow the OECD Guidelines'
procedural and institutional rules regarding the setting up of NCPs and
the proceedings that they are to follow. 150 However, it is doubtful
whether the NCPs may be considered independent from the executive
branch of the states that establish them. As noted, this triggers
problems on the role of the state as a delegatee. 151 This problem is
slightly less serious in OECD Guidelines than in many Public Legal
Instruments because the state is implementing standards that apply
directly to the TNCs instead of relying on their indirect application
through the duty to protect. It has been argued that the NGOs also play
the role of a delegatee, next to the NCPs themselves, because the
procedure allows NGOs to bring cases to the attention of the NCPs. 152
In practice, this is the way in which a case usually reaches an N CP.
A more serious problem is the limited extent of delegation. The
ultimate power of the NCPs resides in their ability to make public
statements. While the power of negative publicity in inducing changes
in TNC behavior (or at least in the image it wishes to promote) should
not be underestimated, it usually still falls short of the obligatory force
of, for instance, monetary fines or the judicial prosecution of
individuals. There are good reasons to doubt the extent to which the
NCPs are, or can be expected to be, performing their tasks as effective

149. OECD Guidelines, supra note 139, at 68.
150. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
art. 5(a), OECD, Dec. 14, 1960, available at http://www.oecd.org/general/
conventionontheorganisationforeconomicco-operationanddevelopment.htm (last visited Apr.
1, 2015) [hereinafter OECD].
151. The Netherlands tried to mitigate this problem by making its NCP a more
independent body, but the OECD Guidelines require at least some measure of government
involvement, so that independence could only partially be achieved. For instance, the
Minister of Foreign Affairs can still make a statement before a report is made public. See
Dutch National Contact Point: Aspirations and Expectations Met? Report of the NCP Peer
(2010),
available
at
http://www.jura.uniReview
Team
bonn.de/fileadmin/Fachbereich_Rechtswissenschaft/Einrichtungen/Lehrstuehle/Verwaltung
srecht/de_Wet/27_Dutch_NCP.Peer_Review.pdf(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
152. OECD, supra note 150, at 1774. According to Schuler, another possible role of
delegatee is reserved for the OECD Investment Committee, but its role is limited to posting
clarifications of a general nature and it cannot overrule statements by NCPs in specific
cases.
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implementers and interpreters of the Guidelines. In fact, there is no sign
that TNCs actually have been publically reproached in more cases than
the odd one out. For example, in the eleven cases over a period of ten
years-a low figure in itself-on which the NCP of the Netherlands so
far has reached a Final Report, not once did it find a reason to publicize
the violations of substantive rights. 153 In but a few cases did it find that
transparency, communication and other such more secondary issues
were below the OECD standard. 154 It urged the companies in question
to improve those particular points, or only congratulated them for
having already done so. In the remainder of the cases, the NCP
concluded that no 'investment context' or 'nexus' existed, so that the
situation fell outside the scope of the OECD Guidelines, 155 or that
bilateral talks between the NGO complainant and the company had
already brought the issue to a close. 156 The figures on the Dutch N CP
reflect those on other OECD member states. 157

153.
Closed
Procedures,
MINISTRY
FOREIGN
AFF.,
available
at
http://www.oecdguidelines.nl/notifications/contents/overview-notifications/closedprocedures (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
154. See e.g., Neth. Nat'] Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the
"Complaint (dated May 15, 2006) on the Violations of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation (PSPC), Pursuant to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises",
OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 14 (July 14, 2009), available at
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/43663730.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
155. See Neth. Nat'] Contact Point, Final Statement of the Dutch NCP on the Specific
Instance Raised by Shehri-CBE Concerning Makro-Habib Pakistan Limited, Raised on 9
October 2008, OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (Feb. 2010), available
at http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/46085466.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
156. See Neth. Nat'] Contact Point, Final Report of the National Contact Point for the
OECD Guidelines in the Netherlands on the Specific Instance Notified by CEDHA,
INCASUR Foundation, SOMO and Oxfam Novib Concerning Nidera Holding B. V., OECD
GUIDEUNES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (Feb. 3, 2012), available at
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/Netherlands_final_statement_nidera_ 03-02-2012.pdf (last
visited Apr. I, 2015).
157. See JORIS OLDENZIEL, JOSEPH WILDE-RAMSING & PATRICIA FEENEY, OECD
WATCH 10 YEARS ON: ASSESSING THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES TO RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT 10-11 (2010).
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Figure 5: "Softness" of OECD Guidelines

3. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights (" U.N. Guiding Principles" or "Principles'')
The U .N. Guiding Principles are the result of a U .N. Human Rights
Council mandate to the Special Representative of the U.N. SecretaryGeneral, John Ruggie. On the basis of the mandate, Ruggie was to
develop such principles within the framework proposed in his Report to
"Protect, Respect and Remedy." 158 The Principles rest accordingly on
the Report's three pillars of protection, respect and remedy:
The first is the State duty to protect against human rights abuses by
third parties, including business enterprises, through appropriate
policies, regulation, and adjudication. The second is the corporate

158. Ruggie, supra note 9, para. 9.
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responsibility to respect human rights, which means that business
enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on the
rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are
involved. The third is the need for greater access by victims to
effective remedy, both judicial and non-judicial. 159

The text of the U .N. Guiding Principles was consulted extensively
with a wide variety of relevant actors ranging from governments to
businesses and NGOs. 160 The substantive principles of the U.N.
Guiding Principles are quite similar to the OECD Guidelines, which in
their 2011 version were aligned with the former. 161 Yet, the U.N.
Guiding Principles have a broader scope ratione personae, because they
include TN Cs from all U .N. member states, rather than from the
industrialized OECD countries only. Ratione materiae, the U.N.
Guiding Principles are not limited to investment settings, unlike the
OECD Guidelines. In other words, the U.N. Principles apply to a larger
number of states and TN Cs, and to a wider array of situations.
The U .N. Guiding Principles were adopted by the geographically
representative U .N. Human Rights Council. The Principles' hardness
along the obligation dimension of the tool is likely to benefit from the
rather strong systemic coherence with the human rights Covenants. As
explained previously, systemic coherence denotes the influence that one
instrument may have on the performance of another along the
dimensions of the tool. The interaction between a similarly aligned
Public Legal Instrument, such as a human rights Covenant, and a Public
Non-Legal Instrument, such as the U.N. Guiding Principles, could
mutually increase the hardness of both instruments. In this case both
instruments are even a part of the U .N. human rights system. The
Principles could lead judiciaries to interpret more specifically the
obligations of states as delegatees vis-a-vis TNC conduct under the
Covenants. 162 Since all parties to the human rights Covenants are also
parties to the U.N., the U.N. Guiding Principles could be argued to
constitute a subsequent agreement or practice that contributes to the

159. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, para. 6.
160. Id. para. 12.
161. This is understandable since the most recent version of the OECD Guidelines
(2011) explicitly states that they are in line with the UN Guiding Principles. OECD
Guidelines, supra note 139, at 3.
162. Arguably, there is no reason why this would not be true as well to some extent for
the OECD Guidelines, just as for all other Public Non-Legal Instruments, which may
influence the development of the law through interpretation or the development of
customary international law.
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interpretation of the pre-existing international human rights obligations
of states. 163 Alternatively, the U.N. Guiding Principles could be
considered a part of the opinio Juris in the formation of new customary
rules. 164 Most relevant in this respect is that Part I of the UN Guiding
Principles deals with what the state "duty to protect" amounts to for
companies. 165 The notion of systemic coherence thus provides insights
in how one instrument may have a high level of obligation but lack in
precision, while for another one the situation is the other way around.
Taken together, the instruments may alleviate each other's softness.
The obligations created by the U.N. Guiding Principles could
therefore be harder than the principled, non-legal nature of their form
would lead to assume, if they are "hardened" by their close links to
existing "hard law" instruments.
Conversely, the U.N. Guiding
Principles could oblige states, and consequently TNCs, by further
"hardening" the obligations that the states have earlier agreed to as
delegatees under human rights Covenants.
This line of reasoning nevertheless holds in practice only where the
Public Non-Legal Instrument in question is actually hard
comprehensively, i.e. is also precise and uses mandatory language. It is
questionable whether this is the case for the U .N. Guiding Principles.
First, the duties of states in the Principles are not phrased in a
mandatory or particularly accurate fashion. The duty of the states
towards "abuses by private actors" is in the Principles defined by using
wordings such as "appropriate steps," "discretion," and "should
consider." 166 Compared with how state duties have developed in the
jurisprudence of the international human rights bodies, the U .N.
Guiding Principles may therefore be a step backwards in terms of
accuracy. The vagueness about what the duty to protect amounts to
leaves the states a wider margin of discretion on what is acceptable
TNC behavior. 167 A closer analysis of the Principles thus reveals
evidence of systemic incoherence, or antagonism, in contrast to what
initially seemed like a case of coherence.

163. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, para. 14; see also Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties art. 31(2)(b), May 23 , 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
164. This is what happened to some of the principles established in the famous Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development (1992).
165. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, at 3.
166. Id. at 3-4.
167. Nicola Jagers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making
Headway Towards Real Accountability?, 29 NETH. Q. HUM. RTS. 159, 161 (2011).
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Moreover, the express emphasis in the Principles that no
international obligations are set on the corporations directly, only on the
states, obviously dilutes the obligatory character of the Principles on
TNCs. In the period before the drafting of the Principles, the idea of
setting legal obligations for companies was still taken seriously. 168 The
"Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights" 169 were
however dismissed, after which the appointment of the Special
Representative followed. The part that directly applies to companies
speaks only of responsibilities to respect, but not of obligations in the
same more explicit sense as the duties laid on states. The concept of
"responsibility" is not defined any further than that a certain standard of
conduct is "expected" of the businesses. 170 Moreover, the U.N. Guiding
Principles do not state on what basis this responsibility arises. Clearly,
it is not on the basis of a legal instrumentum. Since TNCs are not
legally bound by the Principles, the Principles represent to the TNCs, a
mere reiteration of pre-existing legal obligations, and a consensually
agreed moral obligation to reach beyond such legal obligations. The
hardness of such a moral obligation would depend on the authority of
the instrument. 171
In terms of precision, the U .N. Guiding Principles represent the
high end in this paper's examples of instruments. They are slightly less
specific than the OECD Guidelines, because the drafters broadened
their scope of application to all businesses rather than to TNCs alone.
Also accuracy is reasonably high, with elaborate commentaries to each
of the "Operational Principles." The part that sets out the desired scope
and content of the companies' human rights due diligence processes
seems to some extent comparable to an environmental impact

168. Id. at 160 ("From the very beginning professor Ruggie has steered determinedly
away from the concept of human rights obligations for corporations and instead placed
exclusive emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer."). See also De Feyter supra note
15, at 78.
169. Sub-Comm ' n on Promotion and Prot. Human Rights, Commentary on the Norms
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corps. and Other Bus. Enter. with Regard to
Human Rights, Rep. on its 55th Sess., Aug. 26, 2003 , U.N. Doc.
E/CN .4/Sub.2/2003/ 12/Rev .2 (2003 ).
170. Guiding Principles, supra note 48, at 13.
171. Special Representative Ruggie notes quite positively the numerous consultations
he had with companies in establishing the Principles. See Ruggie, supra note 9,
Introduction, 7, 12. It is difficult to assess whether the consultations have truly supported
the authority of the Principles, or were merely something that TNCs participated in to
maintain a constructive image and to influence any obligations they could be subjected to.
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assessment. 172 The focus of the Principles is on prevention, which the
TNCs have direct influence on, and which is often more effective than
remediation.
However, although precise, much is laid out in descriptive and
explanatory concepts that do not amount to new mandatory
requirements from the perspective of the dimension of obligation. So
while accurate, the Principles and their Commentaries at most reiterate
existing legal requirements. They, for example, note that in many
jurisdictions, complicity in committing a crime can lead to criminal
liability, even on TNCs, but they do not in any way expand the scope of
such liability. 173
Even precise obligations on companies need to be interpreted when
they are implemented into practice. The implementation is optimally
delegated to separate authorities. Yet on delegation, the U.N. Guiding
Principles are considerably softer than, for example, the OECD
Guidelines.
An earlier version of the Principles envisaged an
Ombudsperson, 174 but this role was apparently removed. The Principles
in the part on the state Duty to Protect probably confused rather than
clarified the role of states as delegatees in the implementation and
enforcement of international human rights law on TNCs. 175 The part on
Access to Remedy calls for various kinds of national and companybased non-judicial grievance mechanisms to complement the statebased judiciaries. In other words, the Principles neither strengthen the
role of home states nor do they create a centralized authority to
coordinate the implementation. They only advocate a very soft form of
delegation that excludes the power to take decisions. Moreover, such
mechanisms are only encouraged, rather than made mandatory. The
contrast to the National Contact Points ("NCPs"), mandated by the
OECD Guidelines, is clear.

172.
173.
174.
175 .

Guiding Principles, supra note 48, at 17-23.
Id. at 18.
Ruggie, supra note 9, para. l 03.
Jagers, supra note 167.
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Figure 6: "Softness" of UN Guiding Principles

4. Concluding Perspectives on Public Non-Legal Instruments
Public Non-Legal Instruments score around the average on several
dimensions of softness in the tool. While scoring rather high on the
dimension of precision, the Public Non-Legal Instruments in this paper
score low on the scale of delegation. They are low on the scale of
obligation as well, because the two sub-dimensions of obligationauthority and the mandatory nature of the language-give contradictory
results. The language used is often overtly non-mandatory, and this fact
cannot be fully compensated by the respectability of the !Os involved,
which is likely to reinforce the authority of the instruments. Public
Non-Legal Instruments, such as the OECD Guidelines and the UN
Guiding Principles, by definition lack the legally binding character of
their counterparts in formal treaties. Unless they are considered
interpretive agreements, they cannot be invoked before a judge as
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directly applicable to a dispute. Systemic coherence, therefore, could
influence the softness or hardness of a non-legal instrument. However,
unless that dynamic clearly increases the level of obligation and
delegation, the softness along these two dimensions only appears to
permit average levels of hardness in this category of instruments.

Instrumentum
Formal source of IL or not
Obligation
Authority,
mandatory language

Precision
Accuracy, specificity

Soft

Hard

Figure 7: Effects of Systemic Coherence - Hardening Public NonLegal Instruments Through Hard Law

C. Private Instruments
1. General Observations
There are a great number of instruments that belong to the third
group: private instruments with direct relevance to TNC behavior.
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Despite the variance among the instruments in this category, It Is
possible to make some general assumptions on how they score on the
dimensions of the tool.
Private instruments, as explained above in Section III, derive their
denomination from the fact that their dominant authors are neither states
nor state-centric international organizations.
These types of
organizations do not have the capacity to adopt instruments that qualify
as formal sources of international law, i.e. as Public Legal Instruments.
None of these instruments in other words has a legal instrumentum. At
the same time, however, such authors do have the capacity to agree
among themselves on instruments that are of private kind.
Private instruments vary significantly by the combinations of
authors adopting them. These authors are principally businesses or their
associations, as well as national and international NGOs. In many
fields, TNCs and NGOs have even entered into a veritable contest to set
the applicable standards. Sometimes a single instrument is ultimately
agreed upon by TNCs and NGOs together, such as the much discussed
Forest Stewardship Principles and Criteria. Some private instruments
are adopted together with or without the support of states or
international organizations that result in some cases in so-called publicprivate partnerships ("PPPs"). 176 It is for that reason not always easy to
distinguish between private and public instruments, although in most
cases either the public or the private actors will be in a dominant role.
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights ("VPSHR")
and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative ("EITI") are,
respectively, examples of a venture purely among TNCs and a venture
between TN Cs and a few states. In some cases, such as the UN Global
Compact, NGOs have heavily criticized PPPs for being dominated from
the outset by business interests under the umbrella of what was formally
a state or IO initiative. 177
It is difficult to make generalizations along the tool's dimension of
authority with so many different author-addressee combinations. Public
authors are generally, but not always, more authoritative than private
parties, and the views on the authority of self-regulation vary greatly.
Low authority indicates low obligation, and hence softness. Mandatory
176. Peter Utting & Ann Zammitt, United Nations-Business Partnerships: Good
Intentions and Contradictory Agendas, 90 J. Bus. ETHICS 39 (2009).
177. Paine, supra note 13, at 13-14. See also J. Martens, Precarious Partnerships: Six
Problems of the Global Compact Between Business and the UN, GLOBAL PoL'Y FORUM,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/225/32252.html (last
visited Mar. 20, 2014).
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nature of the language differs widely as well: the Forest Stewardship
Council confronts a TNC with mandatory language, while the U .N.
Global Compact does not. It is voluntary to sign up for either
instrument.
Generally, the dimension of delegation is very soft across the
board, in particular where private instruments are a form of selfregulation. The role of the state as delegatee is absent in the context of
private instruments. In the NGO-led schemes, there may be some
delegation to the N GOs, and the TN C schemes sometimes rely on
external firms that perform corporate social accountability audits. Yet
neither of them wields the investigative and prosecutorial powers of the
state.
Specificity is often high, not only ratione personae, but also
ratione materiae, as companies are the only addressees. The language
used may range from the very accurate and mandatory expressions of
technical standards to the very open and loosely formulated texts that
are predominant in the human rights and environmental context, such as
the Corporate Social Responsibility declarations of TNCs. Finally, on
precision there is again much variance. The NGO principles usually
score higher on this dimension than their TNC counterparts.

2. The United Nations Global Compact ("U.N. Global Compact" or
"Global Compact'') 178
The United Nations Global Compact is a cooperative initiative of
the U .N. and businesses, based on the multi-stakeholder ideology of
U.N.-Business Partnerships that became prevalent in the U.N. in the
1990's. 179 The Global Compact is based on the voluntary incorporation
by TNCs of a set of ten principles on human and labor rights,
environmental rights, and the fight against corruption into all their
activities. The companies also undertake to actively defend these values
The Global Compact is
within their "sphere of influence." 180
completely voluntary, both in regards to the initial registration as well
as the subsequent adherence to the rules. In earlier versions, the
principles were quite vague, but recently they refer to the U .N. Guiding
Principles' chapter on the responsibilities of businesses. The link
178. The content of this section is derived partly from Tim Staal, The Roles of Hard
Law and Soft Law in the Regulation of Global Business Conduct (2010) (unpublished
Master's Thesis, Vrije Universiteit Brussels) (on file with authors).
179. Utting & Zammitt, supra note 176, at 39-40.
180. See Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, available at
http: //www.unglobalcompact.org/ AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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subjects companies to the more elaborate set of principles. They give
more accurate, yet clearly non-mandatory guidance about the steps that
TNCs can take not to violate existing legal rules. One may clearly
notice the effects of positive systemic coherence between the Global
Compact and the Principles. For example:
Principle 2: "Businesses should make sure they are not
complicit in human rights abuses;" 181
Principle 9: "Businesses should encourage the
development and diffusion of environmentally friendly
technologies." 182
The Global Compact awards companies who report their efforts on
a regular basis the right to sport the Global Compact Logo. A sanction
exists in the form of "de-listing" a company that does not report on its
efforts over three consecutive one-year periods. 183 But in order to
remain listed, a company need not do anything substantive. This TNCfavorable overall set-up attests to the private sector dominance in the
Global Compact, and speaks for analyzing this public-private
arrangement under the category of Private Instruments.
The Global Compact is based on the idea of forming a "community
among the participants in which each individual actor strives to appear
as appropriate in relation to other members of the network and to their
stakeholders at large, a stance that should drive them to act according to
the articulated principles." 184 Thus, the success of the Global Compact
seems to depend on the plausibility of this relation between (superficial)
peer accountability, the attractiveness of the Logo, and a TNC improved
human rights and environmental record. This outcome seems quite case
specific: what may create a hard instrument for a diligent TNC with
high brand recognition and many aggressive competitors, may appear
completely soft for a low profile free rider. The difficulty in even
measuring such attributes against the tool illustrates well in fact the
uncertainties and vagueness inherent in this type of an instrument.
181.
The
Ten
Principles,
U.N . GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015).
182. Id.
183. Integrity
Measures,
U.N.
GLOBAL
COMPACT,
available
at
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/IntegrityMeasures/index.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2015).
184. See Kerstin Sahlin-Andersson, Emergent Cross-Sectional Soft Regulations:
Dynamics at Play in the Global Compact Initiative, in SOFT LA w in GOVERNANCE AND
REGULATION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY ANALYSIS 129, 138-40 (Ulrika Morth ed., 2004).
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In terms of softness, the drafters of the Global Compact seem to
expect that the lack of mandatory and precise wording, as well as the
emphasis on the Global Compact' s voluntary nature, are compensated
through the hardness of other dimensions. The primary means here is
the delegation of the supervision over self-implementation to "other
members of the network and to their stakeholders at large." 185 These
groups include other TNCs and NGOs. This has, however, arguably
remained an empty promise. First of all, a single group of actors, the
TNCs themselves, "appear[s] as rule setters, rule enforcers, rule
followers and rule monitors." 186 This is at odds with the very idea of
delegation. Second, the delegation of authority to "stakeholders at
large" points to two groups of actors: the general public and NGOs.
The former may be expected to react at press stories about serious
violations, but will not actively compare company behavior to the
Principles. So in that sense the general public has a limited, if any task
at all, in the governance of the Global Compact. The most visible part
of the public, NGOs, have from the beginning played an ambivalent role
in the Global Compact. N GOs can be members, just like TN Cs, and
can therefore present a matter of alleged "egregious abuse" to the
Global Compact Board. However, the ultimate sanction is the "delisting" of the TNC. Such an outcome seems superficial at best, and
thus makes for a very unsatisfactory route for NGOs. Compared to the
OECD Guidelines' National Contact Points or to the human rights
treaty bodies, one may conclude that barely any delegation of authority
takes place under the Global Compact.

185. Id. at 140.
186. Id.
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Figure 8: "Softness" of the UN Global Compact, with the Impact of
Systemic Coherence Highlighted

3. The Forest Principles of the Forest Stewardship Council
Fores try is an area where nation states have consistently failed to
reach a global legally binding agreement. Negotiations on a global
forest convention were called off already at the Rio Earth Summit of
1992. 187 The International Tropical Timber Agreement ("ITT A") is
187. Benjamin Cashore et al., Can Non-state Governance 'Ratchet Up' Global
Environmental Standards? Lessons from the Forest Sector, 16 RECIEL 158, 158 (2007).
All substantive provisions of the ITTA 2006, which entered into force 7 December 2011, are
indeed formulated as 'objectives' (Article 1), that are to be implemented through "policy
work and project[ s]" (Article 24) and funding (Article 21) and the conduct of studies
(Article 27). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Negotiation of a
Successor Agreement to the International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 16-27, 2006,
International Tropical Timber Agreement, Jan. 27, 2006, U.N. Doc. TD/TIMBER.3.12 (Feb.
I, 2006).

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/1

162

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Vol. 42, No.

428

Syracuse J. Int'I L. & Com.

[Vol. 42:2

criticized for focusing on trade issues and leaving environmental
protection practically entirely at domestic discretion. What is left are a
number of initiatives that in the course of the 1990's resulted in nonbinding instruments with weak substance. 188 Possibly for these very
reasons, forestry was one of the first fields where a new form of private
transnational regulation appeared: the NGO-based certification scheme
of the Forest Stewardship Council ("FSC") aims directly at changing
the behavior of large forestry companies, 189 often TN Cs.
The FSC stands both for a governance scheme, the Forest
Stewardship Council, and for a set of principles on forestry. 190 These
"Forest Principles and Criteria" are further "elaborated through more
specific global standards, which are adapted to local conditions by
national or regional chapters." 191 FSC-certified forests must have a
continuously updated management plan, the implementation of which is
to be monitored and periodically verified by an accredited third-party
auditor. 192 Participating companies may actually be obliged to change
their policies, even in ways that are not necessarily cost-effective. 193
The Forest Principles are specific in that they refer to one particular
sector with its own demands, and they are also quite accurate. There are
detailed provisions on tenure and use rights (Principle 2), indigenous
188. Intergovernmental Panel on Forests; Intergovernmental Forum on Forests; United
Nations Forum on Forests, which produced the "Plan of Action" and the "Programme of
Work," contained in E/CN.18/2001 /3/Rev.1, which Dimitrov describes as "masterpieces of
Machiavellian diplomacy." Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Hostage to Norms : States, Institutions
and Global Forest Politics, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 1, 11 (Nov. 2005).
189. The high intensity of research on the FSC shows that if any private regulatory
instrument is taken seriously and seen as a forerunner, it is the FSC. Interestingly, this
literature has also ventured into the complement-substitute-or-antagonist debate referred to
above. See generally Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public
Regulation: the Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 47, 75-76 (2006); Cashore et al., supra
note 187, at 160; Jonathan Zeitlin, Pragmatic Transnationalism : Governance Across
Borders in the Global Economy, 9 Socio-ECON. REV. 187, 196-97 (2011); Tim Bartley,
Transnational Private Regulation in Practice: The Limits of Forest and Labor Standards
Certification in Indonesia, 12 Bus. & POL. 1, 7-8 (2010); Tim Bartley, Transnational
Governance as the Layering of Rules: Intersections of Public and Private Standards, 12
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 517, 517 (2011) [hereinafter Transnational Governance].
190. FSC Principles and Criteria/or Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-00! (version 40) , FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, available at http://ic.fsc.org/principles-andcriteria.34.htm (follow "FSC-STD-01-001" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
191. Christine Overdevest & Jonathan Zeitlin, Assembling an Experimentalist Regime:
Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector Revisited, in LEVELING THE
PLAYlNG FIELD: TRANSNATIONAL REGULATORY INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPM ENT 235, 247
(Laszlo Bruszt & Gerald A. McDermott eds., 2014).
192. Id.
193. Cashore et al. , supra note 187, at 161.
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peoples' rights (Principle 3), community relations (Principles 4) and
environmental impacts (Principle 6). 194 Moreover, all the mentioned
principles are phrased in clearly mandatory terms with every provision
using the verb "shall."
On the macro level, the hardness of the obligation will depend on
how many producers have been willing to join the scheme.
Participation is in principle voluntary, but the pressure to join is
nowadays rather high due to the strong developed country industry buyin and increasing consumer awareness. By the end of 2012, it was
estimated that 169. 324 million hectares, 195 compared to over 4 billion
hectares in total forest coverage, 196 were FSC-certified. Overall, the
high degree of authority of the scheme and its mandatory language
render the scheme quite hard in terms of the created obligation.
Delegation seems at first sight to be quite far reaching as well,
although ultimately it is the softest link in the FSC. The governance of
the FSC is in the hands of the tripartite Board of Directors, with
members representing Environmental, Social and Economic (i.e.
business) constituencies, and an equal participation from the global
North and South. 197 This multi-stakeholder set-up has arguably boosted
the authority of implementing the FSC. The interpretation of the Forest
Principles, discussed above, is in the hands of the FSC's organs, not in
that of the timber-producing participants. The Board of Directors has
indeed from time-to-time issued interpretive decisions on TNC
activities. 198 Moreover, fulfillment by a timber producer of the FSC
Principles is validated by independent certification bodies, which have
in turn been accredited by the FSC. 199
However, there are at least two reasons why the FSC and the
certification bodies as delegatees do not reach a high level of
delegation. First, it is quite impossible for the certification bodies to
regularly check the companies' adherence with the principles. Its

194. Id.
195. Facts & Figures, FSC INTERNATIONAL (2014), available at https://ic.fsc.org/factsfigures-2012.509 .htm (last visited Apr. I, 2015).
196. State of the World's Forests 2012, FOOD & AGRIC. 0RG. U.N 15, FAO (2012),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3010e/i3010e.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
In other words, about 4.2 % of total global forest coverage is certified by FSC.
197. Governance,
FSC
INTERNATIONAL
(2014 ),
available
at
http://ic.fsc.org/govemance.14.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
198. See id.
199. Accreditation,
FSC
INTERNATIONAL
(2014),
available
at
http://ic.fsc.org/accreditation.28.htm (last visited Apr. l, 2015).
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executive capacities fall far short of those of public authorities, even in
developing countries. Its knowledge of "local dynamics" is often
inadequate to really assess compliance with the FSC Principles'
criteria. 200 Second, and also connected to the lack of government
resources and the authority involved, the only sanction available is the
suspension of a forest's certification. As in most timber exporting
developing states, FSC certified forests still amount to only a fraction of
total production; this can hardly be called an effective sanction. To
summarize, a private, non-local authority without effective means of
enforcement makes for a "softer" delegatee than a public, local
authority.
The weaknesses in delegation are further aggravated by the FSC's
lack of legal instrumentum. FSC is a telling example of how the
softness of the dimensions of precision and obligation is quite limited,
yet the scheme still will have to yield in case of conflict with other,
formal rules such as domestic laws on forestry. As Bartley has
insightfully hypothesized and empirically researched with Indonesia as
case study, the design of private instruments such as the FSC and its
criteria disregard the domestic regulatory setting in which the rules are
expected to operate. For example, FSC Principle 2 requires that the
exploitation of certified local forests respects "the tenure and use rights
to the land and forest resources", and that such rights may only be given
up through the "free and informed consent" of the involved
communities. 201
However, in the large forestry industry country
Indonesia, the FSC requirements conflict with the domestic Forestry
Act. The Act has "affirmed state control over forest land", and although
the Forestry Act does protect local rights, "roughly ninety percent of the
twelve million hectares of state forest land in Indonesia has not been
properly defined. " 202 The FSC certifications have added another layer
of rules, with requirements that are in part contradictory to domestic
laws. Yet in case of conflict, the local formal law obviously prevails, as
is even explicitly stated in FSC Principle 1.1. 203 This problem may lead
200. Transnational Governance, supra note 189, at 533 (in the context of the
community land use rights demanded by Principle 2.2) ("One former auditor suggested that
assessment teams generally do not spend enough time on the ground to understand
community dynamics, explaining that you are 'lucky if there's an NGO there,' or it can be
difficult to learn the real situation.").
201.
The JO Principles, FOREST STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, available at
https://ic.fsc.org/the-10-principles. l 03 .htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
202. Transnational Governance, supra note 189, at 531-32.
203. Revised FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship FSC-STD-01-001
(V5-0), FSC INTERNATIONAL 12 (Rev. 2012), available at https://ic.fsc .org/principles-and-
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the FSC to "crumble under its own contradictions": a company must, to
be in conformity with the Forest Principles, both act in accordance with
local law, as well as in contravention of it. 204 Had the FSC's Principles
been laid down by states in a formal source of international law, it
would have been much less clear that domestic forestry law would have
prevailed in case of a conflict. The example shows well how the
instrumentum dimension is fundamentally important.

I nstrumentum
Formal source of IL or not
Obligation
Authority, mandatory
language
-·······

Precision

Accuracy, specificity

Delegation
Extent. authority
-

"Softness in
average"
...

··--

Soft

-

Hard

Figure 9: "Softness" of FSC

criteria.34.htm [hereinafter Revised FSC Principles and Criteria] (last visited Apr. I, 2015)
("Principle I: Compliance with Laws: The Organization shall comply with all applicable
laws, regulations and nationally-ratified international treaties, conventions and
agreements.").
204. Transnational Governance, supra note 189, at 534. Compare the above stated
umbrella to Principle I with Principle 1.8: "The Organization shall demonstrate a long-term
commitment to adhere to the FSC Principles and Criteria in the Management Unit, and to
related FSC Policies and Standards. A statement of this commitment shall be contained in a
publicly available document made freely available." Revised FSC Principles and Criteria,
supra note 203, at I 0.
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4. Concluding Perspectives on Private Instruments
There are many labeling initiatives, such as the FSC,205 and many
voluntary standards with an approach similar to the U.N . Global
Compact. Some of them are even aimed at more specific sectors,
problems or groups of TNCs, such as the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights ("VPSHR") and the Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiative ("EITI").
Two main problems became apparent from the analysis of these
much-discussed private instruments. First, the great weakness in terms
of delegation is, in the words of Sahlin-Andersson, that "it is not so
clear who is governing whom." 206 Are NGOs governing TNCs? Or are
TNCs governing themselves-or even each other? What role remains
for governments? Second, it is unclear where obligation in these
instruments really comes from. They often refer to "international
human rights standards," and stress that lower local standards, local
government abuses, or lack of government enforcement do not impede
what companies "should" do. Yet it is not clear what exactly leads to
raise the requirements above the level of a mere moral obligation,
beyond a bare exclusion from a voluntary scheme. Is the marketplace
already sophisticated enough to create such an impact?
It was apparent that even an instrument that on the surface seems
to have a relatively high level of delegation, the FSC, in practice has
rather limited implementation resources. It moreover has to recede
where it conflicts with formal legal instruments that often maintain
lower environmental or human rights standard.
Although the
implementing authority is clearly delegated, its reach remains limited.

V. CONCLUSIONS-THE MYRIAD EFFECTS OF SOFTNESS
The tool developed in this paper has two aims. First, it aims to
contribute to the "soft law discourse" by promoting a move beyond the
inaccurate and overly generic term "soft law. " 207 This term appears
problematic in the global governance of TNCs. It is proposed here, on

205. Many of these are assembled under the ISEAL Alliance. See generally About Us,
ISEAL ALLIANCE, available at http://www.isealalliance.org/about-us (last visited Feb. 7,
2015).
206. Sahlin-Andersson, supra note 184, at 130.
207. See generally Abbott et al., supra note 73. With international law, they mean to
include explicitly formal sources of international law such as conventions/treaties. Id. at
402.
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the one hand, because it is more accurate and useful in the legal and
political discourse to describe instruments on the basis of the three
general categories introduced in the previous Section: Public Legal
Instruments, Public Non-Legal Instruments, and Private Jnstruments. 208
The categories build on the work of scholars such as d' Aspremont209
and Blutman. 210 The basic distinction lies in the dimension of
instrumentum, the "container" of the instrument, as opposed to its
negotium, the "contents."
On the other hand, it would add further, important nuance to the
understanding of the instruments to perceive them along four
dimensions of softness: the softness of the instrumentum, and of three
aspects of the negotium, namely obligation (authority and the
mandatory nature of the language); precision (accuracy and specificity);
and delegation (extent and authority of delegation). These dimensions
of softness, proposed originally by Abbott et al. 211 and developed
further here, fine-tune the analysis by bringing forth key characteristics
of the instruments.
Second, through the tool the paper explores how such resystemization of instruments functions in the specific framework of the
TN Cs, taking into account the challenge of finding solutions to the void
in their governance. The paper focuses in particular on how softness as
a characteristic manifests itself in different types of TNC related
instruments, and how this may link to the perceived void, and further to
the instruments' effectiveness. It may even be possible to contemplate
certain dimensions of softness, and combinations of thereof that are
necessary in reaching effectiveness in different circumstances. Finally,
the utility and potential weaknesses of the conceptual tool itself may be
elaborated upon during its application to practical case examples on the
global governance of TN Cs.

A. Effective Softness?
The application of the tool to various TNC related instruments,
including legal public instruments, illustrate well how an analysis of
softness is by no means limited to what is incorrectly called "soft law"
208. Compare these three groups with those distinguished by Blutman, who noted
output of international organizations; non-binding output of states directly other than what is
part of the formal sources of international law; and the output of civil society, which is per
definition non-binding. Blutman, supra note 68, at 607-08.
209. See d'Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1082-87.
210. Blutman, supra note 68, at 607-08.
211. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401 .
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instruments. All kinds of hard and soft instruments can, and indeed
should, be scrutinized for their softness.
From the practical perspective of applying the instruments, the
essential question is whether, and to what extent, the observed softness
of an instrument correlates with its effectiveness. While the research in
this paper is not geared to answer this question with any definitiveness,
it is designed to prop exploratory insights onto what such a relationships
might be. The first observation along this trajectory is the usual claim
that "soft law" might be able to act as a supplement or a complement, or
even an alternative, to "hard law." 212 The claim assumes that somehow
an instrument that is soft along one or more of the depicted dimensions
can be effective in reaching a policy outcome. It can even potentially be
more effective in doing so than a "hard law" instrument would be.
The effectiveness in other words may link to softness-but how
exactly? At least two options appear to arise. In the first option, the
softness of one (or more) dimension( s) directly contributes to the fact
that the policy outcome is reached. This would reflect the scenario of
"soft law" acting as an alternative to "hard law": it is because of its
hardness along all the dimensions that a "hard law" instrument would
not able to reach the desired outcome. Softness would under this
assumption correlate positively with effectiveness.
The second option is that softness along one (or more) of the
dimension(s) is unavoidable for an instrument to be legally, politically,
technically, and/or in some other manner possible. Softness is the
critical prerequisite for a policy instrument to be created, yet it is the
other, hard dimension(s) of the instrument that in fact directly
determines the instrument's effectiveness. Soft instruments are in this
scenario a complement to "hard law." Softness as a characteristic only
has an indirect role. Without the subtlety the instrument would not
exist, and hence its qualities could not have an impact. The unique
quality of "soft" instruments as complements is their achievability. 213
They are, as explained in Section II, a necessity if "hard law" options
are not at all, or not initially, available. But softness in itself will rather
work against, than for, the effectiveness of the instrument. Softness is
in these instruments just limited enough not to impede reaching the
policy objective in a sufficient manner. The perceptions on what is
considered sufficient may be quite subjective and, as the examples of
212. "Soft law" may also be seen in some cases as an antagonist to "hard law," but
these questions are beyond the focus of this piece.
213. See Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 401-03.
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using soft instruments to govern TNCs implied, not always
representative of the reality.
The first option, i.e. the direct role and relevance of softness in an
instrument's performance, can be tested through a number of
propositions. The most different case approach would lead one to ask
whether there are instruments that are soft on all the dimensions, yet
still perform effectively. A positive answer would point towards
effective instruments that are already quite removed from classic
command-and-control law. Although the limited scope of the research
does not exclude the possibility, the TNC case studies conducted in this
paper did not offer support for this hypothesis. Rather, the observations
on the case studies seemed to point to the opposite direction: when
defined along the dimensions used in this paper, there seems to be a
negative correlation between softness and effectiveness. A negative
correlation would hence perceive soft instruments in a paradoxical way:
one should seek for the vital aspects of hardness in defining effective
soft instruments. If the hypothesis on a positive correlation held, the
ensuing question would then be whether an instrument's effectiveness
could be associated with a particular aspect of softness.
B. Effective Hardness?
Indeed, looking back at the three categories of instruments and the
empirical examples within them, the observations would appear to point
into the opposite direction: some measure of hardness may be required
on at least one, if not most, of the dimensions also for instruments to be
effective. Turning this around, even the absence of hardness on one or
two dimensions beyond the instrumentum-for instance lack of
precision and specificity in the human rights treaties, or the incomplete
delegation in the case of the FSC-may be fatal for its effectiveness.
The conclusion of the case studies was that none of the instruments in
any of the categories of Public Legal Instruments, Public Non-Legal
Instruments , and Private Instruments seemed to satisfactorily achieve
the set human rights and environmental governance objectives
regarding TNCs. The disappointing observation could hence have an
explanation: each one of the TNC related instruments-even the "hard
law" instruments- lacked one or more crucial hard dimensions that
would have allowed them to be effective in that particular instance.
1. Over-reaching
One may wonder, however, if the need to consider hard
dimensions in soft instruments is already a sign of "over-reaching":
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have the soft instruments been set to achieve objectives that only
instruments that are hard on all dimensions can achieve? Are they
surpassing the limits of what soft instruments in directly filling a policy
void can reach, even theoretically? In cases of over-reaching, soft
instruments cannot act as complements nor as alternatives to "hard
law"-except perhaps in some narrow respects.
As may be remembered from the development of the tool, the
instrumentum is a core dimension of classic "hard law" instruments.
Soft instruments lack this key characteristic; only in the first group,
which consists of the formal sources of international law, are the
instruments formally speaking law. Private instruments as defined in
this paper are adopted by private actors, either amongst themselves or in
collaboration with public authorities. Because private actors completely
lack the capacity to legislate, they cannot create formal instruments of
international law. The instrumentum is not legal. A logical reaction
would be to seek to increase hardness on the other dimensions of
obligation, precision and delegation-potentially even all of them. The
OECD Guidelines from the group of Public Non-Legal Instruments and
Forest Stewardship Council from the group of Private Instruments
served as examples. As noted above, while perhaps practically possible,
such across-the-board hardness would mean that the instrument
measures hard in average, so much so as start to conceptually changing
its nature from soft to hard, and even from non-law to law, if hardened
along the instrumentum to a legislative act. In other words, the soft
instrument has been "over-reaching," if the aim had been in policy
objectives that can in fact only be reached with formal legal instruments
that are hard on all accounts. It does not seem justified, or even
possible, to contemplate Public Non-Legal Instruments or Private
Instruments as effective alternatives or complements to "hard law" in
these types of situations. Their role would remain partial, at best.
2. Under-reaching
The fact that an instrument's effectiveness is tied to more hardness
on a particular dimension does not have to imply that all effective
instruments be considered "hard law." In practice, the relevance of such
labels of hardness or softness is linked to the ability of the tool to help
in creating the impetus to amend (i.e. to harden) an existing instrument
in a tailored and adequate manner so as to reach the set objective. The
situation may be different to the above examples of over-reaching. In
cases of "under-reaching," the soft instrument is not fulfilling its
complete promise, which would still be within the boundaries of what
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under the three categories and the four dimensions still constitute soft
instruments. Hardening a particular aspect of an under-reaching
instrument not would not always require pushing it beyond the
boundaries of what conceptually are soft instruments. Understanding
that the level of obligation and precision in the OECD Guidelines is
sufficient, but that it is mainly the delegation aspect of the instrument
that is lacking, could lead to amend the instrument in the correct
fashion. This would point towards amending the practice of N CPs to
become considerably more aggressive in publically reproaching the
companies for their violations of human rights law.
Under-reaching

Over-reaching

lnstrumentum
Formal source of IL or not
Obligation
Autho rity,
mandatory language

Instrumentum
Formal source of IL or not

OECD Guidelines

Ins/rumentum
Formal source of IL or not

Obligation
Authority,
mandatory language
Precision
Accuracy,
speci fic ity

Delegation

Delegation

Ex tent. autho rity

Extent, authority

Softness

in average

Softness

in average

Soft

Hard

Hardness required for
effectively filling a void

Figure 10: Instrument's Achieved v. Potential Hardness in Cases of
Under-Reaching and Over-Reaching Instruments
Indeed, delegation appears to be a dimension on which practically
all of the TNC-instruments that were used as case examples measured
on the soft end of the scale. This implies an almost structural deficiency
in delegating the implementation of the instruments. The observation
finds clear parallels in the discourse on the deficiencies of "hard law":
poor implementation and enforcement is also often cited as the weak
point of hard international environmental and human rights law. In this
important respect "soft law" therefore appears to offer very limited
remedies. To state this differently: non-legal instruments could most
fundamentally remedy the deficiencies of "hard law" if their unique
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characteristics could innovatively improve enforcement. To reiterate
the above example: the impact of negative media coverage on TNCs
image can be drastic, and hence prompt sweeping changes in company
behavior. For example, heavy media attention led the company
Chiquita (formerly United Fruit) to completely overhaul in the early
1990s its dreadful corporate social responsibility policies on exotic fruit
business. Chiquita outsourced the corporate environmental and social
audits to an external NGO, the Rainforest Alliance. 214 Yet, to actually
create such an impact, the application of this instrument needs to be
delegated to a party that is prepared and equipped to publicize it without
hesitation and delay -not just in theory, but in practice. This is a far
cry from the current state of affairs, should the application of the media
provisions of the OECD Guidelines offer a representative example in
this respect.
It appears possible to give examples of under-reaching "soft law"
also in terms of all other dimensions of softness. The U .N. Guiding
Principles were an example of an instrument where the wording on what
is really expected is both ambiguous and drafted in non-mandatory
terms. More precise use of words that are clearly obligating would
harden this instrument in a way that would appear to be vital for
increasing its effectiveness in filling the policy void. Precision is a
dimension on which the non-legal instruments may score quite well,
because the tools can contain quite accurate provisions specifically
targeted at TNCs. It is in fact the legal instruments that may be underreaching on this aspect. The systemic coherence between soft and hard
instruments could in a useful way combine the precision of the soft
instruments with e.g. the hard instrumentum of for instance the Human
Rights treaties.

C. Softness -A Combination of Multiple Dimensions
Still, it is possible with the help of the developed conceptual tool to
synthesize the findings regarding the over-reaching and under-reaching
soft instruments a few steps further. The values of all the dimensions of
an instrument may be combined into a single value of "average
softness," as was explained in Section III (D) above.
The
softness/hardness of an instrument is only a single variable amongst
many other time- and space-specific, inter-related variables that affect

214. DANIEL C. ESTY & ANDREWS. WINSTON , FROM GREEN TO GOLD. How SMART
COMPANIES USE ENVIRONMENTAL STRATEGY TO INNOVATE, CREATE VALUE AND BUILD
COMPETITIVE ADV ANTAGE 88, 183-84 (2006).
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the overall policy outcomes in a globalized environment. 215 Yet a
summary value may be useful in having an overview on the
characteristics of the instrument that one is dealing with, even if the line
between soft and hard is a subjective continuum, not a "metaphysical
border" where the overall characteristics of an instrument would
suddenly drastically change like the qualities of water change in the
melting and boiling points. This may be exactly the point of using the
model proposed here: the fact that any instrument consists of four
dimensions with their "sub-dimensions" should quickly lead to a
realization that the denomination of an instrument as "hard law" or "soft
law" actually reveals very little of its characteristics. It is the
constitutive dimensions of the instrument that matter. Jnstrumentum is
central, and admittedly the distinction of the formal sources of
international law implies a binary dimension.
But, its binary nature and importance are tempered by the other,
continuum-type dimensions. They too can be crucial, depending on
such factors as the instrument's objectives and addressees. The case
studies on Public Legal Instruments showed how "hard law" may be
quite soft. Case studies across the groups of instruments seemed to
suggest that weak delegation of implementing tasks in some cases
"softens" the instrument more than a low measure of precision or
obligation. The continuums are therefore useful; they make an analysis
of the instruments more flexible and accurate, and facilitate detailed
comparisons between them. As Abbot et al. noted216 while developing
these three dimensions, they can also serve to trace an instrument's
evolution over time. The dimensions were used here as a means to
understand, explain, and propose nuanced improvements to various
kinds of TNC related instruments.
One might also speculate whether there are specific combinations
of these dimensions of softness that are particularly well or poorly
adapted for certain kinds of policy objectives and/or circumstances.
Such "pairing" could support the policy making process. The case
studies gave anecdotal evidence of such interconnections. For example,
in the case of FSC, the hardness of the instrument along the dimensions
of precision and delegation considerably alleviated the need to have
fully hard obligations. Market pressures on TNCs also contributed to a
lesser emphasis on delegation in this particular example.

215. See generally Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen & Vihma, supra note 67.
216. Abbott et al., supra note 73, at 405.
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States and IOs often seem to enforce international law upon TNCs
in a rather lenient fashion: the delegation dimension was soft on
virtually all the analysed instruments. Only very limited delegation to
more independent, international bodies seems likely in the near future as
well.
Hardness along the other dimensions may alleviate that
shortcoming only in some cases, such as the example of FSCs above.
More precise and specific provisions will make it harder for states to
argue that they are not under an obligation to act in a given situation.

D. Systemic Coherence
Many authors have highlighted the importance of the systemic
coherence between different instruments.
Soft instruments may,
according to these views, act either as complements, alternatives or
antagonists to "hard law." This paper does not have as its objective to
delve into the systemic coherence of instruments. It does shed some
light on some of the interrelationships that were noticeable between the
U.N. Global Compact, U.N. Guiding Principles, the OECD Guidelines,
the Forest Stewardship Council, the human rights Covenants and
domestic law.
In particular, the systemic inconsistencies and
antagonistic relations deserve further research particularly in order to
better understand the prospects of governing TNCs. The discussion
merges here with themes such as the fragmentation and integration of
international law 217 and the management of institutional complexity in
global governance. 218
E. Prospects of Governing TNCs with "Soft Law"
1. "Soft law" as a Misnomer - But "Softness" as an Asset
The analysis above has elaborated on whether "soft law" may help
in filling the policy void left by "hard law" in governing transnational
corporations in the areas of environmental protection and human rights.
Softness may indeed be a quality that explains the characteristics of
policy instruments in a manner that is useful. However, this benefit has
often gone undetected
or has
been
overshadowed by

217. See Koskenniemi & Leino, supra note 60, at 553; see also Study Group of the
International Law Commission, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising
from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682
(Apr. 13, 2006).
218. For institutional interaction, see generally Thomas Gehring & Sebastian
Oberthilr, The Causal Mechanisms of Interaction between International Institutions, 15
EUR. J. INT'L R EL. 125 (2009).
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misunderstandings. 219 The softness of an instrument tends to correlate
negatively with its effectiveness- if any straightforward relationship
between the two is even verifiable. Softness as an overarching
conceptual construct might end up not only correlating with
ineffectiveness, but being defined by it. The notion of soft instruments,
let alone "soft law," as an optimal gap filler for legal voids appears in
this sense fundamentally flawed. Soft instruments may remedy policy
problems, but in most cases exactly despite of their softness.
Gearing the policy strategy towards "soft law" without properly
defining it could essentially threaten to misguide the entire effort.
Perhaps the clearest example is the U .N. Global Compact, which relies
on softness quite explicitly. 220 "Soft law" is therefore not only a vague
and overly generic concept-it may be a precarious misnomer. The
case studies on the governance of TN Cs gave insights into how "soft
law" approaches may create false assumptions, and might lead to
skewed policy pathways and meager outcomes. 221
The
conceptualization of the instruments and of the issue at stake, as well as
the definition of the desired policy objectives, need to take place m
much more accurate and authentic terms.

2. Soft Instruments as Complements and Alternatives to "Hard Law"
While "soft law" may be a misnomer, softness as a characteristic
that is first properly defined may prove to be quite useful. It helps in
explaining the characteristics of individual instruments. The notion of
softness may also be useful in more correctly understanding the general
characteristics that are commonly associated with soft instruments as we
noted them in Section II: their necessity, uniqueness and
unavoidability; 222 and their role as complements or alternatives 223 to
219. See d' Aspremont, supra note 64, at 1083.
Note d'Aspremont's recent
introduction in the Leiden Journal of International Law where he apologizes for devoting a
whole issue of the journal to such an oft-debated theme. See Jean d' Aspremont & Tanja
Aalberts, Which Future for the Scholarly Concept of Safi International Law? Editors'
Introductory Remarks, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 309, 309 (2012).
220. Overview of the UN Global Compact, U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT (Apr. 22, 2013),
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Apr. 1,
2015) ("The initiative seeks to combine the best properties of the UN, such as moral
authority and convening power, with the private sector's solution-finding strengths and the
expertise and capacities of a range of key stakeholders. The Global Compact is global and
local; private and public; voluntary yet accountable.").
221. See Utting & Zammitt, supra note 176, at 44, 47 (showing the wide belief within
the UN in the late l 990's that soft approaches are preferable, because of lack of UN
implementation powers).
222. See supra Section II.
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"hard law." The uniqueness of soft instruments can mean a number of
things. It can refer either to the instrument as a whole or to some of its
particular characteristics. This observation prompts us to rethink the
categories of Shaffer and Pollack, soft instruments as complements or
alternatives to "hard law." A unique instrument would seem to mean
that it combines softness and hardness in a different way along the
dimensions of obligation, precision and delegation.
Unique soft
instruments are soft enough to be achievable-unlike a fully hard and
legal instrument-yet hard enough to be effective. Thus, they are able
to complement "hard law" in the narrow sense of addressing policy
questions that "hard law" simply could not address at this moment.
This is different from the occasional misconception that soft instruments
are unique and effective for their softness only. The notion of a soft
instrument constituting in these cases an "altemative"224 also seems
misleading: it hints at the existence of a choice-yet if the soft
instrument is unique in this narrow sense, there is none.
If the uniqueness of the entire instrument refers to its
distinctiveness from a "hard law" instrument, yet does not entail the
filling of policy gaps beyond what "hard law" can do, it seems to offer
an alternative to reaching a policy objective. Because certain softness
on some dimensions is "permissible" in terms of reaching adequate
effectiveness, a soft instrument can be the preferred alternative for other
reasons, such as for being less costly to negotiate, lighter to administer
or quicker to adapt to the evolving circumstances.
The uniqueness of certain (combinations of) characteristics,
instead of the entire soft instrument, leads to a different kind of
complementarity-the type Shaffer and Pollack described. 225 The
differences in the softness of a soft and a hard instrument lead them to
interact in a way that, together, creates a complementary result. The
complementary characteristics may make up for certain soft dimensions
in legal instruments-on which the complementing instrument is in fact
harder-and result in even harder combinations. Some non-legal
instrument may in this way prove harder on important dimensions than
many existing legal instruments, particularly on precision, even though
they are soft on others.

223. The role of soft instruments as antagonists to hard law were excluded from the
scope of this paper.
224. Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 4 7, at 717-21.
225. Id. at 721-22.
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As for the unavoidability of soft instruments as a consequence of
globalization, the nuance that can be identified in the softness of
instruments calls for a similarly delicate attention in managing such
instruments. To the extent that globalization implies the predominance
of instruments without a hard instrumentum, it may imply doubtful
effectiveness. Yet, this is not at all self-evident, and can only be
determined on a context-specific instrument-by-instrument analysis.
The complication would offer one explanation to why it is so difficult to
create clear-cut theories and approaches about the global governance of
TNCs, or governance through regime complexes more generally
speaking.

EPILOGUE - REVISITING THE CHEVRON CASE
While the Chevron case dragged on in the Ecuadorian judiciary
and now continues in the arbitration bodies, Chevron has aligned itself
with the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
("VPSHR") and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
("EITI"). Will these soft instruments offer a remedy to address the
considerable environmental degradation? Could they prevent similar
cases from taking place in the future? The EITI aims at transparent
financial flows between the extractive industry and their host
governments. VPSHR aims to prevent human rights abuses that would
be a consequence of companies' private security operations. Already in
terms of the subject matter, these instruments do not present
comprehensive solutions to address issues of environmental protection
or human rights protection. Regrettably, when assessed through the tool
developed in this paper, they appear moreover to be of the softest type.
Both are predominantly private, non-legal instruments, with some
involvement of governments in the VPSHR. The rather vague and nonmandatory principles are quite soft in terms of precision and obligation,
and auditing as the only measure of delegation leaves this dimension
soft as well. In fact, the principal aim of both instruments may rather be
to shield companies from further liability rather than addressing
fundamental aspects of human rights or environmental protection
related conduct. In other words, a closer analysis of softness reveals
there to be little hope for these particular soft instruments preventing, let
alone remedying, the situation in cases such as Chevron.
More promising, at least for future cases, could be the National
Contact Points under the revised 2000 OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises. Especially insofar as the damage can be
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qualified as (environmental) human rights or labor rights violations, a
"specific procedure" can be commenced before the United States
NCP. 226 As was discussed above in Section IV (C), such procedures
may lead to public statements by the N CP, or to a settlement of the
dispute between the parties. However, due to the very limited
delegation dimension, an NCP cannot order damages; it can primarily
be useful in ceasing the TN C conduct.

226. See U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, U.S. DEP'T ST., available at http://www.state.gov/e/eb/oecd/usncp/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2015).
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ROAD TO RECOVERY: PAKISTAN'S HUMAN RIGHTS
CRISES IN THE FAT A
Naji'a Tameezt

"For the first five days they beat us
constantly with leather belts across the top and
bottom of our backs throughout the day, up to
an hour at a time. The pain was too much to
describe. There were always five soldiers at
every interrogation session; all in army
uniform but usually only one of them did the
talking. He would threaten to kill me if I didn't
confess to being part of the Taliban. I kept
telling him that neither I, nor my Ayub, ever
belonged to the Taliban, we are just farmers.
On hearing this [he} would scream '[y}our
brother is going to die tonight! If you don't
want to see him for the last time speak the
truth!' " 1
t Naji'a Tameez is a May 2015 graduate of the Syracuse University College of Law.
She would like to thank her family and close friends for always providing the open
discussion of this deeply personal topic, which pushed her to conduct her own research into
the human rights crises in Pakistan's tribal lands.
1. AMNESTY lNT'L, 'THE HANDS OF CRUELTY' ABUSES BY ARMED FORCES AND TALIBAN
IN PAKISTAN'S TRIBAL AREAS 20 (2012), available at http://www.amnesty.nl/sites/default/
files/public/p4026_end_impunity_in_tribal_areas.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015)
[hereinafter Hands of Cruelty].
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INTRODUCTION
Niaz, a 39-year-old farmer from Swat, and his younger brother
Ayub are among the thousands of men and boys swept up in security
operations by Pakistan's armed forces in areas formerly controlled by
the Taliban. Niaz was released ten days after his arrest, on that same
day he was confronted with Ayub's dead body, the hospital claiming he
had died of "heart stroke" in army custody. This is just one of the
thousands of instances of uninvestigated enforced disappearance, torture
and death inflicted upon the tribal lands of Pakistan.
The tribal lands have been entrenched in a human rights crisis for
decades, but since 2004 conditions in the region have taken a
considerable nosedive. Due to the U.S. led efforts in Afghanistan and
the Taliban2 insurgency in Pakistan's tribal lands, thousands of people
in the tribal lands have been subject to unjust and inhumane treatment, 3
tens of thousands of people have died and millions of people have been
displaced. The Pakistani government has not only made minimal effort
to remedy this crisis and help its citizens, but has also exacerbated the
poor conditions in the tribal lands.
This paper begins by reviewing the structure of government in the
tribal lands and how said structure puts Pakistan in violation of
international human rights law, 4 international humanitarian law 5 and

2. The Taliban presence in Pakistan is a combination of Taliban and al-Qaeda militants
who fled Afghanistan and slipped through Pakistan's borders in 2001 and 2002. They
formed a new insurgency and drew together Pakistani veterans of the Taliban movement
and recruited new members who agreed with their platform against U.S. military operations
in Afghanistan and Iraq. Id. at 29-30. All references to the Taliban in this note are
references to the Pakistani Taliban movement, specifically the TTP.
3. In Prosecutor v. Furundzija the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia emphasized that humane treatment revolved around "the general principle of
respect for human dignity[, which] forms the common foundation of both international
human rights law and international humanitarian law."
"The essence of the whole corpus of international humanitarian law as well as
human rights law lies in the protection of the human dignity of every person,
whatever his or her gender.... This principle is intended to shield human beings
from outrages upon their personal dignity, whether such outrages are carried out by
unlawfully attacking the body or by humiliating and debasing the honour, the selfrespect or the mental well-being of a person."
Daniel Thurer, Dunant's Pyramid: Thoughts on the "Humanitarian Space", 89 lNT'L REV.
RED CROSS 4 7, 57 (Mar. 2007).
4. International human rights law is comprised of international human rights treaties,
which governments "undertake to put into place domestic measures and legislation
compatible with their treaty obligations and duties." INT'L HUM. RTS. L., available at
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Professionallnterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx (last visited
May JO, 2015).
5. International humanitarian law (IHL) is comprised of principles and rules governing
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customary international law. 6 This paper then argues that Pakistan must
remedy these grave circumstances in order to meet its international legal
obligations and abide by its own constitution as it applies to the rest of
the country.
Pakistan must ensure that all of its citizenry, of which the people of
the tribal lands are a part, is treated equally, humanely and in
accordance with international law and custom. This paper then
concludes by offering some of the more important reforms Pakistan
must make to begin complying with international obligations. These
include, but are not limited to, fully incorporating the tribal lands into
the central government, setting up proper mechanisms for
representation, providing adequate education and healthcare, as well as
equal treatment of women.

I.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES STEM FROM POOR
GOVERNING STRUCTURE AND PAKISTAN'S INABILITY
TO BALANCE FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC INTEREST
Pakistan is made up of five administrative provinces, 7 one of which
is in the northwest part of the country, known as the Federally
Administered Tribal Area ("FAT A"). The FAT A is further divided into
several tribal agencies, from north to south: Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber,
Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan. 8 Most of
the conduct of all parties to international and non-international armed conflicts. Key
provisions of IHL include the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (which Pakistan signed in
1951) and customary international humanitarian law applicable to non-international armed
conflict. What is International Humanitarian Law?, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (July
2004), available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/what_is_ihl.pdf (last visited
May 10, 2015).
6. "Customary international law refers to international obligations arising from
established state practice, as opposed to obligations arising from formal written international
treaties."
Customary International Law, LEGAL INFO. INST., available at
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/customary_international_law (last visited May 10, 2015).
7. The four remaining provinces are known as Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Kyber
Pakhtunkhwa. Before the renaming of this province in 2010, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa was
known as the North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The former NWFP is also a tribal
area but it is not the subject of this note. Though there is some spill over from the conflict
in the FATA into Kyber Pakhtunkhwa, Kyber Pakhtunkhwa participates in the central
government and has not been as gravely affected by the US' war in Afghanistan, the Taliban
insurgency or by Pakistan's neglect. Provinces and Administrative Units of Pakistan,
GOVT. PAKISTAN, MINISTRY INFO., BROADCASTING, & NAT'L HERITAGE (2012-13), available
at http://nationalheritage.gov.pk/provinces.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
8. The FATA is further divided into several tribal agencies, from north to south:
Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.
North and South Waziristan are especially troubled within the FATA because they are
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these agencies are astride the Durand Line, the disputed international
border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 9
The FATA is a partially autonomous region because, under
Pakistan's constitution, it is governed primarily through tribal
leadership but ultimately supervised directly by the executive branch of
Pakistan's central government. This executive mechanism of governing
the FATA 10 leaves the people living there completely unprotected.
There is a total absence of law in the region since neither legislative nor
judicial control officially extends there. The FAT A is Pakistan's least
integrated and least developed province. 11 The Pakistani state has failed
to invest in either the human development of this area or in the physical
infrastructure that would connect the FAT A to the rest of Pakistan. On
top of that, Pakistanis living in the FAT A have no redress for the gross
human rights violations that are committed at the hands of tribal heads,
the Taliban, the Pakistani military, and the United States through drone
strikes, because there are extensive limitations on the ability of the
central government to act as a check. As a result, most FATA residents
have little sense of patriotism or even responsibility towards the
Pakistani state. 12
The influx of Arab Mujahideen in the 1980s and of the Taliban and
al-Qaeda fighters since 2001 brought "political Islam, money and illicit
economic activity" to the region and "buttressed emergent Islamist
leadership." 13 The region has also undergone changes in the
demographic strength of certain tribes; this, in conjunction with the
infusion of new resources and militant influence, has caused discord in
the traditional tribal hierarchy. 14
This has allowed new charismatic, religious leaders to emerge as

Taliban strongholds, which have led them to become a heavy target of Pakistan's military
campaign and the primary site of continued drone attacks from the United States. Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, KHYBER PAKTUNKHWA FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL
AREAS & BALOCHISTAN MULTI-DONOR TRUST FUND, available at http://www.pakistan
mdtf.org/fata.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
9. C. Christine Fair, Nicholas Howenstein, and J. Alexander Their, Troubles on the
Pakistan-Afghanistan Border, U.S. INST. OF PEACE (Dec. 1, 2006), available at
http://www.usip.org/publications/troubles-the-pakistan-afghanistan-border (last visited May
10, 2015) [hereinafter Fair].
I 0. See infra Part IV.
11. Pakistan's Lawless, Impoverished Northwest, ASIA SENTINEL (Aug. 2013),
available
at
http://www.asiasentinel.com/society/pakistans-lawless-impoverishednorthwest/ (last visited May 10, 2015) [hereinafter Impoverished Northwest].
12. Fair, supra note 9.
13. Id.
14. Id.

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol42/iss2/1

184

et al.: Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce - Vol. 42, No.

Syracuse J. lnt'l L. & Com.

450

[Vol. 42:2

political entrepreneurs using political Islam as their instrument of
mobilization. These Islamist leaders also gained considerable
credibility and resources with the influx of foreign fighters from the
Soviet-jihad period and the persistent flow of financial and Islamist
resources during the period of Taliban consolidation in Afghanistan.
Critically, these new Islamist and militant leaders have robust ties with
Pakistan's chief Islamist parties (such as the Jamiat-e Ulame- Islam
and the Jamaat Islami), with the Taliban and its allied militants, as
well as with al Qaeda. 15

In addition to these new influences, other factors that contribute to
the FAT A's instability are the migration of FAT A residents out of the
FATA and into the more settled areas of Pakistan or abroad. 16 People
who leave generally come from "lower tribal lineages with relatively
low social and tribal prestige" and use the opportunity away from the
FAT A to financially provide for their families. 17 Leaving the FATA
also allows them to understand the inequality in the tribal lands and
bring this awareness back to those who still live there. 18 In addition, the
new influx of money allows the families to seek power and influence in
correspondence with their new wealth, which then begets changes and
conflict in the tribal structure. 19
The FAT A gained particular significance because of its location
along the Afghan border, which resulted in remnants of al-Qaeda and
Taliban militants seeking refuge in the FATA's remote villages and
difficult terrain. 20 Militants then used these remote locations to launch
attacks against international forces in Afghanistan and then also allied
themselves with local insurgents, based primarily in the Waziristan
agencies, which then led to concerns regarding Pakistan's internal
security. Its location makes the FATA key to policing the AfghanPakistan border and also the primary site of U.S. drone attacks. 21 The
opposition from the FATA tribes and their alliances with each other and

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Fair, supra note 9.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In 2012, the U.S. carried out about 48 serial drone strikes on suspected al-Qaeda
and Taliban members. These strikes resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties; lack of
access to these tribal areas has prevented independent verification of statistics. The U.S.
drone strikes cause much controversy, outrage and civilian casualties in Pakistan. See
Pakistan: Abuses, Impunity Erode Rights, HUM. RTS. WATC H (Feb. 1 2013), available at
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/0 I /pakistan-abuses-impunity-erode-rights (last visited
May 10, 2015).
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with militant groups across Pakistan has made the situation especially
volatile in the last decade, both for Pakistan's domestic security and the
war in Afghanistan. 22 The continued drone attacks have also further
soured the relationship between the FAT A and Pakistan's central
government, as there is now a feeling of betrayal and abandonment
where the people of the tribal lands feel their government has allowed a
foreign power to wreak complete havoc and destruction upon them. 23
While these factors all contribute to the derogation of the area and to the
rise of militant violence, the lack of societal development as a result of
Pakistan's longtime neglect is also a significant factor that must be
taken into account. 24
The combination of having to balance domestic interests and the
interests of foreign powers makes the situation more complicated for
Pakistan and limits its military options. As a result, many of the actions
Pakistan has taken in its counter-insurgency effort have been
questionable. Accusations of arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced
disappearances and collective punishment have steadily increased over
the last few years as Pakistan has regained territory from the Taliban
and shifted its focus to smaller clashes with militant groups. This is
especially problematic from a legal standpoint because from 2008 to
2010 Pakistan ratified multiple human rights treaties, including the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"), the UN
Convention Against Torture ("UNCAT") and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 25

22. SYED FAROOQ HASNAT, GLOBAL SECURITY WATCH - PAKISTAN 144 (2011).
Though the War in Afghanistan has wound down considerably there are still American
troops in Afghanistan, training Afghan security forces, aiding in the reconstruction process
and continuing to manage the presence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. These foreign troops
are directly affected by Pakistan's ability to manage the FATA and Waziristan especially, a
fact Pakistan has to take into account when they take action in the region. Id.
23. Umar Farooq, Civilians Bear Brunt of Pakistan's War in the Northwest, FOREIGN
PoL'Y
(Feb.
11,
2013),
available
at
http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2013/02/11 /civilians_bear_brunt_of_pakistans_war_in _the_northwest (last visited
May 10, 2015).
24. Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11.
25. Arshad Mahmood, ICCPR Ratified, DAWN (Aug. 2, 2010, 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.dawn.com/news/875750/iccpr-ratified (last visited May 10, 2015); Chapter IV
Human
Rights,
UNITED
NATIONS
TREATY
COLLECTION,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/pagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY &mtdsg_no=IV9&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 31, 2015); Status of Ratification Interactive
Dashboard, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS, available at http://indicators.ohchr.org/ (last visited
May 10, 2015) (Pakistan ratified CEDAW in 1996, the ICESCR in 2008, and the ICCPR
and UNCAT in 2010).
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Though compliance with these agreements is difficult to enforce on
an international level, ratification creates a duty on Pakistan's part to
fulfill the terms of the treaties. 26
With ratification Pakistan
acknowledged that there exists a universal standard for the treatment
and governing of people and that Pakistan has a responsibility to
provide its citizens with that standard of living. Yet Pakistan has not
fulfilled its duty of incorporating these universal standards into its
governmental structure when it comes to the FATA.
Despite this, there are ways that Pakistan can begin to repair the
damage that has been done in the tribal lands and act in accordance with
its own constitution as well as international law. Pakistan can create a
fair and more representative system of governing the region by
integrating the FAT A into the federal union, of which the other
provinces are already a part. Pakistan can invest in the area's
infrastructure, education, healthcare system (what little exists), and
security and hold those who have committed human rights abuses
accountable.

IL

UNDERSTANDING HOW THE HISTORY OF THE FAT A
INFLUENCED THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS

The history and makeup 27 of the FAT A explains the logic behind
Pakistan's handling of the region, because the fact that the FAT A
borders Afghanistan makes it a very central and strategic location 28
from which to carry out militant operations. This, in combination with
the rough and varied terrain, makes the FAT A treacherous for those
unfamiliar with the terrain to infiltrate. The people of the FATA, who
number close to 3.9 million by recent estimates, also make effective

26. Enforcement of international agreements is difficult because all nations are
sovereign and there is no overarching legal body that can force states to comply. Often
economic sanctions or military force are threatened or used to create compliance but such
actions are dependent upon what stake enforcing states have in another state's compliance.
Julian Ouellet, Enforcement Mechanisms, BEYOND INTRACTABILITY (Sept. 2004), available
at http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/enforcement-mechanisms (last visited May IO,
2015).
27. The terrain of the tribal lands makes the region a difficult one to tame. It is a
mountainous region but is also made up of forests and deserts. Its extreme winters and
summers make it difficult for armed forces to carry out effective operations. Akbar Ahmed
& Harrison Akins, Waziristan: 'The Most Dangerous Place in the World, ' AL JAZEERA (Apr.
12, 2013, 9:37 PM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/
04/20134983149771365.html (last visited May 10, 2015); HASNAT, supra note 22, at 145 .
28. HASNAT, supra note 22.
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military operations difficult. 29 The FAT A operates under a tribal
system of government where clans are defined by common ancestry;
most FATA residents are Pashtuns. 30 Because most tribes straddle the
Durand Line, cross border movement is "substantial and difficult to
control. " 31
Prior to the Taliban insurgency the tribes dealt with issues of
crime, administration and politics through their own traditions, an
arrangement that was accepted by the British when they were in power
and later by Pakistan's government as well. 32 The Jirgas were by no
means perfect, but they emphasized mediation rather than violence as a
method of conflict resolution. Safdar Dawar, a journalist from North
Waziristan and head of the Tribal Union of Journalists, reminisces that
"the elders and the people recall the situation before 2001, [when] they
had their own culture, unity, lashkars [militias], and peace committees,"
he explains, that the people of the FAT A know that they were more
effective than any tools from "these stakeholders in the Great Game." 33
They kept relative peace among the tribal people they served. 34 But in
recent years, the Taliban gained control and severed the structure of

29. AMNESTY INT'L, AS IF HELL FELL ON ME: THE HUMAN RIGHTS CRISES IN
NORTHWEST PAKISTAN 20 (June 2010), available at http://www.protectingeducation.org/
sites/default/files/documents/amnesty_as_if_hell_fell_on_me.pdf (last visited May 10,
2015) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT'L]. The tribes of the FATA have a history of resistance,
most notably with Soviet occupation forces in 1979 but also much earlier when the British
were colonizing the Indian sub content. The British tried to establish some sort of central
rule in Waziristan by sending governors into the region. These governors acted more like
ambassadors; they had very limited jurisdiction and were barely effective in keeping order
in the region. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27. Tribes like the Mehsuds and Wazirs from
North and South Waziristan regularly repelled the British when the British encroached on
their territory, they would leave the British forces in shambles and refused to make
concessions until the colonial troops had no choice but to retreat. David Ignatius,
Waziristan and the British Experience, WASH. POST (Oct. 25, 2009), available at
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-10-25/opinions/368562161 south-waziristan-tribalareas-tribal-leaders (last visited May 10, 2015).
30. With a population of at least 50 million, the Pashtun people are Afghanistan's
largest ethnic group, and are also the second-largest ethnicity in Pakistan. Pashtuns are
united by the Pashto language, which is a member of the lndo-Iranian language family,
although many also speak Dari (Persian) or Urdu. Kallie Szczepanski, Who are the
Pashtun, ABOUT Eouc. (2014), available at asianhistory.about.com/od/gloassaryps/g/WhoAre-The-Pashtun.htm (last visited May 10, 2015).
31. Fair, supra note 9.
32. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149.
33. "Stakeholders in the Great Game" is a reference to the key players in the FATA
conflict, the U.S., the Taliban and Pakistan's military forces. Farooq, supra note 23.
34. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27 .
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Jirgas, giving way instead to militant religious leaders, who govern on
the basis of stringent religious doctrine. 35
The Taliban's method of tribal governing is not well taken by the
people of the FAT A. The people of the FAT A have traditionally abided
by an honor code called Pashtunwali that predates Islam. 36 This ethical
code, in combination with tradition and religion is what the region's
culture is comprised of; however, the religious extremism that
contributed to the region's instability can largely be attributed to the
relatively recent alterations to the region's power structures. 37
When Pakistan gained independence from India in 194 7,
Pakistan's founder, Mohammed Ali Jinnah "maintained the British civil
structure of the tribal agency and the role of the political agent 38 in
administering the Tribal Areas. " 39 Jinnah continued to operate the tribal
lands in much the same way as the British had. However, his leadership
differed markedly in policy when, in April 1948, Jinnah made the
unprecedented move of withdrawing military forces from the province
of Waziristan upon meeting with a grand Jirga of FATA tribesman. 40
He said,
Keeping in view your loyalty, help, assurances and declarations we
ordered, as you know, the withdrawal of troops from Waziristan as a
concrete and definite gesture on our part... Pakistan has no desire to
unduly interfere with your internal freedom. On the contrary; Pakistan
wants to help you and make you, as far as it lies in our power, selfreliant and self-sufficient and help in your educational, social and
economic uplift. .. We want to put you on your legs as self-respecting
citizens who have the opportunities of fully developing and producing
what is best in you and your land. 41

As Jinnah is widely considered a brilliant political mind, his speech
to the grand Jirga can be interpreted as strategic political rhetoric meant
to placate the tribes. However, it was also a practical assessment of the
situation and the needs of the region. Jinnah knew that the northwest
frontier of the newly created Pakistan would be difficult to incorporate;
its people had a long history of tribal leadership that would not be easy

35 .
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

HASNAT, supra 22, at 149.
Id.
Fair, supra note 9.
See infra Part IV.
Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27.
Id.
HASNAT, supra note 22, at 148.
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to transition into the central government. 42 It is obvious from Jinnah's
speech that while Pakistan was willing to aid the FAT A it never
intended to fully integrate the FAT A, which is what created the rift that
exists today.
Instead of fighting them into submission with resources and time
the new government did not have, Jinnah made sure they were aware of
their internal autonomy, while still being subject to the central
government. Though keeping the tribal lands autonomous was a
practical necessity at the time it was ultimately detrimental. Because
despite their autonomy, the tribal lands are subject to Pakistan's central
government, yet are inadequately represented in the central government.
Jinnah had promised the tribesmen economic and social aid to lift their
society,
Pakistan will not hesitate to go out of its way to give every possible
help- financial and otherwise-to build up the economic and social life
of our tribal brethren across the border. . . It will certainly be my
constant solicitude and indeed that of my Government to try to help
you to educate your children and with your co-operation and help we
may very soon succeed in making a great progress in this direction. 43

For the next fifty years or so Pakistan struck a balance between the
tribal structure in the FATA and Pakistan's central government with
mechanisms in place to ensure law and order.44 This balance, which
was just non-interference from the central government, did little to
actually lift Waziristan or any of the FATA out of its impoverished
conditions, in fact the non-interference, and therefore isolation, only
pushed the FATA further into the Taliban's hands. 45
For example, in 1996, the government extended voting rights for
adults to the FAT A. 46 But, "mainstream parties were not allowed to
mobilize in FATA as the elections were supposedly held on a non-party
basis."47 The problem though is that Islamist parties held great
influence over mosques and schools, and therefore their candidates

42. Pakistan had just seceded from India and creating a new country was challenging
enough without taking on the arduous task of integrating an autonomous tribal region that
was used to battling those who attempted to conquer it.
43. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 148.
44. Ahmed & Akins, supra note 27.
45. "According to a WHO report, nearly 50 percent of tribesmen live in abject poverty,
75 percent have no access to clean drinking water. Annual population growth rate is almost
4 percent as compared to nationally cited figures of 2 percent." Impoverished Northwest,
supra note 1 1.
46. Fair, supra note 9.
47. Id.
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could effectively lobby for votes. 48 As a result, the tribal lands elected
mullahs to represent them in the National Assembly in 1997 and again
in 2002. 49 This is a major departure from tradition. Previously, maliks
chose their tribal representatives to Parliament on a "secular and tribal
basis." 50 The collapse of the maliki system because of Pakistan's
neglect and the Taliban's influence, is significant to the FATA because
it created a power vacuum that mullahs and Islamic militants then
eagerly filled.
Pakistan continued to treat the tribal lands as separate and apart but
never gave them true autonomy as far as governing. Jinnah's political
promises remained just that; the central government continued to
neglect the people of the FAT A. 51 The people of the tribal lands have
always lived in destitute conditions. For shelter, most people live in
pueblo-like constructions, 52 usually with no electricity. The area
remains impoverished, with extremely low rates of literacy and little to
no healthcare services. Much of the FAT A is completely inaccessible
because of the lack of infrastructure, including lack of roads and
railways. 53 This lack of attention to a major segment of its population is
a large part of Pakistan's problem in the FATA.
While the central government has neglected to govern the area and
has floundered to regain control in the last decade, the Taliban "seem to
operate with a clear chain of command and high level of discipline, and
ha[ ve] demonstrated strong-and growing-operational and strategic
cohesion." 54 Residents of the FATA who joined the Taliban have done
so for a host of reasons, most of which are ultimately traceable to
unemployment and poverty. 55 Further proving that the rise of Taliban
influence and religious extremism in the FATA is directly traceable to
the lack of social development and infrastructure, a responsibility the

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Fair, supra note 9.
52. Pueblos were housing constructions built from stone, mud and other local material
that were built by Native Americans in the Southwestern United States.
53 . HASNAT, supra note 22, at 147.
54. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 30.
55 . Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding FATA : 2011 Attitudes Towards
Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan 's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Vol. V
2012),
COMM.
APPRAISAL
&
MOTIVATION
PROG .,
available
at
http://www.understandingfata.org/uf-volume-v/Understanding_F AT A_ Vol-V-11.pdf (last
visited May 10, 2015).
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central government should be handling. 56 In fact, while more that 30%
of the FATA characterizes the Taliban as "terrorists," almost 23%
recognize them to also be uneducated youth. 57 The lack of literacy and
jobs make supporting the Taliban fruitful for those who join their ranks
and those who do not join are too intimidated to resist in any
meaningful way. 58

III. GOVERNING THE FAT A: CONTRADICTING THE
CONSTITUTION
The Pakistani Constitution of 1973 ("the Constitution") gives
special status to the tribal areas and directs that neither the power of
Parliament nor of the power of the judicial system shall extend to the
tribal areas without the President's assent. 59 While the rest of Pakistan
functions as a parliamentary democratic republic, the FAT A does not.
Under Article 51 of the Constitution, the FATA is included among the
territories of Pakistan. 60 The FAT A functions as a combination of
exclusive executive authority and tribal tradition. 61 The extent of the
FATA's involvement in the central government is that FATA
representatives can be elected on a non-party basis to the National
Assembly and the Senate, but it still remains under the direct executive
control of the President. 62 Despite election to the National Assembly
and Senate, representatives cannot exercise any legislative powers with
regard to the FATA, meaning that any laws passed by the National
Assembly do not apply to the FAT A unless ordered by the President. 63
56. Id.
57. Id. at 95.
58. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 147.
59. History of FATA, FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS, available at
http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iid=28&fid=2&pid=23&mid=l3 (last visited May 10, 2015)
("Soon after [Pakistan's] Independence [from India], the various tribes in the region entered
into an agreement with the Government of Pakistan, pledging allegiance to the newly
created state. The agreement ... did not include political autonomy of the tribes. The
instruments of agreement, signed in 1948, granted the tribal areas a special administrative
status. Except where strategic considerations dictated, the tribal areas were allowed to
retain their semi-autonomous status, exercising administrative authority based on tribal
codes and traditional institutions. This unique system was crystallized in Pakistan's
Constitution of 1973 .").
60. PAKISTAN CONST. art.
51; see also Administrative System, FEDERALLY
ADMfNISTERED
TRIBAL
AREAS,
available
at
http://fata.gov.pk/Global.php?iid
=29&fid=2&pid=23&mid= 13 (last visited May I 0, 2015).
61. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149; PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 51, 59, 246-47.
62. Administrative System, supra note 60; PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 51, 59, 246-47
63. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 27; Administrative System, supra note 60.
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The special mechanism for governing this region falls under a
body of law called the Frontier Crime Regulations ("FCR"). 64 The FCR
dates back to the 1870s when Pakistan was still part of India and the
Despite India's
whole subcontinent was under British rule. 65
independence from Britain, then Pakistan's secession from India, and
multiple revised constitutions, the FCR has been retained. 66 Through
reliance on the concept of Collective Punishment, the FCR codifies the
government's ability to commit human rights violations and fails to
recognize "the rule of law, due process, political representation or
democratic institutions."67 Under the FCR, "the government may hold
an entire tribe or subgroup accountable for the actions of alleged
wrongdoers. " 68 This kind of legal framework and the associated
mechanisms for law enforcement are specific to the FAT A. Segments
of FATA tribes, Pakistani human rights organizations and even
Pakistan's Supreme Court have decried the FCR; the court going so far
as to deem the FCR unconstitutional. 69
Though Pakistan's central government has often promised to
reform the FCR and improve the status of those living in the tribal
lands, it has not made any substantial changes to the FCR in 113
years. 70 The millions who live in the FATA still have "second-class
legal status."71 Pakistan's constitution lays out a list of guaranteed
fundamental rights for all citizens, but it then excludes the FATA from
benefiting from said rights and excludes the majority of judicial, legal
and parliamentary control from reaching there. 72
Since the control of parliament and the judiciary do not extend to
the FATA, it is essentially under direct executive control. The President

64. It is worth noting that under art. 247(6) of the 1973 constitution, the president of
Pakistan has the constitutional authority to end the applicability of the FCR to any agency
after consulting with a tribal Jirga. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26-27; PAKJSTAN
CONST. art. 247, § 6.
65. History of FATA, supra note 59.
66. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 247.
67. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26; Umar Farooq, Pakistan's FATA: Lawless no
more?, ALJAZEERA (Mar. 22, 2014, 12:10 AM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/
indepth/features/2014/03/pakistan-fata-lawless-no-more-20 l 4321111550828897 .html (last
visited May 10, 2015).
68. Fair, supra note 9.
69. Id.
70. Id.; Umar Farooq, Pakistan's FATA: Lawless no more? ALJAZEERA (Mar. 22,
2014, 12: IO PM), available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/03/pakistanfata-lawless-no-more-20 l 4321111550828897 .html (last visited May 10, 2015).
71. Fair, supra note 9; Farooq, supra note 70.
72. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 8(3).
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appoints a Political Agent 73 ("PA") for each agency within the FATA
who exercises a broad range of administrative, executive and judicial
powers. 74 The PA wields so much power that he can "order whole
villages to be burnt down and tribes to be blockaded or sent into
exile. " 75 The only check on the PA is that he may consult with the
Jirgas 76 when resolving disputes.77 However this is a discretionary
option left up to the PA. 78 Currently, the FATA is administered by the
Governor of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ("KP") "in his capacity as an
agent to the President of Pakistan, under the overall supervision of the
Ministry of States and Frontier Regions in Islamabad. " 79

IV. CONFLICT BETWEEN THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTANI
ARMED FORCES
The current conflict between Pakistan's armed forces and the
insurgents in the FAT A is widely considered Pakistan's largest security
threat. Though the social tensions that underlie this conflict are hardly
new, the war itself began after the U.S. and its coalition invaded
Afghanistan in 2001. 80 The fall of Afghanistan's Taliban regime caused
many Taliban officers and leaders to cross the border into the FAT A. 81
As a strategic safe haven, Waziristan was ideal for escaped Taliban
73. The Political Agent position was created by the British around 1901. "Each
agency was administered by a Political Agent who was vested with wide powers and
provided funds to secure the loyalties of influential elements in the area." History of FATA ,
supra note 59.
74. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 26.
75. Farooq, supra note 70; see Fair, supra note 9 ("The role of the Political Agency
has continued to erode both due to the diminished quality and rank of the civil servants
assigned to the position and due to the ever-expanding corruption within the agency since
1947. In recent years, the army has further supplanted the PA' s authority in key agencies
such as North and South Waziristan.").
76. Jirgas are traditionally made up of 3 elder tribesmen, known as Maliks , who are
appointed and dismissed at the whim of the PA. Though they are meant to function as a
check on the Political Agent's extensive authority, practically speaking, they serve at the
pleasure of the executive appointed PA. Around the same tie as when the role of the
Political Agent was carved out, the Maliki system was developed as well. The Maliki
system allowed the "colonial administration to exercise control over the tribes. Under this
system, local chiefs (Maliks) were designated as intermediaries between the members of
individual tribes and the colonial authorities, and also assisted in the implementation of
government policies." History of FATA, supra note 59.
77. Farooq, supra note 70.
78. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 149.
79. Administrative System, supra note 60.
80. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143.
81. AMN ESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20.
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members to carry out attacks on the U.S-led coalition. 82 From there,
they could assist whatever remained of al-Qaeda and the Taliban in
Afghanistan, who had by then escaped into the villages and mountains
to avoid further attack. 83 The northern agencies in the FAT A began
noticing a significant increase in Taliban presence in 2006. By 2009 a
substantial portion of the Federally Administered Tribal Area was under
Taliban control. 84
Due to this increase in Taliban presence the U.S. government put
pressure on Pakistan, particularly on then-president General Pervez
Musharraf, to contain the militant forces that had escaped into the
FAT A's mountain terrain and then into the rest of the FAT A. 85
Musharraf was pressured into launching his own military operation to
assist the U.S. and its allies. This was a difficult decision for Pakistan
because its military had developed a close working relationship with the
Launching a military operation, at the
tribesmen since 1979. 86
insistence of the U.S., against those same tribes was not an easy
proposition for Pakistan's military to carry out. The fact that the FATA
tribesmen, especially those already sympathetic to the Taliban,
considered the struggle between the U.S and the Taliban as a justified
"war of liberation" from the U.S.' "War on Islam" made Pakistan's
decision even more difficult. 87
Musharraf succumbed to U.S. pressure and beginning in 2002
Pakistan carried out unenthusiastic military operations, relying on paramilitary forces. In 2008 and 2009 Taliban forces blocked supply routes
through the Khyber agency, which the U.S. and NATO forces used, and
proceeded to seize, loot and burn several hundred supply trucks. Due to
U.S. pressure, Pakistan "conducted fierce battles to maintain this supply
line" in June 2008, January 2009 and March 2010. 88 Operations like
these were often botched and then followed with urgent peace

82. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143.
83. Id.
84. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20.
85. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 143.
86. Waziristan has been kept mostly autonomous because of their tradition of
militaristic service and support in the defense of Pakistan. Since 1979, Pakistan's military
established a close relationship with the tribesmen of the FAT A to encourage them to help
the Afghans in their struggle against Soviet occupation. Waziristan was central to the
support of the Mujahideen forces attempting to repel the Soviets. HASNAT, supra note 22, at
143, 145, 147.
87. Id. at 143.
88. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 20.
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agreements with the tribes that later fell apart. 89 It was obvious from
Pakistan's halfhearted efforts that they had no desire to establish state
rule in the FAT A by inserting the central government into the largely
autonomous region, at least not through military means.
The drawback to this lack luster effort was that it gave legitimacy
to the Taliban in the FAT A, allowing them to eventually establish their
own party, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (The Pakistani Taliban
Movement, also referred to as the "TTP"). Through Pakistan's every
botched military operation and failed peace agreement, the TTP was
able to gain sympathy and support from the tribesmen, which led to new
resources and recruits, eventually creating a serious obstacle for the
military. 90 The Taliban was no longer just a formidable militant force
but now also an emboldened and legitimized political influence.
Through a series of peace agreements, Pakistan released Prisoners
of War, weapons and territory back to TTP militants, actions that both
the TTP and the tribes in the FATA saw as a weakness. 91 Encouraged
by this display of vulnerability the TTP took steps to challenge state
rule throughout the FATA by carrying out terrorist activity across the
country against law enforcement, military facilities and civilian targets 92
and by appointing their own members to positions of political influence.
This is where the decline of the maliki system is especially
problematic. The decline of the tribal governing structure impaired the
authenticity and legitimacy of the maliks ' leadership.93 Political Agents
favored maliks whose cooperation they could bribe, creating an
environment of corruption and mistrust. As a result, the tribes no longer
recognize or trust maliks as their legitimate representation. 94 They
instead turned to other political forces, more specifically the
"charismatic, religious and militant" alternatives offered by the
Taliban. 95 "These new leaders have effectively captured the various
forms of simmering discontent within the tribes and have emerged as
more legitimate defenders of tribal interests. Thus, the mullahs have
now become respected representatives of the tribes, as have key Islamist
militants in FAT A. " 96

89.

HASNAT,

supra note 22, at 144.

90. Id.
91. Id.

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id.
Fair, supra note 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The increased influence of the TTP had widespread ramifications
across Pakistan. Constantly on the defensive in order to preserve the
interests of the U.S. rather than the interests of Pakistani citizens,
Pakistan ended up prolonging the conflict. Its indecisive military
strategy damaged the military's prestige, caused much human casualty,
property damage and displaced thousands of people, all while causing
massive strain on Pakistan's economy. 97 Residents of the FATA were
affected much worse, dying by hundreds due to random and violent
terrorist attacks, U.S. drone strikes and indiscriminate action by
Pakistan's military. 98
The U.S. drone attacks and the subsequent bombings by Pakistani
warplanes further soured the FAT A's relationship and opinion of the
central government, causing them to seek refuge in the only viable
opposition, the TTP. 99 Anti-U.S. sentiment is still strong in the FATA,
with 79.3% of tribal people opposing American military presence in the
area, a number heavily influenced by the continuing drone strikes. 100
There is also bitterness towards the Taliban for having destroyed the
peace of the region and bringing upon the FATA the chaos caused by
continued drone strikes and Pakistan's military. 101
Nearly 70% of the FATA opposes the presence of Pakistani
Taliban fighters 102 because in addition to suicide bombings across
Pakistan, the TTP has also become an oppressive presence in the FATA
by constantly eliminating its opponents, fighting the Pakistani state and
its security forces, and carrying out beheadings and kidnapping people
for ransom. By 2009, the TTP had carried out so many violent and
disruptive operations, both outside and within the FAT A, especially
against military sites that it forced the military' s hand to end the conflict

97. HASNAT, supra note 22, at 144.
98. Id.
99. See Rahimullah Yusufzai, Waziristan - the Mother of all Battles, NEWS (Oct. 20,
2009), available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=20403 7&Cat
=9&dt=9/2/2009 (last visited May 10, 2015).
100. Shinwari, supra note 55, at 87.
101. Tribesmen have often banded together to expel al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or other
extremist groups from their land. But they have also consistently claimed that the source of
their current problems lies in Afghanistan and the U.S. invasion of 2001. "If you are asking
about Americans," Dawar says, "100% [of the people] here are hating Americans. They are
thinking that this whole drama is from the side of America, because they came to
Afghanistan. That is why they are demanding America leave Afghanistan." Farooq, supra
note 23.
102. Shinwari, supra note 55, at 87.
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as swiftly as possible, leading to more violence and death in the
FATA. 103
In 2009, Pakistan renewed air and ground offensives against the
TTP in the FAT A. These attacks were intended to target militant
strongholds but were often inaccurate since Pakistan was working with
very limited and often unreliable intelligence, a result of having little to
no public support or assets in the area. 104 From the beginning of the war
in Afghanistan, public opinion in the FATA favored the Taliban and
their efforts to rid the region of the infiltration of a foreign power.
However, the TTP's violent and destructive tactics have caused them to
lose much of the public sympathy they gained when Pakistan first began
military operations.
This does not imply that public opinion has shifted in Pakistan's
favor.
Pakistan's most recent military campaign in the FATA,
Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an air and ground offensive launched on June
15, 2014 in North Waziristan, has caused mass civilian casualty and is
yet another source of major human rights violations exacted by Pakistan
against FATA residents. 105 Zarb-e-Azb was launched after government
peace talks with Taliban leaders once again fell through, and though the
military had been planning the offensive well before, the Operation was
pursued ultimately because of the major Taliban attack on Pakistan's
largest airport on June 9, 2014. 106
Zarb-e-Azb was aimed to be a "comprehensive operation against
foreign and local terrorists who are hiding in sanctuaries in North
Waziristan" but practically resulted in the displacement of 500,000 of

103. See Yusufzai, supra note 99.
104. See id.
105. Rebecca Santana & Asif Shahzad, Pakistan Launches Offensive Against Military
Near Afghan Border, HUFFINGTON POST (June 15, 2014, 10:23 AM), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/15/pakistan-anny-says-launch_ n_5496487 .html
(last visited May l 0, 2015).
106. On June 9, 2014, the TTP claimed responsibility for an attack on Pakistan's
Jinnah International Airport, located in Karachi. The nearly 12-hour siege left 28 dead,
including l O TTP attackers. The TTP released a statement following the attack stating, "the
biggest reason for attacking Karachi airport is because it serves as the biggest air logistics
center supplying goods for the Crusaders' war in Afghanistan and Pakistan." This statement
referred to the Afghanistan-bound U.S.-NATO cargo, which comes in through Karachi. The
siege has also been attributed as the TTP's revenge for the death of Hakimullah Mehsud, a
prominent Taliban leader who was killed by U.S. drone strike in November 2013. Declan
Walsh, Pakistani Forces Begin Assault on Militant Strongholds, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 30, 2014)
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01 /world/asia/pakistan-anny-begins-groundassault-on-militants.html?_r=2 (last visited May 10, 2015); TTP claims attack on Karachi
airport, DAWN (Jun. 9, 2014) available at http://www.dawn.com/news/l l l 1397/ttp-claimsattack-on-karachi-airport (last visited May 10, 2015).
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people and hundreds of casualties. 107 Zarb-e-Azb has caused Pakistan's
"biggest conflict-driven humanitarian crises since 2009." 108 The
Pakistani military has claimed that no civilian casualties resulted from
Zarb-e-Azb, this claim is unrealistic on its face and has been disproven
through by refugees from the area who have given accounts of the
military' s indiscriminate attacks which have resulted in mass civilian
death and grave injuries. 109 While Pakistan may claim that Operation
Zarb-e-Azb has been successful in ridding the area of militants and
dismantling the TTP's power in the FATA, especially in North
Waziristan, the TTP has made it clear that these claims are inaccurate.
On December 16, 2014, in what can only be described as
retaliation for Zarb-e-Azb, seven TTP militants laid siege on a school in
Peshawar for hours ("Peshawar Attaack"). 110 The school, Army Public
School and Degree College, is primarily for the children of active
military members. 111 By the time the siege ended later that day, there
were at least 100 injuries and 152 casualties; 132 children, 10 school
staff members, three soldiers and the seven militants. 112 The attack is
considered the deadliest attack in Pakistan since October 2007. 113
Pakistan, in a very opportunistic fashion, has used the Peshawar
Attack to institute fast track avenues around the criminal justice system.
On December 17, 2014, the day after the Peshawar Attack, the Prime
Minister, Nawaz Sharif, lifted a moratorium on the death penalty, which
has been in place since 2008, and promised that death warrants would
follow in the coming days. 114 Given that the rise of Taliban control in
the FATA and the main source of criticism against the Pakistani
government in the FAT A is based on the lack of fair governing - the
renewal of the death penalty is particularly problematic.

107. Syed Azeem & Noaman G. Ali , Zarb-e-Azb and the Left: On Imperialism's
Materiality, TANQEED (Aug. 2014) available at http://www.tanqeed.org/2014/08/zarb-e-azband-the-left-on-imperialisms-materiality/ (last visited May 10, 2015); Santana & Shahzad,
supra note 105.
108. Walsh, supra note 106.
109. Id.; Santana & Shahzad, supra note 105 .
110. Sophia Saifi & Greg Botelho, In Pakistan School Attack, Taliban Terrorists Kill
I45, Mostly Children , CNN (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2014/12/16/world/asia/pakistan-peshawar-school-attack/ (last visited May 10, 2015).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Sheree Sardar & Katharine Houreld, Pakistan PM Lifts Moratorium on Death
Penalty After School Attack, R EUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://in.reuters.com/
article/2014/12/17/pakistan-school-deathpenaltyidINKBNOJVOLJ20141217 (last visited
May 10, 2015).
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Currently, more than 8,000 prisoners sit on Pakistan's death row,
and about 10% of them are convicted of "terrorism" related offenses. 115
Pakistan's definition of terrorism is very broad, to the point where
almost any crime can fall under the category of "terrorism," as a result
more that 17,000 cases of terrorism are pending in special courts. 116
Those convicted of terrorism are often denied their basic rights; they are
tortured into confessions, denied lawyers, and denied adequate living
conditions. 117 Many defendants who have been convicted of terrorism
were charged on the basis of crimes that bore no relation to terrorism in
the first place; they were sentenced to death despite incredibly unfair
trials. 118
What makes this situation even worse, especially for those in the
FATA who suffer most from these government injustices, is that this
heavy crackdown on "terrorism" has not stopped militant attacks. 119
These crackdowns, which essentially pervert the criminal justice
system, have done nothing to alleviate the actual problem of Taliban
militancy. Instead, they are just another way in which Pakistan's central
government commits human rights violation through the justification of
maintaining security in the FAT A and in Pakistan as a whole.

115. Id.
116. Id. Under Section 6 of the 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act (AT A), "Terrorism" is
defined as "the use or threat of action" where among other things, "the use or threat is
designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the government or the public or a section of
the public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society; or the use
or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause." The
Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 1997, FED. INVESTIGATION AGENCY, GOVT. OF PAK.JSTAN,
available at http://www.fia.gov.pk/ata.htm (last visited May IO, 2015). In 2013, the ATA
was amended so as to expand Section 6 - adding in that "intimidating and terrorizing the
public, social sectors, media persons, business community or attacking the civilians,
including damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson or by any other means,
government officials, installations, security forces or law enforcement agencies" would also
be considered "terrorism." Amendment of Section 6, Act XXVII of 1997, GAZETTE OF
PAK.JSTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Mar. 26, 2013, at 2, available at http://www.na.gov.pk/
uploads/documents/1365050846_309.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015). This means that
almost any criminal action can be categorized as terrorism. Such language lends itself to
abuse, hence the large amount of terrorism related cases pending in Pakistani courts and the
hundreds of people sitting on death row.
117. Sardar & Houreld, supra note 114.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES AND CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT COMMIT INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS UNDER THE GUISE OF
MAINTAINING SECURITY

The human rights crisis in the FATA can be attributed to three
main sources, the neglect and mistreatment from the Pakistani
government and military, Taliban militancy and influence and the U.S.'
drone attacks. Actors are largely able to continue committing human
rights violations because the very setup of the FAT A leaves the area
susceptible to corruption and abuse. Although the FAT A accounts for
7% of the national population, it receives a mere 1% of the national
budget. 120 The estimated unemployment rate reliably rests somewhere
between 60% and 80% but it often reaches higher numbers depending
on patterns of migrant labor. 121 In regards to healthcare, the ratio of
doctors to people in the FATA is about 1 to 7670, whereas the national
average is about 1 to 1226. 122 There is about one hospital for every fifty
square kilometers, which serve large populations, sometimes extending
to those living Afghanistan's side of the border. 123 The FCR is
responsible for this neglect because the various branches of government
are barely accountable to the FATA.
Relying on the FCR to govern the FAT A violates Pakistan's
human rights obligations under the international human rights
conventions. 124 The extension of the FCR's power is in direct conflict
with the Constitution and the rights it guarantees to the rest of
Pakistan's provinces.
The FCR denies FATA's residents equal
protection under the law, as well as voting rights. 125 Pakistan's central
government and military forces often exploit the FCR to justify human
rights violations, such as collective punishment and unwarranted
detention of tribal leaders' relatives, in an effort to pressure those
leaders for State purposes.
Since the jurisdiction of Pakistan's judiciary does not extend to the
FATA, the FCR has its own judicial mechanism, which consequently
has negative human rights implications. Under the FCR, a Jirga

120. See Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See infra discussion Section VI, Pakistan is Obligated to Act in Compliance with
the International Human Rights Obligations it is a Party to.
125. See PAKJSTAN CONST., arts. 8-28.
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decides all civil and criminal matters arising in the FATA. 126 Should a
FAT A resident wish to appeal a Jirga 's decision they may do so to the
Supreme Court of Pakistan (Pakistan's highest court) or to the Peshawar
High Court through a constitutional writ challenging the decision. 127
The FATA is divided into two administrative categories, protected
areas, which are under the direct control of the government and nonprotected areas, which are administered (indirectly) through local
tribes. 128
In protected areas, criminal and civil cases are decided by political
officers vested with judicial powers. After completing the necessary
inquiries and investigations, a Jirga is constituted with the consent of
the disputing parties. The case is then referred to the Jirga who issues
a verdict, which is examined by the Political Agent. This decision can
be appealed against to the High Court and Supreme Court. Once
appeals are exhausted, execution of the verdict is the responsibility of
the political administration. In non-protected areas, cases are resolved
through a local Jirga at the agency level. Local mediators first
intervene to achieve a truce (tiga) between parties in a criminal case,
or to obtain security (muchalga) in cash or kind for civil disputes.
Thereafter, parties must arrive at a consensus concerning the mode of
settlement (arbitration), riwaj (customary law) or Shariah (Islamic
law). Once the mode of settlement is agreed upon, mediators arrange
for the selection of a Jirga, with the consent of the parties to the
case. 129
Under customary international human rights law, international
humanitarian law and Pakistan's own Constitution, the right to a fair
trial and an impartial court is necessary, but Pakistan has not extended
that principle to the FATA. 130 As it stands, the PA, or a Jirga appointed
by the PA, carries out judicial functions. However, neither can be
considered impartial judicial bodies, and under the FCR their decisions
may not always be appealable to Pakistan's higher courts.
This has always been problematic but is more so now because
under the FCR the power of the PA is so extensive that on "vaguely
defined grounds he can order that individuals or entire communities be
detained without trial for years at a time seize their property and impose
fines, all without any requirement of ordinary criminal trial." 131 This
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Administrative System, supra note 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
AMNESTY lNT'L, supra note 29, at 27; PAKISTAN CONST. art. 10.
AMNESTY INT' L, supra note 29, at 27.
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provision has often been used to justify collective punishment during
recent military operations in the FAT A. One of the more notable
instances was during the large-scale military operations in Waziristan in
October 2009.
The military blocked tribal access to necessary
humanitarian aid when they suspected members of the Mehsud tribe to
be involved in Taliban activities, punishing an entire population of
people for the suspected actions of a few.
In recent years, with the increased presence of the Taliban,
Pakistan's military operations in the region, and the U.S. drone attacks,
the tribal mechanism of policing and redress fell subject to the Taliban.
The Taliban openly killed Maliks and entire Jirgas for their alleged
cooperation with Pakistan's central government and military. They then
replaced this already corrupt system with insurgents or Mullahs who are
more sympathetic to the Taliban. 132
Before the Taliban insurgency, tribes in the FAT A had largely
policed themselves through their own traditions, mainly the Jirgas.
This method of enforcement was unfair to begin with because the Jirgas
and Maliks were appointed on the basis of how useful they could be to
the PA. 133 As structured under the FCR, the Jirgas also discriminated
against women by denying women access to tribal councils, even when
many of the decisions directly impacted them. This is just another way
the FCR contradicts the broader constitution, which guarantees, "all
citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law"
and that "there shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone." 134
In the last few years, Pakistan has managed to regain control over
most of the FAT A from the Taliban. But in order to accomplish this
goal the military has detained thousands of suspected Taliban supporters
without giving any cause for such action. 135 In an effort to combat
Taliban insurgents Pakistan passed legislation to give the military a
wider breadth of discretion. The Actions in Aid of Civil Power
Regulations (AACPR) was passed in 2011. 136 While the FCR allows
expansion of executive power into the FATA and limits the reach of
parliament and the judiciary, the purpose of the AACPR is to enable the
military to operate against the Taliban and other "armed groups" in the

132. Id. at 28-29.
133. Id. at 28.
134. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 25, §§ 1, 2.
135. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 12.
136. Report Exposes 'the Hands of Cruelty ' in Pakistan's Tribal Areas, AMN ESTY
INT ' L (Dec. 12, 2012), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/report-exposes-handscruelty-pakistan-s-tribal-areas-2012-12-12 (last visited May 10, 2015).
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Tribal areas "in accordance with the law." 137 The AACPR also gives
the armed forces the flexibility to take on "law and order duties" and
"law enforcement operations." 138
In combination with the FCR, the AACPR gives the military
enough legal coverage to arrest and detain suspects without
justification. What is more troubling is that the military's arrest and
detention practices go way beyond the enhanced powers granted to
them under the AACPR, human rights violations committed by the
military extend as far as enforced disappearances, torture and other ill
treatment of prisoners, which sometimes lead to death. 139 Amnesty
International reports that on a weekly basis "[ m Jen and boys allegedly
arrested and detained by the Armed Forces are being returned dead to
their families or reportedly found dumped across the Tribal Areas." 140
Though the families of the detained and the dead often seek
redress, they are given no explanations for why their loved ones were
taken or what happened to them in the months and years they were
gone. The military conducts no investigations into why the detainees
were arrested in the first place, what happened to them while they were
in prison or what led to their deaths. 141 Regional high courts have called
for local authorities to look into the dumped bodies and a host of other
illegal activities, but investigations are rarely carried out and the
military has not been called upon to give any sort of accounting. 142 This
type of treatment and lack of accountability further degrades the image
and reputation of the government and the military in the eyes of those
living in the FATA. The only way for Pakistan to rectify these
extensive human rights violations and its reputation is to make
significant policy reforms and effective mechanisms of redress.
One would think that the government and military are not held
accountable because their violations are hard to prove or because
records do not exist. However, there are reports that document the
military' s activities regarding forced detention, disappearances and
torture as a method of combating the Taliban in the FATA. The
military has admitted to some of these reports, acknowledging the
detention of some 700 militants held without charges or possibility of

137. Hands of Cruelty, supra note l, at 8-9.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 13.
140. Id.
141. /d.atl7
142. Hands of Cruelty, supra note l, at 17.
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trial. 143 Upon inquiry, Pakistan's Attorney General, Irfan Qadir, told the
Supreme Court, "There is a military operation in Waziristan. Under the
law we cannot try these 700 people, nor can we release them, unless the
operation is over." 144
A case that has become famous throughout Pakistan is the case of
the Adiala 11. Eleven prisoners were arrested from different places
because they were believed to be connected to terrorist activity, 145 but in
April 2010, they were all acquitted of the charges by an anti-terrorism
court. 146 Despite their acquittal the eleven prisoners remained in a
detention facility for about a month. Finally, in May 2010, a regional
high court called for the release of the prisoners, declaring their
detention illegal, but shortly after that the eleven had disappeared from
the prison. 147 Pakistan's intelligence agencies continued to give
contradictory statements for sometime before finally admitting to
having them in custody, by which time four had died. 148
VI. PAKISTAN IS OBLIGATED TO ACT IN COMPLIANCE WITH
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
IT IS A PARTY TO
Obligations to citizens within a country's borders do not arise from
just domestic legislation. Countries are bound by an international legal
system as well.
International human rights law, international
humanitarian law and customary international law all play a role in
making sure that all people are given equal opportunities and are treated

143. Pakistan Admits to Holding 700 Militants Without Charge, REUTERS (Jan. 24,
2013, 7:02 AM), available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/01 /24/us-pakistandetainees-idUSBRE90NOHD20130124 (last visited May 10, 2015).
144. Id.
145. Waseem Ahmad Shah, Case of 'Missing' Adiala Prisoners Far From Over,
DAWN (Aug. 13, 1012, 2:45 AM), available at http://dawn.com/news/741861/case-ofmissing-adiala-prisoners-far-from-over (last visited May 10, 2015). "The prisoners are
wanted by intelligence agencies in connection with different acts of terrorism, including an
attack on the GHQ, a rocket attack on the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex Kamra, bomb
blasts at the Rawalpindi Parade Lane mosque, shots fired from anti-aircraft guns on a plane
carrying former President Pervez Musharraf, suicide attacks on a bus of an intelligence
agency in Rawalpindi and other attacks on different military installations and killing of a
number of senior army personnel." Bring 'Missing' Detainees to Court, Agencies Ordered,
DAWN (Feb. 11, 2012, 5:35 AM), available at http://dawn.com/news/694709/bring-missingdetainees-to-court-agencies-ordered (last visited May 10, 2015).
146. Shah, supra note 145.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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humanely. The human rights obligations most relevant to the conflict in
the FAT A (which are covered by an array of international laws) are the
rights to life, fair trial, water, food, housing, education and the highest
attainable standards of healthcare.
There are also significant
prohibitions on torture, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance and
discrimination against women. Pakistan is a party to many international
agreements that cover this broad range of human rights issues and
ratifying 149 or acceding 150 these agreements were notable steps towards
human rights and an acknowledgment of responsibility towards its
citizenry of a certain standard of living and treatment. Though, it is
certainly not enough unless Pakistan takes serious steps towards
compliance with these agreements through governmental reform.
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the UN Human
Rights Committee have confirmed that international human rights law
applies both in peacetime and during times of armed conflict. 151 While
some of these rights can be modified or limited during times of armed
conflict, this can only be done as absolutely necessary depending upon
the circumstances of the situation. 152 Therefore the current conflict in
the FAT A does not give the Pakistani government or military legal
justification under international law for the abuses it carries out.

A. International Obligation to Children
In 1990 Pakistan ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child
("CRC"). 153 The CRC requires that states make every available effort to
ensure children have access to the highest attainable standards of
healthcare, compulsory primary education with an effort to develop
adequate general and vocational secondary education and access to
adequate food, water and housing. 154 The CRC also prohibits torture,
149. Ratification is the act where a state indicates its consent to be bound to a treaty.
Glossary of Terms Relating to Treaty Actions, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION,
available
at
https://treaties.un.org/pages/Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/
page l _ en.xml#ratification (last visited May 10, 2015).
150. "Accession" is the act where a state accepts the offer or the opportunity to
become a party to a treaty already negotiated and signed by other states. It has the same
legal effect as ratification. Accession usually occurs after the treaty has entered into force.
Glossary, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, available at https://treaties.un.org/pages/
Overview.aspx?path=overview/glossary/page l _ en.xml#accession (last visited May 10,
2015).
151. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 93.
152. Id.
153. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. Doc.
NRes/44/25 (Sept. 2, 1990).
154. Id. arts. 3, 24, 27, & 28 .
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cruelty, lengthy imprisonment and capital punishment against children
and seeks to ensure that no child is deprived of life or liberty
"unlawfully or arbitrarily." 155 Further specifying that all "arrest,
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be in conformity with the law
and shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest
appropriate period of time." 156

B. International Obligation for the Equal Treatment of Women
In March 1996, Pakistan acceded to the International Convention
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women
("CEDAW"), a major treaty advocating the equal treatment of
women. 157 In addition to contradicting the constitution, the FCR' s
treatment of women also violates the CEDAW, which requires Pakistan
"accord to women equality with men before the law." 158 CEDAW goes
so far as to require states parties take the appropriate measures
[T]o modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and
women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped
roles for men and women. 1159

Under CEDAW Pakistan is obligated to rectify the unequal
treatment women in the tribal areas face as a result of tribal culture, the
Jirgas and the Taliban.
For women in general, CEDAW requires state parties to give
women, in equality with men, the right to vote and to be elected in all
publicly elected bodies and also to participate in the formulation of
govemment. 16 CEDAW also has specific provisions when dealing with
the plight of rural women that can be applied to the FATA. 161 It
requires states parties to take all appropriate measures to ensure rural
women the right to participate in development planning, to have access
to healthcare (including family planning), to be able to attain formal and

°

155. Id. art. 37, para. b.
156. Id.
157. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women,
1249 U.N.T.S. 13, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979) [hereinafter
CEDAW].
158. Id. art. 15(1).
159. Id. art. 5(a).
160. Id. art. 7.
161. Id. art. 14.
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informal education, to participate in their communities and to have
adequate housing, electricity, water and transportation. 162
C. International Obligation to Provide Humane Living Conditions

On April 17, 2008 Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ("ICESCR"). 163 The ICESCR
requires state parties to recognize the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living, which includes adequate food, clothing and housing,
and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. 164 The
ICESCR also requires that the "development of a system of schools at
all levels shall be actively pursued" and that all people have access to
the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health. 165 The
ICESCR also deals with the equal treatment of all individuals regardless
of race, color, sex or other affiliation and with labor rights. 166
On June 23, 2010 Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the UN Convention against
Torture ("UNCAT"), two of the most notable international agreements
dealing with equality and human rights. 167 Many of the rights and
prohibitions expressed in these two treaties are also represented in the
ICESCR, CEDA W and the CRC, as well as a host of other international
agreements and customary international law. The ICCPR and UNCAT,
as two of the more influential human rights agreements, further
reinforce Pakistan's awareness of the standards it should be applying to
all of its citizenry. They also further cement Pakistan's international
legal obligation to abide by human rights guidelines and reform the
structure of the FAT A to meet them.
The ICCPR deals with individuals' civil and political rights,
addressing the issues of freedom of speech, religion, assembly, voting
rights and due process concerns. 168 Specifically the ICCPR provides for
those whose rights have been violated to be able to seek effective
remedy and that those who claim such remedy "have [their] right[ s]
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative

162. CEDAW, supra note 141, art. 14.
163. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Apr. 17, 2008,
993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR].
164. Id. art. 11.
165. Id. arts. 12-13.
166. Id. arts. 2, 8.
167. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, June 23, 2010, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
168. See id.
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authorities . . . and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy"
where they do not already exist. 169 The UN CAT seeks to prevent the
state use of torture and cruel and inhuman treatment and punishment.
The UNCAT defines torture as
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. 170

By June 2011, Pakistan had withdrawn most of its reservations to the
ICCPR and the UNCAT. 171
In the last few years, since Pakistan has shifted its focus from
large-scale military operations to search and intelligence gathering
initiatives, the military has arrested and detained thousands of people.
Human rights groups have expressed concern over the treatment of
these detainees since reports of mistreatment and torture have come to
light. 172 Torture and cruel and inhumane treatment are prohibited by
multiple international agreements, including the ICCPR, the Geneva
Conventions, customary international law, and the UNCAT. 173

169. /d.art.2.
170. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishent, G.A. Res. 39/46, art. 1., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
171. Pakistan Decides to Withdraw Most of Reservations on ICCPR, UNCA T, NATION
(June 23, 2011), available at http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-dailyenglish-online/national/23-Jun-2011/Pakistan-decides-to-withdraw-most-of-reservations-onICCPR-UNCAT (last visited May 10, 2015). With respect to the ICCPR, Pakistan still has
reservations regarding Article 3 and Article 25, which deal with gender equality and voting
rights respectively, making these articles subject to the provisions in Pakistan's constitution.
ICCPR, supra note 167 (Pakistan should withdraw its remaining reservations so that the
ICCPR and UNCAT are more effective).
172. Amnesty International has documented the situation of detainees who are kept
malnourished and received daily beatings, causing them to suffer major bodily injury and
disfigurement. The military has also been accused of resorting to torture in the detention
facilities as a method of interrogation. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 19.
173. Torture is a crime under international law and information obtained through
torture or inhumane treatment should not be admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings.
Id. at 21; JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW VOLUME 1: RULES (Cambridge University Press,
2009), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-intemationalhumanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015).
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For example, article 6 of the ICCPR provides that "[e]very human
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law
and no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life," yet Pakistan
continues to detain individuals without cause, detention that often
eventually leads to their uninvestigated deaths. 174 Article 7 of the
ICCPR provides that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment," a general assertion that
is supported more extensively by the UNCAT. 175 Pakistan has agreed to
these provisions and almost all others in these treaties yet continues to
allow its military to exact cruel treatment justified through its own laws,
such as the AACPR.
In part, these human rights violations continue because there is
neither any real consequence levied against the state nor any
opportunity for FATA residents to seek redress. Pakistan's constitution
explicitly excludes the tribal lands from judicial jurisdiction, leaving no
way for the courts to rule on issues of fundamental rights and impunity
within the FATA. Legislation like the AACPR makes redress for
human rights violations especially difficult because it leaves much
military action discretionary and therefore above reproach. 176 This sets
up a series of legal and practical barriers that prevent the people of the
tribal lands from bringing suit against the military in Pakistan's courts.
Despite these obstacles, some cases had made it through, and the
military has even conceded to unlawful action. 177
While these concessions are an important step in developing a
judicial mechanism of redress, they have not translated into justice for
the victims, consequences for the perpetrators or legislative reform. 178
Failing to take steps toward reform or at least investigating these
occurrences of human rights violations puts Pakistan in violation of its
international human rights agreements and its international legal
obligations. Specifically Article 2 Section 3 of the ICCPR each state
that is a party to the agreement has the responsibility to ensure effective
remedies for those whose rights and freedoms are considered violates. 179
The violation of rights and the determination of remedy is to be made

174. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 6 § 1.
175. Id. art. 7.
176. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 9.
177. Cyril Almeida, The Adiala 11, DAWN (Feb.
http://dawn.com/news/6966 l 5/ (last visited May 10, 2015).
178. Hands of Cruelty, supra note 1, at 9.
179. I CCPR, supra note 167, art. 2 § 3.
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by "competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities" which
"shall enforce such remedies when granted." 180
In addition to violations of international human rights law,
Pakistan is also in violation of international humanitarian law.
Pakistan's conflict in the FATA is a non-international armed conflict,
and as such, Pakistan is obligated to at least abide by Article 3 of the
1949 Geneva Conventions. 181 Article 3 provides that prohibited conduct
applies to any person not actively involved in hostilities for any
reason. 182 On November 11, 2009, UN Security Council Resolution
1894 dealt with the protection of civilians in armed conflict and it
emphasized that "states bear the primary responsibility to respect and
ensure the human rights of their citizens, as well as all individuals
within their territory as provided for by relevant international law." 183
Therefore, it is important to note that while Taliban insurgents are not
adhering to the rules of international law, that does not give Pakistan
valid reason to also violate international law nor does it deprive in any
way the civilian population from the protections of international law to
which they are entitled to from their government and the international
legal framework. 184
VIL PAKISTAN CAN REMEDY HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES BY
GOVERNING THE FATA IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
Human rights organizations like Amnesty International have been
calling on Pakistan to reform or repeal the FCR for years and this is
certainly important. However, another important step towards reform is
earning the people's trust, establishing a consistent message and
following through on it. So far the only thing Pakistan has been
consistent about in the FATA is its neglect of it. When Pakistan has
peace talks with the Taliban, 185 begins reconstruction efforts or
180. Id.
181 . AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at l 01.
182. Id.
183. S.C. Res. 1894, U.N. Doc S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009).
184. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 101.
185. The Pakistani Taliban leadership has demonstrated its ability to negotiate,
conclude, and implement agreements. The decisions of the Pakistani Taliban leadership, for
example when declaring ceasefires, are implemented and enforced by local fighters. A
central hierarchy seems to command and control the escalation and the de-escalation of
military tactics, including serious violations of IHL, such as the use of suicide bombings to
target civilians, attacks on local tribal leaders, and restrictions on the operation of
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implements new government initiatives it needs to make its
commitments clear, it must lay out effective and specific plans with
realistic targets that alleviate the human rights abuses and move the
population forward. This means Pakistan needs a clear strategy for
integrating the FAT A and for the creation of necessary infrastructure
like roads, an education system and adequate health care. Pakistan
should incorporate civilian needs into its military strategy by offering
access and protection to civilian necessities like health care and
education, especially the education of women and girls, which the
Taliban severely limited.
Pakistan must also take care of its weighty Taliban problem. This
is obviously a difficult feat because after decades of insurgency, the
Taliban have proved to be a challenging and well-structured enemy.
The Taliban have been reduced in numbers, and while they are certainly
still an active threat, they are no longer as large a presence in terms of
militant force. Because the Taliban still have an influential presence in
the FATA through maintenance of control of the local governments, the
people of the region, even when they disagree, cannot voice their
dissent for fear of lethal retribution. 186
In order to remedy the egregious human rights situation Pakistan
and the Taliban have created in the FAT A Pakistan must first, enact
legislative reform by integrating the FATA into the parliamentary
system and extending to the FAT A the same rights and amenities
afforded to the rest of the country. Second, Pakistan must implement
these reforms by creating mechanisms for adequate representation,
healthcare, education and equal rights for women. It is important for
Pakistan to realize that any remedy in the region cannot be achieved
through a completely top-down approach. The central government
cannot simply mandate or legislate its way to reform. In a region very
much used to a high level of independence, grass roots initiatives and
local involvement are not just a good idea, but they are absolutely
necessary. Incorporating the tribes and tribal elders into the process
will ensure a much smoother transition. Each area of the FATA is
different, with different needs and traditions. Success is dependent
upon these needs being met and these traditions being accounted for.
Another necessary method of local involvement is incorporating women
into these reforms.

humanitarian aid workers. In short, the Taliban leadership clearly has the ability to respect
IHL and should be held to account for a failure to do so. Id. at 30.
186. Id. at 39.
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A. Previous Attempts at Reforming FATA Governing Mechanisms
While Pakistan's executive leadership has made some halfhearted
attempts over the last two decades to remedy the extreme inequality the
FCR legalizes, these minimal steps have been fruitless because they
have lacked the requisite legislative support. In 1996, Pakistan finally
extended voting rights to adults in the FAT A and also proposed several
reforms to the FCR but they never got very far. Then in 2005,
Musharraf acknowledged the need for reforms and the NWFP (as Kyber
Pakhtunkhwa was then called) governor created the FCR Reform
Committee, but the committee did not accomplish much at all. 187 In
2008, the Pakistani Peoples Party (PPP) promised to repeal the FCR and
incorporate the FAT A into Pakistan's constitutional framework. Also
in 2008, Prime Minister Gilani announced the FCR had been revoked,
but there has been no legislation or judicial ruling to substantiate that
claim or to put it into practical effect.
In August 2009, former President Asif Ali Zardari announced a
reform package for the FAT A, which included placing limitations on
the powers of the PA, right to bail for detainees, protection for women
and children from the collective responsibility provisions, access for
political parties and the setting up of an appeals process. While these
reforms would have limited some of the scope of the FCR, the FCR is
still in place. In 2010, Zardari again promised to reform the FCR but
there has been little movement to actually do so. 188
B. The FATA Must be Integrated into the Central Government

Though Pakistan has made some attempts to reform the way it
governs the FAT A it needs to take a more radical step and totally repeal
the AA CPR and the FCR in order to manage the FATA in accordance
with international human rights standards. The FATA must be brought
under constitutional protection so that the people living within it have
their fundamental rights enforced just like the rest of Pakistan's
citizenry. Under the ICCPR every citizen is supposed to have the right
and opportunity to take part in public affairs directly or through chosen

187. Govt Failed to Implement Recent Reforms in FATA , Amendments in FCR After
Passage of Six Months, ONE PAKJSTAN, available at http://pakistan.onepakistan.com.pk
/news/ city/islamabad/6884 7 -govt-failed-to-imp lement-recent-reforms-in-fata-amendmentsin-fcr-after-passage-of-six-months.html (last visited May 10, 2015).
188. Raja Asghar, Zardari Eyeing History, Wants Bill Passed Soon, DAWN (Apr. 6,
2010), available at http://www.dawn.com/news/529098/zardari-eyeing-history-wants-billpassed-soon (last visited May 10, 2015).
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representatives. 189 Citizens should also be able to vote in periodic
elections through equal suffrage in a way guarantees "the free
expression of the will of the electors." 19° For the most part, Pakistan
abides by these internationally accepted rights, except for when dealing
with the FAT A. Except for the FAT A, all the other provinces in
Pakistan are represented through elected legislators in the bicameral
parliament 191 and the Prime Minister appoints a Chief Minister, as his
representative, to oversee the provincial governments. Though the
FAT A elects representatives to Parliament, no act of Parliament applies
unless the President so directs. 192 As a result, the Political Agent, an
executive that answers only to the President, is the only true official
governing the FATA.
The FAT A must be integrated into the central government as much
as any other province of Pakistan. This means treating it in equality
with other provinces, providing it with representation in Parliament and
with a Chief Minister. It means establishing free and fair elections and
enfranchising the entire adult population of the FAT A. The role of the
PA should be abolished and the constitution should be amended through
removal of Article 24 7 so that jurisdiction and control of the judicial
system and parliament extend there. Doing so will make the central
government and the entire electorate accountable for the issues in the
region.
Until the Political Parties Act of 2002 193 was extended in 2011,
political parties were banned in the FATA. Lack of political parties
made it difficult to have participatory political culture because without
the financial backing of such organizations people could not afford to
contest and win elections. 194 And even if they managed to win an
election without the backing of a political party, that elected individual
would remain insignificant in the parliamentary politics in Islamabad
without the backing of any particular faction and because acts of
parliament have no effect in the FAT A. 195 This is not an effective way

189. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 25(a).
190. Id. art. 25(b ).
191. Pakistan's Parliament is made up of the lower house, known as the National
Assembly, and the upper house, known as the Senate. The National Assembly is comprised
of directly elected representatives from the four provinces. The Senate is comprised of
indirectly elected representatives.
192. PAKISTAN CONST. arts. 54, 59, 247(3).
193. Pakistan Chief Exec. Order 18 (2002), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/
47567a432.pdf (last visited May 10, 2015).
194. Impoverished Northwest, supra note 11.
195. Id.
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to build up the region. Regardless of whom they elect, even if they have
a free and fair choice in the matter, that representative will be further
proof of the incompetency of the federal government's reach. What
would be the point of investing in an election when you know your vote
is meaningless.
Though the Political Parties Act has limited the PA's authority to
some extent, until 2011 the PA enjoyed absolute control over matters of
law and administration. The people of the FATA had no say in local or
national decision making because the PA was not, and still is not, under
any obligation to take them into account. So although the FATA can
technically elect representatives to the National Assembly, voter turnout
in the FATA is low. This is likely because despite the extension of the
Political Parties Act and the limitation of the PA's power, people know
the elections lack any real legitimacy and that there is no effective
representation at the national level. The FCR's allocation of power to
the Political Agent leaves the political power of the FAT A electorate
negligible at best. And since the FCR doesn't allow judicial decisions
or parliamentary legislation to extend to the FATA, these governmental
bodies can go on just ignoring the crises that exists there.
Fully integrating the FAT A means not only repealing
counterproductive legislation like the FCR and AACPR, but also
creating better mechanisms of governing. Knowing that voter turnout is
low because voting has very little tangible effect in the FATA means
Pakistan needs to get rid of those apparatuses that prevent the FAT A
from moving forward. That means establishing a new system of
governmg.
The PA continues to be a repressive force, unaccountable to
anyone but the President. Replacing the PA with a Chief Minister, an
appointee of an elected representative with far more limited power,
would foster better results. Every province in Pakistan has a provincial
assembly, analogous to state legislatures in the U.S., which deals with
provincial matters. 196 Every province except the FATA. The Taliban
corrupted the FATA's Jirga system, but it was hardly a fair system of
governing to begin with. Instead of allowing the tribal lands to continue
with the Jirgas, the government should establish a provincial assembly
in the FATA as well. A more direct line of governing is likely to build
faith among the tribal lands because they are more likely to see the
results that they need, rather than waiting for the federal government to
step in as they have been.

196. PAKISTAN CONST. art. 106.
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C. Women Must be Treated Equally with Men Before the Law
Another change that should be made in FAT A governing is better
treatment of women. While the rest of the constitution enfranchises
women by mandating seats for them in Parliament, it conspicuously
fails to do so for women in the FATA by not allocating seats for
them. 197 Women in the FATA also do not have the right to vote. This
right should be extended in the FAT A since it already exists throughout
the other provinces. The ICCPR talks about universal suffrage 198 and
CEDAW specifies that women should be afforded equality with men
before the law. 199
Another way to better the situation of women in the FAT A would
be to involve them in all reconstruction efforts going forth. It is
imperative that a more inclusive public sphere be created for women.
That means women must be guaranteed fair and equal voting rights as
well as the ability to participate in conflict resolution and
reconstruction. Pakistan must find a way to enfranchise women in a
way that does not force them to break with their tribal traditions. They
will have a voice in the reconstruction of their communities without
being forced to value their traditions against a new governmental order.
The current state of women in the FAT A violates the terms of the
ICCPR and CEDAW and is also contradictory to the majority of the
constitution. Pakistan must remedy this in order to comply with its
international obligations and also to maintain consistency in governing.
D. Perpetrators ofHuman Rights Violations Must be Held Accountable
Pakistan needs to send a clear message that the violence and
inhumane treatment the FAT A has dealt with is completely
unacceptable. It needs to earn the confidence of the tribal people and
eventually their support. That means not only extending rights and
protections to the tribal lands but also holding both state and non-state
actors accountable for their human rights transgressions. So far
Pakistan has failed in its responsibility to protect the people of the
FAT A from Taliban insurgents, as well as misconduct by the armed
forces.
At the hands of the Taliban the FATA has been riddled with
unlawful killing, unlawful detention, torture, ill treatment, deprivation
of equality, inadequate healthcare, no freedom of association, no
197. Id. arts. 54, 59.
198. ICCPR, supra note 167, art. 25(b).
199. CEDAW, supra note 157, art. 15.
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freedom of movement and dwindling education for girls and women. 200
They have suffered the destruction of civilian residences, farms and
businesses. 201 All of these serious human rights violations are already
considered criminal offenses under Pakistan's law, but such law has
never been enforced due to neglect and the cover given to the central
government under the FCR.
While the central government and even the military are not
completely responsible202 for the actions of the Taliban, they are
responsible for failing to exact adequate measures to stop these abuses
from happening once they are aware. This can only be done through the
extension of judicial jurisdiction. Since the Pakistan's courts have no
reach in the FAT A, any allegations of mistreatment cannot be brought
before an impartial body and therefore injured parties have no form of
redress and perpetrators are not held accountable. The FAT A does have
its own court system, but the Jirgas or the will of the Political Agent
often circumvents those courts' decisions. To reform this, the FATA
courts should be brought under the national judicial system just as the
other provincial courts are, with their apex being the Supreme Court of
Pakistan.
When Pakistan eventually deals with the Taliban, as it will
inevitably have to do, it must refrain from giving clemency to those who
are unequivocally implicated in those serious abuses of human rights
and breaches of law.
According to customary international
humanitarian law, military commanders and civilian leaders can be held
accountable for the actions of their subordinates, when and if their
subordinates commit war crimes, or if they knew their subordinates
were committing such actions, and they took no necessary measures to
prevent such actions. 203 Taliban leaders can be held accountable for the
abuses they perpetrate and, under this same provision, so can armed
forces personnel.
Remedying the Taliban's transgressions will be only one part of
Pakistan's efforts towards solving the human rights crisis in the FATA.
Pakistan must also hold its own military and political leaders
200. AMNESTY INT'L, supra note 29, at 100.
201. Id.
202. There are peace talks with the Taliban where the military or state agencies have
condoned, allowed, or supported some of the Taliban's actions against FATA residents. In
those instances, Pakistan is certainly more responsible, and should eventually be held
accountable through investigation and judicial action. Strategic considerations should not
be available as an excuse for neglecting the population or for knowingly allowing insurgents
to commit human rights transgressions.
203. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 173, at Rule 152.
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accountable. First, Pakistan must make sure that all military forces are
aware of the correct standard of conduct that is expected of them under
international law and under the hopefully reformed method of
governing the FAT A. They must then be required to comply with those
obligations and it must be made clear that failure to do so will have
appropriate consequences. Human rights transgressions that have
already been made should be properly and impartially investigated
according to international standards so that those who have committed
illegal actions are brought to justice. The military should be required to
incorporate precautionary measures for civilians in their strategy, and
they should absolutely be prohibited from any sort of collective
punishment, the sort that is allowed under the current FCR.
Some of Pakistan's most egregious human rights violations revolve
around arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances. 204 Not only is
this a human rights violation, but it also creates a climate of fear in the
FATA that is counterproductive to any reconstructive efforts. Pakistan
should investigate and reveal any information it has about the fate and
location of those who have been subjected to enforced disappearances.
Pakistan should also sign and ratify the International Convention for the
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ("CED").
Ratification of CED would signal that Pakistan is committed to ending
this practice, which is a grave violation of human rights.
Those criminal and insurgent suspects who can be transferred out
of military custody and into civilian detention centers should be
transferred and then should be provided with all the safeguards
available to them under the constitution, 205 domestic and international
law. Those detainees should then be afforded fair trials in front of
competent and impartial courts. Pakistan may have an easier time of all
this if it builds up the law enforcement mechanism of the tribal areas.
Rather than having a constant military presence, a trained law
enforcement agency would be able to alleviate the military presence in
the region while still being a safeguard against insurgents and protecting
civilians.

CONCLUSION
The problems Pakistan faces are certainly not simple ones. Any
remedy that Pakistan implements, and there are many that it must, will

204.
205.

AMNESTY INT'L,

supra note 29, at 49.
art. 10.

PAKISTAN CONST.
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take years to show practical improvement. But the longer Pakistan
waits, the worse the situation in the FAT A gets. More people will lose
their lives, their homes and their livelihoods. Pakistan can start by
taking legislative measures to equalize the FAT A and its residents with
the rest of the country. Pakistan must then begin holding those who
have committed human rights abuses accountable for their actions and
showing the FATA residents that they are not in fact second-class
citizens. Pakistan must then begin to rebuild the FAT A through greater
infrastructure; better education, especially for women and girls; access
to health care and training for law enforcement to maintain security.
Pakistan has to create incentives for the FATA to support it because as
of right now they risk losing their lives by expressing dissent from the
Taliban and any sort of government effort towards redress does not
outweigh this risk.
Pakistan has made many mistakes in dealing with the FAT A.
Between decades of neglect for the tribal lands and the military' s
gutting of the region for "national security" purposes, the inadequate
judicial systems, the weak government structure and the total lack of
development, the situation has only worsened. These issues have to be
remedied not only because they are major transgressions against human
rights, but also because they exacerbate a problem that poses a
substantial threat to Pakistan's national security and internal stability. It
is time for Pakistan to meet its human rights responsibilities to its
people, both for morality and for practical necessity.
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INTRODUCTION
Send a card, some flowers and be prepared to pay your respects;
the age of privacy is dead. At least this is how Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg sees it. According to the chief executive of the world's
most popular social networking site, Facebook, "[p ]eople have really
gotten comfortable not only sharing more information and different
kinds, but more openly and with more people. That social norm is just
something that has evolved over time." 1 To Zuckerberg, and an
increasing number of others, the rise of social networking online means
that people "no longer have an expectation of privacy" when they
choose to utilize social media. 2 Zuckerberg' s comments underscore not
only the pervasiveness of social media and online technology, but also
its implications on an individual's privacy in today's technological age.
And it would seem that his observations are not without merit. With
over one billion people using Facebook, it seems as though more and
more people are using electronic media to post, upload, or share their
most personal and private details, arguments, and disputes. 3 For many,
yesterday's journal entry is today's Facebook post or Twitter tweet.
This was the exact mentality of 24-year-old law student Max
Schrems from Salzburg, Austria. 4 With all the personal information that
he knew he shared online, he decided that he wanted to know exactly
what Facebook knew about him. 5 So he requested his own Face book
file. 6 What he received from Facebook both frightened and fascinated
him; a virtual autobiography at 1,222 pages long. 7 The file had wall
posts that had been deleted, old messages to friends that discussed a
friend's difficult past, even information about his precise locations that

Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, Says Facebook Founder,
(Jan. 10, 2010, 8:58 PM), available at http://www.theguardian.com/
technology/201 O/jan/11 /facebook-privacy (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
2. Id.
3. Cooper Smith, 7 Statistics About Facebook Users That Reveal Why It's Such A
Powerful Marketing Platform, Bus. INSIDER (Nov. 16, 2013, 8:00 AM), available at
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-primer-on-facebook-demographics-2013-10 (last visited
Apr. 22, 2015).
4. Somini Sengupta, Should Personal Data Be Personal?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2012),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/05/sunday-review/europe-moves-to-protectonline-privacy.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
1.

GUARDIAN

Published by SURFACE, 2015

221

2015]

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 42, No. 2 [2015], Art. 1

Data Protection Laws: Quilts Versus Blankets

487

he did not enter himself. 8 When asked how he felt about such personal
information being collected by Facebook, Schrems responded that he
was mostly concerned about what Facebook could do to him in the
future with all that information. 9 He wondered why all that information
was kept when he clearly deleted it from his profile. '"It's like a camera
hanging over your bed while you're having sex. It just doesn't feel
good,' is how [Schrems] finally put it." 10 Mr. Schrems's reaction is
illustrative of the distress sweeping across the globe about the ways in
which Internet companies are treating and storing personal
information. 11 It is this ever-present existence of technology that has
Europeans and Americans alike confronting head-on the issue of how
privacy law can function in an age of constant data collection. 12 It has
become clear that with new technologies appearing quicker and quicker,
privacy laws have become more difficult to keep up and craft to ensure
adequacy. 13
This note will explore whether the European Union's privacy laws
could serve as a model for the United States. Currently, the United
States' data protection laws can be seen as a patchwork system of laws
coming from the state and federal levels, in addition to regulations
imposed by various agencies. 14 In contrast, the European Union's 1995
Directive on Data Protection mandates that every member of the E.U.
pass laws on the national level that will protect their citizens' privacy. 15
While the E.U. Model is vast and widespread, it also allows for some
variation by permitting member states to craft their own laws. 16 This
note will investigate how the United States should take a more
comprehensive approach in regulating online privacy law and protecting
its citizen's legal rights to protect their personal data.
The United States should implement baseline privacy protections
that seek to cover a broad array of personal data, ensuring coverage of
information that is not currently covered by fragmented privacy laws.
In contrast to the U.S., the European Union has a far-reaching set of

8. Id.
9. Sengupta, supra note 4.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See id.
13. Seeid.
14. See, e.g., The Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) of 2003, CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE§ 22575-22579 (Deering 2004); The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act of 1996 (HIP AA), 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
15. Council Directive 95/46, art. 189b, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC).
16. Id.para.9.
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legal rights that serve to protect personal data online. Every country in
the E.U. has a statute that establishes proper practices in collection,
storage, use, and disclosure of personal information. However, "[t]he
E.U. model also allows for variation" in how a particular member state
collects data, "by allowing its member countries to determine their own
laws." 17 This slight flexibility may serve as an important guide to better
regulation in the United States' federal patchwork system. The United
States should seek to adopt some of the key portions of the European
model instead of continuing to add to the disjointed and fragmented set
of laws currently being used. The patchwork quilt of privacy laws that
separately limit the use of Americans' information online should give
way to a more European-like model of a blanket regulatory system.
Part I of this note examines the background and history of privacy
law in the United States. It explores what factors led the U.S. to its
current patchwork-system of privacy legislation and what might be
preventing the United States from moving towards a more Europeanmodel. Part II discusses the underlying attitudes about privacy in the
United States versus Europe. This section explains how certain
protections and freedoms that citizens from different states value may
very well translate into what they choose to protect and what they allow
to remain untouched by the state. Part III traces European Union data
collection privacy laws and the divergent standards that have
materialized in Germany and the United Kingdom. Part IV provides a
comparative analysis of the data protection and privacy laws in the
European Union and the United States. This section seeks to examine
the strengths, weaknesses, and sources of regulation. In addition, this
section explores how certain features of the European law can better
serve the American people as powerful legal weapons to assert control
over their own digital lives.
Finally, Part V concludes that
implementation of key European laws is possible outside of the
European Union. South Africa currently serves as a real-life export of
such regulations. This global push towards stricter regulation may help
to pressure the United States towards implementing more European
regulations.

17. Laura Ybarra, The E. U Model as an Adoptable Approach for US. Privacy Laws:
A Comparative Analysis of Data Collection Laws in the United Kingdom, Germany, and the
United States, 34 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. R EV . 267, 271 (2011).
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THE CONCEPT OF PRIVACY IN GENERAL & INTERNET
COMP LI CATIONS

All across the Western world, the notion of privacy is seen as an
essential element of our humanity, and as such has been described as a
value that cuts to our core and somehow "makes life worth living." 18 At
the same time, such a fundamental component of our very personhood
proves difficult to define. In fact, the United States Courts and
Congress have largely avoided defining exactly what the meaning of
"privacy" is by adopting a flexible approach to privacy protections that
uses voluntary codes of conduct enforced by the Federal Trade
Commission mixed with privacy laws that cover certain categories such
as health, finance, or education. Griswold v. Connecticut, one of the
most influential American cases debating the existence of a "right to
privacy," did not establish a set body of rights, but rather saw privacy to
exist only in the "penumbras" and "emanations" of other Constitutional
protections. 19
This issue has been further complicated with the age of technology
and the creation of the Internet. Protecting one's privacy in the
"Internet Age" has proven to be immensely difficult, with some
believing that with the dawn of social networking, comes the demise of
privacy as a "social norm. " 20 Others refuse to believe that simply
because they utilize the Internet, social media, and email, it somehow
bars them from asserting privacy rights. 21
Privacy law has the elusive task of determining if, and under what
conditions, personal information may be discoverable by others.
Essentially, privacy law serves as the gatekeeper between the right to be
left alone and the right to know. Contemporary technology has made
this legal sector far more complicated and has created divisions largely
along societal and cultural lines.22
The concept of privacy being "all or nothing" is not a notion that
may co-exist with the Internet. 23 Internet users, particularly Americans,

18. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113YALEL.J.1151, 1153(2004).
19. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483-84 (1965).
20. See Johnson, supra note 1 (discussing how Facebook creator Mark Zuckerberg
suggests changing social norms of privacy with creation of social media).
21. See Anne Flaherty, Study Finds Online Privacy Concerns on the Rise, YAHOO!
News (Sept. 5, 2013, 1:42 AM), available at http://news.yahoo.com/study-finds-onlineprivacy-concems-rise-040211677 .html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (discussing how
Americans are more concerned today about their privacy rights online).
22. See generally Whitman, supra note 18.
23. Flaherty, supra note 21.
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are sharing more personal information than ever before. 24 However,
they want the power to control what is released and who has access to
that information. 25 The Internet remains largely unregulated because of
its status as a global enterprise. To further complicate the matter,
comfort levels towards releasing personal information online vary
greatly. These comfort levels reflect unmistakable differences amongst
societies over what ought to be kept "private. " 26
A key illustration of the conflicting notions towards what is to be
kept "private" arose in a 2008 case. Millions of Internet users were able
to get a glimpse into the private and disreputable sex life of Max
Mosley, the then head of Formula One racing, when a British tabloid
released the secretly captured videos of Mosley engaging in various
sexual escapades with several prostitutes. 27 Mosley successfully sued
the British tabloid for the "breach of his privacy" but in today's digital
age, removing the tapes from the Internet completely proved more
difficult than winning the suit. Luckily for Mosley, European privacy
laws place a high value on individual's dignity. This value is seen to be
so important that European states provide powerful legal tools to the
individual that afford him or her the necessary grounds to sue Internet
companies, like Google. The laws in Europe could even compel Google
to filter out the videos from Internet searches. 28 This is all because the
current E.U. Data Protection Directive affords Europeans the right to
"object to the processing of any data relating to himself." 29 In fact, a
German court has ordered Google to block all search results in Germany
that provide links to Mosley's photos. 30 Mosley's case stands to be
further strengthened by a privacy law currently under review by the
European Commission that affords citizens the "right to be forgotten," 31
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Bryce Clayton Newell, Rethinking Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in
Online Social Networks, 17 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 12, 4 (2011 ).
27. Eugene K. Chow, Learning From Europe's 'Right to Be Forgotten', HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 9, 2013), available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eugene-k-chow/learningfrom-europes-rigb3891308.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
28. See Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC 1777 (Q.B.).
29. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 15.
30. Harro ten Wolde & Nikola Rotscheroth, German Court Orders Google to Block
Max Mosley Sex Pictures, RUETERS (Jan. 24, 2014, 8:22 AM), available at
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01 /24/us-google-germany-court-idUSBREAONOY
420140124 (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
31. Note from the Presidency to the Council on the 'Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the
Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data
(May
31,
2013 ),
available
at
Protection
Regulation),
10227 I 13
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which would "allow individuals to force tech companies to delete all the
data it has on them." 32
So why does Mosley have legal recourse in Europe and not in the
United States? Why is there such a transatlantic privacy clash? To
answer these questions, we look to the basic intuitions that are "shaped
by the prevailing legal and social values of the societies in which we
live." 33 We must recognize that European and American sensibilities
about privacy have grown from a much larger legal and political
tradition. It is the contrast between "privacy as an aspect of dignity and
privacy as an aspect ofliberty." 34

II.

BACKGROUND OF U.S. LAW

A. Patchwork System ofLaws
1. Historical Background in American Law
The American system of privacy law "involves a patchwork of
federal and state privacy laws that separately govern the use of personal
details in spheres like patient billing, motor vehicle records, education
Existing federal laws govern the
and video rental records. " 35
management of personal information online by regulating specific types
of entities and specific types of information. For instance, federal law is
in charge of regulating the collection, storage, and distribution of data
by "consumer reporting agencies," 36 regulates how federal
governmental agencies collect and handle personal data, 37 and requires
financial services corporations to implement measures that ensure the
security and confidentiality of their customers' personal data. 38 In
addition, the federal government has enacted legislation that oversees
the protection, use, and handling of personal data that includes
individually identifiable health information, 39 education records, 40 and
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2010227%202013%20INIT (last
visited Apr. 22, 2015).
32. Chow, supra note 27.
33. Whitman, supra note 18, at 1160.
34. Id. at 1161.
35. Natasha Singer, An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete, N.Y. TIMES,
(Mar. 30, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31 /technology/in-privacylaws-an-incomplete-american-quilt.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
36. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1681 (West 2014).
37. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a (West 2014).
38. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6801-6809 (West 2011).
39. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320d-2 (West 2010).
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consumer reports. 41
The United States has separate laws that protect the specific
content of the information, but there is no law that spells out explicitly
how to control or use online data. 42 This method of dealing with
privacy concerns is a result of American history and culture. Suspicion
of state power and control has always stood at the core of American
privacy law policy, and court doctrine continues to see the state as the
prime enemy of a citizen's privacy. 43 For American jurisprudence, the
starting point to understanding the origins of the right to privacy begins
in the late eighteenth century, most notably in the Bill of Rights, with its
forceful constraints on state power. 44 More specifically, the concept of
"privacy" starts with the Fourth Amendment and the idea of privacy as
being protected from unlawful searches and seizures. 45 Therefore, the
right to privacy is a right that "inheres in us as free and sovereign
political actors, masters in our own houses, which the state is ordinarily
forbidden to invade."46 Over time American judges and legal scholars
have connected this protection of physical spaces and bodies from
arbitrary government intrusion, to include a much broader sense of
deference for safety and dignity that are necessary to ensure the wellbeing of our democratic society. 47
The classic statement of this American ideal came in 1886, in the
case of Boyd v. United States. 48 The Supreme Court decided to forbid
the government from seizing the documents of a merchant in a customs
case, after issuing a lengthy opinion discussing the "sanctity" of an
American home. 49 The Court reasoned, "[i]t is not the breaking of his
doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
40. Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C.A § 1232g (West 2013).
41. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1681-168lx (West 2014).
42. Sengupta, supra note 4.
43. Whitman, supra note 18, at 1211.
44. Id. at 1211-12.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 755-56 (2010) ("The [Fourth]
Amendment guarantees the privacy, dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary
and invasive acts by officers of the Government."); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31
("At the very core of the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."); Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("They [the Framers] sought to
protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be left alone- the most comprehensive of
rights, and the right most valued by civilized men.").
48 . Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
49. Id. at 625-26.
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the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right has
never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence." 50
Boyd's fundamental understanding of privacy rights as protecting the
"sanctity of the home" have survived generations and continues to be
relevant today. 51
One of the more influential and widely cited articles on the issue of
privacy is Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' The Right to Privacy,
published in 1890. 52 The arrival of photography as commonplace in
American culture prompted Warren and Brandeis to write the piece, to
"warn of the dangers of displaying private family wedding pictures in
the pages of every newspaper." 53 Warren and Brandeis specifically
emphasized the right to keep personal information outside of the public
domain. 54 Although written over 123 years ago, this article still serves
as an important dimension to the discussion as it was written in
response to the author's own changing technology. Warren and
Brandeis' work laid the foundation for the common law development of
privacy during most of the twentieth century, and gave rise to the four
primary tort causes of action that seek to limit the individual's invasion
of privacy as a "right to be left alone." 55 These common law tort
actions may be brought by placing someone in a false light, public
disclosure of private facts, the intrusion upon a person's seclusion, or
the appropriation of a person's name or likeness. 56
2. FTC Regulation of Online Privacy

Today, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") is the leading
regulatory agency controlling issues of online privacy. 57 Congress

50. Id. at 630.
51. Whitman, supra note 18, at 1213.
52. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
53. Sengupta, supra note, at 4; Warren & Brandeis, supra note 52.
54. E.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 52, at 198 ("The common law secures to each
individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others.").
55. Whitman, supra note 18, at 1208; Commercial Data Privacy and Innovation in the
Internet Economy: A Dynamic Policy Framework (2010), U.S. DEP'T COM., NAT'L
TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN. 10, available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/report/2010/
commercial-data-privacy-and-innovation-internet-economy-dynamic-policy-framework
(last visited Apr. 22, 2015) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T COM. INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE].
56. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
57. Michael D. Scott, The FTC, The Unfairness Doctrine, and Data Security Breach
Litigation: Has the Commission Gone Too Far?, 60 ADMfN L. REV. 127, 128 (2008).
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created the FTC in 1914 in an effort to halt unfair methods of
competition arising in the commercial sector. 58 Upon its creation,
Congress granted the FTC a tremendous amount of power.59 Beginning
in 1938, the FTC has been the agency charged with preventing
corporations from using "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce" spelled out in Section 45 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 60 Courts have treated the FTC' s decisions with a
considerable amount of deference, thereby allowing the FTC to hold a
quasi-legislative power to enact its own regulations. 61 However, the
FTC has placed limitations on its own regulatory power. 62 Specifically
with online privacy concerns, the FTC admits that it "lacks the authority
to require firms to adopt information practice policies or abide by the
fair information practice principles on their websites, or portions of their
websites, not directed at children. " 63 The main source of concern stems
from the fact that the FTC appears to be limited to enforcing whatever a
particular company promises, and most companies are under no legal
obligation to make any promises regarding how they collect or use
personal data online. 64 In its 2012 report on how to better protect
consumer privacy, the FTC suggested that more regulation of online
privacy is needed and it is up to Congress to provide such regulation. 65
Despite its own concern for lack of power, the FTC does in fact
bring complaints against companies that violate their established and
published privacy policies. 66 In 2010, the FTC filed its first security
case against a social networking site. 67 The FTC alleged that social
media giant Twitter failed "to provide reasonable and appropriate
security to: prevent unauthorized access to nonpublic user information
58. About the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE COMM'N, available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/about.shtm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
59. See id.
60. See Fed. Trade Comm'n Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2000).
61. See Jeff Sovern, Protecting Privacy with Deceptive Trade Practices Legislation, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 1305, 1321 (2001).
62. See Ybarra, supra note 17, at 272.
63. Sovern, supra note 61, at 1324.
64. See generally A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission's Investigative
and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM'N (July 2008), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/brfovrvw.shtm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
65. See Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, Recommendations
for Businesses and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Mar. 2012), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-reportprotecting-consumer-privacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations/ 120326privacyreport.pdf
(last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
66. See Scott, supra note 57, at 129.
67. See In the Matter of Twitter, Inc., 151 F.T.C. 162 (2011).
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and honor the privacy choices exercised by its users in designating
certain tweets as nonpublic. " 68 The security breach by Twitter resulted
in two incidents where impostors were able to reset account passwords
and access private account information. 69 In one of these instances, the
unauthorized user was able to gain access to then-presidential candidate
Barack Obama's account and tweet to his over 150,000 followers about
a chance to win $500 worth of gasoline. 70 The complaint resulted in an
agreement by Twitter to "strengthen its non-public user information and
further agreed to [undergo] third-party assessments of its privacy
procedures." 71 This case is only one of a limited number of FTC cases
brought against social media sites, and serves to underscore the fact that
the FTC is hesitant to provide stronger regulation of online privacy
through bringing forth more litigation. 72
Director of the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection, David
Vladeck, made a statement in 2010 affirming the agency's commitment
to protecting consumers through bringing litigation to those companies
that may threaten to undermine their personal data. 73 Vladeck stated,
"When a company promises consumers that their personal
information is secure, it must live up to that promise. . . . [A] company
that allows consumers to designate their information as private must use
reasonable security to uphold such designations. Consumers who use
social networking sites may choose to share some information with
others, but they still have a right to expect that their personal
information will be kept private and secure. " 74

3. Sporadic State Regulation
Individual states have provided constitutional privacy rights,
however these rights have not been focused on protecting informational
privacy. 75 The sporadic nature of regulation, both on the state and
federal levels, results in the recognition of only the most serious attacks
against privacy interests. Informational privacy issues are regularly

68. Id. at 166.
69. Id. at 167-68.
70. Id. at 168.
71. Ybarra, supra note 17, at 273.
72. Sovern, supra note 61, at 1321.
73. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Twitter Settles Charges That it Failed to
Protect Consumers' Personal Information: Company Will Establish Independently Audited
Information
Security
Program,
(June
24,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2010/06/twitter.shtm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
74. Id.
75 . Prosser, supra note 56.
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reviewed under common law privacy torts. 76 Under common law
doctrine, a cause of action may be brought by: (a) the placement of
someone in a false light, (b) the public disclosure of private information,
(c) the interference upon a person's seclusion, or the (d)
misappropriation of a person's name or likeliness. 77 There has been a
division between state courts about whether informational privacy
should extend so far as to comfortably fit within one of these causes of
action. 78
The case law within the United States tends to suggest that courts
are hesitant to extend informational privacy protection to fit within one
of these four categories. 79 The State of New Jersey, for example, in
State v. Reid, recognized an individual's reasonable expectation of
privacy in the possible disclosure of Internet Service Provider (ISP)
records. 80 However, the court stressed the importance in the case that
the government was the primary actor in the privacy intrusion. 81 It is
very possible that the outcome might have been different if this was not
the case. It is likely that state action proved to be an important point in
the case holding because of the historical distrust in the United States of
possible government intrusion into the lives of its citizens.
In fact, a Pennsylvania court reached an entirely different decision
where the primary "offender" was a private actor. In Boring v. Google,
Inc., the court found that the images taken of the plaintiffs home from
Google Street View did not rise to the level a privacy invasion or an
intrusion upon an individual's right to seclusion. 82 The court reasoned
that the photos taken by Google were less intrusive than a person
knocking on the front door; therefore, the plaintiffs did not suffer any
significant injury. 83 What is interesting to note is the fact that Google
paid the plaintiffs one dollar in nominal damages when the company
entered a consent judgment for trespassing. 84 This judgment stopped
higher courts from further investigating the issue of privacy.
These differing outcomes serve as examples of the widespread

76. Id.
77. Id. at 389.
78. Sovern, supra note 61, at 1317.
79. See Boring v. Google Inc., 362 F. App'x 273, 278-79 (3d. Cir. 2010).
80. State v. Reid, 194 N.J. 386, 388 (2008).
81. See id.
82. Boring, 362 F. App'x 273 at 278-79.
83. Id.
84. Defendant Google Inc. 's Response to Plaintiffs Motion to Stay Pending Petition
for Writ of Certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, Boring v Google Inc., No. 08cv-694 (ARH) (W.D.Pa. 2009), 2010 WL 3445457.
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incoherence of decisions dealing with informational privacy cases. It is
clear that the courts are focusing very narrowly upon particular issues
within the cases, rather than seeking to provide any cohesiveness to
establish a set of uniform privacy laws in the United States. The current
method taken by courts to examine possible privacy breaches on a caseby-case basis is not ideal for online privacy control. Citizens across the
United States have attempted to bring cases before the court in an effort
to push for more regulation of the treatment of personal information.
However, the existing self-regulating model, claimed by the FTC to be
the "least intrusive and most efficient means to ensure fair information
practices online, given the rapidly evolving nature of the Internet and
computer technology" continues to be the most common practice used
at the federal and state levels. 85 Therefore, instead of providing citizens
with blanket legislation that can provide greater protection of data
collection practices, the states and federal governments have been
focused on singular practices and sporadic regulation.

III. DIVERGENT NOTIONS OF PRIVACY
Although in many ways the United States and Western European
countries are culturally similar, these states are showing very different
attitudes towards data protection and privacy online. Every country in
the European Union has a privacy law, while the United States remains
a firm holdout. 86 In the U.S., we have laws that protect data covering
everything from our health and financial records, to the movies we buy
online. However, there is no single law that addresses exactly who
controls and uses personal data online. 87 The American system may be
seen more as a "patchwork of federal and state privacy laws" that
govern separate spheres, while the European system has "one blanket
data protection directive" that lays out the rules, no matter what the
particular sector. 88 For now, European laws and U.S. laws are operating
on very different speeds. However, with globalization and the ease of

85. Allyson W. Haynes, Online Privacy Policies: Contracting Away Control Over
Personal Information?, 111 PENN ST L. REV. 587, 600 (2007).
86. Press Release, Eur. Comm'n, Commission proposes a comprehensive reform of
data protection rules to increase users' control of their data and to cut costs for businesses
(Jan.
25,
2012),
available
at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-1246_en.htm?locale=en (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
87. See Sengupta, supra note 4 (discussing how Europeans feel about the American
perspective on online privacy and the concern over American companies and their control
over our digital lives).
88. Singer, supra note 35 .
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worldwide trade and travel, if "the United States wants to foster trust in
American companies operating abroad it has to figure out how to
explain its privacy laws on a global stage." 89 As of now, this patchwork
of American privacy law is "more of a macrame arrangement-with
serious gaps in consumer protection, particularly when it comes to data
protection online."90
In addition to the speed of legislation, it is important to recognize
the speed of innovation. The swiftness of progression with regards to
the Internet and technology adds to the difficulty of regulating online
privacy. While the law has traditionally lagged behind technology,
favoring stability and certainty, this comes at a price when technology is
evolving so rapidly there is no law to regulate it. This is another area
that Europe seems to have recognized as "Europe has forged ahead with
its project to modernize data protection."91 This difference in action can
largely be attributed to the difference in thinking about the principle of
privacy more generally. 92
A. Europeans and Personal Dignity
To Europeans, privacy protections fundamentally serve to protect
the right to "respect and personal dignity." 93 The core value of
European privacy protection seeks to safeguard the "right to one's
image, name, and reputation." 94 For Europeans, "dignity, honor, and
the right to private life" are among the most important fundamental
rights of a human being, and are not to be infringed upon. 95 Europe's
legal system sees privacy, regardless of its context, as a core democratic
value that must be vehemently protected and not left to market forces to
control. 96 Europeans seek to foster the right to guarantee that a person's
image to the rest of society is how they wish to be seen. Privacy in
Europe is the right to "be shielded against unwanted public exposureto be spared embarrassment or humiliation." 97 The primary enemy to

89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Chow, supra note 27; Newell, supra note 26, at 3; Whitman, supra note 18, at
1155.
93. Whitman, supra note 18, at 1161.
94. Id.
95. Chow, supra note 27; see Whitman, supra note 18, at 1155.
96. Joel R. Reidenberg, Should the U.S. Adopt European-Style Data-Privacy
Protections?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB10001424127887324338604578328393797127094 (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
97. Whitman, supra note 18, at 1161.
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this right is the media, which is constantly threatening to broadcast
distasteful information about people in ways that may severely
undermine a person's public dignity. 98
B. Americans and Liberty
American privacy law, on the other hand, is based primarily on the
"political value of liberty from government intrusion and sovereignty
within the home, rather than public image or social dignity." 99 At its
core, the American right to privacy is very much the same as it was at
the founding of the nation, "the right to be free from state intrusions,
especially in one's own home." 100 American law also values the right to
control access to and the distribution of personal information. 101 The
prime danger to Americans is that the "sanctity of [our] home[ s]", using
the language of a leading nineteenth-century Supreme Court ruling on
privacy law, will be breached by governmental actors. 102 There is very
little concern towards the media's potential to infringe on a person's
privacy, but rather the worry focuses on maintaining private autonomy
within our own homes. 103 This value is often at odds between the right
of free speech and individual rights. The American law focus on
individual liberty to control personal information seeks to "allow the
individual to determine which information to keep private and which
information to release into the public domain." 104 However, American
laws frequently prioritize free speech at the expense of individual rights.
Mug shots are a prime example, as they are considered public
information. This gives rise to numerous websites solely dedicated to
publishing mug shots, which publicly shame those shown, regardless of
their guilt or innocence, and the First Amendment protects such
publication. 105 In contrast, in the United Kingdom, the High Court has
ruled that the police must destroy mugshots taken of innocent people. 106
The High Court held that retaining photographs of suspects who were
98. Id.
99. Newell supra note 26, at 10.
100. Whitman supra note 18, at 1161.
101. Newell supra note 26, at 10.
102. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886); see also Whitman, supra note
18, at 1162.
103 . Whitman, supra note 18, at 1162.
104. Newell, supra note 26, at 10.
105. Chow, supra note 27.
106. Rebecca Camber, Police Forced to Destroy All Mugshots of Innocents:
Schoolboy 's Landmark Legal Victory, UK DAILY MAIL (June 22, 2012, 22:42 GMT),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2163219/Police-forced-destroyat
available
mugshots-innocents-Schoolboys-landmark-legal-victory.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
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never charged was a breach of their human rights. 107

C. Liberty and Dignity Diverge
It is important to note that the distinction between liberty and
dignity is not black and white. But this lack of a solid separation can be
helpful in creating a more ideal contemporary notion of what is
reasonable to protect online. Privacy online should have a healthy
respect for control and liberty, while also balancing an essential
recognition of the benefits of protecting human dignity. 108 Therefore,
American law could greatly benefit from the underlying principle of the
"right to be forgotten" dignity from European thinking. 109 When
considering the implementation of the "right to be forgotten" in
America, the question should not be whether individuals like Max
Mosley should be afforded the capability to compel search engines to
filter out undesirable content, but rather why it takes a high-profile
lawsuit before individuals are given a voice and control over the status
of their online selves. 110 When issues of online reputation arise, the
burden of proof is placed on the individual, who is already lacks the
ability to say how their personal information is distributed and to
whom. 111 High-powered tech companies and governmental agencies
constantly parse through mounds of online personal data that reveal
information from online shopping habits, location data, to even the very
content of our emails. 112 Individuals are left with very little control or
recourse of their personal data once they click "I agree," so it comes as
no surprise that privacy rights online are continually violated. 113 By
beginning to implement more of the European notion of privacy online,
Americans could have a powerful legal tool to better control their digital
lives. 114

107.
I 08.
109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Newell, supra note 26, at 4.
Chow, supra note 27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Chow, supra note 27.
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IV. PRIVACY LA W'S EVOLUTION IN THE E.U.
A. Basic Principles of the E. U. Data-Protection Regime

The current E.U. data-protection regime is set within a large body
of legislation that was adopted by its Council of Ministers on October
24, 1995, entitled "European Union Directive on the Protection of
Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data" ("E.U. Directive"). 115 The E.U.
Directive requires its member-states to adopt individual national
legislation based on the provisions set within and may be characterized
as the product of "over fifty years of Europe's devotion to recognizing,
maintaining, restoring, and ensuring personal privacy." 116
The E.U. Directive sets forth eight principles that oversee the
gathering and usage of personal information: purpose limitation, data
quality, data security, sensitive data protection, transparency, data
transfer, independent oversight, and individual redress. 117 The primary
purpose of the directive is to "protect the fundamental rights and
freedoms of natural persons and in particular their right to privacy with
respect to the processing of personal data." 118 Essentially, the E.U.
Directive seeks to ensure that personal data within the European Union
cannot be handled without the individual's permission, unless the
processing of such information is either necessary to perform a contract
between the entities, or falls within a set exception. 119
The European Data Protection Supervisor ("EDPS") monitors the
handling of personal data within the European Union. 120 The EDPS
also serves as an advisor on policies and pieces of legislation that affect
privacy in the European Union, as well as works in cooperation with
other data-protection authorities to promote consistency in data
protection throughout the entire European Union. 121 This agency is an
independent entity that was created by the European Parliament and
Commission and has broad authority regarding data collection, and

115. Council Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 15 .
116. JON MILLS, PRIVACY: THE LOST RIGHT 82 (2008).
117. Id. at 83.
118. Id.
119. Id.
See generally EUR. DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR, available at
120.
https: //secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps/lang/en/EDPS (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
121. See Information Brochures 2009, EUR. DATA PROTECTION SUPERVISOR 5,
https: //secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/
at,
available
Documents/EDPS/Publications/Brochures/Brochure_ 2009 _ EN.pdf (last visited Apr. 22,
2015).
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therefore has helped to make it an effective enforcement organization. 122
However, each E.U. member-state has its own data-protection
authority, given the powers to recommend, counsel, study, and impose
punishments for violations of their data-protection laws. 123 This
allowance of member-state independence has resulted in natural
differences in policy and enforcement. As long as the E.U. memberstate maintains the baseline laws and policies of the E.U. Directive, they
are free to choose to adopt additional laws and oversight. Looking to
both Germany and the United Kingdom helps to provide an example of
the different approaches member-states take in data protection. This
difference should be seen as not a weak spot in promoting uniformity,
but rather as a way for other entities, like the United States to more
successfully adopt such a comprehensive system. For instance, if
applied to the United States' federalist system, a slight independence
among levels would allow for baseline federal uniformity, while also
allowing for more "wiggle room" amongst the states.
B. Germany: The E. U. 's Strictest Data Collection Laws
In both 2009 and 20 I 0, the German government passed a number
of amendments to the nation's Federal Data Protection Act. 124 These
amendments covered a vast array of data collection issues, from
tightening the consent requirements of online users, to limiting the
transmission of data to commercial agencies. 125 The amendments also
increased fines for any violations of the set law and extended the
powers of the supervisory authority. 126
This tightening of online data security has not been exclusively for
German-based entities. Germany has kept a close eye on American
technology companies. 127 Specifically, German officials have begun
investigations of Google, Facebook, and Apple in how they collect and
disperse data. 128 "Facebook is being investigated for collecting data on

122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 6.
124. See Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG] [Federal Data Protection Act] , Jan. 14,
2003, BGBL. I at 2814, available at http://www.gesetze-im-intemet.de/englischbdsg/ (last
visited Apr. 22, 2015).
125. See generally id.
126. Id.
127. Kevin J. O'Brien, Despite Privacy Inquiries, Germans Flock to Google,
N.Y.
Times
(July
11 ,
2010),
available
at
Facebook
and
Apple,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 07 /l 2/technology/l 2disconnect.html (last visited Apr. 22,
2015).
128. Id.
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non-Facebook users," whose information was pulled from the mailing
lists of active users. 129 Google is under watch for having "errantly
collected personal Internet information" during the research phase of its
Street View mapping service. 130 And Apple is expected to explain
exactly what kind of information it stores about its users and for how
long a period of time. 131 It is clear that Germany favors a stricter
punitive system, which serves to set out clear guidelines to ensure that
those who may violate the law are aware of the consequences. 132
C. United Kingdom: Least Stringent Data Collection Laws in the E. U.

Alternatively, the United Kingdom has taken a more relaxed
approach to privacy protections compared to the German system. In
fact, there has been concern among the European Union that the United
Kingdom's approach may, at times, not be compliant with E.U.
Directives. A 2009 European Commission Union ("E.C.") report
maintained it position that the United Kingdom is "failing to comply
with EU rules protecting the confidentiality of electronic
communications." 133 Citing a lack of an independent and central
national authority to oversee the possible interception of
communications, the report urged U .K. authorities to change their
national laws to ensure complete compliance with the safeguards set out
in E.U. law, concerning the right of all E.U. member state citizens to
confidentiality of electronic communications. 134 Most recently in
September 2013, the United Kingdom has been accused of trying to
"impede data protection reforms that would make it more difficult for
spy agencies to get hold of material online." 135 Broadly speaking, the
apprehension in the United Kingdom is the transfer of more power from
Westminster to Brussels. 136 More precisely, the U.K. government is
concerned over enforcement. 137 British officials are worried that by
have a zero-tolerance policy with privacy intrusions and not leaving
Id.
Id.
Id.
Philip Oltermann, Britain Accused of Trying to Impede EU Data Protection Law,
GUARDIAN, (Sept. 27, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/technology/
20 l 3/sep/27 /britain-eu-data-protection-law (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
133.
Telecoms: Commission Steps Up UK Legal Action Over Privacy and Data
Protection, EUROPEAN COMM'N (Oct. 29, 2009), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease_IP-09-1626_en.htm?locale=en (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
134. Id.
135. Oltermann, supra note 132.
136. Id.
137. Id.
129.
130.
131.
132.
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room for possible mistakes, enforcers of the law will be forced to punish
even the smallest of offenses, perhaps mistakenly made. 138 This
concern has been articulated by a U .K. information commissioner: "If
you have inflexible regulation, you overclaim and lose authority. Less is
more." 139
Despite the difference in approaches to regulating privacy between
the United Kingdom and Germany, an ever-growing number of their
citizens are using a litany of social media sites and online resources. 140
These differences highlight a split that many European nations are
experiencing with how to properly draft legislation that adequately
reconciles the competing interests of data protection laws, technology
companies' push to enter the European market, and consumer attitudes
towards privacy in a culture where social media reigns supreme. 141

V. COMPARING DATA COLLECTION PRIVACY LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION
The United States government is also struggling to come to an
agreement on whether to adopt stricter data protection laws. In
February 2012, the Obama Administration proposed a "Consumer
Privacy Bill of Rights," 142 but there has been little traction in
Congress. 143 Those who continue to "favor industry self-regulation and
agreements between Internet companies and their users" are often led by
advertising lobbyists and consumer advocates alike. 144 Although, there
are others that believe that the U.S. government's entrustment of the
Internet industry to police itself has actually created a situation where
consumers are left with little control over their own personal data or
recourse in the event of a privacy invasion. 145 And this camp is gaining
traction. More and more Americans see their representatives are more

138. Id.
139. Id.
140. O'Brien, supra note 127.
141. Ybarra, supra note 18, at 267-71.
142. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Plan to Protect Privacy in the
Internet Age by Adopting a Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (Feb. 23, 2012) (on file with
author).
143. Alex Byers, White House Pursues Online Privacy Bill Amid NSA Efforts,
POLITICO (Oct. 7, 2013 , 5:03 AM), available at http://www.politico.com/
story/2013/1 O/white-house-online-privacy-bill-nsa-efforts-97897 .html (last visited Apr. 22,
2015).
144. Id.
145. Reidenberg, supra note 96.
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interested in protecting commerce than the consumer. This commercial
interest is often cloaked in the stance that strict regulation of
information among citizens will inevitably lead to the situation that
Chinese citizens face, with barriers to Internet-access called the "Great
Firewall." 146 This fear has been described as the belief that such
rigorous standards and disclosure in Internet policy-making would
create countries that could best be seen as "series of walled gardens
with governments holding the keys to locked gates." 147 Often U.S.
lawmakers cite the importance of free speech and individual autonomy
in keeping with the status quo of Internet self-regulation.
Freedom of expression is an extremely valuable and important
right to protect because it works to ensure a stable democratic society.
At the same time, privacy is also valuable and vital protection, because
it works to ensure personal health and flourishing. Therefore, the two
million dollar questions are, at what point does speech and free
expression violate informational privacy, and what personal information
is essential to ensure democratic stability? 148 While American history
has long publicized the individual as the pillar of society, it is European
law that has a much clearer respect for the individual, at least in terms
of privacy protection. 149 This is evidenced by a long history in Europe
of prioritizing people over photographers, newspapers, and technology
companies. 150 So why do such similar cultures and sets of values seem
to stray from one another in the realm of online privacy? To best
understand the difference in mentality and priority between the United
States and Europe is to take two instances of similar circumstances and
compare.
A. Princess Caroline of Monaco

Princess Caroline of Monaco battled a long fight in multiple
European courts in seeking to protect her right to prevent the
publication of various unauthorized photographs. 151 The photos

146. Danny Hakim, Europe Aims to Regulate the Cloud, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2013),
at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07 /business/intemational/europe-aims-toregulate-the-cloud.html?pagewanted=all (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
147. Id.
148. ADAM MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL FOUNDATIONS, 144-45
(2006).
149. Chow, supra note 27.
150. Id.
151. Von Hannover v. Germany, 294 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 25 (2004) (Section 25 of the
European Court of Human Rights opinion is a reproduction of the relevant portions of the
decision by the German Federal Constitutional Court).
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included images of her and her children engaging in various private
activities. With the photos of her children, the German Federal
Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) found that a parent's
relationship with their children warranted more privacy protection. 152
However, the images of just Princess Caroline shopping and sunbathing
were found not to necessitate further protection because Princess
Caroline is a public figure, 153 and the photographs showed her in public
places. 154
She appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, which
found that the German court's decision violated her right to privacy
under the European Convention on Human Rights. 155 The court
balanced Princess Caroline's Article 8 "right to respect her private life"
against the Article 10 "right of freedom of expression." 156 What
ultimately tipped the scales in favor of Princess Caroline and her right
to privacy was the substance of the photographs. The court categorized
the pictures as portraying Caroline in "activities of purely private nature
such as engaging in sport, out walking, leaving a restaurant or on
holiday." 157 Because these photos did not "contribute to a debate of
general public interest" and Princess Caroline performed no official
function, these images were only related to her private life and fell
within the bounds of protection. 158 The court argued, "photos appearing
in the tabloid press are often taken in a climate of continual harassment
which induces in the person concerned a very strong sense of intrusion
into their private life or even of persecution." 159
It is important to note that the photographs in this case would
almost certainly have fallen under the protection of the First
Amendment if this case were heard in the United States. What is
interesting here is the European court's inclination to differentiate
between the types of subject matter and content that could be seen to
fall under public interest and what does not. It is clear that American
courts prefer to permit speech and err on the side of "newsworthiness"
when faced with a First Amendment case, which often results in the loss

152. Id.
153. German case law refers to a "figure of contemporary society '^par excellence.'"
Id. para. 18.
154. Id. para. 25.
155. MILLS, supra note 116, at 100.
156. Id.
157. Von Hannover v. Germany, 294 Eur. Ct. H.R. para. 25 (2004).
158. Id. at 65; see also MILLS, supra note 116, at 100.
159. Von Hannover v. Germany, 294 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 59 (2004).
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of privacy rights. 160

B. Sipple v. San Francisco Chronicle, Inc.
In contrast, in 1975, the California Supreme Court upheld the right
of journalists to publicly out Oliver Sipple as a gay man after he stopped
an assassination attempt on President Gerald Ford. While most of the
media outlets celebrated Sipple as a hero in protecting President Ford, a
reporter discovered Sipple was a homosexual, a fact that his family was
not aware of. 161 Despite Sipple's repeated requests to the media to keep
his sexual orientation private, the court reasoned that Sipple was a
public figure, thereby surrendering many of his privacy protections. 162
The court subsequently denied his motion to suppress and a hero's
sexuality quickly became part of the news headlines. 163
The information in this case can be split into two categories. The
first deals with the facts like the assassination attempt, Sipple's duties as
a secret service agent, and his actions in removing the President from a
dangerous situation as appropriate to publish and circulate. 164 The
second category deals with the sensitive information about the citizenhero, like his sexuality, home address, medical history, or favorite
hangout spot. 165 These pieces of information are entirely "personal"
and are by no means relevant in helping to maintain a stable democratic
institution or more open society. Sipple' s outing quickly led to his
parent's discovery that he was gay, which ultimately led to ostracization
from his family, depression, and a battle with alcoholism. 166 In Sipple's
case, by upholding such a rigid protection in favor of the freedom of
expression, Sipple was neither afforded the American "right to be left
alone" nor the European right to "dignity, honor, and the right to private
life." 167
It has become clear that in matters concerning one's reputation
online or in the media, the burden of proof is placed firmly on the
individual. This can prove to be extremely difficult as the individual is
already at a disadvantage compared to the tech giants and media
moguls. Individuals have little to say about how their personal

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

supra note 116, at 100.
supra note 137 at 147.
Chow, supra note 27.
Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1044-45 (Ct. App. 1984).
MOORE, supra note 148, at 148.
Id.
Chow, supra note 27.
Id.
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information is collected or distributed to the rest of the world.
However, if more courts begin to follow the pattern of analysis from
Princess Caroline's case, the individual will be able to assert more
control over personal data and information, giving Americans and
Europeans alike a powerful legal weapon to better assert control over
our own digital identities.

VI. WHETHER OR NOT THE E.U. SYSTEM WOULD WORK IN
THE U.S.
A. Where Should the Law Go in the Future?

Companies are watching us. They want to know what sites we
visit on the Internet, what we choose to buy, and as much personal
information as they can gather about us. This is all in the hopes of
targeting their own marketing campaigns and sending online users
specific offers based on our online personas. So if companies are
watching us, who's watching over them? Who is making sure they don't
misuse personal data or break promises they make to consumers about
handling their private information? In the United States, the answer is
largely no one. Self-regulation seems to be the name of the game. But
this entrustment to the industry to regulate itself has created a state
where the ordinary individual has little control over their own online
information and even less control over remedies they may exercise
when their privacy has been raided. However, as we have seen in
Europe, there are strict regulations about what companies can and
cannot do in terms of data collection, and governments are pushing to
make these already rigorous rules even more rigorous. The United
States should look to this European model in helping to expand our
limited legal rights seeking to protect us against online tracking and
profiling. There are a number of qualities that the European system
possesses that the American model can greatly benefit from imitating.
First and foremost, the European system recognizes privacy,
regardless of the subject matter, as a core democratic value that must be
vehemently protected. It must not be left to market-forces to protect;
the State must step up to the plate to protect the individual against the
industry. Second, information today has immense value so it only
makes sense that good business practice includes knowing what
information a company holds, how they store it, and making sure its
used properly. Strict and far-reaching privacy standards seen in the
European Union serve to encourage companies to adopt practices that
respect the power of information and ensure they adopt practices that
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protect the collection and storage of information, or risk the punishment
for misconduct. Third is the fact that in Europe, individuals have legal
recourse and action to take when their privacy rights have been violated.
In the U.S., remedies only exist in small sectors of privacy rights. For
instance, if a doctor reveals a patient's medical condition, the patient
would be permitted to sue under the health-information privacy law, but
if a website was to disclose the very same information, the website user
would have no claim. 168 This lack of consistency leaves major gaps in
privacy protection and greatly undermines public trust in the protection
of their online activity. Fourth, it is very important to have oversight in
the enforcement of privacy rules. The independent nature of the
oversight board helps to ensure privacy compliance in a constantly
changing and complex online world. This independent board exists in
the European Union, yet remains without a counterpart here in the
United States.
Some critics assert that legislators and officials in Washington
cannot be trusted with developing complex privacy law and it should be
left to market-forces to correct the intrinsic flaws in the current
system. 169 While this may have been true in the past, privacy has and
continues to gamer bipartisan support. Particularly in light of recent
online privacy scandals, like Edward Snowden's National Security
Agency leaks about the existence of American spies or the Target
Company's credit card information breach, more and more Americans
are seeking more legal protections online. 170 Our current system of selfregulation is not the only viable option for the United States. It is
possible for the U.S. to adopt important practices currently being done
in Europe. In fact, lawmakers in South Africa are doing just that.

B. South Africa Implementing European-like Laws
For those who assert that comprehensive laws on privacy
protection can only be successful in Europe, South Africa serves as an
interesting counter example. The effort in Europe to adopt the world's
strongest data protection laws has drawn international attention. Often
new regulation proposals are motivated by the desire to rein in the
unregulated data collection of powerful social media companies like
Google, Facebook, and Twitter. Companies in the United States, like

168.
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170.
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Exxon Mobil, Amway, Aon, and Procter & Gamble, remain interested
in the discussions going on in Europe about stronger and stronger rights
for consumers. 171 Often they send representatives to conferences and
governmental body meetings where regulations are debated on. But
these multinational companies are not the only ones watching what is
happening in Europe, other countries are watching as well. In fact,
lawmakers in South Africa have been so interested in the European
regulations that they have decided to replicate it.
The South African Parliament passed the "Protection of Personal
Information Act" on August 22, 2013 and it officially became law on
November 26, 2013. 172 This Act essentially regulates how anyone who
processes and is exposed to personal information must handle that
information, and ensure that that information is kept safe and secure. 173
The Protection of Personal Information Act has taken over eight years
to complete, but the final result has been largely seen as a solid piece of
legislation. 174 This act represents the country's first comprehensive data
protection laws, which are greatly crafted from the E. U. 's rules. 175
Lawmakers hope that this new act will help South Africa become
internationally recognized as a nation with impressive data protection
standards, thereby attracting businesses to the country. 176
Although the legislation allows a one-year compliance window, it
is already quite clear that this law means business. The rules are strict
and deviation means substantial penalties. A party that does not comply
with the Act's provisions faces possible prison time and fines up to 10
million Rand. 177 For instance, Zurich Insurance lost an unencrypted
back-up disk in South Africa and the mistake cost the company £2.3
million. 178 In addition, the legislation permits individuals to file
171. Kevin J. O'Brien, Firms Brace for New European Data Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES
(May 13, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/14/technology/firms-bracefor-new-european-data-privacy-law.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) (Aon is headquartered
in London, United Kingdom) [hereinafter Firms Brace for New European Data Privacy
Law].
172. Hunton & Williams, LLP, South Africa Passes Comprehensive Personal Data
Protection Legislation, PRIVACY & INFO. SECURITY L. BLOG (Aug. 30, 2013), available at
https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2013/08/articles/south-africa-passes-comprehensivepersonal-data-protection-legislation/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
173. Lucien Pierce, Protection of Personal Information Act: Are You Compliant? ,
MAIL & GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013, 1:15 PM), available at http://mg.co.za/article/2013-1202-protection-of-personal-information-act-are-you-compliant/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
174. Id.
175. Firms Brace for New European Data Privacy Law, supra note 171.
176. Id.
177. Pierce, supra note 173.
178. Id.
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separate civil complaints, so offenders face additional financial losses
on top of whatever fines are imposed. It is clear that there is a global
"expectation that data protection laws around the world are going to
become more stringent, and Europe is leading the way." 179
This piece of legislation serves as an important example of the
viability, success, and influence that the European model of data
protection has on an international scale. Stringent data protection is not
just something that is important to Europeans, it is important on a global
scale. There is no doubt that the world will be watching South Africa
and monitoring the success of this new Act. Its success may serve as an
important model of the viability of the European perspective outside of
the region. In addition, the success may add further pressure to the
United States and its lawmakers for similar changes. If it is one thing
that the United States hates, it is the feeling of being behind the rest. If
the South African government can show this law to be successful,
American lawmakers will certainly feel the pressure to join the club.
CONCLUSION
"Personal data is the oil that greases the Internet" 180 and each one
of us sits on a vast reserve of this oil. It's the data that we share each
and every day, the names, addresses, pictures, and even our exact
locations, with our GPS and Internet equipped smartphones. 181 This
information helps multi-million dollar companies target their
advertising and discern our personal opinions and desires based on what
we choose to post online. 182 This information translates into millions of
dollars for companies. But there is a price for us, the consumer. The
data that we post about our lives and desires are collected, dissected,
and preserved, often for a very long time, by numerous companies.
Personal data is extremely valuable. It is because of its immense
value to a great deal of companies that we will no doubt see resistance
from the business sector if and when any new data collection laws are
proposed here in the United States. In fact, we are already seeing
companies prepare themselves for such an occurrence. In January 2011,
it was reported that Facebook beefed up its Washington presence as the
Federal Trade Commission and Department of Commerce began to
consider additional and clearer safeguards that Internet companies must

179.
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181.
182.
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begin to use when collecting user data. 183 Current laws allow
companies to be vague about their privacy policies and data collection,
and many do not wish to change such policies. Lawmakers have
allowed this to happen because the business sector is given immense
latitude because the government does not wish to stifle innovation. 184
But this resistance should not stop us, and in fact it is not.
According to a survey conducted in July 2013 by the Pew Internet
Center, most Americans said that they believed current laws on online
privacy protections were inadequate. 185 Many of those surveyed said
they did what they could to protect themselves, namely clearing
browsing histories, deleting social media posts, or utilizing encryption
tools. 186 And while Congress has largely stalled in its efforts to protect
the public, State lawmakers are responding to the concerns of their
constituents. For instance, over the last couple of years, ten states have
passed laws restricting employers from requiring access to their
employees' social media accounts. 187 It is clear that State legislatures
across the United States are facing growing worries about the collection
and use of personal data, and many have swiftly proposed a series of
privacy laws from requiring police to obtain warrants to track cellphone
locations to how schools can collect student data from their online
usage. 188 "Congress is obviously not interested in updating those things
or protecting privacy," said Jonathan Strickland, a Republican state
representative in Texas. 189 "If they're not going to do it, states have to
do it." 190 And with the recent reports on eavesdropping by the federal
government, the issue of digital privacy is becoming more and more
pressing for many citizens. With these concerns becoming increasingly
widespread amongst the states, it is only a matter of time before the
federal government has no choice but to take notice.
As the United States adopts new data protection law, it may look to
the European Union as an adoptable model. U.S. citizens are "becoming
183. Jon Swartz, Facebook Changes Its Lobbying Status in Washington, USA TODAY
(Jan. 13, 2011 , 10:51 AM), available at http ://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/
technology/2011-01-13-facebook13_CV_N.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2015).
184. See U.S. DEP' T COM. INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, supra note 55 .
185. Somini Sengupta, No US. Action, So States Move on Privacy Law, N. Y. TIMES
(Oct. 30, 2013 ), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/ 10/31 /technology/no-us-actionso-states-move-on-privacy-law.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2015) [hereinafter Sengupta, No
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increasingly wary that their lives are going to be no longer their own,"
said Georgia state representative John Pezold, "and we have got to
protect that." 191 There is no doubt that there are a number of competing
factors, such as consumer mindsets and commercial sector interests, that
complicate the implementation of new and stronger privacy laws in the
United States. However, data collection laws can and must be
implemented to provide Americans with broader protections in today's
modem digital age.
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